The sociology of morality and education : a theoretical critique applied to an empirical study of moral judgement making in a girls comprehensive school by Granowski, H. B.
THe 	 c;ocica..c.,  0- ,( 	 Mc ;1114,1r 	 A N,D eZiACATION ' A II-1E011C TIC AL. 
C I T IQUA 
	 i PP& ED 	 TO /AN F-1 NIP i RiCAL. S (AD' 
	
at= 
iLADC-ErvIE 
	 MoillInIC- int 	 6-111 
	 CofriPile i-le'N5iVE 
	 SCHOOL 
MORAL JU 	 T IN A GIRLS' 
	 PREHENSIVE S 
IQUE OF THE 	 LOGY OF MORA 
	 N EDUCATION 
Helen Barbara Granowski 
A thesis presented for 
the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy to the 
University of London Institute of Education 
1980 
2 
ASSTRACT  
The study examines the reasons for Sociology's lack of contribution 
towards the theory and practice of moral education aid sets out to suggest 
am approach to the sociology of morality which would be relevant to 
educational research. 
Pars: I discusses the sociology of morality's theoretical heritage, 
the American pragmatic tradition, and the ethical foundations of the 
sociological traditions derived from Marx, Durkheim and Weber. The 
inadequacies of the founding fathers' conceptualisation of morality and 
the effect of this theory on sociological practice is discussed with 
reference to studies in deviance and education. 
The critical theory of alrgen Habermas is reviewed and it is suggested 
that his work could provide a basis for a sociological study of morality 
in which theory relates to practice and where morality is seem both 
socially and universalistically. 
Part II describes an attempt to put Habermas' moral theory into 
practice in an empirical study of moral judgement in a girls' comprehensive 
school. A theoretical scheme for conceptualising and analysing procedures 
of moral judgement is presented. The scheme incorporates conceptualisations 
of Habermas and Schutz and allows moral judgement to be approached as a 
procedure involving the ideal and the real and relating beliefs and 
practices. The basis of the scheme is the assessment of the style of the 
judgemental procedures according to Habermas' distinction between work and 
interaction. This approach is contrasted with the essentially Kantian 
scheme of Lawrence Kohlberg. 
A study is conducted in the sixth form of Greenbank School w'ien the 
scheme is applied. An intensive phase investigates the relatioiships of 
home and school to the function of moral consciousness. It allows certain 
observations about the function of comprehensive education to be made. 
3 
The study illustrates the potential of Habermasian theory for a 
sociology of morality and helps to pinpoint weaknesses in his formulations. 
It serves as a practical critique of Kantian based approaches to morality. 
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Pure communication is absolute. And yet you and I 
can never be the same; we have our own identities. 
But the more I am in communion with you, the more 
does my own identity expend. The more I am in 
community, the more all-embracing is my own identity. 
Martin Israel 
"Dialogue 3", This 
Time-Bound Ladder, 
E. Robinson (ed.), 
Religious Experience 
Research Unit, 
Manchester College, 
Oxford, 1977. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
"The moral responsibility of the school, and of those who conduct it, 
is to society. The school is fundamentally an institution erected 
by society. . . to exercise a certain specific function in maintaining 
the life and advancing the welfare of society." Thus wrote John Dewey 
over seventy years ago.1 At the same time, at the Sorbonne, Emile 
Durkheim was delivering his famous course of lectures on moral education. 
Durkheim's aim was to formulate moral education not for all men everywhere 
but for men of his own time and in his own country.2 Both great educators 
were writing in response to what they believed was a pressing need for 
their time: to clarify the relationship between education and morality in 
modern secular society. Both saw morality in the field of education to be, 
essentially, a social affair. 
For fifty years Dewey remained the unchallenged authority on moral 
education in the English speaking world. In 1958, W.K. Frankena's paper 
"Towards a philosophy of moral education" was printed in the Harvard  
Educational Review3 and, in Britain the following year, the first of 
R.S. Peter's works relating education and morality was published, 
Authority, Responsibility and Education.4 
	
These writers brought new 
5 insights from twentieth century moral philosophy to the field of education. 
Both stressed rational and cognitive aspects of morality: neither was 
interested in the social. 
In Britain, the upsurge of interest in secular moral education of the 
60's challenged sociologists to enter the field and A.H. Halsey contributed 
to the collection, Moral Education in a Changing Society6  with his essay 
"The Sociology of Moral Education". This was followed by a series of 
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studies by Barry Sugarman who represented Sociology on the interdisciplinary 
research unit set up to investigate moral education by the Farmington 
Trust. But Sociology's involvement in moral education was short lived. 
The unit was disbanded in 1970 and the publication of its journal, Moral  
Education ceased. Thereafter, sociologists contributed little to 
furthering an understanding of morality in education. The Social Morality 
Council's publication The Journal of Moral Education, which replaced the 
Farmington projects' journal was strongly orientated towards Philosophy 
and Psychology, but neglected Sociology which was not represented on its 
editorial board. It sought to answer such questions as, "What does it 
mean to be morally educated ?"7 , or "How shall morality be assessed ?" 
not "How does morality relate to social reality ?". The only social 
emphasis came from comparative studies of moral educational practices which 
did not attempt to define what they meant by morality. 
In an attempt to revive interest in a sociological approach to 
morality in education, P.W. Musgrave contributed "Sociology and Moral 
Education: New Directions".9 He pointed out that previous studies had 
focussed on societal and institutional aspects of morality. He called 
for an adequate definition of morality in sociological terms which would 
allow a focus at the interpersonal level with an emphasis on the 
sociological construction of moral reality. Although Musgrave's recent 
publication The Moral Curriculum10 has prepared the ground for a "new 
directional" approach, no-one yet has provided the necessary theoretical 
base. 
Sociology's failure to enter the field of moral education has not been 
from lack of interest in education: the Sociology of Education is a 
flourishing subject. Nor can it be attributed to an educational disinterest 
in morality: the research output in this field from philosophers 
and psychologists is plentiful. It stems from Sociology's theoretical 
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weakness in the field of morality, of its failure adequately to conceptualise 
the moral in social terms. Halsey's and Sugarman's approach to moral 
education was from the perspective of structural functionalism. 
Functionalism can relate education and society but it cannot relate these 
to morality. The social and the moral, to functionalism, are theoretically 
indistinguishable. The essentially phenomenological approach, advocated 
by Musgrave, can look at moral meanings in an educational setting but it 
cannot relate morality to society. Seventy years ago Dewey had stated: 
Moral principles need to be brought down to the ground 
through their statement in social and in psychological 
terms. . . We need to translate the moral into the 
conditions and forces of our community life, and into 
the impulses and habits of the individual.11  
Sociology has not yet met Dewey's challenge. 
The Sociology of morality's theoretical problems have their roots in 
the /American pragmatic tradition of which the philosophical system known 
as Pragmatism was but one outward sign. Sociology was to concern itself 
with moral matters through attempts to solve the social problem of crime 
and delinquency. The sociologists of the Chicago school, under the 
leadership of Robert Park saw delinquency as an undesirable situation 
caused by the pathological disorganisation of the urban environment.12 They 
did not seek to define morality. They were attempting to define and 
control a practical situation. These ends were social and political 
rather than theoretical. 
Sociological studies of deviance took a more theoretical turn with 
the writings of Robert Merton who worked in an essentially Durkheimian 
framework. His central thesis was "that aberrant behavior may be 
regarded sociologically as a symptom of dissociation between culturally 
prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these 
aspirations."13 Deviance is now seen in functional terms, following and 
modifying Durkheim's own interpretations of deviant behaviour in Suicide.14 
It is now discussed not only as a social problem which is in itself 
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morally undesirable but as morally undesirable behaviour. 	 Whilst deviance 
studies did not attempt to define morality per se, the Durkheimian 
connection meant that social deviance had distinct moral overtones. 
Durkheim had replaced the traditional relationship of morality with God by 
a relationship with society, "the one empirically observable moral being to 
which one wills can be linked." It was society that must provide "the 
objective for moral behavior."15 Deviance from societal norms was moral 
deviance which must be punished in order to uphold the "authority of moral 
law." A moral, that is, a social violation, "demoralizes" society.16 
Sociology entered a phase where the social "cause" of deviant behaviour 
was associated with responsibility or "blame". Reactions away from 
functionalist approaches tended to emphasise a shift of responsibility 
from the deviant or his immediate culture or environment to agencies of 
the wider social order. Thus Aaron Cicourel, in suggesting that what 
constituted the problem of delinquency was related to the definitions of 
those concerned with juvenile justice17 shifted much of the responsibility 
from the delinquents as individuals to the practices of the official 
agencies. Later ethnomethodological studies by J.D. Douglas and his 
associates18 together with studies by Howard Becker from the perspective 
of symbolic interaction19 were to remove deviant behaviour from its social 
context and thus fully remove responsibility for the deviant. Deviants 
were deviant in name only, thus labelled by a society which considered than 
as having deviated from its norms. To ethnomethodology and symbolic 
interactionism a social norm bore no moral connotation and thus deviance 
was unrelated to morality. If functionalism had related the social and 
the moral in such a fashion that they were indistinguishable, then the 
"new directives" to sociology had no way of conceptualising morality at all. 
It's theoretical influences were largely Weberian, thus keeping fact and 
value distinct, and phenomenological, thus observing the topic in isolation 
from its context. To the "new" forms of sociology behaviour was to be 
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described as behaviour and not to be evaluated. 
But if these studies sought to detach the social from the moral, they 
failed to overcome another assumption connected with America's pragmatic 
heritage. In describing behaviour they continued to assume the simple 
relationship between belief and action that the pragmatic tradition had 
emphasised and which had been accepted by Parsons in his functionalist 
formulations. Thus I2t.K . Cohen20 and D. Mat za, 21 whilst engaged in 
critique of the functionalist approach to deviance, continued to regard 
behaviour as in some way directly related to values.22 
Because the sociology of education developed on a functionalist 
foundation, it too, equated the morally desirable with the socially 
desirable. Parsons' pioneer study, "The School Class as a Social System"23 
relates the school experience to its primary functions in society as an 
agency of socialization and allocation. There is a tacit understanding 
that what is "good" for society is "good" for the children. 
It was British Sociology which was to spell out this approach in 
specifically moral terms and it was these attempts that led the sociology 
of morality down a blind alley. When Halsey responded to the challenge of 
the movement for secular moral education with his paper, "The Sociology of 
Moral Education", he relied heavily on Parsons' study of the school class 
and made explicit what in Parsons had been implicit. Thus moral education 
is defined in terms of "the preparation of individuals for participation 
in social life and acceptance of social rules; in short the problems of 
role allocation and socialization."24 Halsey accepted Parsons' major 
criterion for both socialisation and selection - achievement. The competition 
of the school with its goal of achievement was seen as morally desirable 
because it was socially desirable. 
Sugarman's studies, which followed that of Halsey took the argument 
to its logical conclusion. Being part of a moral education team, 
Sugarman defined morality in terms of John Wilson's "morally educated 
16 
person" and the sociology of morality as a study of the "social factors 
or pre-conditions" which affect the behaviour of this morally educated 
person.25 The morally educated person was defined in universal moral 
terms. In addition to his "concern for other people" he was typified by 
the universalistic quality of his moral thought.26 Unfortunately the 
environment which was to foster his development was discussed in the 
functionalist terms of Parsons. As well as teaching "universalism", the 
main moral function of the school was seen in terms of the development of 
"individualism, the achievement a mastery overtaken and functional 
specificity."27 It is clear that Sugarman, like Parsons and his fellow 
functionalists had confused universal morality with social norms. The 
Sociology of Morality was in a situation of total contradiction yet there 
was no theory on which to base an adequate critique. Common sense alone 
could suggest that universalistic aims could not be fulfilled through 
socially relativistic methods. Musgrave's attempt to revitalise Sociology's 
interest in moral education could not succeed because his interactive 
approach lacked the tools with which to critique functionalism. MJsgrave 
could and did make a useful contribution to the investigation of moral 
meanings at the interactive level but he lacked a theoretical framework 
broad enough to support a fully operative Sociology of Morality. 
We have suggested that Sociology lacks a theoretical basis from which 
to mount a study of morality. If we assume that educational study is 
necessary and worthwhile and that the theory and practice of moral education 
is likewise necessary, the question arises: "Does it matter whether 
Sociology contributes to the study of morality in education ?" We observed 
above, that The Journal of Moral Education had a distinct Philosophical and 
Psychological bias. Does this matter ? We would suggest that it matters 
a great deal. Studies in moral education are either relativist as in 
the case of most sociological studies or universalistic. The Journal of  
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Moral Education emphasises the latter approach. In effect, however, this 
means that such studies are based on essentially Kantian conceptions of 
the moral. The work of R.S. Peters and that of Lawrence Kohlberg which 
will be discussed later in this study, both exhibit strong Kantian 
features. Whilst Kant's emphasis on autonomy and on the necessity for a 
universalistic definition of what is considered "right" action is true for 
any society, we consider that there are certain aspects of Kantian theory 
which are inadequate as a basis for an investigation of morality in 
education. 
In the first place the Kantian approach is not suitable for a society 
where there is rapid social change, where norms and values are in a state 
of flux and where, as McIntyre suggests28 the only widely shared moral 
good is tolerance. Kantian action is based on a judgement of what is 
universally right behaviour. No child can be expected to look on our 
pluralistic society and apply Kant's categorical imperative. While this 
may not be asked in so many words it is implied by Kohlberg's formulations 
of moral development.29 Kohlberg's highest stages are assessed in terms 
of a person's generalised understanding of justice in various social 
situations. This approach could only be justified in social situations 
where behaviour is related to certain stable norms. This is no longer the 
case in British society. 
In the second place, the Kantian ideal does not connect with reality. 
We would agree with ethic's traditional distinction between fact and value 
but value and fact must be related. If we consider the moral statement: 
"I ought to love my neighbour" it can be seen that the practical response 
is not the Kantian "I will love my neighbour" but the question: "Who is 
my neighbour ?" 	 If the question is settled as: "My neighbour means all 
needy people and loving him means meeting his needs", the questions still 
come: "What are his needs 
	 "How can they be met ?" Morality is 
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essentially a practical affair and moral action involves concrete practical 
considerations. Good intentions are not enough in today's world. Morality 
must be able to ask: "Is sending 'aid' meeting my neighbours' need ?" and 
critically to evaluate the replies. 
Finally the Kantian approach to the moral is individualistic 
and anti-social. While individual autonomy is essential to moral action 
(one must act in accord with what one believes to he right and not in 
accord with external coercion) the Kantian approach defines what is right 
individualistically. The individual comes to a private decision about 
what action is right based on his own private judgement. Yet morality 
involves the way people behave in relation to each other. It is about 
evaluations of human conduct, about what sorts of actions and practices 
of human society are considered desirable. It can involve individual or 
group behaviour, but it can never involve solitary behaviour which affects 
no-one but the individual himself. 
The Kantian approach gives an inadequate description of morality. This 
however, does not in itself provide the reason for the necessity of the 
involvement of Sociology in the study of moral education. To the contention 
that current Kantian approaches to moral education are inadequate we would 
add the suggestion that a sociological approach, developed as a critique 
of Kant and grounded in the socially real, could provide an adequate 
theoretical base for studying morality in education. Moreover we contend 
that Sociology's involvement is essential because theory matters and moral 
aspects of education matter. 
Theory matters because the nature of the theory will govern the 
research practice. It will define what the problem is and it will define 
the nature of the data. In deviance studies, for example, the 
sociologists of the Chicago school saw the problem as one of social 
disorganisation, their theoretical basis being an ecological model. 
Cicourel saw the problem as being one of the way the situation was defined, 
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Merton as one of relating an individual's expectations to social norms. 
To functionalist research "moral" values are seen as any values which 
assist the cohesion and the goals of society. To Kantian based research, 
a moral value would be in some way connected with universal moral principles. 
Theory matters, moreover, because it will determine the validity of the 
findings - how true they are to social reality. Valid findings will be 
comprehensible in terms of a coherent way of looking at the world. They 
will be understandable in broadly general terms. 
The research findings themselves matter because what is believed about 
the relationship of morality to education will shape educational practice. 
Moral development is considered as desirable by educational authorities and 
their theoretical understanding of how this occurs will influence their 
educational practice. In Chapter 6 we refer to Brian Crittenden's work, 
Form and Content in Moral Education, subtitled "An Essay on Aspects of the 
Mackay Report". 30 Crittenden explains the purpose of the book as being 
to examine the theoretical foundations of the Mackay Report - "The Report 
on the Committee on Religious Education in the Public Schools of the 
Province of Ontario". This report, which had accepted the theory of 
Lawrence Kohlbey, equated moral education "with the acquisition of skills 
in moral reasoning"31 and suggested a change in educational practices to 
foster such skills. 
The question now arises: What must an adequately theorised Sociology 
of Morality be like ? What theoretical aspects are needed ? Put in 
simplest terms, an adequate theory must be truly social and truly moral. 
To be truly moral it must be capable of expression in universal terms. 
Whilst being aware of an individual's moral beliefs and practices it must 
not lose sight of the universal nature of morality. Truth, freedom and 
justice must transcend the social even although they may be described in 
social terms. Our conceptualisation would need to go further than that of 
Winch and other social relativists. In Ethics and Action32 Winch allows 
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that truth and integrity are universal but otherwise morality is socially 
determined and can only be understood in its specific social context. If 
the moral is to be considered in universal terms then there must be an 
adequate conceptualisation for moral deviance. Morally deviant behaviour 
must be capable of being defined in non relativist terms, i.e. in terms 
other than in deviance from social norms. 
If our theory is truly moral then it will be capable of mounting a 
critique not only upon social actions and social practices but upon the 
practice of sociology itself. We observed above that Musgrave's approach 
to the moral in interactive terms was not invalid in the sense of Parsons' 
approach but it was unable to show how moral value differed from what was 
valuable to society, it could not critique functionalism. Our theory must 
be capable of critique - critique of interactive practices of the classroom, 
critique of political practices, critique of Parsonian functionalism and 
so on. 
To be truly social the theory must relate to society as it is. It 
must be capable of application at the different level of society. It must 
relate moral change to changes in the actual social structure. It must 
also relate ideology to action in a way which is neither deterministic 
nor inconsequential. But above all it must be capable of describing 
morality in terms of real social living. Society is not only social 
institutions, it is made up of dynamic human relationships. The essential 
ingredient of social behaviour, the evaluation of which is the stuff of 
morality, is human communication. An adequate theory of morality must in 
some way conceptualise not only individual moral choice but actual social 
interaction. 
The task of this thesis is to search for such a way theoretically to 
conceptualise the moral in social terms. Moreover as a sociological 
theory without sociological practice is a theory of uncertain worth, we 
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shall endeavour to ensure that our conceptualisation of morality is tried 
and tested in practice. Because the field of our study is education, we 
shall test our theoretical formulations in an educational setting. 
In Part I of this study we examine the theoretical heritage of the 
Sociology of Morality, first by looking at the influence of the American 
pragmatist philosophers and then at that of the founding fathers of 
Sociology, Marx, Durkheim and Weber. Their theoretical approach to the 
moral is examined and their effect on modern sociological practice is 
discussed with special reference to studies in education. We then look at 
the work of Jargen Habermas and assess his potential contribution to the 
Sociology of Morality. The critical theoretical tradition to which Habermas 
belongs has a pronounced Hegelian strand. This gives an Hegelian emphasis 
to our critique of Kantian morality. 
In Part II we discuss our endeavours to put theory into practice, 
examining first Habermas' theory with reference to its suitability as a 
basis for empirical research and then using it to formulate a conceptual 
scheme with which to analyse moral judgemental procedures. The study of 
moral judgement in Greenbank Comprehensive School, illustrates the use of 
the Habermasan conceptual framework and enables us to observe the 
relationships that obtain between a Habermasian theory of morality and 
sociological practice. The study allows us to make certain observations 
about the relationship of home and school in the formation of moral 
consciousness and enables us to suggest a way in which comprehensive 
education may function as an aid to social progress. 
22 
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Chapter 2: The Moral Heritage of Sociology I: The Relationship 
of Belief to Action - The Pragmatic Tradition  
Introduction: The Philosophical Perspective  
The relationship between belief and action has proved to be a 
philosophical bone of contention from the earliest times. Plato saw no 
essential problem. There is one good, knowledge of which constitutes 
virtue. While this knowledge of the good may not be easily taught or 
acquired, once good is known it will be pursued. The cry of the apostle 
Paul has not yet been heard: "I do not understand my own actions. For 
I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. . . . For I do not 
do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do."1  Aristotle, 
however, may have experienced something of the Pauline dilemma as he 
distinguishes intellectual from moral "virtue", the former being induced 
through teaching and the latter acquired as habit. In his Ethics he 
writes: "The moral virtues we get by first exercising them; we become 
just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by 
doing brave acts."2 
The Platonic tradition, either in its Kantian mode or variously 
modified and modernised has emerged in the thought of the early American 
pragmatists and the "liberal arts education" tradition and more recently 
in such educational writers as Piaget, Kohlberg and Peters. 
It is the Aristotelian tradition that Kohlberg blames for "the Boy 
Scout approach to moral education which has dominated American practices 
in this field", which was encouraged by Dewey and which has characterised 
British Public School morality. What Kohlberg calls the "bag of virtues" 
approach, 3 where character is built through practising such virtues as 
honesty, service and self-control may have a real place in the education of 
young children (as Peters contends) but is not really relevant to the 
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problems of belief and action relationships, which appear in the writings 
of researchers in the fields of morality and sociology. 
The work of the early American pragmatists C.S. Peirce and William 
James, making as they did, an essential connection between belief and 
action, is not only important for the understanding of the American 
sociological tradition, but relevant to discussions of moral issues in 
general. It is to Peirce and James that we shall now turn. 
The pragmatic inheritance 
C.S. Peirce, the father of pragmatism, is still considered by some to 
be the most important philosopher the U.S. has produced.4 
 His theory of 
belief is an essential element of his theory of meaning which was developed 
as a critique of Descartes and all rationalistic approaches to knowledge. 
Meaning no longer resides in the "mind" but is identified with actions and 
reactions in the physical world - "Our idea of anything is our idea of its 
sensible effects".5 Thought, moreover was bound up with belief - its 
function was to produce belief. While thought culminates in fixed belief, 
the belief must manifest itself in action, so that the deed is the 
ultimate effect of the thought. A belief will, of necessity, issue in 
consistent action so that we are acting in accordance with beliefs whenever 
we act habitually. Peirce's formula for relating belief to action is 
expressed as follows: "Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our 
actions", and "The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication 
of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine 
our actions. "6 
The idea that belief must result in appropriate action if it is 
indeed genuine belief was not new. Peirce himself claims to have 
appropriated this concept of belief from Alexander Bain, an Englishman.7 
And of course St. James' contention (James, Ch. 2: 18b) that the 
presence of faith was confirmed by "works" had long been a tenet of 
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puritanism as well as a catholic doctrine. But Peirce said more than 
that belief without action is empty and dead. He said that action indicates 
belief and that its failure or inconsistency, calling into question such 
a belief, stimulates the process of reflective thought in order to 
establish a new belief. Belief is thus constantly being modified while 
a changing world makes us face situations where we are unsure of what to do. 
Doubt leads to the turning of one's mind to the situation and the problem 
inherent in it and the thought will result in the fixing of a new, more 
adequate belief. There is no place, incidently, for the type of discourse 
which characterised medieval schoolsmen - opinion or belief is never 
directly set against another opinion or belief. All belief must be subject 
to the universal method of enquiry and test in the practical (not 
necessarily material) world. 
While a belief may be identified with a habit or disposition to act 
in a certain way, it cannot be identified with the action itself as no one 
act ever exhausts the meaning of the belief. Peirce's theory of belief 
is summarised by U.S. philosopher J.E. Smith as follows: 
Life embraces both belief and action. Each implies the 
other; when we act, we are expressing habits which are 
essentially beliefs and when we believe, we are committed 
to following certain courses of action when the appropriate 
circumstances arise.8 
Whilst Peirce was a profound and original thinker, his works were 
somewhat erudite and specialised and consequently were not widely read. 
It was William James, no less remarkable as a thinker, although 
considerably less incisive and much more readable, who popularised the 
pragmatist mode of thought. 
	
Like Peirce, James asserted that what we 
believe and the way we act are interdependent. But he was, at base, a 
convinced "voluntarist", emphasising the role of the will in thinking and 
in the pursuit of knowledge. As Smith puts it: "Human intentions, 
purposes, plans, and goals are the dominant powers in his universe" where, 
in order to have a sense of being "at home in a world no longer strange" 
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the philosopher relates all his thinking with his own aims and hopes, fears 
and desires.9 So belief is no longer fixated thought that emerges without 
further ado in habituated action. "Motives" and "goals" are introduced. 
Or in Jones' words "purpose, effort and the will to believe." The 
emphasis on "the will to believe" did not mean that truth no longer 
mattered but was an attempt to express the connection between what James 
called "our passionate nature" and the beliefs we hold. The individual 
is seeking not so much to discover truth as to work out his destiny. 
Where our belief and knowledge is inadequate or irrelevant to the task 
in hand we will be guided by our purpose - our aims and goals. By saying 
that our ideas are our plans of action, James was emphasising not the 
concept of a blueprint but of an all-over purpose that would provide the 
basis of judgements of life-choices. Man is an individual, an active being, 
who shapes the world as he is being shaped. His belief, the essential 
thrust to his action is no longer seen only in cognitive terms - it 
incorporates desire and is transformed into intentionality. As James 
expresses it in "The Experience of Activity": 
Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort 
as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our 
intention - this is action, this is effectuation. . .1O 
So for both Peirce and James belief and action were intimately 
connected and believing was in no way the same as saying that we 
believed. But to James, believing was more than an intellectual 
activity, it involved the will, and the clear-cut relationship between 
thought, belief and action was transformed to a complex system where 
aims, purposes, ultimate values and effort directed and gave impetus to 
the action. The added insight of the involvement of the will in belief 
has, however, cost the theory its reflexivity. Peirce saw that lack of 
an appropriate (habituated) action would lead to doubt or uncertainty 
as to how to act, which in turn would lead to a re-examination of the 
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relevant belief, through reflective thought. But there is little room in 
James construction for action to affect belief. When action is uncertain, 
then one's steadfast intention, in line with one's values and goals will, 
with appropriate effort, find an alternative practical solution. We shall 
see later how this pragmatic tradition, especially James' variant of it, 
has remained viable in the work of American sociologists. In the meantime 
we shall see how present day philosophers, working in the field of moral 
education, have dealt with problems inherent in the relationship between 
belief and action. 
Floral Educationists and the  Belief/Action Relationship  
Writers in the field of moral education are challenged by a mass of 
empirical findings which have emerged from the realms of adolescent 
psychology and the sociology of juvenile delinquency. Typical of the 
response to the apparent discrepancies and obvious complexities of the 
belief/action relationship is that of Norman Bull who, in Moral Education  
poses the question: "What relationship is there, if any, between moral 
judgment and actual conduct ?" - his conclusion is: 
No claim could be made for a strong correlation between 
moral judgment and moral behaviour. . . . Yet it remains 
true that moral knowledge and understanding are pre-
requisites of moral action. No one can act upon a moral 
principle, or precept, or rule, unless he is first aware 
of it. He must for example have learnt respect for the 
property of others if he is to know that he should resist 
the temptation to take it when safe opportunity offers. . . 
Moral judgments derive from moral concepts. . . It can 
at least be held that they furnish evidence of potential 
moral action; and the more so as moral principles become 
interiorised and a sense of guilt becomes a reality of 
moral experience and so of moral control.il  
But Bull considers that moral judgements are not only cognitive 
functions but "orectic" (i.e. conative and affective) as well. "They 
involve. . . not only the mind, but also appetite and desire, feeling 
and striving, emotions and will."12 
These somewhat extensive extracts are quoted not because Bull has 
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solved the problems but because his work illustrates the particular 
areas of tension that educational philosophers are attempting to clarify. 
In the first place, although Bull believes that moral principles are 
prior to moral action he makes only a weak case for their priority. His 
use of the word "correlation" indicates the problem - social scientific 
research has produced a mass of evidence to the contrary. We also note the 
use of concepts associated with the study of psychology (e.g. "sense of 
guilt"), in support of philosophical concepts such as moral judgement 
and moral principles. Finally we have the problem of the place of the 
will and the emotions - conative and affective elements. Where do they 
fit into the belief/action relationship ? Do they influence belief and 
thereby action, or do they in some way moderate the way in which belief 
affects behaviour ? 
A brief look will first be taken at the disjunction between moral 
belief (or moral understanding), and action consistent with the belief. 
Frankena13 suggests that Plato was not unaware of the problem, as is 
indicated by Socrates' concern that the most virtuous parents so often had 
vicious sons - although it appears that the defect was seen to be in the 
method of transmission of "virtue". Frankena sees the problem of 
"producing virtue in the next generation to be twofold. The first 
aspect, "Moral Education X" (MEX) is concerned with handing on a 
"knowledge of good and evil or "knowing how" to act. The second, 
"Moral Education Y" (MEY) aims to ensure that the conduct of the young 
will conform to this "knowledge". Whilst MEX deals in the formation of 
right ideas, MEY is concerned with the formation of right habits.14 The 
development of dispositions to think and act rightly is thus seen as a 
double task. Unlike Peirce, Frankena does not consider that right ideas 
will be directly expressed as right habits. 
Wilson's work on moral components, developed when with the Farmington 
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Trust's Moral Education project, has extended the above approach, probably 
to its limit. He has produced a "phenomenological description of morality" 
where the latter is broken down into a series of basic components. Whilst 
various components are built into a moral judgement, components which 
include ways of thinking, understanding and perceiving oneself and others, 
Wilson has maintained a separate major category, KRAT to refer to the 
ability to translate these beliefs and understandings into action.15 In 
his most recent work on this topic, he has sub-divided the component, KRAT, 
into two aspects, the first referring to the awareness that a situation 
requiring moral action exists and including the decision to act, and the 
second referring to the translation of the decision into action.16 
In his paper on the "Platonic view", referred to above, Kohlberg 
commented that American educational psychology, like Aristotle, divided 
"the personality up into cognitive abilities, passions or motives, and 
traits of character".17 But while moral educators, following educational 
psychology, may be agreed that affective and conative elements in the 
personality affect moral behaviour, there is no agreement as to how they 
affect it or how they relate to the cognitive elements. Kohlberg, taking 
the Platonic view, believes that such issues are extraneous to the 
phenomenon of moral development, which is essentially a cognitive matter 
and are thus not the province of the moral educator. But Kohlberg's 
position in this regard is an isolated one. 
There are two alternatives to assimilating affective and conative 
elements into the moral beliefs/moral action relationship. One either 
inserts them between the belief complex and the action complex of the 
relationship or one incorporates them in the belief complex, consisting as 
it does of thought, ideas, dispositions and so on. 
In "Education for Moral Responsibility", Gustafson gives an example 
of the former alternative. He sees responsible moral action as involving 
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moral decision making, reflection about one's moral commitments and beliefs, 
one's unconscious determinants - character, disposition, attitudes and 
emotions and "willing", i.e. "determination of capacities and powers" in 
order to achieve one's intentions. His definition of moral action is 
reminiscent of William James, except that one feels that the "will" may have 
cut free from belief, and, guided by unconscious forces may be acting as an 
intermediary between belief and action. "floral actions", according to 
Gustafson, "are interventions through the exercise of some form of power in 
accord with intentions, rules, and ends, which are subject to qualitative 
judgments of good or bad, or right or wrong."18 Such an approach does 
little to solve the problem of the place of affective and conative elements 
and tends to blur the relationship between action and belief. 
Wilson's solution to the problem is one of a limited incorporation into 
what was referred to above as the belief complex. His first two 
components, PHIL and EflP each has its own affective element, converted to a 
relatively cognitive form. PHIL, may even have a touch of the conative in 
the form of other people's interests "actually" counting with one, but on 
the whole the conative is most strongly associated with the component 
KRAT. In Wilson's own terms: 
PHIL refers to the degree to which one can identify with 
other people, in the sense of being such that other 
people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh 
with one, or are accepted as of equal validity to one's 
own. . . 
DIP refers to awareness or insight into one's own and 
other people's feelings: i.e. the ability to know what 
those feelings are and describe them correctly.19 
PHIL thus presupposes concern and ElIP, while stressing an aspect of 
consciousness, awareness of feelings, must imply previous experience of 
one's own feelings and emotions and the experience of empathy with others. 
Wilson thus shows that aspects of the personality such as the will and the 
emotions have their place, but do not change the essentially cognitive 
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nature of moral judgement, nor its close relationship with moral action. 
R.S. Peters has concentrated on the rational aspects of morality to 
such an extent that it has sometimes appeared that he has little room 
for affective and conative elements. But whilst these elements are 
brought firmly within the realm of rationality they are not neglected. It 
could be said, even, that Peters has found an ordered place for many of the 
unruly elements spawned by American Psychology. Although he argues that 
being moral is most essentially concerned with moral principles he holds 
that the "passions" are directly involved. For people to be consistent in 
applying their principles to life's concrete situations they must be 
"passionately devoted to fairness, freedom, and the pursuit of truth" and 
"hawie a genuine respect for others". In addition, Peters stresses the 
need for "a development of the imagination" so that one knows how to 
treat a person as a person and how to assess his interests. 20 
Of particular significance to the topic under discussion is his work 
in clarifying and distinguishing between the concept of motivation and the 
emotions. It was noted earlier, that Bull and Gustafson both 
included the emotions as a relevant factor in moral behaviour and 
"motivation" has long been associated with moral behaviour, especially moral 
misbehaviour. In dealing with motives and motivation Peters totally 
by-passed both the utilitarian tradition (Bentham held that a motive was a 
"pleasure, pain or other event that prompts to action") and the 
behaviourist tradition. Peters sees a "motive" as the reason for an action 
which results from an appraisal of a situation where relevant action is 
possible. The appraisal is based on one's beliefs. Emotions are seen 
as arising from similar appraisals in cases where appropriate action is 
impossible. They are thus a by-product of our passivity. Both motives 
and emotions have their sources in the cognitive sphere and both can be 
stabilised in settled dispositions. In the case of motives, of 
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dispositions to act in certain ways. In the case of emotions, of 
dispositions to respond to our appraisals, when suitable action is not 
possible, by experiencing the relevant sentiment. Such factors as love, 
respect, a sense of justice and a concern for truth can act as "self-
transcending emotions" which can displace "self-referential" emotions such 
as jealousy or pride. Self transcending emotions such as these will also 
promote positive appraisals which will result in altruistic action 
where action is appropriate.
21 
Not only by these theories does Peters 
restress the primacy of the cognitive and re-establish the connection 
between belief and the realm of motives and emotions, but he also suggests 
a mechanism for a degree of feed-back from the emotions to thought and 
thence to belief. 
Writing more recently, P.H. Hirst gives his backing to Peters' findings, 
stressing that while the emotions are morally significant, they owe their 
significance to the implicit moral principles involved. "It is widely 
accepted", he asserts, "that all emotions, at least in adult life, are 
tied to particular self-referring beliefs about a situation." And, 
continuing the assertion, "it is in terms of the moral rules or principles 
they embody that emotions came to have any moral character they possess. 
They voice conscious or unconscious moral beliefs."
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We have seen in the above section how philosophers of education have 
dealt with the two essential problems in the relationship between belief 
and action that face moral education, namely the discontinuity that exists 
between moral judgement and moral action and the place of the will and the 
emotions. Wilson has suggested that the translation of judgement into 
action is a separate aspect of moral development and will require 
separate attention by educators. Peters, above all others, has asserted 
that the affective elements of the personality function in the zone of 
belief, at the cognitive level, influencing moral behaviour through their 
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role in appraising a situation. So the moral educator, who accepts these 
findings, will see the need to educate the emotions, realising that 
feelings affect judgement, rather than seeking to repress and control 
emotional elements as forces that may interfere with rational action. 
We shall now turn to the realm of sociology, observing how the 
pragmatic tradition has influenced the American work on moral issues and 
noting some of the problems that have emerged as a result. We shall 
finally discuss attempts to find alternative ways of expressing the belief-
action relationship in order to overcome these problems. 
Sociology and the Pragmatic Tradition  
The earliest tradition of American sociology contains reference to 
morals and morality. Summer's work on pathways and mores, Cooley's on 
human nature and primary groups, Mead's interest in the moral development 
of the individual are a few examples in addition to the mass of work on 
deviance and moral delinquencym typified by the Chicago school. But little 
attention was paid to the relationship between belief, or even individual 
intentionality, and social action until the era of Talcott Parsons. 
The influential work, Towards a General Theory of Action (ed. Parsons 
and Shils),23 incorporates not only the insights of Parsons himself but his 
reflections on Weber with his stress on the actors' intentionality, and on 
Durkheim with his stress on the moral nature of society. 
The general theory of action is complex and many-faceted. The action 
of an individual or collectivity of actors is preceded by the actors' 
orientation to action. There are three categories of motivational 
orientation: cognition, cathexis and evaluation and accordingly in society 
there are three major classes of "culture patterns": systems of ideas or 
beliefs (cognitive interests); systems of expressive symbols (cathectic 
interests), and systems of value-orientations (when "consequences" and 
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"implications" are interests). 	 There are three types of action 
depending on which set of symbols are orientating the actor. Instrumental 
action emerges from orientation by cognitive symbols, beliefs and ideas. 
Orientation by expressive symbols (cathectic), such as aesthetic or 
personal appreciations gives rise to expressive action and motivation by 
value standards or evaluating symbols (standards of value-orientations) 
to acts of evaluation, which in the case of moral standards, results in 
moral action. These value standards which permeate the culture and are 
assessible to all individuals in society are variously called "patterns of 
value-orientation", "normative ideas" or "evaluative systems". A great 
deal of further analysis of these moral standards ensues as they are seen 
to be of the utmost significance being "the predominant norms which are 
institutionalized in the American society and which embody the predominant 
value-orientation of the culture."24 
Yet for all its complexity the theory assumes a very simple relationship 
between what has been absorbed by the minds of individuals from the parent 
culture and the action that ensues. The very fact that action itself is 
classified in terms of the "orientating" symbol systems shows the strength 
of the pragmatic presupposition. The contribution of Clyde Kluckholm et al, 
"Value and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action"25 further explores 
both the meaning of "values" and the relationship of values to action. It 
is here we see a strong reflection of the thought of William James. 
According to Kluckholm et al., the literature of learning shows the 
confused state of the concept of values, where they are variously "considered 
as attitudes, motivations, objects, measurable quantities, substantive 
areas of behavior, affect-laden customs or traditions and relationships 
such as those between individuals, groups, objects, events."26 Their 
definition of value is as follows: "A value is a conception, explicit or 
implied, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the 
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desirable, which influences the selection from available modes, means and 
ends of action."27 They point out that affective ("desirable"), cognitive 
("conception") and conative ("selection") elements are all essential for the 
notion of value. That value is clearly a function of the mind which when 
operative culminates in action is shown by the condensed form of the 
definition: "Values are ideas formulating action and commitments." They 
instigate "behaviour. . . within the individual."28 
The parallel with James is unmistakable - for James, "ideas" were 
"plans of action" and the individual acted freely in line with his own 
choice and intention, the only constraint being the thrust of his own will. 
A further extract from Kluckholm et al illustrates the continuation of the 
Peircean tradition where belief leads not to idiosyncratic action but a 
disposition to settled habit: 
Values are operative when an individual selects one line of 
thought or action rather than another, insofar as this 
selection is influenced by generalized codes rather than 
determined simply by impulse or by a purely rational 
calculus of temporary expediency.29  
As with James, values are seen to imply means and goals; thus action 
is not only instigated but directed. Unlike James, however, they have to 
face the problem of motivation (imposed on them, one presumes, by the 
prevailing psychological paradigm). Motivation is seen to be partly 
"biological" and partly "situational". With general "situational 
conditions" and "available means for action", motivation is seen to be a 
factor which will have a direct effect on the actors' choice of action. His 
values, in fact must reach a compromise with these other factors. The 
concept of "value orientation" defined as "a set of linked propositions 
embracing both value and existential elements"30 
 is the answer to this 
problem. "Value orientations" is now such a complex set of ideas, 
dispositions and extraneous factors that there is no reason to doubt that 
everything has not been taken care of and that immediate and relevant 
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action should not ensue. How to determine a value orientation in the first 
place is another matter. 
The concept of value-orientation was further developed by Florence 
Kluckholm in association with F.L. Stodtbeck 31 and thereafter became 
a standard theoretical tool for empirical research in the moral and 
educational spheres. Value orientations have been investigated in 
association with educational achievement, 32 have been dissected and 
measured (e.g. as adolescent instrumental and expressive value orientations)33 
and have been used to determine the relationship between social class and 
behaviour in the school.34 Not surprisingly, these studies have produced 
few clear-cut results. As the researcher has to negotiate the problem of 
determining "value-orientation" in the first place, usually along the five 
axes suggested by Florence Kluckholm and then relate these findings to 
other variables, the validity and reliability are low. Yet this type of 
research uses a statistical approach. The weakness of the concept of value-
orientation together with the impossible task of determining such a diffuse 
item by positivistic methods has meant that such research throws little 
light on the relationship of beliefs to behaviour. Suffice to say that 
the pragmatic assumptions continue to be fundamental to this type of 
research. 
Robert Merton's work on anomie in the American social structure is 
another example of a seminal theory in the pragmatic tradition. Merton's 
anomie theory attempts to explain various deviant patterns of behaviour by 
assuming that certain individuals experience a disjunction between the goals 
they have internalised from the dominant American culture and the 
appropriate institutionalised means of attaining these goals.35 The 
normalness that results will be responded to by a variety of adaptations, 
the most typically "American" being "innovation" where an individual 
chooses alternate ways, usually involving illicit action, in order to reach 
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the desired goals. Whilst the assumption that the pervading ideology will 
be accepted and internalised by all members of the society is not in the 
tradition of the pragmatists, the emphasis on goals as an essential 
aspect of the individual's belief system is thoroughly Jamesian, as is 
the assumption that the individual is free to adapt his behaviour when 
institutionalised means fail. Also in the pragmatic tradition is the 
assumption that a settled disposition (e.g. acceptance of goals) will 
express itself in consistent and appropriate action. It is when the 
appropriate action is frustrated, when the individual realises that 
the action into which he is being forced by the agents of society is not 
in line with his beliefs about his future state that deviant behaviour will 
result. Throughout the process the emphasis has been on what is assumed to 
be "in the head" of the individual. Action, whether of the conformist or 
the deviant springs from the realm of belief. 
The American theory of anomie proved to be most attractive to 
sociologists of deviance. It was built into further, more complex theories3 6 
and Merton's classification of adaptations was widely used as an explanatory 
tool. When it fell out of favour as a deviance theory 37  its inadequacies 
were seen to be in its inability to specify the cause of strain on sections 
of society and its inability to explain why an individual should suddenly 
start on a deviant career. But it would seem that there are greater 
weaknesses in its basic assumption that a specific aspect of the culture 
could have such a place of dominance within an individual's belief system 
that all other beliefs count little. This points to an essential limitation 
of the pragmatic tradition - beliefs tend to be seen as simple units which 
function independently of each other to produce action. The very basic 
assumption that an individual has internalised a particular set of beliefs 
is fraught with problems as was later shown by the obvious resistance to 
dominant beliefs by counter-culture members. The strength of the theory 
when it first appeared lay in the general acceptance of the pervasiveness 
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of the Great American Dream and the unquestioning assumption that belief 
and action were simply and directly related. 
Perhaps the most outstanding example of a sociological work in a 
pure pragmatist mould is A.K . Cohen 's Delinquent Boys. In addition to 
the pragmatic tradition, he draws upon Merton's theory of adaptation, 
which emerges as "problem solving" and Parsons' theory of action. He 
sets out his assumptions in his section "Facts the Theory Must Fit": 
All human action. . . is an ongoing series of efforts to 
solve problems.38  
Each choice is an act, each act is a choice. 
Most problems are familiar and recurrent and we have 
on hand for them ready solutions, habitual modes of 
action. . . 
All problems are seen to arise from and be solved by changes in either 
(or both) "the actor's 'frame of reference' and the 'situation' he confronts." 39 
The frame of reference is made up of "the interests, preconceptions, 
stereotypes and values we bring to the situation."40 
The particular problem he sets out to solve is that of the working 
class juvenile delinquent whom he sees as being subject to "middle class 
norms", manifestations of "the dominant American value system",41 
especially through the educational process he has to undergo. The 
prevailing middle-class ethic "prescribes an obligation to strive, by 
dint of rational, ascetic, self-disciplined and independent activity, 
to achieve in worldly affairs".42 
While working-class boys who achieve in the school system, thus 
gaining status, are happy to internalise middle-class values and conform 
to middle-class norms, the unsuccessful working-class boy, frustrated by 
low status and conscious of his inadequacy in the light of the middle- 
class standards he has partially internalised, faces a problem of 
adjustment. His answer is to invert the very norms that proved him a 
failure and substitute an alternate set, in terms of which he can be a 
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success. A group of such boys who have undergone "reaction formation" and 
accepted an alternate set of norms, constitutes a delinquent subculture. 
This "solution" is reminiscent of Merton's rebel who adapts to the 
situation of anomie by finding new goals. Just as the goals would be part 
of his belief system so would the inverted norms be believed to be the 
right way to behave, at least in the context of the gang. 
Although Cohen refers to various empirical findings in the field of 
deviance, he produces no evidence for any change in the moral beliefs of his 
delinquent boys. But there is plenty of evidence that gang members have 
habituated patterns of conduct diametrically opposed to the norms of the 
"respectable culture". Cohen has thus assumed that these boys must have an 
opposing set of values as delinquent action must have its source in 
delinquent belief. 
Now although Delinquent Boys has many insightful observations such 
as the manner in which the delinquent directs the "subterranean currents 
of our cultural tradition"43 to his own use, his central thesis, which 
results from his pragmatic assumptions, has attracted such profound 
criticism that its value has been seriously diminished. Critics ask, 
how can "reaction formation" occur if middle class values were never 
fully internalised, and why do young delinquents show guilt when caught if 
their values are inverted,44 and why doesn't working class culture have 
any influence on them ?45 
But Matza attacks the key problem, as well as showing that Cohen's 
theory does not fit the facts.46 He sees the theory as asserting that, 
"delinquency is fundamentally the transformation of beliefs into action".47 
Furthermore where action is seen as necessarily emerging from values and 
norms and the complexity of belief structures is ignored, there is no 
room for the modification of belief by re-examination in the light of 
experience. Matza sees beliefs becoming independent variables and the 
whole approach settling down into hard determinism. 
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Some of the problems which emerge from these strands of sociology 
are partly due to the positivistic tradition to which they belong but 
some stem from the pragmatic assumptions made by social theorists. By 
making the assumption in the above contexts the theorists have drawn 
attention away from the action itself to causal factors in the minds of 
the actors - so the subjective meaning and wider significance of the 
action may be lost. Again, there is a tendency for circular argument, as 
the action is explained in terms of belief, so belief (or norms or values) 
is assumed to be consistent with the action. The researcher has no need 
to find out what the actor is really thinking or what are his actual 
concerns. In addition to these drawbacks, the pragmatists have tended to 
see the belief/action relationship in single-track terms. Peirce, in 
particular, saw each belief as contributing to its particular habituated 
action. Complexity of belief structure as in a web of belief or 
unconscious beliefs were not really visualised. So it does not appear 
strange to Merton or Cohen to ignore all other beliefs and/or cultural 
influences except those under investigation. But beliefs are not separate 
from each other, and whatever the relationship between belief and action 
may be, it is not one of simple determinism. A final weakness which 
stems from the pragmatists themselves and is reflected in the work of the 
above sociologists is the insistence that belief can only be demonstrated 
in action. There is no allowance for a reflexive consciousness, and moral 
discourse is not accepted as being meaningful. The subject is seldom 
asked to give his own account of his behaviour as the state of his 
understanding is assumed from his actions. 
We shall now examine how some sociologists have responded to the 
problems inherent in assuming a direct relationship between belief and 
action. On the whole it has been those influenced by phenomenological and 
interactional schools who have tackled these problems. A Marxist critique 
does not seem able to reach the basic issues involved, for there is within 
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Marxist tradition a strand of hard determinism (however much it is softened 
or re-interpreted) and an embedded approach to the intimate relationship 
between theory and practice that interferes with new ways of looking at 
old problems such as pragmatism. 
The Sociological critique of Pragmatism  
In Delinquency and Drift, Matza sets out to give a practical critique 
of the positive tradition of deviance theories making the pragmatism of 
Cohen's account a special target. Attacking the very assumption that 
delinquent action implies delinquent belief, he sets out to show that 
this is far from the case in real life. His account suggests an alternative 
mechanism for the process of becoming deviant which does not require any 
change in the fundamental beliefs and values of the delinquent. 
Matza's theory allows the juvenile to choose deviance, rather than 
have it thrust upon him by a psychological upheaval, allows for the 
essential influences of the home and culture to have their place and 
takes into consideration the evidence that most juveniles who have been 
associated with delinquent gangs at one stage revert into ordinary citizens. 
Of equal significance is the fact that Matza's juvenile exists in a 
complex and compromising world where the law does not act consistently and 
where one has no temptation to assume that all individuals will accept 
and internalise the dominant ideology. 
According to [latza, adolescents, being midway between adult freedom 
and childhood control can choose to go into "drift", taking a moral 
holiday or entering a kind of moral limbo. Yet as they remain part of 
conventional society they need mechanisms to deal with its moral hold on 
them. The main mechanisms are neutralization where the adolescent 
"neutralises" the moral bind of the law, and subterranean convergence  
where he receives cultural support in his delinquency from deviant strands 
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within main-stream society. Such deviant strands may be non-respectable 
elements such as the "pursuit of fun and thrill" or the cult of male 
bravado, or exist as part of respectable ideology which can be exploited, 
such as behaviourist assumptions that children are never personally 
responsible for their "crimes". 
Matza summarises the usual techniques of neutralization as consisting 
of "negation of responsibility, the sense of injustice, the assertion of 
tact, and the primacy of custom".48 While he need not internalise any 
new values, the presence of the adolescent in the delinquent subculture 
gives him access to ways of believing about his behaviour that "function 
as extenuating circumstances under which delinquency is permissible."49 
Ilatza sees the technique of neutralization not only as being excuses when 
caught but as everyday methods of coping with illegal behaviour, while 
still holding conventional beliefs about right and wrong. So gang 
members hold that they act in self-defence when they attack their rivals, 
that the drunk deserved to be rolled, that insurance will pay for the 
damaged car and that the law is not acting "fairly" in apprehending them 
on suspicion. 
Critics of F9atza tend to pick on minor discrepancies of his theory and 
overlook his main purpose in attempting to show how delinquent behaviour 
does not necessarily presuppose delinquent belief. Matza has shown how 
delinquents could behave in a fashion which is inconsistent with their 
moral beliefs. But he does not prove that they do, in fact, use his 
suggested mechanisms. Box expresses the obvious weakness in Matza's 
account as seen by those used to dealing with adolescents in real life. He 
finds it doubtful whether "neutralization" really precedes deviant action 
and is not just a rationalisation after the event e.g. how much is "I was 
pushed"really a description of intentional action or how much is excuse. 
He also notes inconsistencies in Matza's argument such as his use of the 
concept of fatalism to neutralize the legal bind but at the same time 
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keep it as an impetus to bring about action that will restore the 
adolescent's "humanistic mood" and help him regain control of his world.50 
Other critics point out that Matza has avoided the whole question of 
delinquent aetiology - we are given no indication of why an adolescent 
should decide to commence drifting.51 
But Natza's real task is not to produce a final and all-embracing 
theory of deviance but to strike a blow against positivistic and pragmatic 
interpretations. One could criticise Matza for continuing to express his 
arguments on the basis of the real existence of sub-cultures whilst in the 
process of undermining the sub-cultural theories of writers such as 
A. Cohen and Clow and Ohlin, but Matza's sub-cultures do not presuppose an 
ideological consensus, and the term is probably used for convenience or 
from habit. One does feel, however, that Matza has made an unjustified 
assumption in his very basic concept that adolescents experience the 
"bind of the law". He would see, for example, loyalty to peers as a 
method of semi-cancelling or neutralising the bind of the law. It could be 
argued that to support friends is illegal activity or to refuse to tell 
the truth about such exploits to the authorities constituted action in 
accordance with immediately relevant moral beliefs. It may be considered 
wrong to steal cars but few adolescents will consider this as wrong as 
being disloyal to friends. Matza seems to assume that the law has 
consistent pre-eminence in and relevance to the adolescent consciousness. 
Perhaps Matza has been more influenced by positivism than he intended. 
In "Accounts"52, Lyman and Scott suggest that people use linguistic 
devices when their actions are subjected to valuative inquiry, when their 
motives, in particular, are called for. Such "accounts" fall into two 
major categories - excuses and justifications. Matza's "techniques of 
neutralization" are excellent examples of "justification" accounts. The 
account can tell us a lot about the individual who gives it, but it is a 
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two-way phenomenon and tells us just as much about the situation and the 
person or agency to whom the account is given. Every account, in fact, 
is a manifestation of the underlying "negotiation of identities". While 
Matza is fully aware of the part played by the agencies of juvenile justice 
in forming the content of the "techniques of neutralisation" he jumps to 
the conclusion that the accounts of the young delinquents are "true" 
expressions of what is in their consciousness and uses this to give a 
general explanation of these beliefs and behaviour. 
C. Wright Mills, discussing "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of 
Motive" extends this idea. He sees motives not as subjective "springs" 
of action, but as "typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in 
delimited societal situations", 53 "the terms with which interpretation of 
conduct by social actors proceeds".54 Motives are words, given in response 
to questions concerning an actor's "social and lingual conduct". There 
are no "real motives", no actual unconscious causes of an action, according 
to Mills' view. But motives are important. They are social phenomena 
to be explained i.e. there are reasons for people's "reasons". Seeing 
things this way, one would not say with Box, "but aren't the kids just 
making excuses" nor incorporate such accounts into a general theory of 
deviant behaviour as Matza has done, but seek to understand the situation 
in its varied facets. As Lyman concludes, Sociology should take 
linguistic utterances more seriously. 
Becker's challenge to the pragmatic assumption that action implies 
belief takes the form of showing how action can help formulate belief. In 
fact "instead of the deviant motives leading to the deviant behavior, it 
is the other way round; the deviant behavior in time produces the deviant 
motivation".55 In "Becoming a marihuana user", Becker shows how a mild 
curiosity about the drug with no preconceptions of its properties or value 
is all that is needed to start the process whereby marihuana is seen as an 
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agent of pleasure. The process involves not only the act of smoking, 
but the individual's interpretation of his physical sensations in a social 
setting. He gradually learns to understand the effects of marihuana on his 
mind and body and as he does he develops both definite patterns of action 
(e.g. regular social use of "pot" for pleasure) and a distinct conceptual 
attitude to the drug. 
Of course, it is easy to argue that the potential user has had to have 
certain beliefs to start with and that these have led to his action. Becher 
does point out that the novice must have faith (developed from his 
observations of users who do get high) "that the drug actually will produce 
some new experience" and this must lead him to continue "to experiment with 
it until it does".56 But Becker does show, that contrary to the assumptions 
of many post-Parsonian sociologists, the belief/action relationship is a 
complex one and is in no way deterministic. This reflexivity of the 
belief/action relation reminds us of Peirce whose theory did allow for 
change and modification of beliefs, even though this aspect was increasingly 
lost sight of in later works which followed the pragmatic tradition. In 
Peirce's view, however, action had no direct effect on belief. It was 
only when a habituated action was considered to be inappropriate to a changed 
situation that doubt arose and through reflective thought a new settled idea 
or belief was able to replace the old. The primacy of belief over 
action was not challenged. Becker's marihuana user does not modify his 
concepts via reflective thought - the interrelationship between action and 
belief is on a much more practical level. Neither is action or belief seen 
as a simple and single phenomenon. Many actions are involved varying in 
quality from the company the user keeps and his frequentness of joining 
them, to his technique of drawing in the smoke. And many conceptions and 
beliefs will be involved too. These may extend from such items as a 
consciousness of the drug's effects to an assessment of the degree of danger 
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from police detection that the practice entails. 
We seemed to have strayed back into the realm of Aristotle here, 
where moral education is seen as training in habits at least until they 
were well established and the pupil is ready for reflection. But while 
this approach is scorned by most modern moral educators there are some 
empirical findings consistent with it. In "Becoming a Freak: Pathways 
into the Counter-Culture", Wieder and Zimmerman describe how youngsters 
who have chosen to be "freaks" work to "bring their feelings into line", 
that is to modify their unconscious beliefs and attitudes.57 Freaks take 
deliberate action to overcome their prejudices which they ascribe to the 
induced effects of their cultural past. A person with a "hang-up over 
possessions" i.e. with deeply rooted beliefs about the sacredness of property 
may give everything away with abandon and insist on others wearing his things 
and one who has a residual attitude that nakedness is shameful, may force 
herself to appear nude in public. 
C. Wright Mills, in "Language, Logic and Culture" makes a pertinent 
comment about the efficacy of action: 
Social habits are not only overt and social actions 
which recur - they leave residues, "apperceptive masses", 
which conform to dominant and recurring activities and 
are built by them. In human communities, such dominant 
fields of behavior have implications in terms of systems 
of value. 58 
We are here in a different world from that of the pragmatists - 
much less ordered than that of either Peirce or Parsons but rather 
closer to the real world in which we live. 
In "Words and Deeds"59 Deutscher points to the fact that we still know 
very little about the relationship between "what people say and what they do 
- attitudes and behavior, sentiments and acts, verbalizations and inter-
actions, words and deeds." He sees part of the problem in our methodology: 
"We have not developed a technology for observing, ordering, analyzing and 
interpreting overt behaviour - especially as it relates to attitudes, norms, 
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opinions and values."60 On the research to date he concludes in fact that 
"the empirical evidence can best be summarized as reflecting wide variation 
in the relationship between attitudes and behaviors." 
He does not find the inconsistency in empirical findings to be 
surprising for there will always be a conflict between man's private 
self and his social duty, as Durkheim showed. As Deutscher put it "the 
dialectic between, man's private self and his social self must create 
occasional and sometimes radical inconsistencies between what he says and 
what he does; either way, inconsistency between attitudes and behavior 
may be assumed."61 In addition to this is the problem pointed to by 
symbolic interaction, that a respondent discussing his action with his 
interviewer is in a definite symbolic situation, quite different from that 
of the original action. 
Deutscher does not expect that a simple clear-cut answer will emerge 
as a result of even greatly improved techniques of investigation, for 
the relationship between action and the realm of belief is not a simple one. 
He points out: "We need to recognize that change probably occurs in both 
directions - from thought to act and from act to thought - sometimes 
separately, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes sequentially.62 
Deutscher's suggestion that there will always be tension between an 
individual's private and social behaviour indicates that moral educators 
are not likely to overcome their problems by paying special attention to 
"KRAT" even if their pupils' understanding of social principles and the 
actual needs of others is impeccable. It is true that we still know 
little of what relates the belief that one ought to do something, and 
actually doing it. The work of Peters and Hirst, in showing the wide range 
of elements in moral judgement making is valuable as it clarifies the 
constituent concepts and effectively challenges behaviourism. But it does 
not explain the complexity and flexibility of an individual's system of 
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belief nor how beliefs came to be developed, modified and changed. There 
is room for more work at the empirical level, work which keeps in mind the 
insights of Lyman and Mills and Deutscher on the interpretation of 
"accounts" and "motives" and shows awareness that whilst the realms of 
thought and action are related, the relationship is not as simple as the 
pragmatists implied. 
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Chapter 3: The Moral Heritage of Sociology II:  
The Contribution of the Founding Fathers - Marx, 
Durkheim and Weber  
The Philosophical Background  
"If Renaissance Europe gave rise to a concern with history," suggests 
Anthony Giddens, "it was industrial Europe which provided the conditions 
for the emergence of sociology."1 Giddens sees the catalyst between these 
two complex sets of events as being the French Revolution of 1789. He 
points out that the French Revolution provided a political climate which, 
together with the econonic changes resulting from the Industrial Revolution, 
produced the context out of which sociology was born. 
In nineteenth century western Europe, Britain, France and Germany 
were the most economically prosperous countries and all became increasingly 
industrialised as the century progressed. If Britain was the technological 
and economic leader during this period, it was Germany and France which 
produced the philosophers who sought to understand the changes in social 
terms. 
Marx, Durkheim and Weber, although by no means the first, or only 
sociologists of their time, can be considered as the founding fathers of 
modern sociology. From these three authors can be traced the various 
branches of modern social theory, albeit with modifications and added 
theoretical insight.2 The Germany and France of their day not only lagged 
behind Britain in technological development but were also less equipped 
philosophically than Britain to accept the outcomes of technological progress. 
The dominant philosophy of Britain, utilitarianism, was well suited 
to her economic and political situation. Developed by Bentham and refined 
by J.S. Mill, utilitarianism gave the individualism of Hobbs and Hume a 
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positive and dynamic dimension. Utilitarianism asserts that the only 
end worthwhile in itself is happiness. Actions are right only in so far 
as they produce happiness; the right action is the one which will lead 
to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Bentham had 
seen in the principle of utility the key to the provision of a sound 
theoretical foundation for any legal system. It was a reaction from 
intuitionism and a replacement of the commonly held theories of "natural 
law" and "original contract". It was essentially a pragmatic theory, 
devised to evaluate various types of action in society. 
It was particularly well suited to the economic climate of nineteenth 
century Britain. It retained the stress on individualism, which favoured 
the successful economic policies of "laissez-faire". It was entirely 
secular, thus by-passing problems of ultimate good or divine justice and 
aligning itself with progressive elements of society. It was concerned 
with ends, not means, with ultimate outcomes rather than with intentions. 
It was a practical doctrine which could be used to provide a practical 
guide for action. It was an ideal basis for developing capitalism: it 
justified all practices in terms of progress and the benefits it would 
bring. It also was the basis for reform, acting as an inbuilt corrective 
to undesirable side effects of the capitalistic enterprise. It is not 
surprising that whilst the church complained, progressive thinkers had no 
difficulty in explaining problems due to rapid social change or suggesting 
practical solutions. 
In France and Germany, however, progressive thinkers were faced with 
problems of social change related to increasing industrialisation and 
developing capitalism. The dominant secular ethical system was Kantian. 
Kant Is approach to morality had been developed in an atmosphere of 
eighteenth century "enlightenment" philosophy, which had attacked the 
authority of the church and questioned the nature and justification of 
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government. His essential problem was the nature of knowledge and its 
relationship to rationality. Social changes did not interest him: of greater 
interest was the problem set the philosophy of knowledge by the "discovery" 
of the causal laws of the universe by natural science. 
Kant's essential distinction, of significance to ethics, is between 
pure or theoretical reason and practical reason. Theoretical knowledge 
can only come from sense impressions received from phenomena, the 
outwardness of reality. Noumena, true reality which can be apprehended 
through the understanding, cannot be known theoretically. Impressions 
gained from phenomena, though the senses are ordered by the "categories" 
(conceptual forms) of understanding, which are innate to the human mind. 
A priori arguments, typical of metaphysics, can give no new theoretical 
knowledge. Outside Mathematics, a priori arguments, unsupported by 
sensuous knowledge, can lead to error. 
Practical reason is obedience to "pure" moral law which is perceived 
a priori. It must be kept free from all sense experience. It is 
unconnected with the phenomenal world. It belongs to the non-theoretical 
noumenous world. For Kant, rational action is acting from the motive of 
obedience to the moral law (i.e. a priori command of reason). Action 
connected with desires or practical outcomes is not rational. The only 
good is the good "will", that is, the pure intention to act according to 
duty, or obedience to the moral law. Kant's categorical imperative is a 
compass whereby the individual can perceive his duty. This can be 
formulated as: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same time 
as making universal law through its maxim."3 Following this formula will 
ensure autonomy, self-guided action. The autonomous, rationally moral man 
must also follow the formula of the kingdom of ends: "So act as if you 
were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends."4 The 
kingdom of ends is an ideal kingdom where people are treated as ends in 
themselves and not as means to ends. 
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Kantian morality is thus a private and subjective matter. Because 
no-one can be entirely pure in his intention to do his duty, being moved 
perhaps by pity or compassion, moral action cannot be truly rational 
in practice. 	 It can only approach the rationality of obedience to the 
moral law. In the phenomenal world of appearances which man as an active 
sense-experiencing creature inhabits, the only sure reason is pure or 
theoretical reason. In this world necessity reigns. Freedom belongs to 
the ideal realm.5 Marx, Durkheim and Weber were conscious of the need to 
explain social change in social terms in a world of changing ideas and 
practices. They were aware of the Kantian dichotomy between the world 
of experience and the ideal world. Marx and Durkheim were to engage in 
continuous debate with Kant and Kantians. Weber, in his critique of 
Marx, reverted to a neo-Kantian position. Marx's debate with Kant follows 
in the Hegelian tradition of attempting to bridge the gap between true 
reality, the Kantian "ideal" and experienced, material reality. Hegel had 
shown that the ideal was expressed in the material real in the process of 
history. Value became fact. Marx reversed the Hegelian formulation to 
show that fact gave rise to ideals: the phenomenal world of sensuous 
experience was the real world. Durkheim, too, wanted to get rid of the 
noumenous. The realm of morality, the realm of ideas and ideals was a 
social phenomenon, growing from common social experience. It was binding 
not because of an ideal metaphysical kingdom existing beyond man but 
because of a real society existing beyond the individual. 
Weber believed that attempts to bridge the Kantian distinction 
between scientific rationality and the realm of morality led to confusion. 
The only hope for society was to attempt to understand its changes in 
their rationality. It was, perhaps, his observations that socialism had 
little connection with morality, that led him to reaffirm the Kantian 
distinction in his implicit critique of Marx. The moral realm was, to 
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Weber of vital importance, but in modern rational society it belonged to 
the privacy of the individual conscience. 
Both Marx and Durkheim saw utilitarianism as the antithesis to their 
own approach to the social. For Marx, the doctrine of utility was the 
ally of the British economic system. It was Benthamite morality that 
legitimated the partnership of property and "justice". His attack on 
utilitarianism is implicit in his attack on capitalism. Durkheim's 
debate with utilitarianism was a constant aspect of his work. Utility 
represented the type of secular individualism which he was attempting 
to transcend. The utilitarian individual was unrelated to the social whole, 
his actions were uncontrolled by society. Durkheim was also influenced by the 
general approval of utility. If Marx saw that utilitarianism defied justice, 
then Durkheim was to stress its anti-social nature. As a neo-Kantian, 
Weber's interest did not extend to politico-legal moral systems. 
Utilitarianism, with other moral forms was non-rational and not significant 
to the process of societal rationalisation which concerned him. The way 
Marx, Durkheim and Weber approached morality and how this affected their 
theoretical formulations is now discussed. We review in each case, how 
sociologists working in the tradition of a founding father have treated the 
moral, referring in particular to the Sociology of Education. 
MARX 
Marx and Morality  
The communists do not preach morality at all. . . They do not 
put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be 
egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that 
egoism, just as much as self-sacrifice, is in definite 
circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of 
individuals. Hence, the communists by no means want. . . 
to do away with the "private individual" for the sake of 
the "general", self-sacrificing man. . .6 
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This extract from Marx's critique of Sturmer, in The German Ideology  
has come to exemplify his renunciation of the practice of moralising about 
the state of society.7 For here Marx expresses his distrust of conventional 
moral language which could so easily divert attention from an unjust 
situation. The French bourgeoisie had rallied the masses with the call to 
liberty, equality and fraternity whilst they appropriated the peasants' 
rights in the name of these very principles.5 Marx's focus is not on the 
world of ideals but on the world of definite circumstances, the world of 
"human sense activity" where "man must prove the truth. . . of his thinking 
in practice." 9 
But the opening extract also contains suggestions of Marx's positive 
approaches to value. The communists see egoism as being justified 
("necessary") in terms of their end - communism - where man will 
realise his liberated social being. The very concept of man's restoration 
and fulfilment is a moral one, based on the concept of what is understood 
to be man's "true" nature. Moreover communists, through their study of 
history have shown that the interest of the "general, self-sacrificing man" 
is actually created by "private individuals" - the concept of general 
interest is a ploy to legitimate the interests of a powerful private 
minority. Such a situation cannot be exposed by using the language of 
morality, by condemning it as unfair or unjust. Such a situation requires 
a specialised critique. 
To understand how this critique developed and how it incorporates 
value we need to return to its origins in Hegel and in the reaction called 
forth by Hegelian philosophy. We shall then turn to the moral concepts 
that underline Marx's concept of man and his goal. 
Although Marx's approach to moral language and the realm of value is 
coloured by his historical observations it has its roots in Hegel and 
his critique of Kant. Hegel had rejected Kant's insistence that autonomous 
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thought dealt only with appearances and was thus subjective - the moral 
realm being knowable through introspection alone. Thought was infinite 
and objective dealing with the "noumenal", the realm of things-in-
themselves. Reality was rational and the absolute could be known. Value 
was thus not a category distinct from fact - "is" and "ought" merged as 
history progressed and as it was increasingly understood by the 
philosophical mind. A theory of ethics and hence a theory of politics 
was possible, both being grounded in the understanding of history. 
Essentially the world was in the process of becoming what it "ought to be", 
namely reasonable.10 
Hegel's attempt to bridge the gap between fact and value, which had 
been widening since the fall of Aquinas' Aristotelianism and had reached 
the proportions of a chasm with the Kantian distinction between natural 
science as theoretical and morality as practical-atheoretical, was an 
important philosophical achievement but left his followers with immediate 
problems. As Lichtheim expresses it: 
If the world was not to be confronted with subjective 
demands issuing from the "vanity" of the individual ego, 
then how could there be any kind of practice which did not 
result in conformity with whatever happened to be 
established.11 
In other words, if Kantian subjective autonomy is invalid, where does 
freedom escape the bounds of necessity ? The Hegelians derived the concept 
of a critique which would be grounded in the logic of the historical 
process (to preserve the fact-value relation) but would transcend history. 
Critical understanding was gained by confronting the empirical reality with 
its own logic, (its own norms) not by applying moral commandments, the source 
of which was the noumenous world "beyond". But their answer also left them 
with the further problem as by expressing action as critical understanding 
they were left in the realm of theory. How could they transpose theory to 
practice ? 
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Marx saw these attempts as mere "ideology"12 and set out to base his 
critique in the real movement of empirical history. The "essence of man" 
is replaced by man's "real nature" which is"the totality of social relations". 
And as all social life is essentially practical, a revolutionary critique 
will solve theory's problems "in human practice and in the comprehension 
of this practice".13 By making praxis the central focus for his critique 
Marx thus made a definite break with Hegelian philosophy, for now 
consciousness including moral consciousness, the realm of human values, 
is dependent on praxis-practical human activity. But the Hegelian 
relation between fact and value remains. In praxis as a concept, "is" and 
"ought" are united - man's very humanity is defined in terms of his ability 
to bring about change to his natural environment through his social labour. 
Man is, in fundamental social labour, in the activity of production, what 
he ought to be. But history shows the increasing alienation of man's 
practical activity in production and as man is separated from his "species-
being" so we have "is" being separated from "ought". "Ought" is now 
partially at least, a future category, to be re-united with "is" through 
the overcoming of alienated labour, the emancipation of praxis. But Marx 
has no doubt that this "ought" of the future is no ideal category: it is as 
firmly linked to "is" by history as it was in Hegel's conceptualisation. 
Marx's problem is how to make a real and practical connection between his 
critique and the emancipation of praxis - how to relate his theory to 
revolutionary praxis. 
There are two distinct phases of Marx's critique. In the earlier phase, 
although he sees the problem of social critique as needing a practical 
solution and stresses the need to transcend philosophy, he still presents 
his critique in a philosophical form. In his later phase, however, typified 
by Capital, he dissolves the philosophical form altogether, transforming 
his critique into the form of a critique of political economy in its own 
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terms. Whilst praxis is central to the application of the critique 
throughout, both its conceptualisation and its articulation with theory 
differ with the two approaches. 
Marx's earlier, philosophical approach to praxis is well illustrated 
in the Introduction to his proposed Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.14 
Criticism can only become an effective weapon when it is sufficiently 
radical to seize the masses, inspiring them to practical revolutionary action. 
The "weapon of criticism" will thus be supplanted by the "criticism of 
weapons".
15 
The only way that theory can motivate people is to speak to the 
level of their deepest needs and show how those needs can be actualised. 
The rest must come from the people as: "It is not enough that thought 
should tend towards reality, reality must also tend towards thought." 
The practical task of emancipation will be carried out by the proletariat, 
for this social group alone embodies radical needs. He sees the proletariat 
as the universal class having no particular goals of its own and owning 
nothing, having no structural attachment to capitalism. The proletariat 
has "a universal character because of its universal sufferings and lays 
claim to no particular right, because it is the object of no particular 
injustice but of injustice in general."16 It cannot free itself without 
freeing humanity as a whole .l7 The relationship between theory and practice 
is thus summed up as follows: "As philosophy finds in the proletariat 
its material weapons so the proletariat finds in philosophy its 
intellectual weapons. . . Philosophy cannot realize itself without 
transcending the proletariat, the proletariat cannot transcend itself 
without realizing philosophy."18 
The radical needs which are the essential link with philosophy and 
the proletariat are none other than the need to live as fully human, socially 
related, beings in a society characterised by its co-operative mode of 
production - the society of associated producers.19 Before this can be 
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actualised, the proletariat must become aware of their right to, and need 
of, freedom, justice and equality, not as abstract "bourgeois" ideals but 
as characteristics of a real form of social production which can only be 
realised when capitalism has been superseded. To this end Marx expresses a 
desire to "arouse in the breasts of these men that feeling of human freedom 
that characterizes a man. It is only this feeling. . . that can turn the 
society of men into a community for the realization of their highest end, 
a democratic state."20 
Most of Marx's analyses of the condition of man under capitalism in his 
early writings can be seen as attempts to make critique potentially 
practical through confronting the actual situation with its own norms. Or 
to put it another way, the situation is shown as being what it ought not to 
be by demonstrating how it differs from what in reality it is. 	 In his 
analysis of alienated labour, for example, Marx states that because a man's 
work is imposed and not voluntary, it will not satisfy his essential 
need to express himself through labour but can only act as "a means for 
satisfying other needs."22 Similarly the alienation of the worker from his 
product gives the world of commodities power over him and leaves him 
diminished in his humanity and alienated from his fellow men. The norm is 
here assumed - man's essential nature is social, his essence being 
expressed through freely chosen social labour. Through distortion of his 
labour relations he loses his humanity. This can be restored only through 
his own revolutionary activity. 
Marx's critique developed from a critique of political economy in 
terms of philosophy to a critique of political economy in its own terms. 
In Capital social theory is expressed as a systematic analysis of the 
process of capitalist reproduction - the second phase of Marxian critique. 
Marx's change of tactics was, at least in part due to the failure of the 
Parisian proletariat to sustain its revolution. They must be provided with 
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stronger weapons. The emphasis on praxis now shifted to the potential 
action of Capital's worker readers, who, realising the essentially 
exploitative nature of capitalism would be moved to unite to overthrow it. 
Capital can be seen as continuing Marx's critique of ideology. What appeared 
as justice in action, the idea of a fair day's work for a fair day's pay 
is shown to be nothing but an ideology which legitimates the exchange 
relations of the market place which act in the interests of capital. The 
ideology of "justice" masks the actual situation of exploitation which 
Marx analyses in his value theory of labour.23 Marx's critique in 
Capital demonstrates the existence of two classes in fundamental opposition, 
defined by their relationship to the ownership of the means of production. 
Only through the proletariat coalescing into a self-conscious working class 
and, united, engaging in what is essentially a class struggle, can capitalism 
be overcome. Revolutionary praxis is to be found in united working class 
action, as it struggles to free itself from the fetishism of the commodity 
form which characterises its labour process. 
By emphasising that the social basis of the capitalist mode of 
production consists of two classes which are irreconcilably in opposition, 
and by focussing his critique on the defetishisation of labour relations, 
Marx has lost the power to critique the gap between "is" and "ought" in 
individual praxis. Cohen suggests that there is a fundamental contradiction 
between Marx's early critique that focussed on the radical needs of 
individuals and his later critique in its economic form, that 
emphasises class interests. She considers that the later critique "is 
incapable of uncovering norms and values that could inform the praxis of 
individuals struggling around radical needs."24 It is true that Marx 
still uses morally loaded language in Capital as he strives to develop 
in the workers awareness and understanding of the nature of their 
exploitation and to put into their hands the means of liberation.25 But 
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by replacing individual needs by class interests, Marx has made it 
impossible to guide or to evaluate the actual methods whereby these workers 
carry on the process of revolutionary praxis. The class struggle has been 
placed beyond the reach of the practical application of moral knowledge. 
Not only does Marx leave praxis uninformed by a noemative critique 
but the very nature of the mechanism of the capitalist transformation is 
ambiguous. The "Theses" had indicated that people were to be actively 
engaged in working to change the world but from the time of the German  
Ideology,  Marx had given the impression that change is inevitable - 
that communism is an historical fact that will come.26 This ambiguity can 
be seen as another form of the contradiction between the philosophical 
approach to the proletariat (the theory of radical needs and radical 
praxis) and the critique of political economy and the class analysis 
associated with it.27 Whilst the elements of the self-determination of 
class struggle and the deterministic theory of historical materialism 
(based on the developmental logic of productive forces, i.e. technological 
progress, and its opposition to the relations of production) are both 
present to some extent throughout Marx's later writings, his abandonment 
of a philosophical critique allowed Capital to be interpreted as a 
scientific theory of history. Such a scientific theory would inevitably 
detach any remaining value from the historical "facts". The "is" of 
history would move inexorably towards the goal of emancipation but in no 
way be influenced by the latter's values.28 Scientific socialism lost 
any concept of a morality implicit in Marx's theory, for as the emphasis 
on praxis diminished so did the need to include its moral elements. The 
puritan form of moral consciousness that is promoted in many Marxist 
states and is apparently seen as necessary for social control, is not 
itself derived from Marx's writings. 
The upsurge of humanist Marxism, with its re-emphasis on praxis, has, in 
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recent years led to an interest in Marx's actual moral ideas. What does 
Marx really mean when he uses words like truth, freedom and justice and 
what moral concepts are implicit in his moralising-free method of 
describing the social formation of the future ? We shall turn briefly to 
an examination of the implicit moral concepts in Marx, reviewing the recent 
attempts of moral philosophers to elucidate a coherent Marxian morality. 
Freedom as an ideal has been a dominant theme of Marx since his 
earliest writings. Freedom is one of man's radical needs, as it is part of 
his nature to direct his own activities - "that feeling of human freedom 
that characterises a man."
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If praxis is the underlying theme of Marx's 
works, then freedom is the moral principle that above all characterises 
praxis. Kamenka describes Marx's concept of freedom, in his view, the key 
to understanding Marx's ethical basis, as follows: 
To be truly self-determined and free from contradiction 
is to be truly real and truly good. To exhibit dependence 
(determination from without), division, instability and 
"self-contradiction" is to fall short, to be evil. . .30 
Marx never, however, fully explicates his concept of freedom in terms 
of actual society. Freedom is visualised in terms of the free social 
individual living in a society where "the necessary or true needs" of all 
members could be met - the possibility of continued scarcity is not 
considered.31 Moreover servility and dependence are seen as temporary 
phenomena, as being related to the alienation of labour rather than stemming 
from any positive human characteristics. Yet, Kamenka argues, there is 
no evidence for this, on the contrary, some form of human dependence 
appears to be a permanent feature of social interaction.32 Freedom for Marx 
is essentially an idealistic notion of self-determination and not an 
adequate concept of what it would mean for an individual to be "free" 
within a human society. 
There is continuous debate amongst philosophers about the existence 
and nature of theories of truth and justice in Marx. Kolakowski33  and 
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other advocates of the pragmatist/relativist theory of truth in Marx are 
challenged by those defending an objectivist view of truth. The debate is 
confused by differing approaches to Marxian epistemology. Those, who like 
Kolakowski, emphasise the philosophical Marx of the early writings are 
able to synthesise a coherent relativist theory but advocates of the 
scientific Marx are divided. So we find Binns asserting that "Positistic 
marxism and Structural marxism bear no relationship to truth, "34 whilst 
Collier defends an objectivist view of truth as essential if Marxism is 
to be understood as the science of social formations.35 
Attempts to discover a coherent concept of justice behind Marx's 
condemnation of capitalism, such as that of Ralph Dahrendorf, have been, 
on the whole, unsuccessful.36 A.W. Wood, attacking these attempts, argues 
that nowhere does Marx give any clear conception of right or justice. 
Marx sees the juridicial point of view as essentially one-sided, and 
universal principle, abstracted from a concrete historical context as 
empty and useless, whilst applied to such a context they are misleading 
and distorting.37 Wood does believe that Marx's critique contains an 
implicit critique of justice but only as part of his critique of bourgeois 
ideology, and not as the fundamental basis to his condemnation of 
capitalism as some philosophers have wished to argue. In Marx's view, 
Wood reminds us, capitalism "was breaking down because it was irrational" 
not because it was unjust 38 
Failure to discover any particular moral or social principle underlying 
Marx's critique of capitalism has led radical philosophers into attempts to 
redefine morality to fit their espoused version of Marxism. The activist 
Marxists who desire some guidelines for their praxis, believe that "moral 
ideology" should be superseded by a "naturalistic practical reason"39 
or by a "radical-materialist conception of morality" that will recharge it 
"for an assault into the homes and into the schools."40 From a position 
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of scientific Marxism, however, it can be argued that morality is neither 
more nor less than Marxism itself. For, if one sets out from the classical 
definition of mor4lity as "a scientific investigation of the social order 
which can generate norms for action", then if Marx's interpretation of 
society is true and is believed to be true, knowledge of life would be 
"scientific knowledge", capable of controlling everyday actions, and 
judgements based on this science would be moral judgements.41 
It can thus be seen that attempts to connect Marx too directly with 
morality lead either to a distortion of Marx's thought (as Wood claims to 
result from Dahrendorf's approach) or, in the case of the radical 
philosophers, to a distortion of the concept of morality. For whilst 
judgement about everyday actions are indeed an aspect of the moral realm, to 
brand such universals as freedom and justice as ideologies and to limit 
morality to practical guidelines is to lose touch with the criteria by 
which these practical guidelines can claim moral status. So conceptualised, 
moral argument could bear no relationship to truth. Although Marx does have 
a concept of what man is, and thus what man ought to be when liberated and 
restored, one cannot derive a coherent theory of morality or even an 
elucidated set of moral principles from his concept of man.42 This is not 
surprising, for Marx was attempting to supersede the philosophical form of 
morality. While it is not untrue to describe his aim as emancipation and 
his underlying theme as the ideal of freedom, this philosophical form, found 
at its best in Kamenka, loses Marx's main driving force. Marx was aiming 
at a particular form of liberated society and his constant theme was not the 
ideal of freedom as much as the actuality of praxis. 
It is however, the concept of praxis that has raised endless barriers 
for Marxists searching for an ethic inherent to Marx and thus suitable to 
guide both Marxist political action and everyday life under Marxism. In the 
first place, because of the ambiguities in Marx's thought, such scholars 
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must contend with those scientific Marxists who believe that praxis is 
irrelevant as Marxism is the science of history and human action cannot 
change the course of history. But scientific Marxism aside, if the critique 
of the mature Marx is taken into consideration, one must define praxis 
in terms of the class struggle, and as we saw above, not only is a class 
unmotivated by needs in the way that an individual is, there can be no way 
of applying any type of normative or ideological critique to a class such as 
the proletariat as it engages in struggle. A critique of political economy 
in its economic form may unmask private interests that masquerade as the 
general good, but it cannot act as a critique of united class praxis. 
Analysis of Marx's philosophical works via themes such as radical needs or 
alienation43 which shed light on praxis and show the continuation of the 
humanist thread running through his later writings, has helped combat 
the scientific Marxist school but has not related praxis to ethics. 
Karel Kosik is one Marxist philosopher who has made a serious 
attempt to grasp the moral within Marxism, ("the relation between the 
individual and society, between man and reality")44 by re-examining the 
concept of praxis. He believes that there is an implied morality in 
praxis, that it transcends the moment of labour by involving the moment of 
"recognition". Recognition is the process of realising human freedom.45 
Revolutionary praxis if pursued via a dialectic that attempts to reveal 
contradictions and transcend them, will itself be "moral" activity. Only 
thus can one prevent social politics from degenerating "into social 
engineering, which is in turn based on the scientific mechanism of 
economic forces."46 Kosik Is concern to explicate the implicitly moral 
within praxis and thus to restore morality to politics is important and 
necessary but he fails to show how such a dialectic is to proceed or by 
what means it is to reveal contradictions. Marx's failure to give any 
thought to political education or to give any guidelines for the moral 
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conduct of members of socialist society strengthens the position of 
the social engineers. 
Marx then, has made a potential contribution towards understanding the 
meaning of morality in modern society but the potential cannot yet be 
fully realised. He has shown that norms and moral codes spring from 
social activities and not vice versa, so that morality does not come 
from some transcendent realm but is a product of man. He has further 
shown that moral ideals can be treacherous when they hide the truth of an 
unjust social situation. He has developed the tool of critique to expose 
the masking of interests. He has suggested that fact and value are 
related in praxis. But his emphasis on class interests and his stress on the 
importance of technological development as the prime mover in historical 
materialism has confused the concept of praxis. This has left his followers 
with a serious problem if they wish to articulate morality within 
Marxism. As it stands, Marx's concept of praxis cannot give rise to an 
adequate conceptualisation of morality. 
We shall now turn to Marxist sociology to see how it has taken 
possession of and built upon Marx's thought, how it has treated the 
moral and in what ways Marx's theoretical inadequacies have affected 
its development. We shall look at this with particular reference to 
sociological studies in the field of education. 
Marx and the Moral in the Sociology of Education  
Whether or not there can be said to be a Marxist sociology is a 
47 
contentious issue, 	 but there are certainly Marxists working as 
professional sociologists and sociologists who approach the discipline 
from, at least in part, a Marxist perspective. For there is not one but 
many Marxisms and the approach taken to the study of sociology and within 
sociology to the moral, will vary with the theoretical foundations of the 
form of Marxist thought the student embraces. 
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Bottomore places the major: division in Marxism between those who 
conceive of it as a philosophical world view or philosophy of history and 
those who conceive of it primarily as an objective science of society.48 
Goldmann sees the orthodox school of Marxism as falling into the second 
category, its most extreme expression being Max Adler's belief that Marx 
was the true founder of sociology. "Marxism", asserted Adler, "is a system 
of sociological knowledge. It bases socialism on the causal knowledge 
of the processes of social life. Marxism and sociology are one and the 
same thing."49 To such a position, the moral is at best an implicit and 
involuntary feature of Marx's writings and has no place in Marxist analysis. 
Fact and value are radically separated and any idea of an ethical 
foundation to socialism is rejected. 
Goldmann, himself, with Luk6cs and other humanist Marxists such as 
Gramsci would tend to see Marxism as a unified philosophy of history. For 
Goldmann there is no dichotomy between fact and value as both move 
together. "The idea of progress towards socialism is in fact for Marx both 
part of his theoretical construction, and of his scale of values. . ."50 
There will be, however, little chance of such Marxists undertaking empirical 
investigations relating to morality as they are philosophers rather than 
social scientists and as we saw in the last section any philosophical 
endeavours must contend with insoluble contradictions. 
The situation of the various Marxisms is however anything but the 
simple division above. The theoretical variants of Marxism in particular 
are many and complex, as is demonstrated by the different forms of 
structural Marxism. Althusser's Marxism, for example, is anti-humanist 
and anti-empirical in addition to being anti-economistic. For him, men 
relate to their real conditions of existence via a set of illusory 
representations of reality - the medium of ideology. Ideology is 
permanent and has no history yet it is the cement of social cohesion in every 
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period of history. It is of necessity distorted - an ensemble of false 
beliefs. Even the concept of an idea is ideological - people are 
deluded in their belief that they are free subjects possessing beliefs 
and ideas and showing them in action.51 For Althusser, a persons ideas 
"are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by 
material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological 
apparatus from which derive the ideas of this subject."52 
In Althusserian Marxism the moral is even less accessible than the 
empirical. Morality becomes part of the distorted world of ideology 
embedded in attitudes and practices reproduced by the various institutions 
serving the state. 
Perry Anderson has suggested that the proliferation of theoretical 
variants in Western Marxism may be related to the fact that they have been 
created by isolated scholars, usually in universities, whose theory is 
unrelated to a revolutionary mass movement.53 In his Afterword, Anderson 
attempts to correct the impression he may have given of activism - "Marxist 
theory is thus not, despite every laudable temptation, to be equated with a 
revolutionary sociology."54 Because Marxism claims to be a "science of 
history" it cannot be confined to the contemporary - it is incompatible 
with any philosophical pragmatism. This places a limit on the unity of 
theory and practice55 and suggests that the relationship is more complex 
than classical Marxism foresaw. 
Sociological activism is by no means rare, however, amongst 
sociologists of a general Marxist persuasion. Whilst they do not attempt 
to explicate the moral in Marx and have no conceptual framework in which 
to discuss the morality in or of a social situation, their entire endeavour 
is a moral exercise. By practicing their sociology they are attempting to 
engage in revolutionary praxis. Like Marx, they are approaching 
"ought" through "is", whilst blurring the distinction. 
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There have been few attempts by Marxist scholars to apply a Marxist 
analysis to some form of social life specifically in order to explicate 
aspects of the moral. It is not surprising, then, that critiques of the 
morality within Marxism or of Marxist practices are almost unknown. Maria 
Ossowska is one Marxist who has concentrated on the moral as an aspect of 
the social. In England, a group of sociologists has attempted to devise a 
radical Marx-based theory in the field of deviance. Both have met with 
problems stemming from the limitations of their theory in dealing with the 
moral. 
Ossowska takes a modern Eastern European position where Marxism is a 
philosophical and historical world view and where morality is a form of 
ideology, determined by factors of social life. In Social Determinants of 
Moral Ideas, 56 Ossowska uses the term "moral" in a "neutral" sense to 
denote a particular kind of value judgment to do with action, or for 
distinguishing right from wrong.57 Her discussion of descriptive ethics 
is brief - she notes, en passant, that the sociology of morality is a 
neglected field, not listed in Sociological Abstracts. The bulk of her 
discussion is of moral phenomena which belong to the normative realm 
and various factors are suggested which are determinants for moral codes 
and ideas. Much of this is a review and as sixteen factors are dealt with, 
the treatment is brief. Morality on the whole, exists in society as 
clusters of approved virtues and she discusses the development of two 
European ideal types, the nobility ethos and the bourgeois ethos. About 
the concept of morality itself, she concludes (in the light of her discussion 
of the evolution of these ideal types): The duality of civic and self-
regarding virtues to which I pointed above make difficult not only a 
definition of morality which would aspire to finding some common features 
in the content of moral judgments but also one which would confine itself to 
certain formal traits.58 
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Ossowska's problem in defining the concept of morality and her need 
to confine herself to an atheoretical description of codes and virtues shows 
up the weakness of her type of world-view Marxism for dealing with the moral. 
For not only does she fail to define a "moral idea" but she fails to 
theorise the way in which these ideas are in fact determined by the social. 
A possible critique of the moral in society from a Marxian position 
would be in the field of deviance and criminology. Taylor, Walton and 
Young show how there is a swing away from theories about law breakers 
"towards social theories of rule-creation and rule-breaking, located in a 
wider, more complex moral and social dynamic. . ."59 The adequacy of such 
theories must be assessed in terms of their "utility in demasking the moral 
and ideological veneer of an unequal society and in terms of its ability 
to enliven the critical debate. . ."60 
However much their aim may appear to be true to the Marxian 
historical critique the radical deviance theorists have not yet achieved it. 
Hirst points out that whilst radical deviance theory does question value 
assumptions of established interests and the ideological stand of orthodox 
criminology, it rarely questions its own position's assumptions and 
interests.61 He suggests that radicals, by attempting to apply Marxism to 
a pre-given field of sociology are actually engaging in a more or less 
revisionist activity - i.e. it must modify and distort Marxist concepts 
to suit its own pre-Marxist purpose." The objects of Marxism are specified 
by its own concepts: the mode of production, the class struggle, the state, 
ideology etc.", Hirst asserts.
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As Marxism has a quite different view of 
crime and deviancy from that of the radicals (crime is not for Marx a 
radical activity nor a form of rebellion but a reactionary, anti-working 
class activity), it is senseless to speak in terms of a "Marxist" theory of 
deviance. Now even if some consider that Hirst is being unnecessarily 
purist in his approach it must be accepted that this field has produced 
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few studies and has few proponents.63 
In the Sociology of Education, there has been no attempt to develop a 
Marxist critique of the moral per se. Many studies however have an 
implicit moral content and others, whilst in no way explicating the moral, 
contain a moral imperative. The moral content of such studies can be 
seen to fall into two categories - the category of critique and the 
category of praxis. 
Studies in the first category are essentially critiques of 
educational ideology, of societal and pedagogical assumptions about 
education. Such assumptions are frequently moral or have moral overtones. 
It has been widely believed in the United States that education is for liberty 
and equality. Clarence Karier and Michael Apple64 have shown that two 
commonly accepted agents of "liberty", the system of psychological testing 
and the content of the liberal curriculum actually militate against the 
social mobility of the economically disadvantaged. Bowles and Gintis have 
attempted to show that education is a reflection of the American economy, a 
vast machine for reproducing the social division of labour.65 
A much deeper and more sophisticated critique of an educational system 
is Bourdieu's work on education in France. He reveals the social nature 
of scholastic excellence and exposes the myth of equality of educational 
opportunity.66 But profound as Bourdieu's work may be, as a Marxist 
critique67  it does not come to grips with elements of the moral. As with 
the Americans, his moral judgement lies in the exposure that education is 
not what it claims to be or what it is believed to be. The above critiques 
are not so much judgements about justice as about truth. 
In England we have had a shorter tradition of the widespread 
acceptance of the ideology of equality of educational opportunity than in 
the U.S. but there has been a strong belief in working class movements 
that education acts in the interests of the working class. 
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Many Marxist orientated studies have argued that "the school is an 
instrument of social control perpetuating the hegemony of the ruling class."68 
The Birmingham centre for cultural studies has worked in this area.69 
Paul Willis' research into the transition from school to work for 
working class youths70 tries to do more than merely describe an aspect of 
the differential function of schools in reproducing the division of labour 
and thus expose the liberal-democratic myth of "equality". His "lads" 
are part of a wider working class culture which articulates with that of 
school and work in a complex network of ideologies and practices. And this 
working class is not a powerless group of the oppressed but a group with 
potential for struggle, in the Thompsonian tradition.71 Willis brings 
the notion of self-determination and autonomy into his account, even though 
such factors are not directed towards liberty and fulfilment. He suggests 
that, in fact, "it is the partly 'autonomous' counter-cultures of the 
working class at the site of the school which behind the back of official 
policy ensure the continuity of its own underprivilege. . ."72 Even if 
we ignore the theoretical problems that accompany the use of the phrase 
"working class culture" as a general category,73 what came out strongly is 
Willis' lack of clarity in his expression of the moral. Like Marx, he appears 
to view self-determination as a "goal" but fails to explain why this is at 
times to be seen as "joyous, creative and attractive" and yet also contains 
"an element of self damnation".74 Because of this ambiguity in his 
underlying concept of the "desirable" his work fails to make it clear 
whether he is attempting a Marxist critique of the ideology of education or 
whether he is pointinkg to a supposed feature of the seeds of emancipation 
within working class consciousness. 
The "Marxism as critique" approach which comes closest to making a 
moral statement about education is to be found in studies which set out 
to show that educational practices can be seen as aspects of alienation. 
We are not referring here, to early U.S. studies influenced by writers 
77 
such as Lukacs or Fromm which tended to see alienation in psychological 
terms
75 but to the work of sociologists such as Michael Young and his 
followers. Here alienation is seen in its classical Marxist sense of a 
specific mode of distortion of the means of achieving objectification under 
capitalism. Young starts out from the Marxist assumption that a central 
part of men's historical possibilities for fulfilment as human beings is 
their appropriation and transformation of the natural world of which they 
are part. He suggests that one part of this human possibility, the 
professional practice of scientists and science educators has become 
separated off, during the last two centuries, and has developed an 
independent existence. This separation is a feature of man's alienation. 
He shows this process existing at various levels of scientific knowledge and 
its transmission76 for the Nuffield Science Projects stress on Science as 
"commodity knowledge", to actual classroom practices. 
Like the more general critiques, these studies can be said to have 
the moral purpose of showing up undesirable elements in the educational 
system and thus clearing the way for possible action. As Hextall and Sarup 
put it at the conclusion of their study: "One starts by taking 
responsibility for making oneself knowledgeable. Then, it will be possible 
for knowledge and action to be joined."77 This is the voice of the early 
Marx when the stress is still on critique at the philosophical level. The 
assumptions are almost Platonic, in reverse - if one knows what is wrong 
one will take steps to right it. As we saw in the previous section, critique 
which does not give guidelines for remedial action, cannot be called 
morally sufficient. 
Hirst points out that to use alienation in an explanatory sense, as 
Marxist studies of deviance have done is improper. He stresses that 
alienation does not exist as an isolated concept but must always be seen 
in relation to "man's-being-towards-communism".78 Young's studies are 
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contextualised in Marxism and have the implicit morality of all such 
critique, with the same problem of how to bring about change. 
The category of praxis, like Marx's later work, focussed on the need 
for the working class to take practical steps towards their own emancipation. 
Like Marx's later work, it loses all purchase on the concept of morality. 
Whilst the sociology of critique has an implicit moral force, the sociology 
of praxis degenerates into a general activism. This approach is typified 
by Frith and Corrigan's, "The Politics of Education".79  Here politics 
means organized working-class politics. The call for praxis sounds clearly. 
"'Bring Politics into the Classroom !' 'Bring the Classroom into Politics !I" 
The only good is the implied socialist end and how this end is to be reached 
we are not told. For if working class involvement as praxis is to succeed 
then it needs direction and a means of criticising its own methods. 
We appear, then, to be left with more than pointers to guide 
Sociology in the task of making use of Marx's insight into the social nature 
of morality. Marx's great contribution to a sociology of morality was his 
insistence that the moral reals be understood in terms of real human 
activity and not in terms of a future ideal. Injustice must be exposed not 
through moralistic argument but through a critique which reveals the 
nature of the exploitation in real material terms and unmasks moral ideas 
which are serving to legitimate the injustice. 
So far, Marxists working in the Sociology of Education have made little 
progress in applying these insights, have done little to clarify their 
concept of morality and have not engaged in a morally adequate critique 
of any aspect of education. We contribute this lack of progress not to the 
sloth or disinterest of the sociologists but to Marx's theoretical 
weakness. Marx's ambiguous concept of praxis was inadequate as a base for 
a coherent sociology of morality and he left no moral guidelines within 
his model of emancipated society which could direct the emancipatory 
activity of either pen or proletariat. 
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CURKHEIM  
Durkheim, Morality and the Moral Ideal  
"Durkheim believes that the moral ideal is a social ideal, that society, 
the object of moral action, also confers its value on moral action," wrote 
Aron at the conclusion of his essay on Durkheim.80  Indeed Durkheim does 
appear to believe that the moral realm is a function of the social. But why ? 
He cannot, in all honesty be said to have "discovered" the relationship, 
however much his empirically based examples in works such as The Elementary  
Forms of the Religious Life, appear to give substance to the idea. Is it 
perhaps that Durkheim is merely a moral philosopher who has become aware of 
the reality of social forces and that Durkheimian sociology is merely a by-
product of his moral philosophy ?
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Or does Durkheim's preoccupation with 
morality make better sense when seen in the context of his passion to 
establish a science of society. A science which attempts to complete the 
project begun by Comte "to occupy the last space in knowledge created by 
the order of the real, a space which has always existed but for which until 
now man has been unready and unequal."
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Giddens states that Durkheim began his intellectual career with an 
attempt to found a "science of morality", that this led him to look to 
sociology for method and that thence he was led, by the moral nature of 
social facts, back to moral philosophy.83 But we propose a more active 
Durkheim who pursued knowledge and tried to get to grips with anpirical 
reality in a way that Kant and the "moralists"
84 
never could.85 Fur 
Durkheim, trained in philosophy and history, morality must have presented 
both an opportunity and a challenge. An opportunity, because if the moral 
could be studied objectively it could help answer the question that emerged 
from his early studies and would remain pertinent to his later work - the 
question of the relationship of the individual to "social solidarity".86 
Morality, unlike art, was present in all societies - "the least indispensable, 
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the strictly necessary, the daily bread without which societies cannot 
exist"87 and so would allow a comparative study of societies. Moreover moral 
phenomena whilst in themselves inaccessible can be studied via external 
indices which act as visible symbols. So that law and custom are symbols of 
the moral bonds which provide society with its solidarity88 and the nature 
and characteristics of the latter can be understood through an empirical 
investigation of the former. So moral facts lend themselves readily, if 
indirectly, to scientific study in the world of social reality. 
But to study moral facts as social facts is also a challenge. Morality 
has always been the exclusive province of philosophers who, since the 
Reformation, have sought to expound it with reference to the individual. 
Both the Kantian imperative and the utilitarian ethic were expressed in 
terms of individual action and bore no direct relationship to the social. 
Individualism and idealism could be challenged at the same time if one 
managed to study morality as a science. Morality was even more of a 
challenge because it had traditionally been intimately connected with 
religion, until recently, in France, being strongly under the sway of the 
Catholic Church. As a student at the Ecole Normal, and later as a teacher 
in the provinces, Durkheim was made aware of France's educational heritage 
and of the effect of the Jesuit Colleges on the national character and of 
their essentially moral approach to education.89 Durkheim was a convinced 
and dedicated secularist and both in philosophy and education was quick to 
translate the religio-moral into secular moral terms.90 To isolate the 
moral and treat it as science was to help free it from religion. The end of 
the road for this process, when Durkheim had returned to a philosophical study 
of morality, is seen in this comment. "Kant postulates God, since 
without this hypothesis morality is unintelligible. We postulate a society 
specifically distinct from individuals, since otherwise morality has no 
object and duty no roots. Let us add that this postulate is easily verified 
by experience. "91 
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Even though Durkheim left the scientific study of morality to return 
to its philosophical exposition, it would appear that he considered that 
he had successfully described value in terms of fact92 and that his 
empirical investigations into the realm of the ideal had been fruitful.93 
In his essay "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality", published with 
"The Determination of Moral Facts" (quoted above) posthumously, Durkheim 
states that sociology's particular field of study is the ideal and that the 
method of study must be the scientific method.94 Judgments of value and 
judgments of fact are of the same order because whilst the former refers to 
ideals and the latter to concepts, both ideals and concepts are constructs 
of the human mind and both exist in society in symbolic form - "concrete 
realizations".95 Now Durkheim believed that he had already demonstrated 
this empirically in The Elementary Forms - religious beliefs, moral values 
and concepts of the cosmos are all to be seen as symbolic representations of 
collective social practice. His thesis is that the earliest forms of 
collective understanding were religious beliefs and that "religious 
conceptions are the result of determined social causes."96 Once man had 
the "idea that there are internal connections between things" in religious 
terms, science and philosophy become possible.97 After giving numerous 
examples of the close relationship that exists in primitive societies between 
the experience of their natural and social world and their symbolic 
expressions through totem, rites and ceremonies (their ideal world) he 
draws the following conclusions: 
The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an irreducible 
fact which escapes science; it depends upon conditions which 
observation can touch; it is a natural product of social life. 
For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain 
at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it 
thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself. . . . 
A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself 
without at the same time creating an ideal. . . . The 
collective ideal which religion expresses is far from being 
due to a vague innate power of the individual, but it is 
rather at the school of collective life that the individual has 
learned to idealize.98 
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Secular concepts are formed by a similar process to religious concepts, 
being "the manner in which society represents things" and the value 
attributed to secular knowledge will itself depend" upon the idea which 
we collectively form of its nature and role in life."99 
We have been illustrating our suggestion that far from really founding 
a science of morality, Durkheim merely assumed the moral as a social fact. 
Then, after using "moral facts" to help explain the nature and the evolution 
of social cohesion and to assist him in his critique of egoism and 
utilitarianism, he relegated morality with religion to the realm of the 
ideal, one which was not of a different order from the realm of scientific 
fact. Both are socially created, accessible to empirical investigation and 
both are interconnected. This is not to condemn Durkheim's treatment of the 
moral. He was a philosopher and a sociologist - he did not wish to be a 
moralist. 
He may indeed appear to be something of a "moralist" when he 
approaches education but it is suggested that even in Moral Education  
he was making use of moral language and concepts to answer the question: 
"How is the secular school to shape children according to the needs of 
society ?" 	 At the same time by seeing the school as a micro-society he 
could expound the two-fold manner by which the individual was in society 
and yet had society in him (discussed as "moral" bonds) and yet could still 
retain his autonomy as an individual. But autonomy will not mean 
individual decisions according to conscience as the Protestant ethos 
stresses, it will involve the knowledge of the "laws of morality" which 
means the socially accepted moral rules. Because, as Durkheim has expressed 
from the start: "To act morally is to act in terms of the collective 
interest. . . the domain of the moral begins where the domain of the 
social begins.01 0  Morality and moral language are then not only products 
of the social but agents of the social. They are of strategic interest to 
Durkheim in his elucidation of the nature of social solidarity and the 
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limits of individualism.101 
It could be said that Durkheim is closest to being a moralist when he 
is not using moral language but speaking of his vision of education based 
on a concept of human nature which is "infinitely flexible", having within it 
a "multitude of unrealised potentialities" through which individuals can 
"achieve real self knowledge" and learn to act with knowledge and under-
standing.102 This vision of education is one not of socialisation but of 
emancipation. "Here we have a first goal which deserves to be methodically 
and systematically sought after. It contains everything which is necessary 
to attract someone engaged in an activity which he would like to regard as 
useful. But how are we to attain this goal ? This education in the world of 
persons, via what disciplines and with what methods is it most suitably 
carried out ?"103 
Durkheim's main concern, then, was not what was the essential nature 
of morality but what was the essential nature of society. Society becomes 
the totality and morality is ultimately expressed in terms of the whole. 
But first the nature of the cohesive forces within society had been 
explained by means of the more readily accessible moral "facts". For 
society itself is less suitable as a subject for scientific investigation 
than practices and beliefs within it. It was not until Durkheim began his 
investigations of the beliefs and practices of primitive societies that 
he was able to observe a society as an entity, as a unit. The moral now can 
be described less in terms of its function in society and more in terms of its 
creation by and symbolic relationship to, society. We must not expect, then, 
that Durkheim's conceptualisation of morality will either be totally 
consistent or explicit. Nor is it likely to be totally inclusive. For 
his is not a study of morality but of society. We turn now to his explicit 
moral concepts, from his early works, through to his mature works. 
Prior to The Division of Labour, Durkheim had conceptualised morality 
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in terms of "the facts of the moral life". First amongst these were 
obligatory rules of conduct but also included were "sentiments of sympathy 
and love, feelings of ultimate loyalty and disinterested devotion, emotional 
reactions of remorse and regret, and the conscious pursuit of order, harmony, 
solidarity and well-being."104 In the Division of Labour the moral is seen 
in terms of the types of relationships existing between participating 
members of a society. The central problem is: "What are the bonds which 
unite men one with another and how do they change in nature as society 
develops." Of his two ideal societal types those exhibiting "mechanical 
solidarity" have such bonds between individuals but specifically defined 
norms covering every facet of daily life and a collective consciousness 
which is absolute religion and transcendal, related to the interests of 
society as a whole. More advanced societies, typified by their "organic 
solidarity" exhibit the phenomena of collective consciousness to a small 
degree and in nature it tends to be secular, human-oriented and abstract. 
Members are bonded together by the diversity of individual social roles 
creating the need for a co-operative interdependence. Norms are more 
general and tend to relate to a person's differentiated status through work, 
family etc. Supreme value is attached to the individual dignity as well 
as certain secular ideals such as equality of opportunity and social 
justice.105 Moral solidarity in primitive societies thus depends on a 
psychological resemblance produced by shared beliefs and in advanced 
societies it depends not on similarity but on heterogeneity. But in 
addition to their bonds of economic interdependence, individuals in 
advanced societies have stronger individual personalities, are tied to 
each other with bonds of mutual concern and have a sense of dependence 
on and devotion to society as a whole. Durkheim affirms that co-operation 
has just as much "intrinsic morality" as a community of beliefs.106 In the 
Division of Labour,  then, we have various aspects of the moral being used in 
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the analysis of societal types but not a great deal of conceptual clarity in 
what is meant by morality. At this stage one can distinguish these 
principal types of moral phenomena - interpersonal sympathy, group loyalty 
and moral obligation.107 
In The Rules of Sociological Method Durkheim introduces the concept 
of the normal as opposed to the pathological in society as the principal 
empirical method for ascertaining the value of its rules and institutions. 
In practice "the normal type merges with the average type."108 In addition 
to a social phenomenon being normal and thus desirable if it exists in the 
average society it must also serve a useful social function. Thus not only 
moral rules such as those of respecting private property are seen as 
desirable but crime itself is normal and necessary - "a factor in public 
health, an integral part of all healthy societies."109 
If society were perfectly controlled by collective sentiments there 
could be no individuality and thus no change. "To make progress, 
individual originality must be able to express itself. In order that the 
originality of the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may find 
expression, it is necessary that the originality of the criminal, who is 
below the level of his time shall also be possible. One does not occur 
without the other."110 
Durkheim also believes in the possibility of the functional rebel 
- someone like Socrates who is morally ahead of his time, "an anticipation 
of future morality" and who although defined as a criminal "plays a 
definite role in social life."111 
Durkheim's moral theory has a major development in Suicide where we 
see an increasing emphasis on the idealistic nature of group life112 - an 
individual is attached to a group in terms of its shared ideals and ends. 
Durkheim's categories of egoistic and altruistic suicide are defined as 
suffering from too little and too much shared group ideals and beliefs 
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respectively. Anomie and fatalistic categories however are classified 
according to their degree of normative control, the former being in-
sufficiently regulated and the latter overregulated and lacking in 
individuation. As norms in an advanced society are partially related 
to one's position in the division of labour, the individual suffering from 
anomie will lack the relevant norms for the place he occupies in society. 
Both the ideals and ends of group life and practice and social norms are 
seen as collective representatives. 
These concepts are the basis of his argument in Moral Education. 
The moral aspect of regulation by norms is discussed as "discipline". Here 
regularity and the acceptance of authority are essential. Regular habits 
will predetermine the child to appropriate modes of response needed for 
order and organization, and authority will give him the necessary limits to 
enable him to attain worthwhile goals and the feeling that beyond him are 
forces that set bounds for him. Attachment is seen as personal commitment 
to social groups as well as to shared group aims and ideals. Thus "a 
bond of constant communication is established between the consciousness 
of the child and others' consciousness. "113 
These two aspects of social bonding are offset by autonomy or self- 
determination. The individual must not merely have his behaviour regulated 
by rules not of his own making. "We are not free if the law by which we 
regulate our behavior is imposed on us, if we have not freely desired it."114 
But this cannot mean licence to disobey rules, so autonomy is best reached 
through a rational acceptance and understanding of rules. 
In Education and Sociology education is defined as consisting "of a 
methodical socialization of the young generation", where the "social being" 
is constituted in each individual. "The social being" is defined as a 
system of ideas, sentiments and practices which express in us, not our 
personality, but the group or different groups of which we are part; these 
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are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national and 
professional tradition, collective opinions of every kind. . ."
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This concept of the social being is characteristic of Durkheim's mature 
work, where the moral is defined and described entirely in terms of society. 
Man is "homo duplex" having in one personality his individuality together 
with "everything in us that expresses something other than ourselves."
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Within him is the "sacred", all that represents the social and the "profane", 
his individual self. Moral rules are nothing but "norms that have been 
elaborated by society" yet this makes them sacred and gives them their 
obligatory character, the "authority of society".
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The moral problem for 
the individual is that "the interests of the whole are not necessarily 
those of the part" so he is "required to make perpetual and costly 
sacrifices."
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Autonomy has now become an aspect of society, no longer to be defined 
in terms of individual knowledge for all knowledge is social.
119 
"For man 
freedom consists in deliverance from blind, unthinking physical forces; this 
he achieves by opposing against them the great and intelligent force which 
is society, under whose protection he shelters. By putting himself under the 
wing of society, he makes himself also, to a certain extent dependent upon 
it. But this is a liberating dependence. There is no paradox here."
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The moral authority of society stems from the fact that society is "a 
higher and richer conscience than our own, one upon which we feel that 
our own depends," and from which is derived "all the essentials of our 
mental life." In a secular world, in fact, society replaces God as the 
highest imaginable "being", the source of what makes us human, our mental 
and moral sensibility. "The believer bows before his God, because it is 
from God that he believes he holds his being, particularly his mental being, 
his soul. We have the same reasons for experiencing this feeling before 
the collective."121 So ultimately, society as the source of all collective 
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representations is the source of all forms of knowledge - concepts, ideals 
and values - as well as being the custodian of the symbolic and 
institutionalised forms of these representations. In this and this alone 
lies its moral authority. 
If one analyses the way Durkheim conceptualises the moral it is hard 
to escape the conclusion that in his middle period at least he was a 
rule utilitarian. Wallwork classifies much of Durkheim's treatment of the 
moral as utilitarian.122 Conventional rules and institutions are "useful" 
in the sense of being necessary for peaceful social solidarity where this 
state is seen as having intrinsic value. "Rules are justified if and only 
if they share in the intrinsic value of social solidarity, assuming that 
solidarity includes peace, trust, mutuality, and co-operation."123 In 
moral Education Durkheim justifies discipline in terms of its "social 
utility" and translates the famous Kantian ideal of autonomy into an 
understanding of the reasons for rules. Giddens sees some of this aspect 
in Durkheim, pointing out that he "drew upon utilitarianism in order 
to criticize Kant." 
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It is understandable that philosopher-protagonists of Durkheim would 
want to gloss over the notion of normality as a criterion for desirability 
which is put forward in the Rules. As Wallwork comments, after mentioning 
Durkheim's "getting entangled in complex logical gymnastics: "In any case, 
it is a matter of record that Durkheim placed considerably less stress on the 
test of normality after 1897."125 Durkheim's concept here, appears both 
crudely utilitarian and relativist. Not only must the phenomena be necessary 
to a society but relates to one particular type of society and not to human 
society in general. 
When we come to Durkheim's mature work we are led to the conclusion that 
his position is now one of ethical relativism. Giddens believes that 
Durkheim probably never held moral relativistic views although it might be 
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taken that he does imply that there can be no universal theory of morality.126 
An analysis of what he actually writes about the relationship of the moral 
to society, especially the social genesis of the moral and the moral 
authority of society would appear to leave us in no doubt. It is true that 
he does allege at various points in his writings, that a moral principle 
is right because it is universally acknowledged by the moral conscience of 
mankind.127 But on the whole his argument, expressed most clearly in the 
essays of Sociology and Philosophy but well backed by his discussions in 
The Elementary Forms is that value judgements are valid if and only if they 
correctly represent changing collective ideals. As Wallwork points out: 
"The problem with this argument lies with the underlying assumption that the 
statement "X is right or good" means "X is approved by my society." These 
statements, however, are not synonymous, for it is one thing to say that 
murder is disapproved by my society, but it is quite a different thing to 
assert that murder is wrong for reasons that rational men will accept."128 
A separate criticism can be levied at Durkheim's treatment of moral 
education, which gains added significance in the light of Durkheim's 
familiarity with the works of John Dewey.129 Durkheim's form of socialisation 
whilst humane, has much in common with conditioning - the child is to be 
moulded to fulfil the needs of society. Furthermore some of the features of 
Jesuit education have been transposed to the secular setting. The teacher 
must interpret societal ideals as the priest interpreted his God130 and the 
child must be aware of forces beyond him exercising silent control.
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It 
is this approach that has led Kohlberg to classify Durkheim as having a 
"construction" of morality 4t "stage 4".132 In other words Durkheim's 
approach to moral education is limited to inculcating habits and a respect 
for rules; it does not attempt to develop an understanding of principled 
morality. Moreover his approach to the development of autonomy is 
thoroughly inadequate and takes no account of the child's need to 
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experiment or use his creative initiative.133 
The most serious criticism of Durkheim's definitions of morality is 
that at no time do they adequately explicate justice. Utilitarianism is 
well-known for paying little attention to the concept of justice and 
Durkheim himself realised it as a limited theory of morality which 
"denies its specific characteristics and reduces its fundamental ideas to 
those of economic techniques."134 But when Durkheim made the collective 
the measure of good and the source of moral authority he did not allow 
the possibility of an unjust society. Ginsberg sees two questions arising: 
"First, if morality comes from the group and is obligatory for that 
reason, has then the individual no right to criticise it ? Must he 
accept as binding every demand that society at any time makes upon him ? 
Second, if Durkheim's account of obligation answers the question of fact, 
does it also answer the question of jurisdiction ? Ought we to obey the 
commands of society merely because they are commands ?" He adds: "To both 
these questions Durkheim offers answers. but they fail, I think, to carry 
conviction ."135 
Not only does Durkheim fail to allow for a just relationship to obtain 
between individuals and the community but he ignores the need to include 
interpersonal relationships as being part of the moral reels. Morality is 
what is in a society: Durkheim does not allow for the presence of any 
ultimate "what ought to be." This was of course part of his aim, but by 
defining the moral as social facts, he then limits it to those aspects 
which can be described in social terms. This means that the moral realm is 
reduced to ideals and values and socially sanctioned rules of conduct. 
And as we saw above, he stresses that whilst judgements of fact and 
judgements of value are not the same they are of the same order, as they 
both refer to social constructs, concepts and ideals respectively, both of 
which are accessible to sociological investigation.136 
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But we return to our original thesis, that Durkheim was interested 
in sociology, not morality in defining the limits to individualism and the way 
that individuals relate to the social whole. We do not believe that 
Durkheim's major concern was to found a science of morality although 
it would have been a crawling triumph to his secularism had he succeeded. 
But to do Durkheim justice, he does not claim to have established such a 
science, in fact he had only started on his proposed task when he died. 
As he protested during the discussion of his paper "The Determination of 
Moral Facts": "I cannot attempt to explain the general characteristics of 
moral facts until I have passed carefully in review the details of moral 
rules (domestic, civic, professional or contractual) and have shown both 
the causes that give rise to them and the functions which they perform, in 
so far as the data of science at present permit. Thus I collect on my way 
a number of ideas which arise directly from the study of moral facts, and when 
I come to pose the general question its solution is already prepared; the 
solution rests on concrete realities and the mind is thus bound to see it 
from the correct point of view."137 
We have quoted at length to show how far from any attempt to theorise 
the moral Durkheim was but also to point to what we believe was his 
overriding interest - the establishment of a science of society. This 
meant submitting every aspect of the socially real to scientific scrutiny, 
even those aspects that had previously been thought inaccessible because of 
their metaphysical nature. Durkheim's great faith lay not in the moral 
realm but in the concrete and real which he believed was available and 
open to be understood by the human mind. He criticised both empiricism and 
rationalism and struggled, through social science to escape the 
limitations of both. 
In his approach to social facts, Durkheim returned to the pre-Kantian 
position of Descartes and from this position attempted to bridge the 
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empiricism/rationalism gap. For Kant, the mind of man, equipped with 
innate categories of understanding (rationalism) received and processed 
impressions of phenomena through the senses (empiricism). This put the 
mind outside society - God still had some power, as originator of the 
mind of man. 
Durkheim believed that what was received through the senses related 
to the reality of the social world, the phenomenal was real. But unlike 
the empiricists, the sense impressions did not form the understanding 
directly. The minds of men were able to interpret perceptions through the 
concepts they had received from society. He develops this theme in 
The Elementary Forms, as it is in primitive societies that collective 
representations, concepts formed through corporate religious expression and 
shared by societal members, are at their strongest. Durkheim attempts to 
show that such collective representations act as categories to interpret 
sense experience. The categories are not innate but socially formed. The 
mind of man as well as his sensuous experience is related to the greater 
social whole.138 
He cannot be said to have been entirely successful. The Kantian 
categories are capacities for understanding - "pure concepts" or conceptual 
forms. Durkheim's "categories" are not of the nature of capacities but 
they do point to the social formation of much of what we perceive as real. 
Durkheim's approach to morality is generally relativistic but his 
approach to truth is certainly not relativist. His lectures on pragmatism 
deplore its tendency to destroy the "obligatory and necessary character" of 
truth.139 Yet he honoured the attempt to bridge the "epistemological abyss" 
between reality and the mind, "to connect thought with existence, to 
connect thought with life"140 which he saw as the fundamental idea of 
pragmatism. He believes that sociology has managed to bridge this gap 
without subjectivism and without hard-line relativism. For although truth, 
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reason and morality are understood as the results of human history, the 
relationship is between the physical environment on the one hand and man 
on the other and the physical environment presents a "relative fixity".141 
Behind Durkheim's search for an epistemological solution to the 
empiricist/rationalist problem was his own desire to understand man as a 
creative individual. The empiricists' reality is composed of sensory 
things, with thought doing nothing but translating sensations from the 
external world while the rationalists' reality is "an organized system of 
ideas which exist by themselves and which the mind must reproduce.142" 
Even Kant's moral law, which appears to open up the intelligible world is 
characterised by fixity and impersonality. "In one sense we discover the 
moral law within ourselves, but we do not invent it - we only find it. 
It is not we who have made it, nor is it our own mind that has given birth 
to it. It is, therefore, a reality that is outside ourselves, one that 
is imposed on us."143 
So for the immutable categories of understanding and the 
transcendental moral law, both beyond man and totally inaccessible, 
Durkheim has substituted society itself, source of concepts and ideals, 
which although it stands in a "social" relationship to man, is not only 
essentially a human product but allows the individual the chance to 
express himself and even to effect change. By making the ideal a product of the 
social, Durkheim can now conceive of three ways in which individuals 
can contribute to moral change. Firstly as the man who, like Socrates, is 
"ahead of his time while at the same time expressing its spirit",144 the 
functional rebel; secondly, through a group of individual minds which "enter 
into close relation with and work upon each other" and produce new sentiments, 
typified by movements such as the Reformation and the Renaissance;145 
and thirdly through the sociological study of values and ideals, which 
can be explained, thus "giving man a greater control" of them.146 
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Durkheim believed fervently that society was evolving and that this 
change would involve moral change which would be in the nature of an advance. 
"For by showing that this moral order came into being at a particular time 
under particular circumstances, history justifies us in believing that the 
day may eventually come when it will give way to a different moral order 
based on different ethical principles. Amongst all the advances accomplished 
in the past, there is scarcely one to which this ne plus ultra argument 
has not been raised in opposition; and yet historically evolution has 
always played havoc with the restrictions which men have sought to impose 
on it."147 Evolution allows the individual the necessary chance to influence 
history. But it must be noted that not only does Durkheim willingly accept 
changing ethical principles but he sees evolution as desirable in itself not 
because it moves towards any desirable moral goal. 
Durkheim had shown in the Division of Labour how advanced 
societies needed individual ambition and initiative and he pointed out 
in the Rules how this individuality, though necessary for progress would 
also produce criminals. In Suicide he investigates the ways in which the 
individual can come adrift from social control. In his later works he 
tries to understand the origin and nature of the obligatory power of the 
ideal in terms of the social. 
If we look at Durkheim's developing treatment of the individual and 
his relationship to society, of his need for individuality and yet for 
bounds and limits and if we see this in the context of his desire to put 
reality on an epistemological foundation which will allow it to be 
accessible to investigation and open to change, we find a consistency which 
is lacking in his treatment of "morality". By seeing Durkheim's 
individualist as the key to advanced society, his approach to education 
appears less oppressive. If the individual is not to come adrift in 
society, he will need to be thoroughly socialised, not to lose his 
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individuality but to give it direction and control - the child needs 
discipline to help him reach his goal. But he also must be given a 
version of his own human potential. 
Aron concludes his essay on Durkheim with statements that give 
weight to the above view. "Durkheim wants to stabilize a society whose 
highest principle is respect for the human person and fulfilment of 
personal autonomy. . . . A sociologist justifying rationalist individualism 
but also preaching respect for collective norms - such, it seems to me, 
is Du rkh eim . "148 
We would accept Aron's conclusions as true in fact, but would 
emphasise that Durkheim's greatness as a sociologist went beyond these 
immediate concerns, and perhaps the areas where he was conscious of little 
success will prove to be relevant to morality in the future.149 Yet we 
look in vain for a consistent theory of the moral, or for that matter for 
a conceptually coherent approach to morality. Durkheim has many, often 
contradictory approaches to the moral, none of which touches upon the 
essential nature of morality nor upon the most basic of all moral matters 
- the principle of justice. This is not surprising as the study of the 
moral is always peripheral to his main concerns, the development of a 
science of society which will make all aspects of social reality 
accessihle to the sociologist and allow a socially related study of the 
individual. 
What is surorising is that so many sociologists have seen in 
Durkheim's work a ready-made sociology of morality and even a ready-made 
sociology of moral education. 
Durkheimian Sociology and the Functional Moral  
One of the greatest drawbacks for the future of Durkheimian 
sociological theory was that only some of Durkheim's works had been 
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translated into English at a time when American sociologists were looking 
for a general social theory. For many of his works remained untranslated 
until the 1960's or later, thus giving a lop-sided view of his concerns. 
Durkheim's work had been known to English-speaking anthropologists since 
the publication of The Elementary Forms in 1915 and it was the 
anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown who credited Durkheim with being the 
founder of structural functionalism,150 which was to be made known to 
sociologists through the work of Talcott Parsons. Unfortunately, Parsons' 
Durkheimian knowledge was mainly confined to The Division of Labour and 
The Rules. He read into Durkheim's idea of socialization Freudian insights 
that were unknown to Durkheim151 and built up theory that was a fusion of 
aspects of Weber and Pareto as well as of Durkheim. The leading example of 
the latter is his great theoretical work The Structure of Social Action152  
which became the standard text for functional sociology. 
Parsonian functionalism starts with the concept of the generalised 
social system. Within the social system various social phenomena are 
functionally related. Moral phenomena, such as norms, are likewise seen 
in terms of their function in maintaining social stability, an "inherent 
need of every stable social system" being the "set of norms governing 
relations of superiority and inferiority."
153 
Discussing the role of norms 
in social stratification, Parsons writes: 
As with all other major structural elements of the social 
system, the norms governing its stratification tend to 
become institutionalized; that is, moral sentiments 
crystallize about them and the whole system of motivational 
elements (including both disinterested and self-interested 
components) tends to be structured in conformity to them. 
There is a system of sanctions, both formal and informal in 
support; so that deviant tendencies are met with varying 
degrees and kinds of disapproval, withdrawal of co-operation, 
and positive infliction of punishment. Conversely, there 
are rewards for conformity and institutionalized 
achievements. 
From this example of Parsonian functionalism it can be noted that 
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some of Durkheim's major concerns have been lost. Durkheim's society 
was capable of change and his social individual had a dynamic part to play 
in social change: Parsons' socially individual is totally socialised. 
Moreover there is no mention in functionalism of the symbolic aspects of 
societal representations and thus nothing out of which a sociology of 
knowledge can be developed. 
Functionalism was the dominant sociological perspective from which 
studies in education developed. As its social perspective is essentially 
Durkheimian, we must look to functionalism in order to see how Durkheim's 
understanding of the moral has influenced work in the realm of education. 
There are two main strands in functionalist sociology of education as it 
approaches the moral. The first stresses education as connected with 
society as a whole - especially the maintenance of social order and 
social equilibrium. The second concentrates on values as related to the 
educational task and ultimately to the stability of society. 
In Parsons' now classic paper, "The School Class as a Social System: 
Some of its functions in American Society"154 we have a typical example of 
the "social whole" strand. Here Parsons analyses the elementary and 
secondary school class as a social system and relates its practices to 
its primary function in society as an agent of socialisation and allocation. 
Through socialisation the school class inculcates in its pupils both the 
commitments and capacities for successful performance of their future 
adult roles. Its task of allocation is to separate out and suitably train 
the "human resources" for work within the role-structure of adult society 
and thus to maintain a stable society. 
The emphasis on values emerged from the Parsons theory of social 
action, where in the pragmatic tradition values were seen as directly 
expressed through action. The theory of values and "value-orientation" 
was developed by Kluckholm155 and became related to education in terms of 
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value inculcation being part of the school's socialising function and of the 
relationship of familial values to educational achievement.156 The role of 
socialisation is typically described as follows: "From the standpoint of the 
layer society, one of the objectives of the socialisation process is to 
produce individuals who will not only conform to the socially prescribed 
rules of conduct but will, as members of society, accept them as their 
own values." 157 
The main criticism of the structural functionalist approach came from 
sociologists who saw functionalism as being interested in the social 
order to the extent that man was being described as lacking all autonomy, a 
totally determined unit in the social whole. Wrong in the U.S. asserted that 
this model makes man a thoroughly socialised being, a fact which is quite 
untrue to social reality.158 Dawe159 in Britain argued more strongly for a 
change of theoretical basis that allowed sociology to describe man as the 
social actor whose individual actions were meaningful and socially creative. 
It could be said that such criticisms were putting back some of Durkheim's 
original insight into the Durkheimian distillation that was structural 
functionalism. But no voices were raised in protest at the way functionalism 
conceptualised the moral and it became the basis of work on moral 
development and moral education. 
Parsonian functionalism sees morality totally in relation to the well-
being of the social whole. There is no moral law which transcends the 
social - no ultimate justice, no stress on means as being as morally 
relevant as ends. There is not even rule utility. The end is social 
cohesion and stability. We have here a double degeneration of Durkheim's 
mature ethically relativist position. In Durkheim's society, a state of 
change existed, society was evolving towards something better, the 
nature of which was never conceptualised but which would allow some chance 
for individuals to realise their potential. Then, whilst Durkheim's 
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societal norms and values were external to the individual they had been 
socially created by individual humans. Parsons' society has no beginning 
nor future - it is. It has its own goals but these are beyond both moral 
judgement and individual challenge. Individual autonomy whilst a 
contradictory concept for Durkheim, at least exists. It has no place in 
Parsonian functionalism. 
It is thus unfortunate that an English sociologist with a high 
reputation in the field of education should have chosen Parsons' paper, 
"The School Class as a Social System" on which to base his contribution to 
Niblett's influential work on moral education.160 Halsey's "Sociology of 
Moral Education" sees the American educational system as favouring equality 
of opportunity and thus as a challenge to the British system161. But by 
contextualising his discussion within structural functionalism, he limited his 
moral parameter to that single good, equality. The way the school system is 
organised to allow the goal to be pursued or the process of the schooling 
itself is beyond his critique. Needless to say the very social "ideal" 
of equality and its possible oppressive function are completely beyond 
the scope of such analysis. 
Research into the value aspect of functionalism is not immune from the 
above limitations. By focussing on the beliefs of individuals, such work 
may appear to be connected with individual identity which would allow some 
discussion of autonomy to be introduced. But within the functionalist 
perspective, individual values are seen as relating to the well-being of the 
whole. In practice, an even greater problem is that by assuming social stability 
to be an ultimate desirable and by accepting Parsons' conclusion that the 
schools' main function is to socialise and allocate manpower for the social 
system, it follows that the major school value associated with the process 
of selection and allocation, the achievement ideal is also desirable. 
This conflation of the moral and the social is a feature of Sugarman's 
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work. An example is his educational study entitled: "Social class and 
values as related to achievement and conduct in school."162 This, and 
other works by Sugarman, more directly on the topic of moral education163  
are characterised by the fact that they fail to make any critique of the 
moral in society. There may be some moral content but it is at the 
individual level, an elucidation of Wilson's "morally educated person" and 
entirely unrelated to society. In fact we could say that Sugarman's work 
ran into difficulties once it introduced Wilson's philosophical analysis. 
There is a distinct contradiction that arises in The School and Moral  
Development between the juxtaposing of Wilson's morally educated individual 
and the reiterated Parsonian assertion that, in the school, children learn 
"universalism, individualism, the achievement or 'mastery' orientation and 
functional specificity or narrow relationships" to a higher degree than 
they would by remaining within the family .164 Whilst Wilson's attributes 
are related to the traditional philosophical moral goods of fairness, 
respect, concern and truth, the Parsonian goods are linked to the existing 
society with all its injustices. There is no conceptual structure, 
however, with which Sugarman could assess these latter goods and perceive 
moral defects in the school system or even note the contradiction which 
exists between individual achievement orientation and concern for others. 
It is suggested that such contradictions led to the natural death of 
functionalist studies of the sociology of moral education. 
Some work of elucidating values goes on: attempts to measure the 
values of adolescents in particular being still viable. But these 
studies, which typically compare adolescent values with adult values 
(specifically or in general) neither make any theoretically based moral 
judgements on the nature of the values nor do they seek to relate them to 
the structure or function of society.165 
Another Durkheim-derived approach to sociology that is relevant to 
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education and morality is the work connecting anomie and deviance. Whilst 
this work grew out of functionalism it became theoretically isolated and 
the concept of anomie was applied to various theories of deviance and even 
entered the vocabulary of everyday life. Merton's concept of anomie166  
was different from Durkheim's in that whereas Durkheim's anomic individual 
suffered from too little normative regulation, Merton's suffered from an 
inappropriate internal value system. The main difference lay in the fact 
that Merton's individual was described in terms of socialisation 
being understood as the internalisation of norms and values where Durkheim 
did not see socialisation in psychological terms. Moreover Merton's 
individual was the product of a society typified by an open, achievement-
oriented education system. He had internalised the American dream of 
money and status, but his position in life through social circumstance or 
lack of ability failed to live up to his expectations. So, frustrated, he 
tries to overcome the tension between the internal and external disjunction. 
One solution is to turn to crime. 
Anomie was discussed as a cause of juvenile delinquency, and 
when it failed to explain the facts was added to other deviance theories 
such as Sutherland's differential association theory.167 As an explanatory 
theory it was not successful but as a moral comment on society Merton's 
anomie may have made a contribution. However much the concept differed 
from Durkheim's own it did allow the individual to be seen as more than 
a passive unit of society and thus as potentially in conflict with society. 
This may have helped create awareness amongst sociologists that structural 
functionalism did not allow an important aspect of the social reality to 
emerge, the existence of the individual in conflict with society and 
perhaps even to show something of the injustice of an educational system that 
promises equality and future prosperity for all as possible then denies 
their realisation. But in itself anomie was powerless to critique injustice. 
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There is one aspect of Durkheim's work which has so far not been 
put to use in explicating the moral in education but which could possibly 
be developed as an adjunct to a sociological approach to morality. This is 
the Durkheimian insight into symbolic expression and its relation to the 
realm of the ideal. Where this aspect of Durkheimian theory is released 
from the context of a consensual society it takes on a new meaning. Holzner, 
for example, discusses ideology in Durkheimian terms with phenomenological 
and Marxist overtones: "By 'ideology' we mean a limited aspect of the 
interpretive order of faiths and beliefs, namely, those reality constructs 
and values which serve to legitimate the claims for power and prestige and 
the activities of groups and their members. Ideologies are thus, legitimating 
symbolizations; that is, they enable a group or a person to justify their 
activities."168 In other words, Durkheim could possibly (in spite of his 
inability to cope with it in his lifetime) be able to help discussion of 
the differential sources of power in society, posthumously. 
Symbolic power is an important strand in the world of Pierre Bourdieu. 
He sees "symbolic systems" (art, religion and language) as amenable to 
structural analysis.169  Symbolic systems can be instruments of domination 
through which the dominant culture contributes to the real integration of the 
dominant class. But any critique of symbolic power would then be in 
Marxist terms. Durkheim was not only unable to make the sources of power 
explicit in society but would have been totally unable to comment on the 
moral nature of domination. The most he could say, in moral language, was 
that if the needs of society (not in terms of its consensus but of its 
peaceful evolution) were being met by means of symbolic violence, then this 
was desirable. 
So Durkheim's concepts of morality have not proved fruitful for the 
critique of the moral within the sociology of education nor for the 
sociologist to contribute to the study of moral education. Whilst some of 
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the problem lies with the thoroughly amoral theory of structural functionalism, 
at base the ultimate responsibility rests with Durkheim himself and the 
inconsistency and theoretical inadequacy of his elucidation of morality. 
WEBER  
Weber and the Realm of Value  
Unlike Durkheim, Weber believed that ethics, "the kingdom of absolute 
value" was not of this world.170 The realms of fact and value must be ever 
kept apart. The social scientist must analyse and teach facts - value-
judgements have no place in the lecture hall and values, themselves, are not 
open to empirical investigation. The only evaluations that the teacher of 
a social science is justified in giving are those which are relevant to 
the discipline itself, the "inherent norms" of every "professional task".  
He must limit himself to the scientifically demonstrable, facts. 
Weber's separation of fact and value was essentially, a Kantian 
position and in one sense it typifies the separation of the nomothetic 
and ideographic traditions of German scholarship. But it also reflected 
the practical and epistemological tensions that Weber perpetually 
experienced. It can be suggested that much of his theoretical sociology 
reflects his attempt to resolve these tensions. 
The practical tensions can be described at the level of Weber's personal 
sense of vocation and also in terms of the professional academic situation 
at the time. Giddens has pointed out that throughout his life, Weber was 
drawn towards two conflicting vocational expressions; the "passive 
disciplined life of the scholar" and the "active and practical vocation of 
the politician". The fact/value dichotomy reflects his desire to draw a 
clear-cut distinction between these competing inspirations - the one 
typified by "factual or scientific knowledge" and the other by "normative 
or value judgements".172 Gouldner has suggested that among the "motives 
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originally inducing" Weber to formulate the concept of value-free sociology 
was his desire to maintain both the cohesion and autonomy of the university, 
especially in the realm of the newer social science disciplines.173 
University lecturers who introduced value-laden arguments into their 
lectures attracted more students than colleagues who limited themselves to 
fact. This situation caused an unprofessional element of competition and 
was likely to influence university authorities in their selection of staff. 
Moreover value-laden argument masked the facts and confused the students, 
weakening their "taste for sober empirical aialysis",
174 
as Weber points out 
in his discussion of the situation. But, above all, polemic in the social 
sciences was by nature political and Weber had seen many excellent academics 
removed from or denied university positions because of their unacceptable 
political views. And if political values were denied then all values 
should be banned from the lecture hall. As Weber put it: "In view of the 
fact that certain value-questions which are of decisive political significance 
are permanently banned from university discussion, it seems to me to be 
only in accord with the dignity of a representative of science to be silent  
as well about such value-problems as he is allowed to treat."175 
At the epistemological level the situation is more complex as Weber 
inherited two conflicting approaches to knowledge, the ideographic and the 
nomothetic, the former as an historian and the latter through his study 
of the science of economics. Interwoven with this tension, which he 
sought to resolve in his sociological methodology was the European 
traditional belief in the reality of the inner realm, exemplified by 
Christian faith and the realm of technology and science exemplified by the 
capitalistic notion of progress. These aspects of reality were related in 
his work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism176 but also appear 
at every stage of his writings as the irrational and the rational elements 
of life. Only the material world of progress is rational, the inner level 
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of personal faith and conviction is irrational. 
Like Kant, Webe7 accepted the realm of the moral to be that of inner 
reality. It was not accessible to theoretical knowledge: it could not be 
scientifically evaluated. But this does not mean that the moral is 
powerless or unimportant. Its power lies in its motivational force. 
Whilst the ancient Christian systems of beliefs and ideals tended to 
be reactionary, Weber saw in Calvinistic religion a force for radical 
progress. Other forms of Christianity had stressed the view that "faithful 
work. . . is something highly pleasing to God", but the Calvinistic forms 
added the radical element of a "calling". "Not only did [Protestant 
asceticism] powerfully add a whole new depth to the view, it also 
created for that ideal something which was absolutely essential if it was 
to be effective, namely a psychological stimulus in the form of the 
conception of such work as a calling, as the most excellent, indeed often 
in the end the only, means of becoming sure of one's state of grace."177 
Although powerful, the inner ideal is seen as irrational, its motivational 
force not springing from a knowledge of God's will or purpose, as 
typified by the theology of Aquinas, but from the very ignorance of God's 
will and mind. God's ways are past finding out. One's motivation is 
connected, not with knowledge but with irrational "psychological" needs, 
the need to prove to oneself and others that one belongs to God's elect. 
But although irrational, the realm of the moral is important, 
ultimately more so than science itself. Weber was concerned about the 
increasing industrialisation of society and the relentless development 
of capitalism. He saw capitalism as a unique configuration which was 
inexorably bound up with progress. But with progress came an increasing 
bureaucracy and an increase in formal rationality which usurped 
morality's traditional role. The moral could not compete openly with 
rational progress. It must keep to its own domain, the realm of 
intention and motive, the domain of the individual conscience. The 
science of economics must travel the path of rationality. Weber states 
this clearly in his essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social 
Policy" which was written to present and defend his editorial policy with 
its "insistence on the rigorous distinction between empirical knowledge 
and value-judgments": 
It is true that we regard as objectively valuable those 
innermost elements of the "personality", those highest 
and most ultimate value-judgments which determine our 
conduct and give meaning and significance to our life. . . . 
Certainly, the dignity of the "personality" lies in the 
fact that for it there exist values about which it 
organizes its life; - even if these values are in certain 
cases concentrated exclusively within the sphere of the 
person's "individuality" then "self-realization" in 
those interests for which it claims validity as values,  
is the idea with respect to which its whole existence is 
oriented. Only on the assumption of belief in the 
validity of values is the attempt to espouse value- 
judgments meaningful. However to judge the validity of 
such values is a matter of faith.  It may perhaps be a 
task for the speculative interpretation of life and the 
universe in quest of their meaning. But it certainly 
does not fall within the province of an empirical science 
in the sense in which it is to be practiced here.178 
Weber, thus makes it clear that he is not undervaluing the realm of 
value. But value is not of the same nature as empirical reality. It 
cannot be rationally evaluated. One can judge a scientific fact by 
putting it to the test against empirical reality. Judgements of value 
are tried out in terms of faith, with regard to one's personal 
meanings. To confuse scientific understanding with personal value is 
to underrate both aspects of life. 
Like Comte, Weber sees the progress of rationality as typified 
by the movement from religion to science. But this science is not the 
prerogative of the theoretical scientist it is embedded in the being 
and practice of capitalism. Capitalism is the incorporation of 
technical reason and progress in the capitalist enterprise is marked by 
a continuous rationalisation of all aspects of life. Marcuse has 
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listed three elements that are characteristic of Weber's concept of 
reason. Firstly there is the "progressive mathematization of experience 
and knowledge" which starting from the natural sciences extends to "other 
sciences and to the 'conduct of life' itself". Secondly there is stress 
on the necessity of rational experiments and rational proofs in the 
organization of both science and life. Thirdly there is the development 
of "a universal technically trained organization of officials" that Weber 
saw as becoming the "absolutely inescapable condition" of the modern 
world.179 
It is in this third aspect of rational progress that Weber experienced 
profound disquiet. Whilst bureaucracy was an inevitable outcome of 
technical rationality he saw it as posing a serious threat to democracy, 
in itself a rational form of government. The only way he saw to combat the 
development of bureaucratic despotism with its possible outcome in the 
"socialism of the future"180 was to maintain a form of democracy under 
charismatic leadership. Whilst the bureaucratic political official is 
outside the realm of value judgement, the morality appropriate to his 
office being that of conscientious obedience to his superiors,181 the 
charismatic leader exercises personal responsibility and thus must engage 
in making moral judgements. But he does this as an individual, 
democratically elected to his office, who is now in a position to turn to 
both the voters and the bureaucratic party machinery and say "Now shut up 
and do what I say ."182 Charismatic leadership was thus, by means of its 
partially autonomous nature, a morally evaluating activity. So, at the 
same time it was an irrational form of leadership, militating against 
rational progress. 
The tension between democracy and bureaucracy, and the dilemma of the 
only alternative to rational despotism being a form of leadership which is 
irrational, led Weber to his study of legitimate authority. If a "state" 
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is, by definition, a community in which "the administrative staff 
successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force"183 within its given territory it follows that for the 
state to exist its members must obey the authority of those in power. 
Weber asks the questions: "When and why do men obey ? Upon what 
inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination 
rest ?"
184 
He suggests that there are three inner justifications for 
domination, and hence three "legitimations of domination". His three 
types of legitimation are traditional authority, as exercised by "the 
patriarch and the patrimonial prince of yore", charismatic authority, as 
exercised by the prophet or the elected war lord or political party 
leader and "domination by virtue of 'legality'." Only the legal form 
of authority is rational, its 'legality' being attributed by Weber to 
"the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' 
based on rationally created rules."185 
Whilst the belief in the legality of an order was traditionally 
established by voluntary agreement, Weber sees the modern rational form 
as being based on the formal correctness of rules "which have been 
imposed by accepted procedure"186 whilst its functioning within a social 
group will be dependent on the willingness of individuals with deviant 
wishes to give way to the majority.187 
In his classification of legitimate authority Weber has continued 
to keep value and fact separate. Traditional and charismatic authority are 
value laden personal forms, where obedience is owed to the person of a 
chief or political leader. The leader exercises personal responsibility and 
the obeying individual exercises personal trust. The bond is a moral one, 
but it is a private irrational morality, the inaccessible Weberian 
morality of the individual conscience. Whether such leadership is 
benevolent or oppressive is the personal concern of the individual 
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leader - the individuals under authority are morally impotent. Under the 
modern irrational form, the only way those under authority can express moral 
disapproval is by voting out or overthrowing the charismatic leader. 
On the other hand, the rational form of authority is expressed in 
morally neutral terms. Legitimacy is based on rules, the "correctness" of 
which is a function of the procedure of their formation and implementation. 
There is no room for the moral at any level here. This model of 
"legitimate" domination postulates an amoral bureaucracy ordering a 
passive population, whose (private) morality is inappropriate to evaluate 
or effect change in official policy. Within the Weberian framework of 
legitimation it is impossible for the citizen or the social scientist to 
assess the justice of a regime. Weber believed that as society became 
increasingly rational at the technological level so it would become 
rational at the level of government. He considered that morality only 
belonged to less developed political forms. Fully rational government 
would have no conceptual phase for the moral. Under his approach to 
rationally legitimate authority, the possibility of domination did not 
arise. Domination was the situation that obtained under charismatic 
authority. While Weber continued to assert that individuals had moral 
motivation he allowed the rational "body politic" to have none. 
According to his concept of legitimation, authority was legitimate in 
terms of the acceptance of its legal status. There is no room for 
negotiation, no room for discussion. Weber's concept of legitimate 
authority is an illustration of a social concept, which because it is 
designed to be free of value can serve to condone domination. Because it 
cannot conceptualise domination within its framework, Wlaber's rational 
authority can actually legitimate domination. To Weber progress in 
rationality is progress towards truth. He cannot, however, conceive of 
truth and justice progressing together. 
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Weber's methodology for the study of sociology is an attempt to 
resolve the tensions between fact and value inherent in cultural 
investigation. If sociology were indeed a science one would need to 
investigate causes, and because Weber believed that social life depended 
on regularities of human conduct he saw this as logically possible. But 
social life is a cultural phenomenon and thus it not only contains value 
knowledge but brings up the problem of evaluating the values - as the 
values which are considered culturally significant "alone are objects of 
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causal explanation." 	 The ideographic, historical method is inadequate 
because it deals only with describing individual facts and their causes 
and not with causal interrelationships. But the nomological method of the 
natural sciences, which seeks the knowledge of recurrent causal sequences 
is meaningless when applied to cultural phenomena. This, according to 
Weber, is partly so because knowledge of social laws only aids knowledge 
of social reality and is not to be equated with moral knowledge and 
especially "because knowledge of cultural events is inconceivable 
except on the basis of the significance which the concrete constellations 
of reality have for us in certain individual concrete situations".189 
Weber's solution to the problem of the scientific investigation of the 
causal relationships of the cultural (and thus subjective and moral) 
realm was firstly to use the operation of VQrstchen. This method sought 
to understand individual human action by applying to it a generalisation 
based on personal experience. Weber was never completely clear about 
either the concept or its application and sociologists have interpreted 
it v ariously .190 Verstchen gains its historical dimension by being 
used in association with Weber's "ideal-type". The ideal-type is neither 
a description of reality nor a hypothesis, although it aids in the 
construction of hypotheses. It is an "analytical construct" formed by 
the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
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synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, . . . concrete individual  
ph en omen a. "191 Ideal-types are to be used as a means to understanding 
concrete cultural phenomena "in their interdependence, their causal 
conditions and their significance."192 But ideal-types are also a 
means of maintaining the dichotomy between fact and value, as we saw 
above with the ideal-types of legitimate authority. 
The ideal-type essential to sociological investigation is that of 
social action. Now, as we saw above, regularities of human conduct can 
only be explained if the subjective value meanings of individuals are 
considered, as all value is seen as lying at the level of individual 
personality. So the individual is the unit of sociological investigation. 
With perfect consistency, Weber places moral elements of human behaviour in 
the irrational classification of traditional and affective action. Rational 
action has two pure types, both defined in terms of means-ends relationship 
- zweckrational in terms of rational orientation to a system of discrete 
individual ends and wertrational in terms of rational orientation to an 
absolute value. Weber describes the latter as "involving a conscious 
belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or 
other form of behaviour, entirely for its own sake"193 and some 
sociologists have seen this as indicating the presence of the moral. But 
there is no room here for moral choice or evaluation. The action is only 
typed as rational because the moral objectives or ends are "given". As 
Giddens points out: "Weber wholly rejects the conception that the sphere 
of the 'rational' can extend to the evaluation of competing ethical 
standards. What he often refers to as the 'ethical irrationality of the 
world' is fundamental to his epistemology. Statements of fact, and 
judgments of value, are separated by an absolute logical gulf: there is 
no way in which scientific rationalism can provide a validation of one 
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ethical ideal compared to another."  
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But whilst fact and value are to be separated as aspects of 
objective empirical knowledge and subjective individual faith, 
respectively, Weber still believes that he has not finished with value. 
The belief which we all have in some form or other, in the 
meta-empirical validity of ultimate and final values, in 
which the meaning of our existence is rooted, is not 
incompatible with the incessant changefulness of the 
concrete view-points, from which empirical reality gets 
its significance. Both these views, are, on the contrary 
in harmony with each other. Life with its irrational 
reality and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible. 
The concrete form in which value-relevance occurs remains 
perpetually in flux, ever subject to change in the dimly 
seen future of human culture.195 
Weber makes one or two sorties in an attempt to shed a little more 
light on value relevance. In his essay "Science as Vocation"196 he 
poses Tolstoi's problem: "Science is meaningless because it gives no 
answer to our question, the only question important for us: 'What shall 
we do and how shall we live ? 1197and points out the moral nature of the purpose 
of the individual scientific task. But above that, science's only 
connection with value is through its contribution to "clarity" in 
sorting out means from ends. It can thus force the individual "to give 
himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his conduct." Here the 
teacher of science "stands in the service of 'moral' forces; he fulfils 
the duty of bringing about self-clarification and a sense of responsibility. 198 
This is indeed a moral purpose. 
But Weber can say no more than this about the realm of value. It is 
impossible to bridge the epistemological gap which he has, in effect, 
through his methodology, widened into a yawning chasm. Value cannot be 
rationally assessed: one cannot critique value. So Weber returns value 
to where he found it, in the conscience of the individual, with 
the vain hope that the world will meet the "demands of the day" if each 
individual "finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his very 
life."199 
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Weber, Sociology and the Value-Free Tradition  
Weberian sociology entered Anglo-American social theory via Talcott 
Parsons, first through his translations 	 and secondly through his own 
writings which incorporated and interpreted Weberian theoretical concepts 
and methodology. Since the appearance of The Structure of Social Action  
in 1937 Weberian theory has been deeply embedded in American sociology, 
firstly in the context of Parsons' structural-functionalist perspective 
and then breaking free and fusing with Meadian insights in interactional 
studies. But whether in the Durkheimian framework or in Meadian partnership 
Weberian theory kept its emphasis on value freedom. 
The logical development of value-freedom within Parsonian theory is 
shown in Parsons' later work on power where power is seen as a 
"circulating medium" in the same sense as money. Power is defined as 
"generalised capacity to serve the performance of binding obligations by 
units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are 
legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals." 201 
The collective goals rest upon the common value-system which according to 
Parsons is characterised by the primacy of values of "instrumental 
activism" and the main collective goal is the furtherance of economic 
productivity. Giddens points out that power "becomes a facility for the 
achievement of collective goals through the 'agreement' of the members 
of a society to legitimize leadership positions - and to give those in 
such positions a mandate to develop policies and implement decisions in the 
furtherance of the goals of the system."202 The sole right of the member 
of society is to vote in an election to put a certain government in power. 
Power is derived from authority and authority is the institutionalized 
legitimation which underlies power. Authority is defined as "the 
institutionalization of the rights of 'leaders' to expect support from 
the members of the collectivity." Giddens adds: "By speaking of 
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'binding obligations', Parsons deliberately brings legitimation into the 
very definition of power, so that, for him, there is no such thing as 
illegitimate power."203 Talcott Parsons' discussion on power has been used 
to illustrate how Weber's value-free definition of legitimate authority 
has no safeguards from reduction to the formula - "all authority is 
legitimate if it generates power," which can further be reduced to the 
adage "all might is right". 
Until the end of the 1950's, value-free sociology reigned supreme, 
over both the theoretically based work of the structural-functionalists and 
weakly theoretical survey-based sociology, with its scientific analyses of 
official statistics and statistical analysis of empirical data. But in 
1961, the "myth" of value-free sociology was attacked by Alvin Gouldner 
with an uncompromising polemic. "Today," he wrote, "all the powers of 
sociology, from Parsons to Lundberg, have entered into a tacit alliance to 
bind us to the dogma that 'Thou shalt not commit a value judgment', 
especially as sociologists. Where is the introductory textbook, where the 
lecture course on principles, that does not affirm or imply this rule ?„204 
He points out that value-free sociology has this latent meaning: "Thou shalt 
not commit a critical or negative value judgment - especially of one's 
own society”205 and that sociologists who refrain from social criticism 
give the worthy appearance of upholders of professionalism. He commends 
sociologists of the past, forthright in their social criticism, and looks 
with interest to the expression of resistance to value-free "professional" 
sociology in the work of ex-Chicagoans such as Howard Becker and Erving 
Goffman who speak on behalf of the underworld. He calls for a re-awakening 
of sociology's social conscience, to become, like Weber, aware of values 
as ends, of science as only supplying the means. His cry, in effect, is 
to return to the true Weber with his unresolved tension and his vision of 
ultimate meaning. 
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Six years later, however, Gouldner finds himself attempting to 
sten the tide of value-slanted sociological research.206 His particular 
target is Becker and those working in the field of social deviance. In 
"Whose side are we on ?"207 Becker had asserted that it was impossible for 
research to be uncontaminated by personal and political sympathies using 
the notion of a "hierarchy of credibility" to explain how accusations of 
bias are more common if one gives an account from a subordinate viewpoint. 
Gouldner realises the complex web of repercussions that can result from a 
partisan sociology and calls sociologists not to social criticism but to 
"personal authenticity"208 which must involve a deep knowledge of the self. 
Again the profession is reminded of the Weberian vision: "It is to values, 
not to factions, that sociologists must give their basic commitment."209 
In the period between these two papers by Gouldner, sociologists 
working in the field of deviance, in particular symbolic interactionists, 
had become very aware of value as a hidden factor in nearly every aspect of 
their work. They had begun to question the reliability of official records 
and statistics and see the inbuilt bias in the ways behaviour is recorded 
and classified.210 Labelling theorists had become aware of the effect the 
evaluations of young people's behaviour and scholastic performance can have 
on their future careers,211 and so labelling theory found its way into the 
everyday world of the sociology of education.212 
Yet although symbolic interaction can show the affect of an evaluation 
on an individual child or group and can by implication point to the 
undesirable nature of a particular value judgement in an educational 
situation, it can do so only in terms of the demonstrated gap between the 
situation and a recognisable educational aim. It has no standard with 
which to assess value in a practical situation. It can make no moral 
judgements. Eggleston sums up both the possibilities and the limitations 
of an interactional approach to the sociology of education: 
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In these approaches to the study of the school we can 
see with far greater clarity the ways in which individual 
teachers° and students' definitions of the situation help 
to determine its social arrangements; how perceptions 
of achievement cannot only define achievement, but also 
identify those who achieve; how expectations about 
schooling can determine the nature and evaluation of 
schools.213 
Classroom interactional studies that aim at objectivity are at their 
most useful when helping teachers gain insights into social processes that 
necessarily accompany group learning and also could be used in an evaluation 
of the process of schooling according to certain specified moral criteria. 
But just as Parsons' treatment of the Weberian "value-free" concept of 
legitimate authority led to his theoretical legitimation of oppression, so 
the use of the concept of legitimation in a symbolic interactional context 
can undervalue such desirables as academic discipline and define as trivial 
the notion of legitimate authority in the classroom. 
An example of such a study is Carl Werthman's "Delinquents in schools: 
a test for the legitimacy of authority".214 The concept of the legitimation 
of authority as presented here is that of the subjective acceptance of the 
authority of an individual teacher by gang-member students. Authority is 
seen as providing the necessary stable basis for interaction between 
teacher and students. Gang members are characterised by their refusal to 
accept authority as legitimate unless the manner in which it is exercised 
complies with their preconceptions of what is "suitable".215 Whilst some 
features of the criteria for "suitability" are discussed, the criteria 
themselves will be arbitrary as each gang is different owing to the 
variation of attitudes of individual members. Whether or not the teacher's 
authority is accepted as legitimate by the students depends not only on 
their shifting criteria but on his own personality and the way he interprets 
their behaviour. His reaction to the students' challenge of his authority 
in his task of assessing their work will lead to their acceptance or 
rejection of his authority exercised in maintaining discipline. 
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A purely arbitrary and subjective treatment of legitimation and 
authority such as this, not only trivialises the concepts that rightly 
belong to the wider context of discussions of "the just society" but 
give sociologists a false moral glow that in some way they are contributing 
to fairness and understanding. It is more likely that they are contributing 
to the fear of teachers to exercise any authority over their pupils to the 
spread of the belief that all must be freely negotiated in the classroom. 
When phenomenological perspectives are added to those of symbolic 
interaction we find that value is now inextricably woven into the very 
fabric of the world of meanings, intersubjectively constructed by the 
social actors. Dawe216 asserts that Weber has been misunderstood. Weber's 
sociology is "demonstrably rooted in and permeated by his moral vision." 
There is a continuity between his work on meaning and social phenomenology's 
"attempt to recover for sociology the sensitivity to meaning."
217 
Now, 
because Weber's "ethical world is that of autonomous individual choice 
from an infinity of possible values", a "bleak world where moral choice 
faces morally isolated individuals", it follows that each individual will 
need to "impose [his] own meaning upon an otherwise meaningless world."218 
In phenomenological terms, Weber's sociology of domination becomes a 
struggle to impose meanings, for at its heart is legitimation and 
legitimacy is seen as "the acceptance by one group, on whatever basis, 
of a meaning imposed on than by another group."219 In fact, for Dawe, 
"the sociology is entailed by the ethic".220 And the sociologist will 
need not only to be aware of this but of his own values, for "he, too, 
must impose meaning and, therefore, negate other meanings."221 Dawe 
stresses that if one is to convey the meaning and value in which social 
relationships are rooted, one must use the language of meaning and value. 
In fact we must "allow value to surface, through our terminology, at every 
stage of our work."
222 
The real substance of Weber's doctrine of ethical 
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neutrality thus becomes "an injunction to social science not to retreat 
from value, but to confront it, to reveal and proclaim it as value, and 
thereby to preserve the possibility of moral consciousness, moral choice 
and moral action."223 
These extracts from Dawe show a confusion of "meaning" with "value". 
Dawe uses the terms almost synonymously. Value, in Dawe's sense has lost 
all connection with the moral. Behind the irrational and individual 
value of Weber lay the Kantian moral law, the realm of ultimate reality. 
For Dawe both value and meaning are individual and relative, they do not 
connect with any universal reality. Meaning has no relationship with truth. 
Weber, however, did not confuse meaning with value - meaning or significance, 
is linked with culture, not ideals. It does relate to scientific 
endeavour. Value belongs to the private realm of personal understanding. 
One searches in vain for an example of the methodology advocated by 
Dawe in its entirety. For, in practice, without a consensually accepted 
conceptual framework in which to evaluate the moral we would run into a 
tangle of objectivity and subjectivity. But one does find Dawes' general 
approach to value in some of the work of the "new" sociologists of education. 
In Keddie's study of classroom knowledge224 for example, we have an 
account from the author's personal observation of how knowledge is defined 
and evaluated by teachers and pupils. Interwoven into the account are 
subjective assessments of interpersonal relationships, as shown here: 
"By inference, teachers feel that A stream pupils are more like themselves, 
at least in ways that count in school."225 But we also have objective 
conclusions drawn from these observations: "The school may be seen as 
maintaining the social order through the taken for granted categories of 
its superordinates who process pupils and knowledge in mutually confirmling 
ways. The ability to maintain these categories as consensual, when there 
are among the clients in school conflicting definitions of the situation, 
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resides in the unequal distribution of power."
226 
Value here is both 
implicit and explicit. There is the negative connotation of "taken for 
granted" and disapproval in the concept of "processing", rather than 
educating. Judgement is explicit in the use of the term "unequal" where 
equality is the unwritten ideal. But when we get to the concept of power, 
Keddie herself suggests that we need to look outside the school. All in 
all, the study appears to pass judgement on school practices but the source 
of the problems or the nature of their remedy and to what extent light is 
thrown on the wider social situation is impossible to assess. 
Bill Williamson comments on the tendency in recent work in the 
sociology of education to see the content of what the school transmits in 
terms of the power system in society. "The new sociologists in this 
respect are trapped by the same problems as their colleagues in political 
sociology. They cannot find the power centre ! And like some of their 
colleagues in the field of modern deviance studies they solve the problem by 
examining the minutiae of interaction sequences in schools." He adds 
that people might assume that the message of the new sociology is "that 
teachers are not the nice people they are cracked up to be."227 
It is clear that the attempt to bring value back into sociology has 
brought with it conceptual ambiguities and in many cases, through 
frustration, has led researchers to the study of trivia. Gerald Bernbaum 
comments on the difficulty of distinguishing between "science" and 
"ideology" in the new sociology of education. Whatever might have been 
the limitations of the "old" sociology of education, it "never totally 
conflated questions of truth and commitment, and it might even be that the 
tensions that have existed between the two have been the major means by 
which some educational hypocrisy and muddle have been cleared away."228 
Yet whether sociologists prefer the old or the new, the fact stands 
out clearly - Weberian social theory is not built to assess the moral. 
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Weber's basic concept of the moral is such that it is inaccessible not 
only to him but to us. So the sociology of education is left with little 
to offer professional educators in the way of tools with which to evaluate 
value. And as David Hargreaves points out, in the face of the pressure groups 
which are "fighting for particular forms of structure, roles and content in 
education" it is the teacher who suffers. "The teacher has to choose  
where he stands, and be prepared to defend his chosen territory."229 The 
sociology of education can give him little help in making his choice. 
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Chapter 4: The Critical Theory of Mrgen Habermas: 
Its significance for the sociology of morality  
In the last chapter it was shown that whilst Marx, Durkheim and Weber 
had distinctly moral motivations in their approach to social theory and 
each to a different degree gave a critique of morality in society, none 
of them provided an adequate basis for a theoretically coherent sociology 
of morality. Durkheim, whilst making morality central to his concept of 
social change and pioneering the study of secular moral education, was 
essentially a relativist and failed to explicate the moral in universal 
terms. Marx provided an immanent critique of bourgeois "justice" as the 
legitimating ideology of labour exchange under capitalism and was motivated 
by a concern for liberty but his assumption that revolutionary praxis bore 
no relation to moral universals left no possibility of applying a critique 
to the means whereby the desired and predicted state of emancipation 
was to be brought about. Weber was aware of the intimate connection 
between religious and moral beliefs and social change, yet held the sphere 
of the moral to be essentially irrational and thus saw the task of modern 
social science as providing the theoretical foundations for the understanding 
of the process of the increasing rationalisation of society in value-free 
terms. Morality was a private and individual matter, important to the 
sociologist in the understanding of the motives of social actors and for the 
guidance of his own professional conduct - it was not to be confused with 
social fact nor incorporated into social theory. It was further shown 
that building on these foundations, sociologists either tended to ignore 
the moral, thus rendering injustice invisible or to approach the moral 
as a means to the end of understanding society in functionalist terms. 
It was functionalism's inability to deal with morality per se that led to 
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sociology's almost total retreat from the arena of moral education. 
During the last few years, however, the moral insights of the founding 
fathers have been criticised and extended and the whole realm of the moral 
within the sociological has been re-opened through the writings of the 
critical theorists, in particular, of Jurgen Habermas. 
Like the earlier critical theorists Habermas has taken Marxist theory 
as a starting point and used Weberian insights in his critique of Marx 
and of instrumental rationality and positivism. His interests, like theirs 
are wide. They include linguistic philosophy, sociology, psycho-analysis, 
social psychology and many aspects of political and philosophical thought. 
But he has broken with the pessimism of earlier members of the Frankfurt 
School and whilst sharing their debt to Hegel, Habermas has endeavoured to 
ground his critical theory empirically. Above all Habermas has sought to 
show the interrelatedness of theory and practice and has theorised the 
relationship of truth to justice. Whilst he agrees with Durkheim that 
values and norms are the essential factors of social integration1  he 
maintains that social norms bear a direct relation to truth. The moral 
realm is not, as Weber insists, irrational. Where norms express 
generalisable interests, they are indeed, rational. Here Habermas shows 
his greatest difference from Weber and Kant in his approach to the moral, 
shifting the emphasis from the individual reflecting moral consciousness 
to the community of subjects in dialogue. Habermas can be seen as having 
brought morality back into the political sphere. He has not only shown that 
the political has at base a moral dimension but has restored to morality 
its political dimension - from being an individual and irrational 
phenomenon it can be seen as a rational universal and communicative 
phenomenon, not abstract in the Marxist sense but concretised in human 
practical activity. 
In order to give substance to the above claims, we shall first look 
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at the way Habermas has come to theorise the moral through his critique of 
rationality, in the context of his critical theorist heritage. We shall 
examine briefly his main deviations from traditional critical theory 
including his characterisation of advanced capitalism and his concern for 
the re-establishment of a dynamic relationship of theory to practice. And 
we shall consider the main aspects of his critiques of Marx, Weber and 
Kant in their approach to the moral. We shall then look at the 
development of his work on universal pragmatics (his theory of communicative 
competence) with special reference to its explication of the moral. We shall 
next review his work on social evolution, which incorporates both his 
communication theory and his crisis theory and where the moral sphere takes 
precedence over the technical-economic sphere. Finally, we shall note the 
place Habermas affords institutional systems in his various schema and 
attempt to evaluate what relevance the work of Habermas might have for the 
sociology of morality. 
Habermas' Critical Theory: his critique of rationality  
The founders of critical theory had sought to bring the basic 
contradictions of capitalist society to consciousness. They had emerged 
in the Germany of the early thirties when capitalism appeared on the 
verge of collapse and neither fascism nor communism provided acceptable 
alternatives. The paradigm for their critique was Marx's Critique of 
Political Economy but from the beginning they shifted the critical focus 
from the infra-structure to the superstructure. Essentially their critique 
was of "instrumental reason" or one-dimensional rationality which, with 
the emergence of organized capitalism was an increasing threat to 
emancipation.2 Critical theory according to Hockenheimer's earliest 
writings saw men as the producers of all their historical life forms. 
Truth was objective in the metaphysical sense of being inherent in the 
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essence of human reality as the "goal of a rational society" was 
"invested in every man". Critical theory was concerned to "accelerate 
a development which should lead to a society without injustice."3 But 
Critical theorists were philosophers and like Hegel, whose philosophy they 
reintroduced into Marxism they neither had direct political connections nor 
attempted to provide a theory to guide political practice. They maintained 
the belief that the proletariat, through enlightenment and realised class 
consciousness, would act, in due course, as the agent of revolution. In 
its later stages, when history had shown the proletariats' inability to 
meet the fascist challenge, critical theory retreated into the realm of 
pure theory and exclusive individualism, earning the criticism that their 
work was an example of "the substitution of theory as a surrogate for 
politics".  
Emerging from this tradition, Jargen Habermas maintained a concern 
for the continued effective critique of positivism and instrumental 
rationality and for the telos of emancipation but brought to his work an 
awareness of the overriding need to re-establish the connections of theory 
and practice. This required from the beginning an intention to give his 
research a firm empirical foundation but would also require re-examination 
of the assumptions of the critical theorists and a thorough critical 
examination of the writings of Marx himself. Habermas' early work 
continued in the philosophical vein of the founders of critical theory, 
extending several of Adorno's ideas, developed during the latter's critique 
of fascism. Adorno had rejected the Marxian idea of emancipation via a 
mass social movement brought to self-consciousness through a theoretical 
understanding of the nature of its exploitation under capital. He 
believed that the experience of oppression could only be formulated on an 
individual basis. Adorno accepted Marx's notion of philosophy's practical 
self-realisation, present in his early writings, together with the Marxian 
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concept of the reflective relation existing in history between social 
practice and consciousness. Habermas incorporated these ideas into his 
theory of historical self-consciousness and later was to develop Adorno's 
notion of dialectic "as the reconstruction of what is systematically 
suppressed in communicative power relations."5 
In his critique of positivism Habermas sought to radicalise 
epistemology as he endeavoured to show that all forms of knowledge, 
including the natural sciences were "intertwined with the objective self-
formation process of the human species."6 "A radical critique of 
knowledge" has, in Habermas' words, "to be social theory".7 His analysis 
of knowledge as the empirical-analytic sciences, the historical- 
hermeneutic sciences and the critical social sciences with their 
technical, practical and emancipatory constituent interests, was the 
start of his long connection with language theory for it led to questions 
about truth and experience and their relationship which could only be 
answered by research into human communication. 
Habermas believed that knowledge constituent interests preserved "the 
latent nexus between action and theoretical knowledge".8 through the 
discursive verification of their truth claims. To follow this line of 
thought, he would need a coherent theory of communication. 
From the beginning, Habermas sought to extend critical theory 
without depending on the action of a politicised proletariat. His 
characterisation of advanced capitalism gives the rationale for this 
approach. As capitalism advanced, two tendencies became dominant, an 
increase in state intervention and the interdependence of research and 
technology.9 This led to the formation of "organized or state-regulated 
capitalism" which Habermas sees as being characterised by two types of 
phenomena: firstly by "the process of economic concentration - the rise 
of national and, subsequently, of multinational corporations - and to the 
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organization of markets for goods, capital, and labor" and secondly, by 
"the fact that the state intervenes in the market as functional gaps 
develop."10  On one hand, the economic system being re-coupled to the 
political system causes the repoliticisation of the relations of production 
(via unions and their actions in pay claims etc.). But on the other the 
administrative system is increasingly separated from the public realm which 
results in an effective depoliticisation of the masses.
11 
Under this 
condition class conflict becomes latent. 
This change in the nature of capitalism, whilst not invalidating 
Marx's theories, will affect the way they are applied to present-day 
situ at ions .12 Habermas' critique of Marx is focussed on what could be 
considered Marx's tendency towards positivism, his lack of distinction 
between the meanings of techne and praxis. While Marx clearly intends, in 
his early writings that work be considered as "social labour", involving 
not only the productive relationship between man and nature but the 
interaction of man and man, Habermas contends that the bulk of Marx's 
theorising on labour refers almost exclusively to technical labour - 
communicative action is reduced to instrumental action. Habermas' analysis 
of the German Ideology revealed that this tendency is due to a theoretical 
deficiency: 
. . . Marx does not actually explicate the interrelationship 
of interaction and labor, but instead, under the unspecific 
title of social praxis, reduces the one to the other, namely: 
communicative action to instrumental action. . . For Marx 
instrumental action, the productive activity which regulates 
the material interchange of the human species with its 
natural environment, becomes the paradigm for the generation 
of all the categories; everything is resolved into the self-
movement of production. Because of this, Marx's brilliant 
insight into the dialectical relationship between the forces 
of production and the relations of production could very 
quickly be misinterpreted in a mechanistic manner. 13 
The corollary of this tendency to subsume the category of social 
interaction under the umbrella of production is that for Marx, the whole 
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realm of morality is subject to production and its definite relations. 
Morality "is an institutional framework constructed out of cultural 
tradition; but it is a framework for processes of production. Marx takes 
the dialectic of the moral life, which operates on the basis of social 
labor, as the law of motion of a defined conflict between definite parties."14 
This conflict, moreover is always "about the organization of the 
appropriation of socially created products" whilst the parties at conflict 
are classes, "determined by their position in the process of production."
15 
The factor which will determine the revolutionary transformation of the 
conflict is the developmental level of the forces of production. Thus the 
whole moral area of social interaction is lost in any Marxist analysis. 
Habermas considers that had Marx "not thrown together interaction and work 
under the label of social practice" but had theorised the relationship of 
instrumental and communicative action within his theory of materialism 
he would have surpassed "Hegel's critique of the subjectivism of Kant's 
epistemology. . . materialistically."16 He concludes that ultimately a 
"radical critique of knowledge can be carried out only in the form of a 
reconstruction of the history of the species".17 Whilst still using a 
philosophical approach, Habermas saw this in terms of "the self-reflection 
of the knowing subject"18 but once he had taken the linguistic turn, 
he would be able to embark on a reconstruction of historical materialism 
with a rich theory of the moral which was to provide a critique of 
Kantian individualism. 
While Habermas introduced his "fundamental distinction" between work 
and interaction in a critique of Marx, in the context of his critique of 
Hegel's moral theory, he developed it in order to reformulate Weber's 
"subjective approach" to rationalisation.19 Habermas' early critique of 
Weber was in terms of Weber's neo-Kantian espousal of value-freedom in 
social science. The "very term 'values'. . . in relation to which science 
is supposed to preserve neutrality", in the opinion of Habermas, renounced 
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"the connection between the two that theory had intended."20 As Habermas 
sought to incorporate Weberian insights into the progress of instrumental 
rationality, his critique deepened and led him to further theoretical 
development. 
In his essay, "Technology and Science as Ideology", Habermas shows 
that rationalization can be theorised along two dimensions - the dimension 
of systems of purposive-rational action and the dimension of the 
institutional framework, characterised by symbolic interaction, the 
former being typified by "work" and the latter by "interaction".21 
Purposive-rational action is understood as instrumental action, governed 
by technical rules based on empirical knowledge or rational choice 
governed by strategies based on analytic knowledge. Whilst instrumental 
action implies conditional predictions about observable events, which can 
prove correct or incorrect, strategic action implies deductions based on 
values and maxims. Both sub-types of purposive-rational action aim to 
realise defined goals under given conditions. 
Symbolic interaction or communicative action is governed by 
consensual social norms, defining reciprocal expectations about behaviour 
and enforced through sanctions. Their meaning is objectified in everyday 
language communication. Whilst learned rules of purposive-rational action 
supply one with skills, required for problem solving, internalised norms 
give rise to one's personality structure and the motivations needed to 
conform to social norms. Habermas points out that "while the validity of 
technical rules and strategies depends on that of empirically true or 
analytically correct propositions, the validity of social norms is grounded 
only in the intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions and 
secured by the general recognition of obligations."22 
Rationalisation can occur on each of the above levels. At the level 
of systems of purposive-rational action we have the extension of the 
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power of technical control and the growth of productive forces. This is the 
zone of scientific-technical progress, typified by Weber as moving into the 
political sphere as bureaucratisation. But at the level of the 
institutional framework (or as Habermas is later to describe it, the "socio-
cultural system"),23 rationalization will occur in the medium of symbolic 
interaction itself, through the removal of distortion in and restrictions 
on, communication. The rationalisation of communication would involve 
the rationalisation of social norms and would furnish individuals with 
"the opportunity for further emancipation and progressive individuation". 
And to theorise this level of rationalisation one needs a theory of 
language.24 Weber saw the moral realm in advanced societies as being 
private and individual, not subject to rationalisation, because essentially 
irrational. Habermas can show that morality can be rational only by 
showing how normative-validity claims can be justified which will 
require a way of determining the generalisability of interests. 
If Weber's concept of rationalization led Habermas towards providing 
a theory adequate for determining the validity of norms then it was his 
concept of legitimate authority which directed Habermas' attention to the 
relation of legitimation to truth.25 To Weber, rational authority was 
characterised by being constituted according to law which was accepted as 
valid by the people - it had no immanent relation to truth as the people's 
acceptance was not considered to be rationally based. There was thus, 
according to Weber, no way in which such a rational authority could display 
domination. Considering the ambiguities in Weber's formulation led 
Habermas "to problems concerning the possibility of justifying norms of 
action and evaluation in general.26 
Habermas' theory of communication with its relationship of truth to 
norms and their validification through discourse would not only provide a 
definitive critique of the Weberian doctrine of value-freedom but provide 
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an adequate critique of Kant - in terms of both his separation of theoretical 
and practical reason and of his individualistic and subjective (rather 
than intersubjective) basis of morality.27 We shall turn now to a 
consideration of Habermas' language theory, "universal pragmatics", 
particularly paying attention to its significance for the conceptualising 
and theorising of rational morality. 
Universal pragmatics: the moral expressed in linguistic terms  
Habermas' move from the theory of cognitive interests to the theory 
of communicative competence can be demonstrated through his analysis of 
systematically distorted communication. The concept of distorted 
communication had arisen from Habermas' critique of Marx where all 
previous history rather than the history of class struggle was seen as 
the history of systematically distorted communication, consisting essentially 
of dissociated symbols and suppressed motives.28 Habermas considered that 
Marx "was not able to see that power and ideology are distorted communication 
because he made the assumption that men distinguished themselves from 
animals when they began to produce their means of subsistence,'P i.e. 
because he failed to demarcate the dimension of symbolic interaction when 
he made production his all-embracing category of action. 	 Habermas 
turned to psychoanalysis as a paradigm for the analysis of systematically 
distorted communication and was able to identify some of the structural 
conditions to which normal communication conforms, conditions governing 
intersubjectivity and the relationship of the private to the public 
world. From the analysis he concluded that a theory of communicative 
competence was presupposed. 30 
Habermas developed his theory of communicative competence in terms of 
"universal pragmatics" incorporating Chomsky's work on linguistic 
competence and building on the pragmatic theories of speech of Austin and 
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Searle.31 Universal pragmatics attempts to reconstruct the general 
structures of speech exhibited in the everyday communication of competent 
adult speakers. The unit of speech is the speech act, "the smallest [verbal] 
utterance sequence which is comprehensible and acceptable to at least one other 
competent actor within a communications context."32 So universal pragmatics 
looks for the rules governing sentence use in utterances, regardless of 
their context. Following Austin, Habermas makes a distinction between 
the propositional content of a speech act and its illocutionary forces. The 
illocutionary force is the extent to which a speech act does something 
in saying something. A speech act is successful in the illocutionary sense 
"if the intended relationship between a speaker and a hearer is brought 
about" and if one understands and accepts the contents uttered in the 
communicative role indicated by the other.33 Habermas points out that we 
can intuitively distinguish between four areas of life experience - "the 
objectivity of external nature, the normative character of society, the 
intersubjectivity of language and the subjectivity of internal nature"- 
and that these areas will be distinguished in speech. The first area 
is typified by propositional language, the second and third by interpersonal 
communication and the last by expressive language use. Speech acts of 
the first type are classified as constative, of the second as regulative 
and of the third, as representative.35 
Communication must be transacted at both the level of objects in the 
world, as states of affairs (the propositional components of the speech- 
acts) and at the level of intersubjectivity (illocutionary acts). Each 
type of speech act has its own inbuilt validity claims. Constative 
speech acts have an implicit claim to truth, in their case, propositional 
truth. Less obviously, though, non-constative speech acts share this claim 
which belongs to the meanings of the propositions they can be shown to 
express. Thus "truth claims are validity claims. . . which are built into 
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the structures of all possible speech."36 Through the illocutionary 
force of speech acts, normative validity claims, claims to rightness or 
legitimacy, are universally built into the structures of speech. Habermas 
explained it as follows: "The illocutionary force of a speech act, 
which brings about an interpersonal relationship between consensually 
interacting participants, arises from the binding force of acknowledged 
norms of action; to the extent that a speech act is part of consensual 
interaction it actualizes an already established value-pattern. The 
validity of a normative background of institutions, roles, socioculturally 
accepted forms of life and so on, is always already presupposed."37 
Expressive language, which belongs to the inner subjective world has a 
claim to veracity, to the true self-representation of the subject. Insofar 
that all speakers are expressing the intention of meaning what they say, 
then the veracity claim is also universally implied in all possible 
speech. Similarly the essential presupposition for any communication to 
exist, comprehensibility, is also universally implied in speech. 
Habermas asserts that anyone acting communicatively must raise 
universal validity claims in performing any speech action. If he wants 
to reach an understanding, then he must share knowledge, mutual trust 
and accord with any others, for agreement is based "on recognition of 
the corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, 
truthfulness and rightness."38 The following procedure will be required: 
The speaker must choose a comprehensible expression so that 
speaker and hearer can understand one another. The speaker 
must have the intention of communicating a true proposition 
(or a propositional content, the existential pre- 
suppositions of which are satisfied) so that the hearer 
can share the knowledge of the speaker. The speaker must 
want to express his intentions truthfully so that the 
hearer can believe the utterance of the speaker (can 
trust him). Finally the speaker must choose an utterance 
that is right so that the hearer can accept the utterance 
and speaker and hearer can agree with one another in the 
utterance with respect to a recognised normative background. 
Moreover, communicative action can continue undisturbed 
only as long as participants suppose that the validity 
claims they reciprocally raise are justified.39 
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Habermas has developed his theory to cover an analysis of dialogue 
constitutive universals and to explore various aspects of semiotics. 
It is by no means complete. It is, however, through his typification 
of discourse and the ideal speech situation that we find significant 
points of interest for the sociology of morality, rather than in recent 
extensions to the theory of universal pragmatics. 
Discourse has long been a subject of interest to Habermas with 
regard to the relation of theory and praxis in an evolutionary historical 
perspective. Institutionalised discourse, can, he believes, become "a 
systematically relevant mechanism of learning" for a society.40 Yet he 
has noted a tendency "to reject as illusion the claim that political and 
practical questions may be clarified discursively and to deny. . . the 
truth value of such questions."41 He thus made the "framework of the 
logic of discourse" the basis of the redemption or criticism of validity 
claims. Theoretical discourse serves to verify truth claims of assertions, 
using different rules of argument from practical discourse which serves 
to justify recommended norms. "However," Habermas asserts, "in both 
cases the goal is the same: a rationally motivated decision about the 
recognition (or rejection) of validity claims."42 
Discourse, according to Habermas' characterisation, is a particular 
form of communication which will be capable of leading to a consensus 
that expresses a "rational will". The formal properties of discourse 
guarantees that a consensus can only arise through appropriately 
interpreted needs that can be communicatively shared - generalisable 
interests. Norms which express generalisable interests, being based 
on a rational consensus are thus justifiable. For a rational will to be 
expressed through discourse the following conditions must obtain: the 
discussion must be limited to the validity claims of assertions, 
recommendations or warnings; the participants, themes and contributions 
must not be restricted apart from reference to the goal of testing the 
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validity claims; no force may be applied save that of better argument; 
and only motive present shall be the co-operative search for truth. In 
order to characterise a situation under which norms which regulate 
generalisable interests could be determined, Habermas has thus introduced 
the idea of the ideal speech situation.43 The ideal speech situation can 
be seen as a way of expressing universal moral principles. In determining 
the truth of an assertion or the appropriatness of a norm through 
theoretical or practical discourse, no governing moral principles need 
be applied - the universals are built into the situation, "based only 
on fundamental norms of rational speech that we must always presuppose 
if we discourse at all." 
The ideal speech situation can be seen as an idealisation which 
is "determined by pure intersubjectivity."44 This pure intersubjectivity is 
characterised by complete symmetry in the distribution of "assertion and 
disputation" (unrestricted discussion), "revelation and hiding" (based 
on the mutuality of unimpaired self-representation, including the 
acknowledgement and self-representation of the "other") and 
"prescription and following" (universal understanding and the necessity 
of universalist norms). These three symmetries thus represent a 
linguistic conceptualisation of the ideas of truth, freedom and justice."45 
According to this typification, truth cannot be analysed independently 
of freedom and justice. 
It must be stressed, that while the theory of universal pragmatics 
refers to all speech acts entered into by competent adult speakers and 
has demonstrated, with increasing precision, the fundamental relationship 
of truth to social norms and their implicit validity claims in all acts 
of verbal communication, the ideal speech situation, wherein truth and 
justice co-exist has more in common with an "ideal construct" than with 
a "reconstruction".46 For whilst the universal rules of a communicative 
1 49 
ethic can be derived from the basic norms of rational speech via universal 
pragmatics, the actual truth of an assertion or the fairness (generalisability) 
of a norm can only be determined under ideal circumstances. While 
Habermas conceives of the possibility of social norms being actually 
criticised by institutionalised forms of discourse under conditions that 
approximate total openness, he stresses that his theory does not need the 
actualisation of the ideal speech situation. It is sufficient that "the 
expectation of discursive redemption of normative-validity claims is 
already contained in the structure of intersubjectivity."47 It is worth 
noting that in his earlier work on the discourse theory of truth, 
Habermas made it clear that, unlike Peirce, he was not envisaging an 
actual, potential situation. 
I may ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if 
every other person who could enter into a dialogue 
with me would ascribe the same predicate to the same 
object. . . .The condition of the truth of statements 
is the potential agreement of all others.48 
Even without further theoretical advances within universal 
pragmatics, Habermas has already demonstrated the fundamental relationship 
that exists between fact and value in ordinary acts of communication. 
"Is" and "ought" increasingly converge as the ideal speech situation is 
approached but propositional truth and universal social values such as 
justice and freedom are kept conceptually distinct, although inter-
dependent. For Marx, however, value tended to be fact or at least to 
emerge directly from it. What is coming into being and what ought to be  
were confused. There was a telos but there was no guiding theory for the 
means to this end as the telos was hazy. Habermas' ideal speech situation 
presupposes a telos which is moral in essence as "justice" is essential 
to the process of discourse. The ideal speech situation is ideal in the 
sense that it is never to be perfectly realised but it is grounded in the 
concrete human situation of interaction and intersubjectivity which brings 
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it into the realm of praxis. By showing that discourse presupposes the 
activity of what are described by philosophers as universal moral 
principles Habermas brings the realm of the moral back into that of the 
political. Political action can never be value free. Moreover, even 
if the ideal speech situation is never actually realised, it can serve 
as a model for the practical institutionalisation of discourse and act 
as a guide for the critique of systematically distorted communication.49 
As Habermas commented with respect to the practical purpose of his 
ideal speech situation in the context of its anticipatory rather than 
its actual or empirical nature: "This anticipation alone is the warrant 
which permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim to 
a rational consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard 
against which every actually realised consensus can be called into 
question and checked. . ."50 
If politics is to have a moral challenge, then philosophy has a 
potential political challenge. For, potentially at least, Habermas has 
put the political back into moral theory to an extent unknown since the 
time of Plato and Aristotle, and has extended the critique of Kant, 
commenced by Hegel. Under Kant's moral law, the individual autonomous 
will is the active principle, even though morality itself is universal. 
Habermas considers that according to Kant, moral action is thus cut off 
from the domain of morality - Kantian moral actions being in Habermasian 
terms, strategic action.51 Habermas, having replaced the individual will 
with the discursively generated rational (corporate) will, has moved 
moral action back into the universal realm of morality. If moral 
philosophy is to continue as an agent of truth it cannot be content to 
restrict its argument to the level of the individual. It must take 
seriously the relationship of ethics to politics. 
These ideas of Habermas are not without their problems and critics. 
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Dick Howard, in "A Politics in Search of the Political"52 has mounted a 
strong attack on Habermas' moral/political relation. It is in part 
theoretical - he sees a clash between the individual commitment to reason 
in discourse and the need for universal norms - but largely practical. 
How, for example, do we tell which interests are generalisable ? Who 
gets this "good of all" plan going ? Who "breaks" individualism ?53  
It is clear that he considers that Habermas is an idealist who has 
betrayed "the entire thrust of Marx's dialectical critique" which is "to 
refute this philosophical stance." Habermas' idealism "is precisely that 
attitude which believes that it can abstract itself from the social and 
historical conditions of its time."54 Such criticism was common with 
Habermas' earlier philosophical writings but became less deserved when 
the ideal was grounded in linguistic theory. It does highlight the fact, 
however, that even universal pragmatics needs to be embedded in a 
social and historical context. Wellmer considers that the theory of 
universal pragmatics does provide a way of explicating social injustice 
(systematically distorted communication) but doubts if it can be 
usefully developed in isolation" as a "transcendental pragmatics" of 
communication prior to and independent of the work of historical 
reconstruction itself."55 
Whether or not Habermas' connection between truth, freedom and 
justice is ultimately considered defensible by philosophy, will have to 
await the outcome of debate by the philosophical fraternity. There 
are many fundamental questions which arise from a discourse theory of 
truth which McCarthy has shown are to some extent reflected in Habermas' 
own versions of the consensus theory.56 Whatever the outcome, universal 
pragmatics is essential for Habermas' work in reformulating historical 
materialism, to which we now turn. 
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Social evolution: the moral built into reconstructed historical materialism  
The historical materialism that Habermas is in the process of 
reconstructing is that codified by Stalin in 1938, rather than any specific 
formulation by Marx himself, 57 although Habermas considers that historical 
materialism is the theoretical framework for all Marx's work. Marx 
had drawn an analytical distinction between two different, dialectically 
related, "dimensions" of the reproductive process of societies - the 
technological dimension and the institutional dimension. The first 
was the location of the forces of production 58 and the second of the 
relations of production. The institutional dimension comprised the 
symbolically mediated forms of social interaction, i.e. forms of social 
integration (domination) in addition to forms of social conflict (class 
struggle). But because Marx saw the category of labour as pre-eminent, 
conceiving man as essentially a "tool making animal", he tended to reduce 
the institutional dimension to that of the technological.59 Production 
was the premier category. So in Marx's scheme, changes in the forces of 
production (technological changes), were the main instrumental factors in 
social evolution. Social changes would be felt firstly at the 
substructural level, as the relations of production were transformed and 
adapted under the challenge of the more highly developed technical forces. 
They would later be felt at the level of the superstructure as changes 
in the institutional framework affected the political and ideological 
dimensions. 
We saw earlier that Habermas' critique of Marx was based on Marx's 
reduction of communicative action to instrumental action. In addition 
to this, Habermas had concluded from his analysis of advanced capitalism, 
that due to the repoliticisation of the relations of production (or the 
recoupling of the uncoupled state from society), state and society could 
be no longer related as superstructure to base.60 As well as these factors, 
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Habermas believes that Marx's formulation of five or six clearly 
distinguished modes of production which he linked to the history of the 
species is too dogmatic a version of history and is philosophically 
unsound. He proposes a weaker model where the bearers of evolution 
are "societies and the acting subjects integrated into them." Social 
evolution will thus "be discerned in those structures that are replaced 
by more comprehensive structures in accord with a pattern that is to 
be rationally reconstructed. In the course of this structure-forming 
process, societies and individuals, together with their ego and group 
identities, undergo change."61 
Habermas' aim is to reformulate Marx's theory in a non-technologically 
deterministic manner by restoring the symbolically mediated dimension of 
communicative action to human reproduction and by keeping it analytically 
distinct from the dimensions of instrumental and strategic action. This 
has meant a re-interpretation of some of Marx's original categories and 
their relationships as well as the formulation of new categories. The main 
concepts and features of his reconstruction, as it stands at present are 
indicated below. 
The relations of production are no longer part of the economic base 
of a social formation, although they are still defined "by means of 
their function of regulating access to the means of production and thereby 
indirectly regulating the distribution of social wealth."62 The relations 
of production are interconnected with various institutions. It is this 
institutional core "around which the relations of production crystallise" 
that "lays down a specific form of social integration."63 Social 
integration is considered in the Durkheimian sense of "the unity of a 
social life-world through norms and values."64 We shall thus find the 
relevant factors for social integration to be institutions (especially 
those such as the family and school, connected with socialisation) world 
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views and moral beliefs and individual identity (with the incorporated 
norms of the personality structure).65 Rather than the relations of 
production being directly threatened by the forces of production it is 
the form of social integration which is threatened by problems 
emerging in the economic domain. These systems problems may be 
transferred from the economic to the political domain66 but will only 
endanger the identity of society if they cannot be solved "in accord with 
the dominant form of social integration."67 
Whilst Marx only conceived of knowledge functioning in social 
evolution in the instrumental and strategic sense, namely technological 
knowledge which would lead to improved technologies of production and 
organizational knowledge for the creation of a more efficient labour force, 
Habermas adds the communicative category of moral-practical knowledge  
to the Marxian category of cognitive-technical knowledge. Whilst the 
latter is necessary for further development of the forces of production and 
thus for a move to a more highly developed mode of production, the former 
is essential for the development of new forms of social integration which 
must be formed prior to the further utilisation of technical knowledge. 
Habermas has summarised his evolutionary outline, leaving out the 
"how" of this fundamental development of new form of social integration, 
(thus omitting reference to moral-practical knowledge), as follows:- 
a) The system problems that cannot be solved without 
evolutionary innovations arise in the basic domain 
of a society. 
b) Each new mode of production means a new form of social 
integration, which crystallizes around a new institutional 
core. 
c) An endogenous learning mechanism provides for the 
accumulation of a cognitive potential that can be 
used for solving crisis-inducing system problems. 
d) This knowledge, however, can be implemented to develop 
the forces of production only when the evolutionary step 
to a new instituional framework and a new form of social 
integration has been taken.68 
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While for Marx the generative mechanism of historical materialism is 
through "social conflict, struggle, social movements, and political 
confrontations (which, when they take place under the conditions of a 
class structure, can be analysed as class struggles)"69 the 'how" for 
Habermas will concentrate on changes in the form of social integration, 
on the development of moral-practical knowledge in a society and on 
the relation between them. 
The crisis tendencies which threaten the form of social integration 
have been discussed in some depth by Habermas within the concept of 
legitimation. By legitimacy, Habermas understands "the worthiness of a 
political order to be recognized", the claim to legitimacy being 
"related to the social-integrative preservation of a normatively 
determined social identity."70 Legitimation problems arise in advanced 
capitalist society as a result of a fundamental "conflict between the 
social welfare responsibilities of mass democracies and the functional 
conditions of capitalist society. The state is forced to deal with the 
dysfunctional side effects of the economic process under a number of 
restrictive conditions - balancing a policy of economic stability against 
a policy of social reform in a world economy that increasingly limits 
the individual states' latitude for action and without being able 
effectively to control social integration or to "plan ideology".71 If 
the state fails to keep the situation balanced manifestations of 
delegitimation appear - economic instability, political breakdown or 
"disintegration of the motivational patterns essential to capitalist 
society and the spread of dysfunctional patterns."72 It is at 
the motivation crisis level when the normative and value structures 
of society are unable to cope with threats to their stability that 
Habermas sees the potential for evolutionary advance. 
Whether or not the form of social integration can be transformed 
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to a"higher" lwvel or whether social disintegration results will depend 
on the activity of two partially theorised concepts, the "learning level" 
and the "organisational principle". 
Organizational principles are "highly abstract principles of social 
organization"73 which can be readily exemplified within social evolution 
but which are difficult to define.74 By definition they are "innovations 
that become possible through developmental-logically reconstructible 
stages of learning, and which institutionalize new levels of societal 
learning, and which "circumscribe ranges of possibility".75 They are 
exemplified by kinship relations in primitive social formations and 
wage labour tied to market economy in liberal-capitalist social 
formations.76 Until the whole area has been further theorised, Habermas 
considers it adequate that organizational principles be characterised 
"through the institutional core that determines the dominant form of 
social integration."77 
A learning level is defined as the "structural conditions of the 
possibility of cognitive-technical and moral-practical learning 
processes", or alternately as "structures of consciousness".78 For a 
"theory of learning levels", Habermas turned to the developmental 
psychology of Piaget and Kohlberg, finding in the developmental stages 
of moral consciousness, a correspondence with the stages of inter-
active competence. Hence Habermas' interactive stages whereby a child 
moves from symbolically mediated interaction through propositionally 
differentiated speech to argumentative speech or discourse correspond 
to Piaget's preconventional, conventional and postconventional stages 
of moral development.79 By typifying social integration as functioning 
in the levels of a) general structures of action, b) structures of world 
views determinate for morality and law and c) structures of 
institutionalised law and of binding moral representations Habermas 
shows that there has been a development in moral consciousness (moral- 
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practical learning level) from Neolithic societies through to the modern 
age. 
Habermas' incorporation of Piaget/Kohlberg moral development theory 
into his reformulation of historical materialism has resulted in a 
critique of the Kantian individualism implicit in Kohlberg's highest 
stage of principled morality. At the sane time he has attempted to 
demonstrate the developmental logic of the Kohlbergian sequence by 
connecting moral consciousness with general qualifications for role 
behaviour.80 He concludes that there should be a seventh stage of moral 
development, characterised not by autonomy and a formalistic ethic of 
duty but by an unconstrained ego identity and a universal ethics of 
speech. It is clear that this stage whose "inner nature is rendered 
communicatively fluid and transparent to the extent that needs can, 
through aesthetic forms of expression, be kept articulable. . ." 81 
is in one sense, like perfectly undistorted communication itself, an ideal 
situation. 
Habermas' plan is to use this rationally constructed developmental 
logic to represent rules for possible problem solving in a society. That 
is, he looks to developmental psychology for learning mechanisms at the 
individual level and then attempts to "explain sociologically how 
individual learning processes find their way into a society's collectively 
accessible store of knowledge."82 His thesis is that "individually 
acquired learning abilities and information must be latently available 
in world views before they can be used in a socially significant way, 
that is, before they can be transposed into societal learning processes."83 
From world views (determinate for morality and law), we must move to the 
institutional embodiment of rationality structures in these world views 
through the learning of individuals or marginal social groups until the 
societal lump has been sufficiently leavened (the moral-practical insight 
158 
has been sufficiently widely shared) for a new set of social institutions, 
which will include more permanent structures such as institutionalised 
law and binding moral representations. 
Although his formulation is not claimed to be a theory and is still 
at the developmental stage it holds firm to several points which are 
important to an understanding of his approach to the moral. Firstly, 
he holds firm to the priority of moral-practical learning over 
cognitive-technical learning in affecting social integration and believes 
that the essential role of technical learning is in the formation of a 
new mode of production. Secondly he lays stress on the priority of 
individual moral learning over institutional change - social change must 
take place from the grass roots upwards. 
It is premature to criticise Habermas' relationship to the empirical 
at this stage but it is perhaps unfortunate that he accepts Kohlberg's 
work as essentially sound at the empirical level because its 
developmental logic shares the rationality of his own theory of 
developing communicative competence. On the whole his theory is 
reconstructive rather than empirical and it does not stand or fall by the 
validity of developmental psychology. 
His greatest difficulty at the theoretical level is how to theorise 
the relationship between individual and corporate moral consciousness. 
The genetic epistemologists claim that both cognitive and moral 
development take place as an orgasmic response to problem situations 
and that the mechanisms of assimilation and adaptation are innate to 
humans. 84 Kohlberg, moreover, asserts that one individual can influence 
the moral developmental level of another through discursive interaction, 
but this is still very tentative.85 The relationship between the 
individual and societal levels of development, however, has always been 
tenuous. Habermas does not appear to have any theoretical sources at 
his disposal to help him move from the level of societally embedded world 
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views through the necessary individual leaps in moral-practical learning 
levels to the sufficiently wide acceptance by members of society for the 
new knowledge to become institutionalised and thus form the basis of a new 
type of social integration. It is obvious that he has something 
different in mind from Durkheim's functional rebel, but with Durkheim 
he shares the problem of how to theorise institutional change. 
Habermas turns to Weber for insight into the rationalisation of 
structures of consciousness and observes that whilst Weber was strong 
on the transformation of structures of world views into universalistic 
value-orientations and had investigated the "institutional embodiment 
of the universalistic principles in the various areas of life" he had 
failed to analyse the structures of consciousness themselves.86 Whilst 
Habermas has at his disposal cognitive psychological knowledge, he 
appears to take the mechanism of institutionalisation of this knowledge 
and the relationship between the institutionalised forms of being of 
little importance. He refers at various times to processes of 
socialisation, to enterprises and public administrations, to institutions 
of jurisprudence87 and so on but he appears to take their function and 
interrelationships as unproblematic. At other times he appears to see the 
transmission of moral learning as a type of osmosis which permeates 
society. He suggests, for example, that "norm and value-forming 
communications" may be "diffuse" rather than institutionalized, appearing 
under a variety of definitions but penetrating into the "pores of 
spheres of life which are formally organized."88 
Habermas' tentative reformulation of historical materialism, in 
spite of its unresolved difficulties is important in that it seeks to 
restore the emphasis on human symbolic activity in the historical 
dimension and show that rationalisation is not confined to the 
technological sphere. It also gives a context to his valuable work on 
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universal pragmatics. While Habermas does not intend it to be considered 
a "theory of history", history not being theoretical as such,89it is 
clearly not yet a theory of evolution. In fact, McCarthy doubts that 
it is capable of becoming one even if it were shown to fit the empirical 
facts and even if the "relevant hierarchical relations of dependence 
and interdependence among the different stages of morality and legality" 
could be demonstrated 	 For "hierarchical structural patterns do not of 
themselves supply an account of how and why developments actually come 
about." go  
Habermas himself considers that evolutionary theory will find its 
application not in history writing but in practical discourse.91 It may 
be that in fact the whole venture of the reconstruction of historical 
materialism will prove its worth, through highlighting and contextualising 
Habermas' theory of communicative competence. For only through the context 
of historical materialism, reworked to include the dimension of symbolic 
interaction can we conceptualise the coming into being of a more 
advanced stage of moral consciousness than we have at present and thus 
of a stabilised form of social production that allows for human 
emancipation. 
We shall now look at some of the implications of Habermas' ideas 
for a sociology of morality. We shall first look at the possibility of 
applying his better developed theories and concepts to the investigation 
of morality and then discuss the significance of his considerations 
about present-day society. 
Habermas' theories and the empirical world - their significance for a socio-
logy of morality  
Habermas' theory of universal pragmatics including his characterisation 
of discourse under ideal conditions gives us a theory of both distorted 
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and undistorted communication. With these theories we can apply a 
critique to determine whether norms are generalisable and thus rational, 
or particularistic and thus stabilised by force. This will involve, 
firstly, the investigation of the validity claims of norms to ascertain 
whether they are indeed applicable to all those concerned, that is, 
"right" under the given circumstances. The appropriate model for this 
"practical discourse" is the communication community of those 
affected, who test the appropriateness of the norm in rational argument. 
A norm that is (or could be) grounded in a consensus of all affected 
parties, discursively obtained, will be itself rational - in ethical 
terms, a "just" norm.92 Should a norm fail to be recognised as valid 
it will indicate its inappropriateness to all concerned, that is, its 
interest bias. And interest bias, incorporated in norms, is an indicator 
of embedded power relations. Such a critique would have significance 
for investigating power relations in a particular social formation at a 
particular stage of history. By applying the ideal speech situation in 
theory one could reconstruct the norms which would regulate generalised 
needs, thus testing the validity of existing norms through comparison. 
Similarly one can apply such a critique to a situation which claims to 
act as a substantive democracy, asking: "Is this realised consensus a 
'true' consensus ?" Thus through the application of discourse theory 
we can locate normative power in a society and pinpoint social injustice. 
But as Marx had shown, there is no point in demonstrating the 
situation of injustice if we cannot unmask the ideology that legitimates 
it. Any invalid norms which are commonly accepted as representing 
generalised interests will point to the presence of a dominant ideology 
which has the double function of proving the legitimacy of the norm system 
and of preventing the open testing of the norm's validity through rational 
discussion. This approach could become the basis of a dynamic critical 
social theory. Habermas has summarised it as follows: - "A social theory 
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critical of ideology can, therefore, identify the normative power built 
into the institutional system of a society only if it starts from the 
model of the suppression of generalizable interests and compares normative 
structures existing at a given time with the hypothetical state of a 
system of norms formed, ceteris paribus, discursively."93 
Furthermore universal pragmatics gives us a means of mounting a 
moral critique within the realm of social science itself. Habermas had 
shown that Weber's typification of legitimate authority was deficient because 
of his inability to conceptualise rationality within the moral realm. 
Weber's concept of legitimation bore no relationship to truth and thus, 
used as a tool for sociological analysis it could effectively mask 
latent forces embedded in institutional structures which served minority 
interests. Such a critique is especially apposite to Parsonian 
functionalism. We noted in the previous chapter that for Parsons, the 
well-being of the social whole was taken, implicitly, as the highest good. 
When the morally relativist position was applied to education we found 
that values such as achievement were ranked equally with moral universals 
such as fairness and honesty. Within the wider society, power was 
defined by its relation to legitimate authority and legitimate authority 
by its ability to generate power. We saw, that in effect, the Parsonian 
position supported the adage "all might is right". 
But, in our previous discussion we could do no more than criticise 
functionalism in moral terms. So we noted that it failed to discriminate 
values considered as "moral" by philosophers from those which were 
expedient for the economy and that it masked the presence of injustice 
in society. But a Habermasian critique would explicate the nature of the 
injustice using the model of the suppression of generalisable interests 
to show the existence of ideologies serving to legitimate the power 
structures which a Parsonian analysis had seen as self-legitimating. It 
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would thus show the inherent flaws of structural functionalist theory 
using the language of social science and point to the possibility that 
functionalism itself could act as a legitimating ideology in the modern 
technocratic state.94 
Wellmer has pointed out the implications of Habermas' communicative 
theory for hermeneutic sociology. Because from this perspective 
distorted communication is taken to be in fact undistorted, the 
existing self-interpretations of groups and groups is elevated "to a 
position where they cannot be questioned, and. . . prevent questions 
concerning the truth of fundamental beliefs and the justice of 
fundamental norms from even being raised by the hermeneutically proceeding 
social scientist."95 Thus hermeneutic sociology may not only be untrue 
to the underlying social situation but may have the unintentional result 
of perpetuating an unjust status quo. 
Because Habermas' communication theory shows that judgements of 
value can be rational and that norms have a relation to truth it is a 
good corrective to subjectivist approaches to sociology which tend to 
confuse value with subjective meaning. We noted in the last chapter how 
this approach, typified by Dawe, had its roots in Weber's belief that in 
modern rational society the domain of the moral was the private conscience. 
In attempting to stress the importance of the moral realm to Weber, Dawe 
equated "the language of meaning" with the language of "value".96  
Habermas makes it plain that the language of value is something which 
can be defined and discussed objectively. In fact "language" use is the 
key to the rationalisation of institutionalised values (norms). The 
moral realm is certainly not part of a universe of subjective meaning. 
Habermas makes a clear distinction between value and meaning at the 
sociological level. 
Just as Habermas' distinction between communicative action and 
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strategic and instrumental action was developed as a tool with which to 
critique positivism and one-dimensional technological progress, so this 
distinction will have value to sociology. Within the educational system 
it could be used to examine the curriculum to see whether the ideology 
of science and technology held sway at this level. Or at the level of 
moral education it could be used in analysing the making of moral 
choices or moral judgements. 
Habermas' own application of his theories to the future of our 
society can also be starting points for research in the sociology of 
morality. Habermas claims that there is a theoretical stage of moral 
development beyond that typified by Kohlberg as stage six. Even if one 
does not attach the same degree of validity to Kohlberg's work as does 
Habermas, one can still consider his seventh stage of "communicative 
ethics" as that of a different type from the principled morality 
advocated by many moral educators. Principled morality has been 
traditionally described from the point of view of an individual in a 
conflict of interests. Guided by inner principles"each 'individual' 
must will in such a manner as to make the best reply to the corresponding 
demands of the others."97 Principled morality stresses the need for 
autonomy and thus for rationality. In the works of Professor Peters: 
"Autonomy implies the ability and determination to regulate one's life 
by rules which one has accepted for oneself - presumably because the 
reasons for them are both apparent and convincing."98 Habermas defines 
principled autonomous morality as the "formalistic ethics of duty", 
seeing it superseded by the "universal ethics of speech." Here we find 
the emphasis is not on individuals, negotiating interests or privately 
applying their own inner rules but on individuals in open, interpretive 
communication with other individuals, where others are seen in co-
operation rather than in competition. It may be a utopian notion, but 
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arguably no more utopian than the Kantian autonomous, perfectly rational 
and purely willed individual. But as an ideal it gives us a different 
perspective from which to view morality and opens up the possibility of 
looking at the moral in terms of interaction and communication. In other 
words we have an ideal which is expressed in sociological rather than 
philosophical language and which introduces the possibility of a 
sociological study of morality at the empirical level. 
Habermast theory of communicative morality could be of great interest 
to students of deviance and juvenile delinquency. If the ideal speech 
situation defines perfect (theoretical) moral behaviour as that which 
shows itself in perfectly symmetrical relationships then it also defines 
moral deviance in communicative terms. Moral deviance is defined as 
distortion to communication. The deviant is someone whose interactive 
relationships are inconsistent with those described by the rules of 
competent communication. 
Behind traditional approaches to deviance has been the unresolved 
problem of the relationship of societal deviance to moral deviance and 
the subsequent confusion of social cause with blame. To Durkheim, deviance 
was a normal social phenomenon which usually, but not always, indicated 
moral inadequacy. From the time of the Chicago studies, deviance was seen 
as an essentially undesirable social problem and whilst the investigation 
emphasised cause there were often overtones of blame. Thus, when 
Cicourel considered that the system of justice was a causative 
factor in producing deviance there was a shift of responsibility, in the 
moral sense, to the juvenile justice system. attempts to describe 
practices usually considered deviant as voluntary styles of behaviour, 
as in Becker's studies, not only discussed the phenomena out of their 
social context but denied any consideration of their morality. This 
confusion of moral deviance with social deviance and the loss of any 
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connection of deviance with morality in symbolic interactive and 
ethnomethodological studies was referred to in our Introduction. 
To define moral deviance in terms of distortion of communication gives 
it universal moral significance. It is real and it is undesirable if 
it is indeed moral deviance. Yet this does not mean that the individual is 
totally responsible for his moral inadequacy. For essentially all social 
repression can also be described in terms of distorted communication. So 
to say that a young person shows distortion or a high degree of 
incompetence in his social communication is to state a "moral" fact, not to 
impute blame. Distortion of communication provides a theoretical link 
between individual or group deviance and social injustice. 
Habermas asserts that "only communicative ethics is universal. . . 
only communicative ethics guarantees autonomy."99 Yet his characterisation 
of today's advanced capitalistic society leaves great doubt as to whether 
the present weakening of the moral structures of social integration are a 
sign of potential progress or of societal disintegration. He has 
described the increasing collapse of world views with an integrative 
force, such as the weakening of the traditional values of justice and 
equality that undergirded liberal capitalism, which although exposed 
by Marx as part of bourgeois democracy were at least a remnant of 
universalistic belief. Democracy no longer has the goal of rationalising 
authority through the participation of citizens - no one expects equal 
rights. He has also described the weakening of the very values needed to 
maintain legitimation of the capitalist mode of production - possessive 
individualism and achievement orientation.100  
He asks the following questions: 
If world-views have foundered. . . what fulfills the moral-
practical task of constituting ego- and group-identity ? 
Could a universalistic linguistic ethics no longer connected to 
cognitive interpretations of nature and society (a) adequately 
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stabilize itself and (b) structurally secure the identities 
of individuals and collectives in the framework of a world 
society ? Or is a universal morality without cognitive 
roots condemned to shrink to a grandiose tautology. • •?101 
and 
Are we dealing with reactions uncontrollable in the long 
run, against the continued violation of normative 
structures. . . . Or are we dealing with the birth pangs of 
a fundamentally new mode of socialization."102 
Whilst Habermas believes that formal education has a part to play in 
social integration by mediating achievement ideology and occupational 
success he is not sure of its actual power because "the expansion of the 
education system is becoming increasingly independent of changes in the 
occupational system,"103 which decreases the support to any intrinsic 
motivation to succeed. 
Whilst the questions Habermas asks are a challenge to the sociologist 
of morality they also highlight the weakness displayed in Habermasian 
theory with regard to institutions. Habermas does not appear to see the 
educational system or even the family as transmitters of any worthwhile 
values or world views that could either act in the continued maintenance of 
social cohesion in the present manner or give rise to a new form of social 
integration. His only opportunity for social progress is seen in the 
development of a universal linguistic ethic unconnected to cognitive 
interpretations and thus, it is inferred unconnected with institutions suich 
as schooling. 
Cohen points out that Habermas has completely under-emphasised the 
very analytical path that could have answered his questions, namely, 
"the institutions of democratic traditions or national and political 
cultures of particular societies", whereby he might have been able to 
"locate action-orienting, emancipatory norms in objective institutions."104 
It is true that Habermas has demonstrated the relative weakness of 
institutions under late capitalism. He makes it clear that today's 
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democratic procedures are true to democracy in form only, not in 
substance, because the public realm is thoroughly depoliticised.105 
But he has not shown that there are no residual traces of substantive 
democratic -tradition. He sees little chance of the schools maintaining 
their positions as transmitters of class specific moral consciousness 
unsupported by religious traditions.106 The main ideological task of the 
schools is to maintain the achievement orientation and their role here is 
declining.107 He does not see them as having any potential for 
emancipation. We would agree with Cohen when she asserts: "Habermas has 
failed to assess the holding power of democratic traditions, and to 
analyse the possible institutional bases within late capitalism that 
could secure individuation, or autonomy, as norms to be radicalized."108 
We would suggest then, that a sociology of morality should make use of 
Habermas' concept of communicative ethics and seek to investigate 
morality in society from an interactive perspective. But it must not 
overlook the power of basic societal institutions, such as the family 
and the school, to transmit values and world views that may either help 
maintain capitalism as it is, or act as reorganising structures for new 
moral practical learning. 
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PART II: MORAL THEORY IN PRACTICE: 
MORAL JUDGEMENT AT GREENBANK SCHOOL 
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Chapter 5: Habermasian Theory and Empirical Research: 
Possibilities and Problems  
The work of Jargen Habermas contains an approach to the moral which 
is of significance for the sociology of morality. Defined in relation 
to human communicative processes, the universal moral principles of truth, 
justice and freedom are shown to be intimately connected and socially 
real, and language dealing with appropriate moral standards can bear 
the mark of rationality. Moreover, Habermas has given primacy to 
rationalisation at the moral and interactive level over rationalisation 
at the technological and instrumental level. In his reformulation of 
historical materialism, moral practical learning is the limiting condition 
for the technical learning necessary for the constitution of a more highly 
developed mode of production. Instead of morality being seen as a 
remnant of past generations, it can be seen as a key to the future. 
In the last section we looked briefly at the significance of Habermas' 
work for an applied study of morality within sociology. We noted that 
through the use of communication theory, critiques could be mounted both 
on historical social situations and on sociological theory. There is 
also the possibility that an investigation of changes at the moral level 
in late capitalist societies could act as a key to understanding the 
direction of social evolution - i.e. are we experiencing progress or 
regress ? But there is a marked distinction between the possible 
application of a theory and a theoretical basis for empirical research. 
Habermas has always attempted to relate theory and practice and to ground 
his theory in the empirically real. While we may consider that his theory 
is suitable to be applied with some effect, as critique, to both political 
and sociological practice, the same situation does not necessarily obtain 
for empirical studies. 
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It is important that we evaluate the empirical possibilities of 
Habermasian theory and that we do so both theoretically and practically. In 
the first place Habermas' approach to the moral has stressed its rational 
and objective nature. If Habermas' theory is true, in its own terms, it 
must be able to be applied at the empirical level. To have validity as 
critique it must be true to the concrete historical situation. Secondly, 
the sociology of morality is urgently in need of theoretical 
revitalisation, and as no well-established social theory describes the 
moral in universal terms we need to look to recently developed theory 
for a suitable basis for empirical research. Morality is an important 
topic for education, yet sociology has been unable to make any significant 
contribution to understanding their relationship. There is need for a 
theoretical framework in which to conceptualise and investigate moral 
phenomena in the sphere of education. Habermasian theory appears to 
hold out such promise to these endeavours that it cannot be left untried. 
We shall turn first to the hopes that Habermas' work holds out for an 
empirical study of the sociology of morality in the field of education. 
We shall then look at the problems it poses for such empirical 
research, attempting to assess which aspects of Habermasian theory and 
conjecture could be appropriately used in a study. 
Possibilities of Habermasian theory for empirical research  
Habermas holds out hope for a sociology of morality because he 
describes the social situation under advanced capitalism as one which is 
morally recognisable, yet which does not of necessity spell doom and 
disintegration. He describes the existence of remnants of the 
universalistic moral values and the decline of specifically bourgeois 
value orientations such as possessive individualism in terms which match 
well with observations of social philosophers such as MacIntyre. Yet 
MacIntyre sounds a pessimistic note. Two types of people exist in our 
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society, those who speak from within one of the surviving remnants of 
morality and those who stand outside all of them, There is no moral 
communication between the two for "there exists no court of appeal, no 
impersonal neutral standard."1 From this stance there can be no general 
empirical investigation of morality in present day society, only a study 
of the morality of distinctive minority subcultures. So Habermas' 
acceptance of remnant morality as part of an interrelated system, which, 
whilst it may be in a state of flux, is open to rational investigation 
in universal moral terms, makes empirical research seem more feasible. 
Habermas' conceptualisation of the moral in terms of communication 
theory has application to the sociology of education. If truth, 
freedom and justice are defined in terms of the ideal speech situation then 
there will be a direct relationship between distortion of communication and 
the repression of these principles at the theoretical level. Habermas has 
given some guidelines, derived from psychoanalytic exchanges and 
expectations,2 which could be of help in using this conceptualisation 
in an empirical study of some aspect of education. An evaluation of 
classroom practices in Moral Education lessons would be a possibility, 
where the moral principles assessed in teacher/class interaction were 
compared with those being intentionally transmitted or generated. 
Similarly, such an approach to the moral could have application in 
studies of primary socialisation. If the moral is seen in terms of 
communication, then it would be possible to assess socialisation 
patterns and practices in these terms. This would give a theoretically 
meaningful base from which to relate socialisation practices to 
children's moral behaviour. The inconsistent results of past studies 
have been to a large degree owing to a lack of standardisation in 
describing such practices.3 
The theory of generalisable interests, where the validity of norms 
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is tested under the conditions of an hypothetical ideal speech situation, 
would not be likely to have direct application at the empirical level to 
educational systems. Hopper has suggested that educational systems can 
be classified according to their ideologies of legitimation concerning 
educational selection.4 His study shows that educational systems contain 
various ideological elements which can be seen to represent conflicting 
values. Where such a complex system of values obtains, practical 
discourse concerning norms would not be meaningful. Moreover, it is 
doubtful whether the term "system" can be realistically applied to 
education in Britain. When differences in policy and practice between 
the independent and state sectors, between one local authority and another 
and between individual schools are considered, it can be seen that 
"several educational systems in a more concrete sense"
5 
exist. The 
norms of a particular educational institution could only be tested for 
validity in the light of its own educational aims and definitions. 
Whilst communication theory gives a way of conceptualising the moral 
within specific situations it does not have great significance for a 
study of education that attempts to see morality in relation to the 
social formation. Habermas' reformulation of historical materialism would 
appear to have more to offer here. Central to the process of social 
evolution is the concept of learning processes which act both at the 
level of technically useful knowledge and of moral-practical 
6 
consciousness. 	 While learning is accomplished by individuals, the 
individuals acquire their competences socially ("by growing into the 
symbolic structures of their life-worlds".)7 As moral-practical 
learning is postulated as being an essential precondition for the 
further development of cognitive potential, this whole field of learning 
relations would be a fertile one for empirical study. 
Habermas' ambivalence towards the possible functioning of traditional 
institutions during a period of moral upheaval suggests another avenue for 
180 
investigation. Are schools functioning in society as guardians of the 
universalistic morality which typified the bourgeoisie under liberal 
capitalism ? If so, how is it transmitted and are any groups of pupils 
more or less prone to its influence ? 
Is the presence and transmission of universal morality connected 
in any way with the development of autonomy in individuals as Cohen 
has suggested ? a But more interesting than the transmission of a morality 
(which in terms of Habermas' thought may function either to help 
maintain the status quo or to be a basis for further moral-practical 
learning) is the relation of schooling to the generation of a more 
advanced form of morality. 
Habermas' crisis tendencies could be an indication of the generation 
of a higher form of social integration or they could indicate social 
disintegration; the former state will involve the gradual incorporation 
of an ethic of communication, the latter the end of the individual as we 
have come to know him. Earlier critical theorists described the situation 
of increasing bondage that awaited mankind. Habermas gives us a choice - 
it might mean progress, it could mean regress. Such a tantalising 
situation stimulates a sociologist to one of two responses - either to 
seek alternate theory or to attempt to settle the question through 
empirical investigation. An empirical investigation of this nature 
would need to be spread over a considerable period of time and would need 
to consider not only the young people, whose moral development would be 
a major focal point, but parents, schools and other agents of 
socialisation or sources of world views. And we would need to have 
some idea of how communicative morality could be characterised and 
recognised at the empirical level before attempting the wider task of 
determining whether there is a swing towards an ethic of communication 
and, if so, which factors promote or retard the change. 
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Problems of Habermasian theory for empirical research  
The immediate difficulty experienced by the sociologist who attempts 
to apply Habermas' insights to the empirical is that his formulations are 
insufficiently theorised. To read Habermas' ideas may be stimulating but 
to work through his discussions looking for a thoroughly theorised concept 
is a frustrating experience 	 The problem is not so much that his ongoing 
work on universal pragmatics is incomplete or that his work on social 
evolution has not yet, and probably never will,9 become a theory. Such 
work remains incomplete to some extent throughout a theorist's lifetime. 
But Habermas has a marked tendency to treat an important concept in 
parenthesis and to suggest guidelines for developing a relationship which 
he declines to follow to completion. At best, we are referred to the 
work that stimulated his idea in the first place, usually in German 
and lacking an English translation. 
Habermas' formulation of the ideal speech situation and his work 
on distorted communication is a case in point. Discussing the 
symmetries which must exist for unconstrained communication, Habermas 
comments: "These three symmetries represent, by the way, a linguistic 
conceptualization for that which we traditionally apprehend as the ideas 
10 	 h he has often referred to of truth, freedom, and justice." Althoug  
universal principles, in passing, as expressed by the ideal speech 
situation, only this once does he go so far as to describe them, and then 
in roughly formulated terms. He similarly fails to fulfil the promise given 
by his introduction of the psychoanalytic dimension to the topic of 
distorted communication. "All three categories" he states firmly " - ego, 
id, and superego - reflect fundamental experiences typical of a system-
atically distorted communication."11 But after less than a page of 
explication, he writes the following: "I have delineated only some 
of the assumptions, which extend to the structure of normal communication 
and to the mechanisms of systematical distortion of communication. These 
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assumptions would have to be developed within the frame of a theory of 
communicative competence, which is lacking as of now."12 Habermas did 
develop further his theory of communicative competence as universal 
pragmatics, but he has not returned to theorise this politically 
relevant concept of systematically distorted communication, still 
referring readers of his most recent publications to his original essay.13 
His work relating ego identity to moral development, with its 
suggestion of a third level of principled morality - universal ethics 
of speech - is of the utmost importance to the sociology of morality, 
but once again when a relationship needs to be theorised, he tends to 
sketch an outline and proceed on assumptions.14 Discussing the 
relationship between the developmental hierarchy of role competence and 
the Piagetian cognitive developmental stages he comments: "This provides 
initial grounds for the conjecture that a deeper analysis could identify 
a developmental-logical pattern in Piaget's sense. In the present 
context, I shall have to let the matter rest with this conjecture.15 
Of all his work of significance to an empirical study of morality, the 
relationship of moral development to ego identity and the demonstration 
of the sequential logic of the moral types represented by Kohlberg's 
stages, come closest to adequate theorisation. 
Habermas' tendency to theoretical imprecision is not helped by 
his reluctance to answer his critics and engage in the cut and thrust 
of scholarly debate.16 Central to his critique of Marx and fundamental 
to his reconstruction of historical materialism is his distinction 
between work and interaction. His somewhat sketchy definitions have 
led to misunderstandings of his meaning, a situation which has been 
augmented by the tendency to describe his conceptualisation of the 
distinction variously as his work develops 	 Yet in spite of clearly- 
183 
presented criticism from his supporters, stressing that it was 
imperative that he theorised a dialectical relationship between work and 
action, he has continued to make use of the concepts in their unrelated, 
semi-theorised state. So, several years after Keane had criticised him 
for making "a compromise between, rather than a dialectical synthesis of,= 
the two interests"17he is still being criticised and to some extent 
misunderstood, for his distinction between instrumental and strategic 
action.18 While developing theoretical conceptualisations which 
are always incompletely explicated may be a sign of a brilliant and 
open mind which is constantly exploring new areas, it creates quite a 
problem for the sociologist wishing to use such theory to undergird an 
empirical study. 
A further problem for empirical research is Habermas' habit of 
incorporating the formulations of a wide range of theorists into his 
own constructions and reconstructions. In certain cases his interaction 
with the theorist is essentially a critical one19 but more frequently 
he accepts a mass of theory without question, and builds upon it. A 
clear example of the latter is his incorporation of Austin's theory of 
speech acts into his theory of universal pragmatics.20 Where the 
theorist has derived his formulation directly or indirectly from empirical 
investigations, Habermas tends to take the theory as an indication of 
empirical reali y, and, once part of his own theory, as solid fact.21 
The work of Piaget and Kohlberg for example has become an integral 
part of his reformulation of historical materialism and his typification 
of emancipated morality, the communicative ethic, is classified by its 
supposed position in relation to Kohlberg's six stages of moral development. 
It appears likely that Habermas has turned to cognitive psychology less 
to ground this formulation empirically than to give some substance to his 
concept of moral-practical development. But merely because they fit 
well into his conceptualisation does not justify the uncritical acceptance 
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of Piagetian and Kohlbergian psychological theories. In his recent 
review of Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus, J.P. Amason 
has aptly commented: "While the adequacy of the psychological evidence 
cannot be discussed here, it is obvious that highly speculative 
extrapolations of psychological discoveries would only be justified 
insofar as they are presented as hypotheses, to be confronted with 
historical realities."22 
While we do not consider that Habermas' essential thesis within his 
formulation of social evolution nor his proposed universal ethics of 
speech will be invalidated if aspects of his incorporated cognitive 
psychology are discredited, the validity of these psychological 
components will be important for an empirical study of morality. For 
the sociology of morality the question then is: Do we take Habermas' 
concept of communicative morality, with its overtones of emancipation 
and social reformation, in its Kohlbergian context ? - Or do we seek 
to extricate it from its psychological setting ? It would be 
unnecessarily eclectic to attempt to take the universal ethics of 
speech out of its context, unless we had good grounds for doubting 
the validity of Kohlberg's stage theory. But if we entertain serious 
doubts about Kohlberg's work we will need to uncouple Habermasian 
theory and recontextualise it. 
Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development is an elaboration of 
Piaget's cognitive development theory, which Piaget considered 
obtained in cognitive areas of moral development such as moral judgement. 
Although Piaget's work on moral judgement in children was well 
illustrated it was a highly generalised account and did not include 
older adolescents.23 Kohlberg expanded the 3-stage Piagetian model 
on the basis of longitudinal and cross-cultural empirical studies and has 
continued to refine his tools of investigation and modify his scheme as a 
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result of further empirical findings. 
The validity of Kohlberg's empirical research has been the focus of 
mounting criticism during the last ten years. Critics have stressed that 
his developmental model has not been substantiated and that the complex 
system he has evolved does not reflect reality. 
In their comprehensive review, Kurtines and Greif refer to "a 
multitude of problems" which have beset Kohlberg's research.24 Problems 
include the arbitrary nature of the stages, the lack of standardisation 
of their measurement and the lack of connection between moral judgement 
and moral action. They emphasise the lack of evidence to support a theory 
of progressive development through stages - either the stages do not 
exist or the measuring device is inadequate to demonstrate their existence. 
Don Locke's recent critique supports these doubts. He concludes that 
in spite of the originality of Kohlberg's analysis "his insights and 
evidence cannot begin to support the enormous theoretical weight he 
wishes to place on them."25 
In addition to criticism at the empirical level, Kohlberg's work 
has been criticised from a theoretical perspective. R.S. Peters has 
summarised what philosophers see as the main theoretical weaknesses in 
his paper "The Place of Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education".26 
These are:- 1) Kohlberg's failure to show that his stages form a logical 
hierarchical sequence; ii) the vagueness of Kohlberg's account of 
"cognitive stimulation" as a determinant of stage to stage progress; 
and iii) that he fails to account for concern for human welfare. which, 
Peters claims is as fundamental to morality as the principle of justice - 
Kohlberg's sole criterion. 
Critique of the "stage" aspect of Kohlberg's theory (points (i) 
and (ii) above) has questioned both the hierarchical logic of the stages 
and their constitution as structural wholes each representing a unified 
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pattern of thought. Locke argues that Kohlberg's own evidence "unambigu-
ously implies a developmental continuum, not discrete stage structures."27 
Weinreich comes to a similar conclusion through her own attempt to 
replicate Kohlberg's original study of moral development with a British 
sample. She points out that Kohlberg Qssystem is really a description 
of six types of moral ideology which follow a sequence showing "increasing 
sophistication of what is generally accepted as 'moral' understanding." 
She sees no reason to suppose that any individual adolescent can be 
said to be "in" or to pass through a particular stage.28 And Gibbs, 
who has worked with Kohlberg, considers that the higher levels of moral 
reasoning are not developmental stages in the sense of stages 1 to 4 
but "existential or reflective extensions of earlier stages," stage 5 
being the meta ethics of stage 2 and stage 6 of stage 3.29 
Kohlberg's neglect of concern for human welfare (point (vii) above) 
is borne out by his scorn for what he refers to as the Aristotelian 
"bag of virtues" approach to morality30 together with his concentration 
on the Platonic ideal form of justice and his neglect of affective elements 
of morality. Although his more recent work has widened moral development 
to include affective elements, 31 it is still largely defined in 
cognitive-structural terms. 
Crittenden refers to Kohlberg's work as "an uneasy mixture of form 
and content", arguing that whilst claiming to define morality 
according to the formal characteristics of justice, Kohlberg proceeds 
"to extend the concept of justice to include the moral questions of 
courage, prudence, temperance, love, generosity, compassion and so on."32 
Peters' critique of contents notes that in the later stages certain 
virtues are made to appear as principles. "But why just these ?" he 
asks. 33 Because Kohlberg has failed to specify which moral principles 
characterise the principled stages, Peters sees no logical reason "why he 
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should not come up with any type of ethical position."34 Similarly 
Gibbs notes that principles are not equally valid or adequate, the 
historically recurrent doctrine of "might makes right" being a case in 
point.35 Peters' major emphasis in his critique of content, however, 
is that Kohlberg gives no account of the development of benevolence or 
concern for others. He stresses, moreover, that content "vitally affects 
the application of principles both in the lives of societies and 
individuals", the application of justice, for example, depending "on 
whether need is thought more important than desert."36 
Habermas himself deals with some of the above criticisms of Kohlberg 
in his essay, "floral Development and Ego Identity".37 He appears aware 
that Kohlberg's cognitive emphasis represents only one aspect of moral 
development which, as Kohlberg has recently begun to do,38 he places 
within the wider context of ego development. The cognitive side of 
moral consciousness is accepted by Habermas as being shown by "the 
ability to make moral judgments".39 Habermas sets out to show that 
"Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness satisfy the formal conditions 
for a developmental logic by reformulating these stages within a general 
action-theoretic framework."
40 
By connecting moral consciousness with 
general qualifications for role behaviour (interactive competence) and 
showing the hierarchical sequence of the latter, he infers a similar 
sequence for the former.
41 
He notes that there are three main levels 
of interactive competence, distinguished by degrees of reflexivity: 
"the simple behavioural expectation of the first level becomes reflexive 
at the next level - expectations can be reciprocally expected; and the 
reflexive behavioural expectation of the second level again becomes 
reflexive at the third level - norms can be normed."
42 
Assuming that 
moral consciousness "signifies the ability to make use of interactive 
43 
competence for consciously processing morally relevant conflicts of action" 
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i.e. accepting the limitations of Kohlberg Qscognitive approach, he then 
shows that the first four moral stages have an orderly sequence. Stages 
5 and 6 are stages 2 and 3 raised to principles, so that the egocentric 
utility of stage 2, for example, becomes the principled "contractual-
legalistic orientation" of stage 5.44 Habermas thus demonstrates the 
need for a further stage of moral consciousness. Kohlberg's stage 6, 
the conscience orientation, is still limited by the atomistic individual 
who is "supposed to test moralogically the generalizability of the norm 
in question." Habermas asserts there is room for his communicative ethic 
to crown the sequence and take possession of the logical niche it inherits 
as the meta-ethics of stage 4. "Only at the level of a universal ethics 
of speech," claims Habermas, "can need interpretations themselves - 
that is, what each individual thinks he should understand and represent 
as his 'true' interests - also become the object of practical discourse." 
The principle of justification of norms is no longer to be applied 
individualistically: it is to be a "communally followed procedure of 
redeeming normative validity claims discursively."45 
Habermas' work on providing a logical basis for the Kohlbergian 
sequence goes a long way to meeting the challenge of Peters, Locke and 
the other philosophers. Although by no means conclusive, it goes 
further than Garbarino and Bronfenbrenner's socialisation model46 to 
which Peters admits he is attracted47 and shows an interesting 
concurrence with Gibbs' derivation of stages 5 and 6, although neither 
refers to the othergs work. But it would be wrong to conclude that 
Habermas necessarily accepts Kohlbergian theory in its entirety. It is 
doubtful, for example, that Habermas means the same thing by the word 
"stage" as does Kohlberg. Kohlberg's concept of stage is essentially that 
of Piaget, where the individual, through cognitive stimulation and 
the processes of assimilation and adaptation, responds to his social 
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environment by a series of distinct cognitive leaps. Habermas, however, 
tends to look at the stages as typifications, referring, for example, to 
the "descriptive sequence of moral types".48 There is no reason to 
believe that, because Habermas accepts Kohlberg's sequence, and later 
incorporates it in his own formulations, he also accepts Kohlberg's 
entire developmental theory. Habermas' discussion of moral-practical 
learning, the key to social evolution, may be inexact, but it in no way 
limits moral learninkg to the cognitive dimension, as it is conceptualised 
within the framework of ego-identity. Habermas also clearly includes 
content in his idea of cognitive morality; for if the higher stages are 
reflections on norms, they are not so much represented by the form 
of justice as by a dialectical relationship between form and content, where 
content is seen as the principles and norms of social practice. 
There is much in cognitive developmental moral theory, as typified 
by Kohlberg's work, that fits in well with Habermas' own approach to 
social evolution and gives immediate promise of contributing to an 
understanding of how moral-practical learning might advance. The basic 
motivation for development is social interaction rather than internalisation 
of rules, stimulus-response mechanisms or modelling - typical of social-
isation theories. This means that an individual can develop further than 
those responsible for his socialisation, an important point for 
evolutionary development. Moreover, cognitive development theory deals 
with morality in universal terms because, as Kohlberg explains, "all 
cultures have common sources of social interaction, role taking and social 
conflict, which require moral integration."49 
In spite of these advantages, we believe that Habermas has made a 
serious mistake in accepting, modifying and incorporating Kohlberg's work 
into his own formulations. The critiques cited above have asserted the 
weakness of Kohlberg's empirical foundations and have questioned certain 
theoretical aspects of his developmental scheme. They have not, however, 
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criticised his basic assumptions. We consider that Kohlberg's basic 
assumptions make his work incompatible with that of Habermas. 
Following Piaget, Kohlberg's approach is essentially Kantian. He 
believes that a judgement is made by an individual applying his under-
standing of the principle of justice to a practical situation. It is 
true that Kohlberg replaces Kant's innate principles with principles 
derived from an individual's experience.50 Once principles have formed, 
however, it is through their interaction at the ideal level,51 
that judgements are made. Habermas, on the other hand, sees moral 
judgement as an actual interactive process, where individuals engage 
in practical discourse to test the appropriateness of norms. 
Kohlberg holds that there is a direct relationship between moral 
judgement and moral action. Moral action is seen as the "application" 
of values to behaviour. The more highly "developed" the individual is 
morally i.e. the more principled his reasons for judgement, the more 
likely it is that his action will show "correspondence" with his 
judgements.52 In fact he considers that ". . . the maturity of moral 
thought should predict to maturity of moral action" and that "specific 
forms of moral action require specific forms of moral thought as 
prerequisites."53 This linear relationship of thought to moral action 
is at variance with Habermas' own approach which stresses the dialectical 
and reflexive relationship that exists between the ideal and the practical, 
between thought and action. For Kohlberg the situation to be judged is 
separated from the mental activity of judgement even though the principles 
may be considered to "correctly define that situation".54 For Habermas, 
the situation is actively involved in the judgemental process. When 
norms are being examined with regard to the generalisability of the 
interests they represent, the interests are actual and refer to concrete 
situations. 
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Habermas' critique of Kohlberg focussed on a demonstration of the moral 
inadequacy of the sixth developmental stage and its replacement as the 
moral pinnacle by a seventh stage, the universal ethics of speech.55 
He appears to be unaware, however, that by accepting Kohlberg's 
developmental scheme as the foundations for the universal speech ethic 
he cannot escape accepting the basic assumptions of Kohlbergian theory. 
Habermas himself places great emphasis on the interrelationship between 
theory and practice. His inheritance of an interest in the theory/practice 
relationship from his Frankfurt School predecessors, and his development 
of it through linguistic theory, was discussed in chapter 4. We can only 
conclude that Habermas did not fully consider the consequences of his 
acceptance of a Kohlbergian base for the ethics of speech and for his 
incorporation of the cognitive psychological scheme of moral development 
into his formulations of social evolution. 
In the Introduction we pointed out that moral theory will have an 
influence on research practice and that it is essential that a sociological 
investigation of morality has an adequate theoretical base. We consider 
that it is impossible to engage in empirical research with a theoretical 
perspective containing conflicting elements. How, for example, are we to 
regard the social context of a moral situation from a theoretical position 
that is both Kantian and Hegelian in derivation. For one, the social 
situation is inconsequential, for the other it exists in a dialectical 
relation with the ideal. To incorporate Kohlbergian theory into that of 
Habermas is to attempt to graft Kant onto Hegel. It would be impossible 
to mount an empirical study on such a base. 
We shall proceed with our task of applying Habermas' theories and 
formulations to a study of morality at the empirical level but shall do so 
without recourse to Kohlberg's scheme. Our main aim is to investigate 
Habermas' moral theory as a suitable basis for a viable Sociology of 
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Morality. To include Kohibergian formulations or assumptions would 
make this task inoperable. 
Habermas' theory appears to meet most of the criteria for an adequate 
Sociology of Morality outlined in our Introduction. It is fully social 
and fully moral. It relates to both the social structure, through social 
evolution and to social relationships at the level of interaction, through 
the ideal speech situation and practical discourse. It is essentially 
universalistic. It can be used as critique. Its drawbacks have already 
been outlined in this chapter. Because of the incomplete nature of 
Habermas' theories and formulations it will be necessary to choose the 
areas of theory which appear most pertinent to the educational situation 
and investigate how they can be put into practice. 
We shall accept Habermas' formulation of social evolution as the 
broad context for a study of morality in education. This will give us a 
framework that will make education meaningful in moral terms. If 
education is contributing to moral development, seen in terms of a 
universal ethics of speech, then it is contributing to a more desirable 
system of social integration and social progress. If not, then although 
education may contribute to technological learning, it will not be 
contributing to new and necessary forms of social integration, and 
progress, should it occur, will do so in spite of the educational system. 
Moral-practical learning would need to be transmitted through channels 
entirely unconnected with education. 
Because the key to social evolution is the development of a universal 
ethics of speech (communicative morality) our task will be to characterise 
this moral form in empirical reality and to look for influences that 
encourage its generation. We shall limit our search to a single educational 
institution and the influential factors to those of school and home. The 
study and its location, Greenbank Comprehensive School, is outlined 
and discussed in chapters 7 and 8. 
The first step in our attempt to put Habermas' moral theory into 
practice will be to formulate a means whereby his theory can be applied 
to the study of moral consciousness. As Habermas sees the making of 
moral judgements as an indication of moral consciousness56 we shall 
start by attempting to formulate a theoretical scheme for examining 
moral judgement from the perspective of Habermasian rather than 
Kohlbergian theory. This theoretical formulation is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Assessing Moral Judgement:  
The Schematic Framework  
Moral Judgement Making as an Indication of Moral Consciousness  
In the context of his concept of social evolution, Habermas 
discusses morality at the personal level in terms of moral consciousness. 
Moral consciousness is considered to be capable of development into 
higher forms both in the individual and societal sense. Although 
strictly speaking, moral consciousness is a characteristic of 
individuals, society, too, can have its form of morality exhibited by its 
institutionalised norms, world-views and legal systems. Habermas also 
discusses societal morality in terms of "motivation", which includes 
personality structures resulting from socialisation practices as well as 
moral systems (norms and values) and world-views which are part of the 
cultural tradition.1 As moral consciousness is considered to be an 
aspect of ego identity2  it has affective as well as cognitive levels 
and we can take it that when Habermas uses the term "motivation", he 
is considering what we could express as the action orientation of 
moral consciousness. 
Moral consciousness is described as expressing itself in judgements 
about morally relevant conflicts of action.3 It is closely related 
to interactive competence. Habermas expressed it thus: ". . . 'moral 
consciousness' signifies the ability to make use of interactive 
competence for consciously processing morally relevant conflicts of 
action."4 He accepts that by considering the ability to make moral 
judgements as an indication of moral consciousness he is only dealing 
with the cognitive side of moral consciousness.5 But the affective side, 
especially "the ability to give one's own needs their due" is an important 
aspect of moral consciousness, and, Habermas stresses, essential for the 
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practice of communicative morality. Whether he really considers that 
conventional and principled types of moral judgement are entirely functions 
of the cognitive domain or whether he is merely limiting his definition to 
accommodate Kohlberg, is impossible to tell. But it would appear that he 
considers the making of moral judgements to be directly connected with 
moral consciousness and a suitable vehicle for its study at the empirical 
level. 
From a Habermasian perspective, however, a moral judgement could not 
be considered a simple or one-directional activity. As moral judgements 
are essentially discursive phenomena concerning practical situations they 
will involve a complex series of procedures in order to resolve the 
problems. We shall thus use the phrase "moral judgement procedures" 
in preference to "moral judgement making" in order to emphasise the 
procedural nature of judgement in terms of Habermas' theory. We shall 
accept Kohlberg's definition of moral judgement as judgements about the 
good and the right of action and argue that not all judgements of 
"good" or "right" are necessarily moral judgements as they may fall into 
categories of aesthetic or technologically fitting goodness or rightness. 
Kohlberg however, following Kant and Hare, disqualifies prudential 
judgements from the category of moral judgement because moral 
judgements "tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to be 
grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds."6 We cannot accept 
this Kantian contention for the following reasons: In Habermas' terms 
a moral judgement would be universal and inclusive not because it was 
objective and impersonal but because it was universally inter-personal. 
The ideal does not exist in a transcendent moral realm beyond human 
activity. An "ideal" judgement is the judgement that would be made if all 
people had the opportunity to present and discuss their interests under 
"ideal" conditions. Principles such as justice take on the nature of 
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objectivity because they are built into the very substance of humanity - 
human communication. Thus prudence may be just as much part of a moral 
choice as the application of a basic universal principle such as justice. 
The object of our study is to assess morality in both its rationality 
and its concrete reality. We shall use procedures of moral judgement as 
the basic material of the research, for it is in the making of moral 
judgements that one is closer to giving, or being prepared to give, reasons 
for one's choices than in any other moral activity. 
As Frankena put it in his classic paper on moral education: 
11 . . . it is the very genius of morality to appeal to reason. To make 
a moral judgment is to claim that it is justified, that a case can be 
made for it."7 There is a good case to be made for the argument that 
the primary function of morality is to adjudicate conflicts of interest.8  
For although one can make moral judgements about the good life (what 
kinds of things are intrinsically worthwhile doing etc.) or about the 
worthiness of people, morality is essentially a practical tool that 
deals with situations of conflict. In a situation involving a conflict 
of interests, a judgement is less likely to be based on a well-worn 
paradigm and more likely to involve the reflection which is necessary to 
moral thinking.9 Indeed we found in Phase I of the study that the girls 
more readily backed up their judgements with reasons when faced with a 
conflict which they found relevant than when they were judging a problem 
which did not relate to their own lives. 
The Conceptual-analytic scheme  
This chapter discusses the theoretical associations of the 
components of the scheme devised to conceptualise and analyse moral 
judgement making from a Habermasian perspective (See Fig. I). The scheme 
was developed through discussions with sixth formers at Greenbank School 
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during Phase I of the study (described fully in Chapter 7). It grew 
out of the belief that Kohlberg's approach was both empirically and 
theoretically inadequate and that it was contradictory to Habermas' 
critical theoretical position. 
In the Introduction we outlined why we believed Kantian approaches 
to morality to be insufficient for an adequate description of moral 
phenomena. In Chapter 5 we discussed the particular limitations of 
Kohlberg's work. Kohlberg's work is typical of a Kantian approach to 
empirical moral research. 
This scheme is an attempt to replace Kantian-based approaches to 
moral judgement with one which is based on Habermas' theory. It can be 
seen as essentially Habermasian in two ways:- 
1. It treats moral judgement as a complex interactive procedure. 
Even though it may be assessed as an individual activity, 
the judgement of a morally relevant situation will involve 
a reflexive interrelationship between elements of the 
situation in association with a person's past experience 
and belief system. It will take into consideration other 
people's beliefs and interests. It is neither a solitary 
process nor a one-directional process of applying a principle 
or a belief to a situation, typical of the Kantian approach. 
2. It incorporates Habermas' distinction between work and 
interaction applying it to the way in which the judgement is 
made. The active style of the judgemental procedures is 
referred to as the "logical form". 
The components of the scheme and their relationship are now 
considered. 
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Monothetic and Polythetic Judgements  
In emphasising the rational basis of moral judgement, philosophers 
of education have at times given the impression that judgements are 
made by the application of moral principles "objectively and impartially".10 
This approach ignores an important aspect of moral judgement, that of its 
relationship to the inner life of experience and imagination. 
Dewey saw that many everyday choices of action involved deliberation, 
"a dramatic rehearsal in imagination of various competing possible lines 
of action." This involved an experimental selection and combination "of 
habits and impulses to see what the resultant action would be like if 
it were entered upon."
11 
Schutz has described this experience as one of 
"projection" where we need to visualise the state of affairs to be 
brought about by our future action before we can "draft the single steps" 
of action from which this state of affairs will result.12 The practicality 
of the project will depend on the actor's experience, beliefs and 
assumptions referring to his physical and social world.13 
However, Schutz does not suggest that all application of experience 
is made through deliberation and an imaginary projection into the 
future. Discussing reflective thinking, he calls upon Husserl's 
distinction between the ways we grasp the meaning of previous experience. 
We may use a logical, step by step process to understand its meaning 
or grasp it in a flash, intuitively. The former stepwise process is 
referred to as polythetic and the latter as monothetic. '14 
Musgrave has applied this distinction to the making of decisions, 
typifying decisions made by the monothetic process as routine or 
"recipe" decisions and those made polythetically as "reflective" 
decisions.15 His work has shown that some teenagers tackle some 
moral decisions in a routine manner and others in a more reflective 
manner and that "these two types of decisions do seem to be of a very 
different kind." 
 16 
204 
In the preliminary phase of the present study (group discussions of 
dilemmas, social problems and personal relationships)17  it was noted 
that sometimes pupils made judgements that they found difficult to 
justify. On being encouraged by the group to give reasons, their 
answers varied from the direct application of principles in an 
undiscriminating fashion: "It's only fair," through citing an experienced 
paradigm: "My little sister acts like that and I can't stand it !" 
to the inconsidered: "I don't know really - my Dad's terribly against 
it." The only thing that such approaches have in common is that they 
are non-reflective. It is impossible to tell without some detailed 
questioning whether the judgement is being made in accordance with a 
well-taught or a tried and tested recipe, a deeply believed principle, 
or merely arbitrarily. For analytic purposes then, it seemed wise to 
discriminate between judgements that appear to have been made reflectively, 
or at least can give reasoned grounds for their conclusions and 
judgements which give the appearance of being intuitive. 
It was thus decided to apply Schutz's categories of monothetic and 
polythetic thought to moral judgement making. Monothetic judgements 
will include intuitive or habitual judgements, those made by unreflective 
application of a maxim or principle. They are not suitable for analysis 
in terms of their style or form. Polythetic judgements are those which 
give grounds for their conclusions and show evidence of consideration or 
reflection. The procedures whereby the judgement was made is thus 
open to analysis. 
Form and Content in Moral Judgement  
In Chapter 5 we referred to criticism that has been directed at 
Kohlberg for his concentration on the form of judgement making whilst 
neglecting content or "virtues", for his confusion of form and content in 
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the principled stages and for his emphasis on cognitive aspects to the 
detriment of an understanding of the influence of affective elements. 
But although these correctives are now being applied to Kohlberg, he in 
his turn acted as a strong and necessary corrective to the anti-rational 
and relativist approach to morality which had become psychology's 
orthodoxy since it had started to question the pragmatic assumptions of 
American education. Until Hartshorne's and Day's classic experiments 
in the relationship of moral knowledge to moral conduct it was assumed 
that character-education classes and religious instruction programmes 
would lead directly to approved behaviour.18 Hartshorne and Day's 
experimental tests of "honesty" (cheating, lying and stealing) and 
'service" (giving up objects for others' welfare) led them to conclude 
that there was no connection between conventional moral education and 
moral behaviour and that there was no such thing as "moral character" or 
"conscience".19 These findings were accepted by research psychologists 
who favoured two interpretations that Kohlberg expresses as follows: 
"the interpretation that moral behavior is purely a matter of immediate 
situational forces and rewards and the interpretation that moral 
character is a matter of deep emotions fixed in earliest childhood in 
the home."20 By denying any cognitive element to moral behaviour, the 
psychological tradition was claiming that morality was irrational and 
that whilst moral conduct may be influenced by operant conditioning 21 
it would not be influenced by general educational methods. Like 
Dewey, Kohlberg believed that the school has a responsibility for moral 
education, that "the serious business of the school is, and should be, 
intellectual" and that the two are interconnected.22 Following 
Piaget's work on moral judgement he set out to probe the reasons for 
the child's moral choices and believed that through a cognitive 
developmental approach to morality he had the basis for a critique of 
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both Hartshorne and Bay and orthodox psychology. This led him to break 
with all traces of an Aristotelian approach to the moral, thus weakening, 
although not breaking his allegiance to Dewey. Aristotle had seen virtue 
to be of two kinds, intellectual and moral, the former being developed 
through education and the latter being acquired through habit. Kohlberg 
equated the approach of American educational psychology with that of 
Aristotle. Personality was divided up into cognitive abilities, 
passions or motives and traits of character, moral character consisting 
of "a bag of virtues and vices".23 
Kohlberg believed that by adopting a purely Platonic stance he 
could bridge the gap between the "is" of the psychologists and the 
"ought" of the philosophers. 24 He would concentrate on the ideal form  
of the good, the one ultimate virtue, justice. Justice, he saw in terms 
of equality, rather than as "Plato's hierarchy". It was the prime moral 
principle. An understanding of justice meant knowledge of ultimate 
goodness and as according to Plato: "He who knows the good chooses the 
good", knowledge of the principles of justice would predict virtuous 
action.25 Because he was dealing with ultimate virtue and not virtues 
in general, he considered that he was defining morality in terms of its 
"formal characteristics" rather than "in terms of its content".26 
Kohlberg's six moral stages are defined in terms of increasing maturity 
in understanding the concept of justice. Each stage represents a 
distinct way of apprehending the form or nature of justice and change 
from a lower to a higher level of understanding is taken as an indication 
of moral development. 
The fact that the criteria for Kohlberg's stages represent an 
"uneasy mixture of form and content"27 was referred to in the last 
chapter. Crittenden suggests that Kohlberg is, in actuality, extending 
the concept of justice to include the moral questionis of courage, 
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prudence, temperance, love, generosity, compassion and so on."28 
Crittenden does not consider that it is possible to separate form and 
content in moral analysis, for not only do we hold moral beliefs that 
influence our judgements but the grounds on which we hold these beliefs 
will also influence our perception of the situation and thereby the 
judgements we reach. Crittenden sums it up as follows: "Our reasons, 
if we have any, for holding moral principles and standards do make a 
difference to the way we interpret morality and make moral judgments."29 
R.S. Peters considers that if reasoned morality is to be understood 
"it is important to make a distinction between the form and content of the 
moral consciousness". 30 To Peters the form of moral consciousness is 
supplied by fundamental principles of impartiality, consideration of 
people's interests, honesty and freedom, These principles "sensitize 
us to what is relevant when we think about what is right or wrong".31 
The content of morality will be rules and habits that are taught through 
practical situations. In the Platonic-Aristotelian partnership of 
Peters, the form of rational morality (autonomous and principled) 
has to "evolve out of conventional mores".32 
It can be seen, then, that typifying and distinguishing between form 
and content in the practice of morality is far from a simple matter. Whilst 
Kohlberg believes that the form is a sufficient basis for judging moral 
development and that content concerns trivial virtues, Crittenden believes 
that form and content are closely interrelated and cannot be separated. 
Peters believes that concrete moral content will, through training, 
provide a foundation for the development of the more abstract form. 
In this study we are concentrating on moral judgement making as an 
active process, Form is seen not in a static Platonic sense as something 
existing over and above the practice of everyday morality but as the 
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shape or style of the judgemental procedures. Thus, whereas Kohlberg's 
"uneasy mixture" (the elements of which were in practice indistinguishable), 
as well as Crittenden's "beliefs" and Peters' "rules and habits" are all 
subsumed under "content", in our sense form and content can be distinguished. 
As we are thinking in terms of a dynamic model of judgement making, we 
are not concerned with analysing structures of moral consciousness, per 
se; thus although what is believed to be a virtue will concern us, 
virtues as character traits and moral habits will be outside our scheme. 
We have classified the content of a moral judgement as "reference" - 
what an individual refers to from his knowledge, experience and beliefs 
when he is making his moral choice. It will be related to our logical 
style or "form". 
It is considered that a dynamic model of this type is essential 
for conceptualising Habermas' idea of communicative morality. Habermas 
sees moral judgement making in active terms, even when accepting the 
Kohlbergian hierarchy, translating the stages into levels of interactive 
competence. Communicative morality is described both in terms of how 
moral judgements and decisions are made, (what constitutes the moral 
process) and in terms of the general political orientation of individuals 
who demonstrate this type of morality. This political orientation will 
involve beliefs and understandings as essential to the constitution of 
an individual's world view. 
But any moral judgement is made in terms of social situations which 
themselves have bearing on the judgement. There is no doubt from the 
Kohlbergian studies that there are situational factors which influence 
judgement. Although Locke has found that the topic or issue about which 
the dilemma centres tends to affect the way the subject makes his 
judgement and that it appears to be the topic itself rather than its 
context which is the influential factor,33 a recent British study of 
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adolescent moral judgement has concluded that the context in which issues 
were presented was an important influence.34 Experience gained from 
the first stage of this study showed that pupils varied both in the 
style and content of their judgements depending on which aspect of their 
experience they drew on. It could be that the topic under consideration 
was taken to be relevant to family experience or it could be seen as 
relating more to the experience of classroom or school common room. Topic 
and context could not be clearly distinguished as the pupils' assessments 
of the total situation depended on the way an issue was contextualised, 
not only in the problem or dilemma under consideration, but in the 
experience and understanding of each individual. 
The factor of relevance was thus considered to be necessary for the 
scheme. A moral judgement must be conceptualised not only in terms of 
its logical form and the internal elements of the understanding to which 
it refers, but in terms of the way the situation is perceived and what 
aspects of experience are considered relevant in its assessment. 
Before looking at how it is proposed that we analyse the logical form 
of the judgements, we shall discuss the related elements of reference and 
relevance in a little more detail. 
Reference and Relevance  
Reference: 	 Philosophers have analysed moral content in various ways; 
the sociologist needs to choose not only which analysis he accepts but 
to what extent he intends to predefine content in advance of his study. 
Frankena, for example, makes a distinction in terms of obligation and 
moral value judgements based on ideas of what is right being essentially 
35 
different from those based on ideas of what is good. 	 For Hare, no 
judgement can be defined as a moral judgement unless it is based on moral 
principles, where a moral principle is a prescriptive statement which 
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guides moral decision making.36 Many philosophers make a distinction 
between moral principles and moral rules. For Dewey a principle was a 
"method and scheme for judging" whilst moral rules "of themselves tell 
agents just what course of action to pursue" - a principle is primarily 
intellectual, a rule is primarily practical.37 Boyd considers that 
most philosophers accept that moral principles are more fundamental than 
rules and can serve as grounds of support for them.38 Peters accepts 
this distinction but shows that in practice moral principles are no more 
fundamental to moral judgements than moral rules. Both principles and 
internalised rules can be described as character traits. Character 
traits such as justice and honesty may also function as principles but 
higher order traits such as courage, determination and integrity which 
do not act as principles are just as important to moral activity. 
Moreover, there is a class of traits to which compassion belongs, which 
are also motives for action. This class is, in Peters' consideration, 
more important for moral judgements than an understanding of justice.39 
Each of these philosophical approaches to moral judgement will 
influence how we view content. In Hare and Frankena's approaches, the 
judgement is defined in terms of its ideal content. Thus for Hare the 
moral nature of the judgement depends on the moral nature of the concept 
on which it is based whilst for Frankena a distinction is made depending 
on the class of moral idea behind the judgement. These approaches may 
have a place in analytical moral philosophy but they would be most 
misleading to an empirical study. They would support the notion that 
there is a simple and direct relationship between an individual's 
moral concepts and his judgement making activity, leading a researcher to 
look for distinct moral principles or moral beliefs behind each 
judgement. The accepted philosophical approach to principles and rules 
is not necessarily misleading, but care must be taken not to consider 
211 
principles as more influential to judgement than concrete rules or 
paradigms, simply because they are more highly generalised. Peters' 
plea for pluralism in approaching moral development is a corrective 
to any tendency to give principles pride of place in an analysis of the 
content of a moral judgement. 
Kitwood's empirical investigations into adolescent values have 
led him to advise researchers against using methods "which assume, a 
priori the existence of global value dimensions and attempt to measure 
them or extract them mathematically from the situational context."40 
He believes that such approaches force the phenomena into an inappropriate 
theory and thus tend to misrepresent the actualities of social life. He 
also warns against assuming "the presence of a coherent personal value 
system, unique to each individual", particularly when working with 
adolescents.41 
Kitwood's advice will be followed but this does not mean that there 
is no philosophical framework for our approach to content. We consider 
that when adolescents give reasons for their moral judgements they are 
referring to their own belief system. We do not define beliefs used for 
moral judgement making as "moral beliefs". The beliefs referred to will 
include concepts of what constitutes "good" or "bad" people or situations, 
principles, paradigms and rules for right or appropriate conduct as well 
as beliefs about the nature of the world, society and themselves. Our 
approach to the way beliefs are held will be that of Quine and Ullian. 
In the Web of Belief, beliefs are discussed as constiting a loosely 
connected system, a network or web, perpetually in flux.42 Beliefs may 
come through direct experience or they may come indirectly, because the 
supplier of the information is trusted. Previous beliefs will usually 
affect the acceptance of new beliefs but where a belief is not challenged 
it may be held even although it is inconsistent with others. As Quine and 
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Lillian put it: "As long as a belief whose causes are undetected is 
not challenged by other persons, and engenders no conflict that would 
prompt us to wonder about it ourselves, we are apt to go on holding it 
without thought of evidence."43 
It is realised that beliefs are not held in a cognitive system, 
isolated from affective elements, but, depending on the way they are 
interconnected and the experiences associated with their formation, they 
will be held with various degrees of emotive intensity. However, the 
task of this scheme is to relate the major elements of moral judgement 
making, viewed in its cognitive dimension. 
This flexible approach will be needed if we are to investigate 
Habermas' loosely conceptualised formulations at the empirical level. 
One would expect that subjects tending towards the use of a communicative 
morality would refer more to concepts of mutuality, sharing an open 
exchange than they would to set rules or paradigms. On the other hand, 
if the breakdown in traditional morality is associated with a marked 
tendency to accept an ideology of science and technology, as Habermas 
suggests, one might expect traditional moral justifications to be 
replaced by justifications when technological progress is seen as the 
desirable (or inevitable) goal and thus as a valid reason for choice. 
Habermas stresses the political dimension of communicative morality 
and lays emphasis on the need to hold a world view consistent with this 
ethic. Such world views may be only tentatively formed in adolescents 
but will consist essentially of interrelated elements of the individual's 
belief system. An individual's world view may be reconstructed by 
piecing together the criteria for choice and the reasons given for 
judgement of questions which involve not only the subject's intimate 
and wider world but her own hopes and expectations for her future 
life. 
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Relevance: 	 The decision to involve the concept of relevance was 
influenced by experience gained through the group discussions of the first 
stage of the research. We are not using the concept in the sense of the 
problems themselves being seen as "morally relevant", although Habermas' 
use of the term was accepted and utilised when the situations for 
judgement were being designed. Habermas' consideration that moral 
consciousness expresses itself in judgements about "morally relevant 
conflicts of action" makes moral relevance a function of the capability 
of the action conflicts to be consensually resolved.44 Our use of the 
concept of relevance is in the Schutzian sense of those aspects of the 
experience (or that part of the belief network, in Quinean terms), which 
an individual considers relevant to the problem. This will involve the 
way the individual interprets the nature of the problem which will draw 
upon his experience of previous problem situations which appears relevant. 
Schutz refers to two sets of experiences which are used in deliberation 
about projected action. The first set "consists of the actor's 
experiences and his opinions, beliefs, assumptions, referring to the 
world, the physical and social one, which he takes for granted beyond 
question at the moment of his projecting."45 The second set consists 
of the experiences which the actor has of his biographically determined 
situation at the moment of projecting. This concerns his assessment of the 
situation in terms of the extent its factors are imposed on him and the 
extent to which they are capable of being brought within his control. 
What he chooses to do will be affected by his prevailing system of 
interests, depending on what is considered relevant at the time.46 
Schutz's discussions of processes of projection and deliberation 
warn us against over-simplifying the way we conceive of individuals' 
calling upon their experience and using it for making decisions or 
judgements. In judgement making, within a research situation, the problem 
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is made more complex by the extent to which judgement is associated with 
any real action. A fictional dilemma may, for example, be associated 
with experience of action via the subject's memory of a similar situation 
or it may be purely hypothetical. 
Musgrave has introduced this concept of relevance into his 
conceptualisation of the process of moral decision-making. From Schutz's 
insights, he extracts three elements which he considers are crucial 
to the analysis of moral decisions. Firstly, the structure of the 
knowledge at hand to the process; secondly, the factors considered by the 
actor to be relevant to that situation; and thirdly, the likely 
interpretations of others of the actor's possible behaviour.47 
The first element, in particular, was recognised during the first 
phase of research. Some problems, for example those dealing with family 
relationships were discussed in terms of the pupils' direct experience 
of family life. Wider social issues called upon knowledge gained from 
wider levels of experience which included the school, the media and 
institutions outside the home. But it was also noted that Musgrave's 
second element now became apparent. Some pupils introduced parental 
opinions into discussions on social problems whilst others considered a 
previous class discussion or a novel contained material relevant to the 
problem. With most pupils, direct personal experience of a situation 
related to the problem under discussion appeared most relevant. A 
discussion on euthanasia, for example, was contributed to by pupils 
having experienced the suffering of terminally ill relatives. This 
personal experience, even if indirect, was frequently considered by the 
groups to be more relevant to judging a problem situation than what 
could be considered as moral argument. 
Kitwood considers that mid-adolescence is characterised by what 
he terms "the morality of inter-personal perspectives". He gives 
evidence for thinking that a "considerable part of the life which many 
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contemporary English adolescents count as real and significant" is 
conducted at the level of inter-personal perspectives. The young people 
possess acute insight into the feelings and perceptions of others 
in so far as these relate to themselves.
48 
This skill, developed 
through experience, is used as the basis for making decisions about the 
practical moral problems that are met in their day to day lives. 
It is important that we do not confuse this aspect of adolescent 
morality with Habermas' communicative morality. This adolescent 
morality is typified by its particularism not by its universality.
49 
Although other people's feelings and interests are taken into account in 
making a judgement there are inevitably categories of people who are 
not perceived as people in the same sense as those significant to the 
individual who is judging. Distinctions are made between people because 
of their relationship to the moral agent rather than on more general 
criteria.50 
It was thus decided to ensure that the nature of the problems and 
situations to be assessed and judged would emphasise two distinct zones 
of relevance. The first would relate directly to immediate experience 
of home, family and friends. The second would be difficult to 
conceptualise and assess without reference to wider knowledge, either 
gained directly from experience in the wider world or from the media and 
the school curriculum. This does not mean that the first, or inner zone 
of relevance was isolated from a pupil's wider knowledge or understanding. 
Nor does it mean that the second, or outer zone would not be a suitable 
context for re-expressing parental opinions. It is an attempt, however, 
to provide a method of distinguishing pupils able to sustain the logic 
of their judgement making procedures in contexts which require reference 
to different aspects of experience. Communicative morality would be 
used consistently, irrespective of relevance zone and would not be limited 
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to direct application of interpersonal experience of family and peers. 
The Logical Forms of Judgement Making  
The logical form or style of the procedures whereby moral judgements 
are made is the key aspect of the scheme. It refers directly to Habermas' 
distinction between work and interaction. It was shown earlier that 
Habermas developed this distinction as a dual critique of Marx and 
Weber. Work is seen in terms of purposive-rational action, interaction 
in terms of the symbolically mediated communication fundamental to social 
exchange. By considering Habermas' typification in terms of the logic 
of the judgemental procedures we derive the following formulation.51 
Strategic/instrumental logic follows the approach that Weber 
typified as Zweckrationalitat. It is the logic of technology where choice 
is made in accordance with goals or outcomes. It may be truly 
instrumental, proceeding as if by following technical rules or it may be 
strategic. The logic of strategy is shown in evaluating possible 
alternative choices by making deductions from one's own value system. 
Strategic/instrumental logic will be orientated towards a successful 
5 
outcome to a problem situation. It is the logic of utilitarianism 2  
but it may be used in association with moral maxims or principles or 
with further practical outcomes. 
Communicative logic is the logic of reciprocity and consensus, of 
mutual recognition and understanding. Intersubjectivity is important 
for the understanding of intention which is essential for the reaching 
of a consensus. Thus the emphasis will be on reaching understanding and 
on involving other people's interests rather than on solving a problem. 
The logic of communication is not end-orientated, except where the end is 
seen in terms of mutuality and understanding. 
One cannot further typify these logics in abstract terms. For applying 
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the distinction to a series of problems the criteria need to be 
identified within the terms of the problem situations. By viewing 
moral judgement making procedurally one is thus able to distinguish 
between pupils who have a tendency to use a strategic/instrumental 
approach to judgements from those who tend towards the use of a 
communicative logic. This can be determined in different contexts - 
zones of relevance. The internal elements of the subject's belief 
system can be related to the form of logic habitually used. 
By using this scheme, further understanding of what constitutes 
Habermas' communicative ethic in the empirical reality of the school will 
be sought. 
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Chap-ter 7: The Empirical Study: The Procedures and  
the General Phases of the Study  
The Context of the Study - Greenbank School  
Greenbank School is a large girls' comprehensive school, situated 
south of the Thames in Greater London. Purpose built as a comprehensive 
it has had a continuous history of commitment to "comprehensive" ideals 
- streamed when founded, moving to banding and now "mixed ability" 
for the first three years. It offered a highly suitable location for 
research, particularly in terms of its distinctive comprehensive ethos 
and the nature of its sixth form. As our immediate research target was 
the identification and characterisation of communicative morality, it 
seemed advisable to begin the search in a place which was generally in 
sympathy with open communication. Grammar schools have been characterised 
by their emphasis on "middle class"1 values, which includes an orientation 
towards achievement. As traditional "bourgeois" values are, in 
Habermas' opinion, declining, and social evolution will require their 
replacement by a new communicative morality it is important to see if 
there is any relationship between new moral forms and the new educational 
forms i.e. comprehensive schools. 
The nature of the sixth form was the other factor that made the 
school a most suitable location. As this was to be a pioneering study, 
it was considered desirable to have as wide a range of pupils, in terms 
of intelligence, subjects studied, career orientation and social 
background as possible. Any factors which appeared to influence the 
moral type could be indicated as suitable for further study. It had been 
decided to work with sixth formers because, whilst still in a formal 
learning environment, they are old enough to have begun to think things 
out for themselves, to have challenged the values of their childhood 
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and to have their own perspective on life.
2 
Girls only were preferred 
in view of the researcher's own biography, which has included many years 
of experience with schoolgirls, as a teacher and as a headmistress. It 
was believed that such experience would facilitate the development of a 
rapport between researcher and subjects that would engender the type of 
reflective thinking the study required. 
The practical advantage of Greenbank School was that having a 
reputation as an early established comprehensive school it was used to 
having frequent visitors in addition to student teachers and occasional 
research students. A stranger did not stand out. Moreover, its 
flexible Religious Studies Department would welcome the presence of an 
observer. 
Greenbank's sixth formers occupied a separate sixth form block with 
a large common room extending into a study area, and a series of 
tutorial rooms. At the beginning of the 1978 school year, there were 
180 sixth formers, 133 in the lower sixth and 47 in the upper sixth. 
Of the lower sixth girls, 49 were studying at least one subject at 
A level whilst 84 were taking various combinations of 0-levels, C.E.E's, 
C.S.E's and R.S.A. commercial courses. Of the upper sixth, 35 were 
taking A levels and 12 were doing one year courses. This very mixed 
group was unsegregated and had access to the same facilities. They 
had a weekly meeting in the common room area with their year heads. 
Apart from a half day off per week each girl was supposed to be at 
school during the school day. Girls met briefly twice daily with 
tutors for roll call and could be contacted via tutors or via notes 
in their pigeon holes. The sixth form was thus a collection of girls who 
shared a similar general environment but who varied greatly in academic 
interests and levels of achievement. There was, in addition, a racial 
and class mix. 
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It was stated above that Greenbank has a distinctive "comprehensive" 
ethos. In the absence of any established theory on what constitutes an 
ethos3 we would suggest that a school's ethos is expressed through its 
daily organization and the style of its human relationships. The way 
a school is structured to regulate or foster such relationships gives 
one indicator of its ethos. The truly comprehensive nature of Greenbank's 
sixth form, both in constitution and in access to staff and facilities 
is one indication of the school's comprehensive ethos. The single 
major indicator of a school's ethos, however, is its head. Ultimately 
the head either orders the school in accordance with her educational 
ideals or fails to be truly "head" of the school. The extent to which a 
head's ideas indicate the school's ethos will depend on whether she is 
seen as putting them into practice by staff and pupils. We shall describe 
Greenbank's ethos by showing what the head believes and how she 
attempts to put her beliefs into practice. The actuality of her vision 
from the pupils' viewpoint emerges in interviews with some of the 
pupils. (Discussed in Chapter 8). 
The headmistress of Greenbank was fully committed to comprehensive 
education. In a press statement on comprehensive schooling she wrote: 
"Teaching people to read beyond the basic needs is an extremely risky 
business unless one also develops understanding, enlarges sympathies, 
strengthens judgment, increases tolerance. This cannot be done by 
separating people from each other - certainly not at the age of ten. 
Real learning only takes place when there is a strong sense of security 
and of being valued for oneself. My experience, as Head of a selective 
school, suggested to me that the 80% had little sense of being valued 
and the 20% were often lacking a sense of security because they felt a 
strong, even if unnecessary obligation to continue to justify themselves."4 
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She believes that a comprehensive school is an ideal place to develop 
talent, the duty of all teachers being to find and encourage this talent. 
In a prize night report she wrote: "I seriously believe that 
comprehensive schools, in refusing to accept any limitation on talent 
at the age of 10+, start from a better vantage point than others; but 
only, of course, if they keep an open mind once the pupils are in the 
school ' 	 In accepting all children at 11+ they are saying, in a 
voice which I an sure children appreciate. . . that the school does 
not know what talents they have, does not know whether they have any 
that will ever be recognised on a certificate, but they are welcome to 
enter the school anyway. I believe that that single act of faith releases 
talents which might never be revealed - and even if it does not, a girl 
has been valued for herself."6 Development of talent extends to non-
academic fields both via the curriculum and through extra-curricular 
activities. The Drama department is strong and Drama is a compulsory 
subject for the first three years. Music, Sport and Gymnastics are 
likewise important and have a large after-school following. Notable 
is the emphasis on Dance which is essentially extra-curricular but can be 
taken as a C.S.E. subject. It is not unusual for girls doing a full 
set of 0-level subjects to include C.S.E. Dance. 
While the Head values the self-denial and perseverance of those who 
develop their talents as well as the humility and endurance of those 
with little talent, she considers that the greatest virtue is tolerance. 
And tolerance, which she sees as "allowing the sane freedom and grace 
to the people you do not like as to the people you do",6 is basic to 
comprehensive education. Tolerance should be encouraged to develop 
between staff and pupils as well as amongst the pupils. In the school 
prospectus, she describes the benefits which result from a second year 
residential course: "Staff and girls meet in an informal situation and 
225 
relationships become more personal. Consequently a greater understanding 
arises and once back at school both staff and girls see each other in a 
more tolerant and friendly light." 
Her belief in non-streaming has little to do with egalitarian ideals 
- she believes it to be educationally better. "Streaming is still a 
fairly crude tool, banding has some refinement, setting is more 
sophisticated and non-streaming is a precision instrument. Selection and 
streaming are about imposing limits. . . Unstreaming forces the recognition 
of every pupil as an individual and does not allow the lumping together 
of children into classes whose members are supposed to be able to be 
treated as though they are all the same." She sees it as the 
responsibility of the head to encourage staff to acquire the skills 
needed for this precision work 
The school is run on strongly departmental lines with a high degree 
of autonomy for each subject team. Subject teachers occupy the subject 
zones in the main staff area, meet formally once weekly and informally 
frequently. Pastoral care is organized on a form and tutor-group basis, 
co-ordinated by year heads. Subject heads meet with the headmistress, 
deputies and year heads to negotiate time allocations for their subject 
and work out details of school policy. These meetings are long and 
continue until there is consensus. The head believes in reason and 
feels that "even if a decision takes hours before an agreement is reached 
it will be worth it as in the end reason will prevail."7 Some subject 
heads admire her tact and perseverance and appreciate her trust; others 
feel they waste a lot of time and would get through the agenda faster if 
the headmistress took a "firmer stand".8 The ordinary teachers do not 
know the head very well but most think highly of her and some have 
commented on her kindness and personal interest in their activities. 
They consider they are lucky to be at Greenbank and to have the professional 
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freedom they enjoy. Complaints about senior staff personnel were heard, 
sometimes, in the staffroom, but never about the head. 
At her interview9 the head stressed the importance of staff attitudes 
and relationship. She selects staff for being good teachers but also for 
being "real human beings" who "will treat the children as people". 
Children should be able to discuss anything openly with teachers. She 
aims at a non-differentiated staff-room. She has noted that in many 
comprehensive schools, even though the children are mixed ability the 
staff assess themselves AB CD or E as teachers and separate themselves 
out. She tries to give an example by never pretending to be the 
"completely competent teacher". She knows she must be able to teach as 
well as the best on her staff, (and she has some marvellous teachers), 
but if she has problems she shares than, to help her best teachers to do 
the sane. For example, she takes the weakest group of fifth years' for 
English. If a girl keeps not doing work or not having a book she mentions 
it at [Departmental] meetings. "Something is wrong with the girl, how 
can we help her", instead of thinking: "I'm slipping as a teacher and 
mustn't let on." This approach, she believes, helps promote sharing 
between senior and junior staff. As well as a mixing of able and less 
able staff, she also wants a mixing of old and young. She thinks her 
staff is marvellous and particularly likes the way members of a 
department co-operate together and get on. She sometimes wonders why 
the girls don't vandalise the place at all. "Do they lack imagination ? 
Haven't they thought of it ? Or perhaps it's just that they don't have 
a need to take their feelings out on the buildings. They can express 
their feelings to the teachers." 
The above description of the head's attitude to the staff, taken 
almost verbatim from an interview, shows something of her personality. 
She is a strong minded woman with a ready wit, ready to fight for what 
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she believes in. She is highly practical and tries to put into 
practice things she feels strongly about. Trust, co-operation and 
tolerance are basic to her way of life, but so are initiative and 
perseverance. A combination of these character traits can be seen in 
her approach to the primary schools in Greenbank's area. Their head 
teachers and staff are treated as colleagues and invited to Greenbank's 
"select gatherings".10 But since the problem of "falling rolls" has 
become apparent, she has also visited every primary school within a 
wide radius to recruit future pupils for Greenbank and thus ensure its 
viability. 
Purpose and approach  
The main purpose of this study is to extend the relationship of 
Habermasian theory and practice to the realm of empirical reality - 
in this case to moral reality. In Part I, we criticised the traditional 
strands of sociology for their inability to grasp the moral in social 
terms without sliding into relativism, or losing sight of morality 
altogether. Habermas offered a solution with a theory that not only 
treats morality as rational and universal but gives it pride of place in 
society's development. But to what extent is Habermasian theory 
applicable to sociological practice ? And what would be the 
characteristics of an empirical study of the sociology of morality 
conducted in Habermasian terms ? 
One theoretical discussion of the potential of Habermasian theory 
as a basis for empirical research (Ch. 5) showed that whilst Habermas' 
work gave many indications of fruitful areas for study, there were 
problems in applying his theory. The most serious problem was his 
incorporation of cognitive psychology into his formulation of the 
social evolutionary process; in particular his uncritical acceptance of 
the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. Not only was Kohlberg's work questionable 
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at both the methodological and the analytical level but we considered his 
theoretical approach to moral judgement to be inconsistent with Habermas' 
own approach. For Kohlberg, moral judgement is seen in terms of the 
application of an individual's concept of justice where a relevant 
situation for studying judgement is one that elicits a choice on the 
basis of what is right or fair and leads the subject to reveal the level 
of his understanding. For Habermas, however, moral judgement is the 
process of judging between conflicts of interest in the practical realm 
- "action conflicts". A conflict of action is "morally relevant" if it 
is capable of consensual resolution.11 The morality of a judgement is 
not defined in relation to a subject's ideals. 
In Chapter 6, we outlined a conceptual scheme suitable for analysing 
moral judgements from a Habermasian perspective without relying on 
Kohlberg's formulations. This scheme focuses on the logic used in the 
judgement process, allowing the logical form to be related to the general 
context, and to the elements of the subject's belief system referred to as 
grounds for choice. In order to investigate and evaluate the practicality 
of Haberrnas' theory for empirical research in the sociology of morality, 
we aim to apply the scheme to a school study. The theoretical context 
will be Habermas' formulation of moral evolution as the key to social 
evolution, the practical context, Greenbank Comprehensive School. The 
specific task will be to investigate tendencies towards the use of a 
universal ethics of speech (communicative morality) in pupils and to 
look for factors connected with its generation in home and school. 
The procedures involved in this task are as follows:- 
i) The formulation of a series of conflict situations, contextualised 
at the two major zones of relevance, to elicit moral judgements; 
ii) The administration of a questionnaire containing the above material; 
iii) The analysis of responses in terms of logical form and content; 
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iv) Consideration of the results from iii) together with background 
information to:- 
a) guide investigation into school influence, 
b) select pupils for intensive study in relation to home and 
school; 
v) The conducting of an intensive study of selected pupils to include 
interviews of pupils, their tutors and their parents; 
vi) Consideration of the relationships observed in this study in terms 
of Habermasian theory. 
These procedures were carried out in three main phases of research. 
The first phase, which lasted for two terms was a period of observation 
and interaction. During this period the conceptual scheme and the 
questionnaire were constructed. The second phase, which lasted one 
term, consisted of getting to know the subjects in their context and 
of administering the questionnaire. The third phase was spent with 
the intensive-study pupils, mainly at the school, and included visits 
to their homes and interviews with their parents and tutors. The 
interviews were conducted over a period of one term, but informal contact 
continued, reports were obtained on all these pupils after a further 
two terms and all members of the "communicative" group were followed 
up approximately a year after their first interview. 
The Study in Action: Phase I  
Phase I was the period of observing the school world in general 
and in particular the life worlds of some of its sixth formers, 
through a lattice of projected Habermasian concepts. Habermas' works 
currently available in English (January 1978) had been read and 
particular attention had been directed to his essay, "Technology and 
Science as Ideology" and Legitimation Crisis. There was no precedent 
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for approaching morality at the empirical level from the perspective. 
Observation, informal interaction and a trial and error approach to the 
subject matter of morality would be necessary. At the sane time, 
intuition, constant reflection by oneself and one's sixth form assistants, 
together with cross relating to other bodies of sociological understanding 
would be essential. 
The aim of attempting to "operationalise" Habermasian theory, and 
using his concepts, to seek communicative morality in real-life terms was 
present at this stage, as was the intention of focussing on moral 
judgement as a key to moral consciousness. The scheme for conceptualising 
and analysing moral judgement in terms of Habermas' distinction between 
work and interaction (discussed in Ch. 6) emerged during this phase. At 
the end of it, the questionnaire, which included the situations on 
which judgement would be based, was constructed. 
During this period, approximately two days per week were spent at 
the school at the official level, observing in the Religious Studies 
department. However, as Religious Studies staff shared a room, off the 
main staff area with the Drama staff, and both were frequently visited by 
friends, from English and Physical Education departments, in particular, 
observing spread unofficially into these areas. Lessons were observed 
in these subjects, with girls from first to fifth year and occasionally 
lessons were taken to relieve Religious Studies staff covering for other 
teachers absent through illness. During Phase II and III informal staff 
contact continued and Art, Music and Social Studies departments were 
visited. The informal contacts and wide observation were considered 
important, partly to become familiar with the normal routines and 
expectations of staff and pupils and partly to have some idea of the 
background experience of sixth formers in lower years. 
Contact with sixth formers was solely through the Religious Studies 
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department. Two groups were joined; the first, a group of mixed lower 
and upper sixth girls who had elected to study World Religions on their 
Liberal Studies afternoon and the second, the lower sixth Religious 
Studies A level group preparing for the paper on Islam. The first group 
was attended as an observer for five weeks and when the upper sixth 
members retired from the group the five remaining lower sixth girls chose 
to help me investigate moral thinking rather than continue their course. 
They spent four hours in tape recorded sessions discussing themselves, 
their relations with their parents and their opinions of current social 
issues and problems. The group studying Islam for A level religious 
studies consisted of three girls, who accepted me as a friend of their 
teacher, who was interested in the subject and who was doing research in 
education. By the fourth lesson they had agreed to meet with me once 
weekly in their lunch hour in a vacant tutorial room to help me gain 
background for the research. The Islam lessons were attended twice weekly 
for two terms and during most weeks the groups met informally, except 
when illness, exams or other commitments intervened. Four months after 
we had first met I asked them why they had given their time so freely. 
They answered that they had found it "interesting" and they liked 
"helping" and "doing something constructive for a change". But they 
would have been more reluctant to help a teacher and would have found 
it more difficult to discuss how they felt about things. If someone they 
had not known had come and said "Right, I'm from so and so and I want 
to know what you think and you've got to discuss it, I want to know 
everything about you - " the response would be resentment. "Why should 
I tell somebody else what I think !"12  This insight was applied to 
phase II the following school year and led to a shift from staffroom 
to sixth form common room for morning coffee drinking and the resolve to 
be as open as possible about research aims with the girls, asking for 
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their help and treating them as collaborators rather than research 
material. Discussions with the Liberal Studies group (five girls - 
three English and two Asian) centred on modern social problems and how 
the girls differed from their parents in their approach to such matters. 
It was during sessions with this group that the tendency to make 
evaluative statements that could not be justified was noted. This was 
in contrast to the Religious Studies group which consisted to some extent 
of trained moralists. Their 0 level course had included a section on 
moral problems and the girls had learnt to justify their judgements. The 
tendency of some girls in the first group to apply principles or 
paradigms unreflectingly when judging a moral situation led to the 
decision to follow Musgrave's precedent of applying the Schutzean 
monothetic/polythetic distinction to moral thought. This distinction 
and its relationship to the analytic scheme was discussed in Chapter 6. 
The group of three discussed how they perceived their own changes 
in beliefs, attitudes and social behaviour and how they saw themselves 
in relation to their families. They also discussed issues, such as 
immigration, where they differed from their parents or where their 
parents held strong views and they supported their parents' beliefs. 
Kohlberg's dilemmas were discussed thoughtfully and comments were made 
as to the extent they represented realistic dilemmas. The girls produced 
situations from their own experience of when they had found themselves 
in a moral dilemma and these dilemmas were analysed by the group. 
Two facts emerged from these discussions that influenced the 
research stage:- 
i) That situations the girls found to be morally challenging 
tended to involve conflicts of loyalties rather than conflicts of duty 
or right; 
ii) That the girls' approach to a topic was influenced by the source 
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of their experience of the topic. 
With regard to i), a typical personal dilemma might involve the 
impossibility of being loyal to a friend and loyal to parents at the 
same time. Breaking trust with one was opposed by the need to show care 
to the other or to prevent the other getting hurt. Real life dilemmas 
seldom involved seeing problems in terms of what was one's duty. There 
was no strong belief that the law was necessarily right. Thus Kohlberg's 
dilemmas that had the concept of filial duty or obedience to the law 
as one of the "horns" were not seen as real life dilemmas. 
The second fact was noted in discussions about general social problems. 
The group had discussed the problem of abortion law reform in a 
thoroughly rational fashion. Principles were applied and all aspects 
were examined. The girls had studied the problem in Religious Studies the 
previous year. Immigration, however, was handled contentiously and 
irrationally, one girl airing her father's right wing views whilst the 
others alternately pleaded for justice and derided her scornfully. Yet 
later, the girl who had argued for forced repatriation admitted that had 
she realised the tape recorder was on, she would have modified her 
argument. She was ashamed to be recorded sounding so callous, even 
though she felt that she and her father were right. 
Such responses made one aware of contextual complications which 
involved not so much the way the topic was contextualised in the 
discussion but the way it related to a girl's inner world of experience. 
It was decided that what was being observed was the same phenomenon 
Schutz has discussed as "relevance". So relevance was introduced as a 
factor to be considered.13 This also underlined the problem, never 
entirely absent in research with a hermeneutic dimension, of the 
interaction of the subject's self-image with his or her understanding of 
the researcher's expectations. In this case the girl was an active member 
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of an evangelical church whose behaviour in lessons constantly pointed 
to her need to give the right answers. She felt she had not put forward a 
properly Christian argument on immigration, which, as the preliminary 
research was being conducted under the aegis of Religious Studies, was at 
least for her, the expected response. To minimise this source of 
invalidity one can stress the subject's anonymity, remain as dissociated 
as possible from specific group interests (e.g. staff, church, political 
interests) and emphasise the openness of the research's intentions. Even 
then, the subjects will have preconceptions of what sociology is about 
and what sociological research is looking for, which can lead them to 
angle their responses accordingly. To some extent "self-image" and 
"preconception" interaction can be overcome by the form of the questionnaire. 
Some questionnaires are constructed with an emphasis on ease of analysis 
of the information so collected, but with little thought to the process 
of answering the questionnaire or to what the responses represent.14 A 
questionnaire designed to minimise the above effects will first aim to be 
inherently interesting, holding the subject's attention and challenging 
him to think out the answers. Secondly it must be sufficiently varied 
in form to present the subjects from making assumptions about its 
intentions. Some items not intended for analysis and scoring may 
effectively be included to this end. 
Attention to the tapes of the above discussions with both groups led 
to the observation that with the exception of the repetition of whole 
patterns of argument (derived from home or school lessons, for example), 
the girls each tended to use a consistent style when approaching a problem. 
One girl in particular saw all situations in relation to their ends, 
usually practical outcomes, which themselves were evaluated in terms of 
further ends. There was a strong emphasis on cause and effect and a 
temporal dimension that brought to mind the purposive-rational action of 
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technological progress. Her approach was contrasted with that of another 
in her group who was highly aware of interrelationships that existed 
between people, and believed in the need to involve all those concerned 
in making a decision. This girl had told the group how she had discussed 
Kohlberg's dilemmas at a party the night before, and that everyone had 
been very interested. The contrast between these two girls appeared more 
marked because it was the former girl who possessed a religious faith and 
tended to have the right "moral" answers. The outcome of these 
observations was the decision to analyse moral judgement primarily in 
terms of the manner or style used in the making of the judgement. As 
already outlined, this logical style or form, typified in terms of 
Habermas' work and interaction distinction, was built into the scheme 
for conceptualising and analysing moral judgement procedures. 
The questionnaire and its morally relevant conflict situations  
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was constructed with the 
intention of stimulating thought and maximising reflectivity. The 
questions are as life-like as possible taking into consideration the 
general nature of the school and its neighbourhood. The questions to be 
answered concern conflicts of interests and loyalties or potential 
conflicts of values. Where questions refer to conflicts of interest 
Habermas' definition of morally relevant situations in terms of their 
potentiality for consensus has been accepted and the situations 
themselves are capable of consensual resolution. The problem of the 
Bloggs family (Section B, Q. 4), for example, could be approached 
discursively by any group of people knowing the facts. It also contains 
a dimension of internal resolution, however, where the people involved 
in the story can be advised to seek a consensus amongst themselves. 
The questions are not all intended for analysis. They are of several 
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types. The background questions in section A are designed for use in 
grading the respondents according to school achievement, subject 
orientation and general scientific/technological bias. Section B 
includes questions for analysis, questions designed to help focus the 
respondent's thoughts and questions intended for follow-up interviews 
of those selected for the intensive study. Q.1, for example, ("helpful 
hints" for a younger sister or girl-next-door) is designed to focus 
attention on home, school and neighbourhood, the relevance zone of the 
next questions. Q.6 which follows naturally from the previous family-
centred problems, is intended to stimulate thought about how girls 
actually deal with problem decisions. It will serve as a basis for future 
follow-up about patterns of communication in the family. Q.8(a) on 
controversial social and political issues, asks the respondents to 
consider which issues have been discussed with friends and family and 
Q.8(b) starts by asking for their order of importance for British society. 
The issues themselves were based on those chosen by members of the two 
discussion groups and some of their parents from a list of twenty-five 
social problems, as those they were interested in but were least sure 
about, i.e. the most truly controversial topics. (On some socially 
controversial matters, such as abortion, individuals tended to have 
very definite viewpoints. To them the matter was not open to debate.) 
The preliminary questions (Q.8(a) and Q.8(b) - 1st part) will be used in 
follow-up interviews on family relations but are primarily intended to 
force the pupils to reflect about the problems before starting to write. 
In particular, they are designed to encourage respondents to realise 
the many sources of knowledge about these problems and prevent the 
regurgitation of what their fathers said the previous night or their 
teachers said the previous day. 
The questions to be analysed (2 - 5; 7, 8 b & c) are designed to 
lay particular emphasis on each of the two major zones of relevance. 
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Questions 2 - 5 refer to the zone of experience of personal relationships 
in home and school. Questions 7 and B refer to the zone of wider 
knowledge, gained from school study, the media, private reading, 
discussions with family and friends etc. The first set of contextualisation 
is referred to as the inner zone of relevance: the second as the outer 
zone of relevance. 
In the inner zone, Q.2 and Q.3 refer not to actual conflict of 
interests but to potential conflicts of value. The first part of Q.2 
serves to focus attention on a particular friendship, the second part 
then introduces the potential conflict between valuing close friends and 
a wide circle of friends. This question is to highlight the manner in 
which girls make judgements about those close to them. Question 3 switches 
the attention from friends to consociates as they relate to the school 
learning situation. Here, the potential conflict may be between the 
value of congeniality and the value of school progress but is also likely 
to involve various ways in which learning is understood and appreciated. 
Questions 4 and 5 involve conflicts of interests and loyalties in the 
context of neighbours and wider family. Question 4 deals not only with 
the needs of two children, which apparently cannot both be satisfied, but 
introduces a potential conflict between values such as achievement and the 
intrinsic worthwhileness of pursuing self-developing interests. Question 
5 represents a conflict of loyalties - the teenage code of not telling on 
a peer conflicts with family loyalty. (This type of conflict had 
appeared meaningful to girls in the discussion groups of Phase I, 
including the two Asian members. Questionnaire responses indicated, 
however, that for some Asian girls family loyalty was so strong that no 
peer loyalty came into conflict with it.) 
The zone of outer relevance is introduced with Q.7, a question about 
the neutron bomb. The obvious conflict is between valuing lives in 
themselves against the need for quick and decisive warfare but background 
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knowledge will add other dimensions. The issue had been widely 
discussed in the media. Q.8 refers to a series of conflict situations 
which again cannot be discussed without a certain degree of familiarity 
with at least some of the issues. 
The questionnaire completed, the study could now move on to its 
administration in phase II, after a suitable period had elapsed for the 
matter to have been cleared through official ILEA channels. 
The Study in Action: Phase II 
Administration of questionnaire  
Phase I had focussed on morally relevant situations in terms of 
Habermasiai theory and had pursued the idea of relevance to include 
the contextualisation of a situation in the mind and memory of the 
moral agent (Schutz). Phase II now sought to elicit empirical evidence 
of moral consciousness through written moral judgements. The questionnaire 
form was chosen because it would give rise to a large amount of written 
material in the minimum time and, via analysis, lead to identification 
of girls tending towards the two polarised judgemental styles based on 
Habermas' distinction between work and interaction. It would also allow 
preliminary evidence of values referred to in judgemental procedures 
to be collected. If Phase I looked at empirical moral thought through 
a lattice of Habermasian concepts, Phase II commences the collection of 
data, defined in Habermasian terms. 
Phase II commenced about a month after the new school year had begun. 
The combined sixth form (seven of the eight discussion group girls were 
now in the upper sixth, one having left) was told of the project and 
volunteers were recruited. Girls were asked to do the questionnaire 
with the understanding that on the basis of their answers, and possibly 
their subject emphasis, a number would be invited to become part of an 
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extended study with their parents. We were aiming for one hundred 
initial volunteers. Sixth form meetings were attended regularly to 
keep contact and make arrangements for times when the girls were free to 
do the questionnaire. Groups of girls, ranging from two to nine in 
number, did the questionnaire in twenty separate sessions either in 
spare periods or after school. The venue was usually a spare tutorial 
room during the school day or the common room after school. The procedure 
was kept standard. Girls took numbered questionnaires and signed for 
them. Confidentiality was stressed and girls were assured that they would 
not have to go any further than the questionnaire stage unless they wanted 
to. It was emphasised that they were not to let the questionnaire 
"strait-jacket" them - they could choose to withhold information 
if desired, they need not fill all the space provided, or if they wished 
they could use the backs of the pages also. If they thought a question 
was meaningless they could say so. They could take as long as they liked 
to complete it. They were asked not to discuss the questions with other 
girls and readily agreed. 
Most girls took from three quarters to one hour to complete the 
questionnaire although one "got rather carried away" and took eighty 
minutes. There was no evidence that they had divulged any part of the 
questionnaire's contents during the six weeks of its administration. 
There was a steady trickle of positive feedback from the respondents, 
especially in the early stages, which encouraged others to volunteer. 
Tutors reported that girls had told them that it was interesting and 
made them think. By the end of term, eighty four girls had attempted 
the questionnaire and many hours had been spent in informal discussion 
with these and other sixth formers, especially with the lower sixth 
girls, as they had more time to spare. Upper sixth girls spent much 
less time at school, although officially they were only allowed one half 
day off per week, and they often missed the weekly year group meetings. 
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Although it had not been intended to include any of the original 
discussion group girls in the questionnaire, six out of the remaining 
seven were keen to be involved, so were included. Their original task had 
been to help me translate Habermas' ideas into formulations through 
which the empirical could be grasped: they had had no direct hand in 
the questionnaire nor did they know the underlying purpose of the project. 
Table I shows the constitution of the group in terms of whether they 
were in the first or second year of the sixth form and whether they 
were taking two-year courses and thus studying at least one subject at 
A level, or whether they were taking one year courses which included 
subjects for C.S.E., C.E.E., G.C.E. 0 level and various R.S.A. courses. 
The upper sixth's total numbers quoted are those at the beginning of the 
term. By the time the eighty four girls had done the questionnaire the 
numbers would have been lower than those recorded. Upper sixth girls 
frequently found jobs and dropped out during their first term only telling 
the school after the event. The head of sixth form described the upper 
sixth as "a fluid group with a high drop-out rate" where numbers change 
from week to week. 
PROPORTION OF SIXTH 
Year and Course 	 Upper Sixth 
FORMERS ATTEMPTING QUESTIONNAIRE 
Lower Sixth Total 
Sixth 
Formers 
direction 2 year 	 1 year 
courses 	 courses 
2 year 
	
1 year 
courses 	 courses 
Number attempt-
ing questionnaire 19 2 31 32 84 
Number available 
(beginning of 
term) 35 12 49 84 180 
Proportion attempt-
ing questionnaire 54% 17% 63% 38% 47% 
TABLE I  
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It can be seen from Table I that the highest proportion of girls 
attempting the questionnaire came from the two year courses. More than 
half of the upper sixth (54% is a conservative figure) and 63% of the 
lower sixth girls taking two-year A level based courses, attempted the 
questionnaire. Most of the one-year pupils found the last two questions 
very difficult and many one-year course girls were not sufficiently 
confident to attempt it at all. Until the last of the six weeks during 
which the questionnaire was being conducted, only thirteen of these girls 
had come forward. An additional twenty one attempted it during the 
last full week of term when I was stationed full-time in the sixth form 
common room. They now had confidence in me as a person, had seen that 
others had survived the experience and had few end of term commitments, 
such as last minute essays or projects to hand in. The upper sixth girls 
doing one-year courses were all doing R.S.A. commercial subjects and 
spent most of their time in the commercial department, the two attempting 
the questionnaire taking a lower proportion of commercial subjects and 
spending some time in the sixth form block. Many of the one-year 
course girls, including a number attempting the questionnaire, were of a 
very low academic level indeed. Only eleven of the eighty four girls 
were taking four or more 0 levels and thirty were taking no subjects 
at 0 level. Whilst as a group they could be considered as "low achievers", 
compared with girls taking one or more subjects at A level, their reasons 
for low achievement and their potential for further achievement varied 
greatly within the group. Those repeating 0 levels or doing one or more 
0 levels after a background of C.S.E. subjects had, in most cases, some 
career plans and were by no means below average academic ability. Many, 
however, had been unable to find jobs after their fifth year, had few 
C.S.E. qualifications and were staying on at school to gain extra 
maturity in a sheltered environment. Some Asian girls, in particular, 
had problems with English, and were taking a non-examination Basic English 
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course. It was mainly girls of this latter type who comprised the twenty-
one who responded during the last week of term. Five one-year course girls 
did not attempt the last two questions. (Table III shows the occurrence 
of unattempted questions). Many, however, had difficulty in managing the 
ideas in these questions and had problems of written self expression 
throughout the questionnaire. Difficulties in assessing such questionnaire 
responses will be referred to below. 
The fifty girls taking two-year (A-level based) courses were classified, 
on the basis of the academic information given in the questionnaires, 
into those with a science emphasis and those with a humanities emphasis. 
Both groups were further classified mainly on the basis of achievement at 
0 level. This classification was done in order to get a preliminary 
indication of whether it would be fruitful to follow up the effect of 
science-orientated study and of school achievement on moral consciousness. 
Results of the questionnaire analysis in terms of these categories 
are given in Table IV and the possibility of bias is discussed in 
Appendix B. 
The two-year course respondents were classified as having a science 
or humanities emphasis on the basis of their A level subjects. 
Those classified as science-based were taking A levels in Mathematics, 
Chemistry, Physics or Biology. If Biology or Mathematics was the only 
A level from the above list and was taken in conjunction with humanities 
subjects (at 0 or A level), the respondent was classified as having 
a humanities bias. If Biology or Mathematics was taken in conjunction 
with at least two science subjects at 0 level (Geology now included) 
the girl was classified as science-biased. Geography was treated as a 
humanities subject. However, in cases where it accompanied Biology as an 
A level subject, where there were no other humanities A levels being taken 
and where there was an additional science subject being studied at 0 
243 
level, the respondent was classified as science-biased. 
The humanities-biased girls, like those taking one-year courses were 
wide ranging in ability and academic background. Some were keen 
humanities students who were aiming at an Arts-based university course. 
Many, however, were taking a single A level whilst re-taking 0 levels 
needed for their careers, or whilst making up their minds on what to do 
in the future. They were sub-divided on the basis of their academic 
achievement level. Class I humanities students were doing at least two 
subjects at A level and had gained at least six 0 level passes at grade 
C or better (or C.S.E. grade 1). Class II humanities students were 
doing one or two A levels accompanied by C.S.E. or 0 level subjects. 
They did not have the prerequisite six 0 levels. 
Respondents classified as science-biased had stronger academic 
backgrounds than the humanities-biased girls. Most intended to follow a 
career in a scientific- or technologically-based field. At an all-girls 
school this is a common occurrence. The sub-classification thus was slanted 
to show not only academic achievement but the degree of scientific 
commitment. A student wishing to continue with Biology, for example, 
must take other sciences at A level to gain entry into biologically-based 
careers. Class I science students were classified on the basis of taking 
at least two sciences at A level, one of which was Chemistry or Physics. 
All had the prerequisite six 0 levels at grade C or better. Class II 
science students did not have both these requirements, several attempting 
to qualify for a science-based career with weak backgrounds and 
(according to tutors) little hope of success, and others having stronger 
backgrounds but not Chemistry or Physics at A level. Table II shows how 
the girls divided up according to the above classification. 
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SCHOOL RELATIONS 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO YEAR, SUBJECT-BIAS 
AND ACHIEVEMENT LEVEL 
No. 	 of 	 Science-Biased 
respondents 
in each group 	 Class I 	 Class II Total 
Humanities-Biased 
Class I 	 Class II 	 Total Total 
Upper Sixth 3 - 3 9 7 16 19 
Lower Sixth 4 8 12 5 14 19 31 
Total Sixth Form 7 8 15 14 21 35 50 
Proportion of 
respondents (%) 14% 16% 30% 28% 42% 70% 100% 
TABLE II  
Xt will be noted that 30% of the respondents taking A levels were 
science-biased and 70% were humanities-biased. This was approximately 
the same proportion that existed in the sixth form as a whole.15 Sixth 
form classes in Physics and Chemistry at Greenbank were small and although 
more girls studied Biology in the lower sixth, Biology passes at A level 
were few. In the 1978 A level examinations, of the twenty-seven girls 
who passed some subjects twenty gained passes in humanities subjects 
only, four passed in Chemistry (with Physics, Biology or Mathematics 
as accompanying subjects) and three included Biology without accompanying 
Sciences. Thus 74% passed in humanities and 26% in sciences, including 
Biology. We shall keep this information in mind when we come to look 
at the analysis of moral judgement in relation to school subject bias and 
experience of achievement. 
Analysis of Questionnaire  
The questionnaire responses (which represented moral judgements) 
were analysed in terms of their form and content according to the scheme 
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discussed in Chapter 6. This necessitated selecting sets of criteria 
for distinguishing between the two logical forms. Here we moved into a 
further stage in translating Habermasian theory into practice. The moral 
and interaction distinction is now spelt out as detailed sets of criteria 
whereby everyday judgements of personal and political problems can be 
logically typified. 
The respondents' judgements were analysed at the end of the school term. 
Although by now the head and deputy head of sixth form had given their 
opinions on the eighty four respondents and many of them were well known 
to me, contact with them had not included written work, so their writing 
was not familiar. This meant that, during analysis, the respondents 
remained anonymous. Because Habermas has only left general guidelines 
for characterising communicative, strategic and instrumental action, it 
was necessary to look for more specific criteria in the terms of the 
conflict situations. To characterise communicative logic, we thus 
looked for the limiting conditions needed for the communicative ethic to 
be put into practice, in terms of the way individuals, activities 
and situations were approached. We saw strategic/instrumental logic 
as purposive-rational approaches which acted in contradiction to the 
above communicative ones. These factors were looked for during the first 
reading through of the girls' responses. Some basic criteria were 
isolated and the answers were assessed and reassessed while the system 
of evaluation was being refined. The assessment and scoring of the 
answers was checked by an assistant who was an experienced English 
teacher. One general approach probably had more in common with practiced 
school marking procedures than with sociological methodology. With 
the open-endedness of the questions it was quite impossible to make a 
detailed analysis of codified responses and we found it sufficient to 
work from a set of criteria extracted from the girls' responses. 
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Analysing the logical form: It will be recalled that the initial 
categorisation of moral judgements was in terms of a monothetic or a 
polythetic approach. It was pointed out that the distinction into 
strategic/instrumental and communicative logical form could only be 
made with a stepwise or polythetic form of judgement. The questions were 
designed to minimise the direct application of "recipes", whether as 
moral principles or paradigms for action. Monothetic responses were 
still quite common, however, either because of the respondents' keenness 
to solve the issue by applying practical paradigms or because of an 
inability to think the problem through. Classification as monothetic 
meant that the question was not analysed further and gained a score of 0. 
As we were working with a continuous scale for scoring, where strategic 
and instrumental logic scored on the minus axis and communicative logic 
on the positive (see below), a monothetic judgement scored the same as one 
that was equally balanced for the two opposing logical approaches. 
Monothetic judgements were most common with regard to the problem 
of the Bloggs family (Q.4). The dilemma was by-passed in the respondents' 
enthusiasm to solve the problem. Student 74, for example gave her 
reason for judgement as one word - "equality" and advised Mrs Bloggs 
"to take each child in turn, e.g. 1 month swimming, next month training", 
whilst student 51 answered that, "She should give an equal chance to 
both children". Some respondents elaborated on such by-passes but where 
they answered with a series of recipe solutions they sometimes strung 
them together in such a way that one scoring criteria applied. Few 
monothetic judgements were given with the other situations in the zone of 
inner relevance (Q.2 - 5) but they appeared again in Q.7 responses. Some 
gave a judgement in terms of right and wrong without analysing the question. 
Student 40 gave her opinion as, "I think it too is immoral and should be 
banned" and her reason for judgement as, "I think it is totally wrong, 
that property is more important than a human life". There was also the 
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overriding interest that ruled out any controversy: "A Bomb is a bomb - 
I pray there will never be a war in my lifetime. Ban all Bombs." The 
rationale for this opinion was the simple statement: "I an a pacifist" 
(Student 41). Such responses were more commonly given by girls with weak 
academic backgrounds. Whilst a monothetic response was scored as if it 
were an ambivalent or neutral response, it was separately recorded on each 
respondent's record card for follow-up at interview (should the respondent 
become part of the intensive study). Table III shows the distribution of 
monothetic responses over the questions. 
The analysis of polythetic judgements was based on a set of 
criteria relating to these areas - interpersonal relationships, human 
activities and the relationship of people to the world. In each case an 
aspect that was basic to communicative morality was contrasted with the 
corresponding aspect which typified strategic or instrumental action. The 
logic was assessed as the way people, activities and the wider environmental 
relations were approached in the discussion. The following were our 
guidelines in these three areas: 
A. Interpersonal relationships. If people are to be able to enter 
into discursive norm formation they must treat other people as responsible 
and rational. Other humans must be approached as autonomous, as 
subjects not objects, as ends in themselves and not as means to ends. 
There must be an expectation of mutuality. A communicative approach, 
whether directly or indirectly focussed on human relationship must deal with 
people in these ways. Strategic or instrumental approaches will see 
people as atomistic individuals or collectives, as objects rather than 
subjects they will use them as pawns or see them as using each other as a 
means to an end. We can thus make the following distinctions in a rather 
more embodied form, i.e. as actual indicators that emerged from the 
responses. 
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COMMUNICATIVE LOGIC 
	
ST RATEG I C/IN ST RUMENT AL LOGIC 
1. - emphasis on mutuality. 	 1. - emphasis on reciprocity, exchanges 
between atomistic individuals. 
2. - discussion or sharing of ideas 2. - discussion seen in terms of its 
seen as good in terms of common 	 usefulness to a private purpose, or 
interests, or the resolution of 	 regarded as unimportant. 
interests. 
3. - others treated as reasonable 	 3. - others are manipulated for their 
people, capable of making their 	 own good. 
own choices. 
4. - peoples' lives seen as valuable 4.- peoples' lives seen in terms of their 
to the people themselves. 	 value to others (e.g. friends, family). 
5. - relationships seen as reflex-
ive. 
6. - people treated as subjects, 
able to change themselves 
(rational autonomy). 
7. - human needs take precedence 
over principles. 
5. - relationships seen as non-reflexive, 
one-directional. 
6. - people seen as objects which are 
changed by outside circumstances, but 
unable to co-operate in their own 
change. 
7. - principles take precedence over 
human needs. 
Points 1 and 2 tended to emerge in response to Q.2 and Q.3. Student 34, 
for example, who proved to be consistently communicative in her logic, 
distinguishes the nature of friends and acquaintances in terms of the 
style of communication. Acquaintances are defined as having fun with each 
other, whilst close friendship involves "trust and complete confidence" 
for the sharing of problems. She responds to Q.3 as follows: 
1  
If classes a[sic]16 small you find that as time progresses 
you get to know the other girls better. Some girls you may 
never have spoken to before become a part of the group. The 
group is very much a unit. If the group can communicate 
with each other you find the work is made a little easier 
to understand because you can talk about it together. 
This stress on mutuality and sharing of ideas is contrasted by the 
following responses. Student 74 prefers a wide circle of friends "because 
you got more people to turn to and if one is not understanding, then you 
got someone else. . .", whilst student 54 feels that a few close friends 
will mean "there is less people to upset". A small class should get on, 
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in the opinion of student 2 to overcome boredom, otherwise "there would be 
no-one to talk to about my holidays, boyfriend etc. . ." These responses 
also illustrate point 5: friendship is seen as one-directional. The 
extreme negation of point 2 is shown by a total unawareness of the efficacy 
of sharing ideas. It is immaterial whether or not you get on with your 
classmates because, ". . . you are in a lesson to work and communicate with 
the teacher", (student 31), and ". . . you are not there to talk but the 
work for the exams that you desire" (student 76). 
Point 3 and its related point 6 (rational autonomy) are illustrated 
by the responses to the problem of the potentially delinquent cousin 
(Q.5). Student 14 will talk to her cousin and "perhaps to his friends" 
but she respects his autonomy: ". . . I certainly would not tell his parents 
because if he wants them to know its his job in telling them." Student 18 
has no such worries. She will try to "stop him" and "make him see that he 
is wrong". If she fails, ". . . it might be an idea to contact the police 
without him finding out who it was that did it." This student may not 
respect her cousin's autonomy but she considers him potentially capable 
of being changed, even if not of changing himself. Student 45, however, 
would tell her parents and hope they would tell his parents because she 
". . . wouldn't want his bad character reflecting onto our part of family 
. . ." This emphasis on people's lives (or welfare) as being approached 
in terms of their meaning for others (point 4), was seen more commonly in 
discussions on euthanasia where an individual's suffering was seen in 
terms of the distress it caused relatives. 
True strategic logic where people's needs must give way to a rule, 
such as a moral principle (point 7) is shown in this approach to the 
Bloggs problem (Q.4). Student 70 writes: "Talk to both the children, 
explain the situation and tell them that until her finances improve neither 
will continue their activities. This way the solution is fair." 
250 
Communicative responses to this problem included that of student 14 who 
advised Mrs Bloggs to discuss the matter with the children to "ask 
their feelings about the situation" and student 7 who advises that the 
problem be discussed with the manager of the county team "to see what he 
could suggest. 
B. Human Activities.  Communicative morality is based on action as seen 
as interaction not action in the production sense which results in a 
product external to it. A norm that may be the agreed outcome of 
discourse is not its product in the same way that labour produces 
commodities. So, to communicative logic, human activities are seen in 
terms of their intrinsic nature, not in terms of external outcomes. 
Strategic/instrumental logic sets external goals to its activities, 
evaluating them in terms of outcomes. 
Criteria for distinguishing human activities emerged from the responses 
as follows: 
COMMUNICATIVE LOG IC 	 STRATEGIC/INSTRUMENTAL LOG IC  
1. ACTIVITIES (WORK, HOBBIES, SPORTS 
&c.) worthwhile pursuing for them- 
selves. [Solitary pursuits -
inherently worthwhile. 
Shared activities - inherently 
worthwhile and/or worthwhile in 
terms of social interaction.] 
2. Knowledge valued in relation to 
understanding. 
3. Human activities seen inter-
actionally - doing and under-
standing are never entirely 
private matters, 
1. ACTIVITIES (WORK, HOBBIES, SPORTS 
&c.) worthwhile in terms of 
extrinsic criteria - achievement, 
success or improved social status 
(shared activities). 
2. Knowledge valued in relation to 
external ends of power or progress. 
3. Human activities seen 
individualistically - doing and 
understanding are private matters. 
This set of criteria emerged most strongly in the responses to the 
Bloggs problem (Q.4). The strategic/instrumental response saw no real 
problem as only one child had achieved (seen in terms of standard or 
recognition). So student 83 advises Mrs Bloggs to: "Tell the younger 
child to give up swimming and support the elder child" because, "the 
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elder girl has proved she is serious about gymnastics by getting as 
far as the county team - the younger one is only enjoying swimming - 
it could be a flash in the pan." Another comes to a similar decision 
because, "the older child had obviously been training hard to achieve a 
place in the county's team, so the opportunity cannot be lost." (Student 
31). The reason may be expressed in the more moral language of "being 
serious" or "training hard" but the real criterion is achievement. This 
approach was contrasted by those who saw the situation as a real dilemma 
because both children had real needs at stake. So student 37 takes into 
consideration, "the happiness of the two children, in doinig something 
because they want to do it", whilst student 67 considers it important, 
"not to dampen the younger child's interest", although neither can see any 
resolution to the dilemma. 
Applied to school work this extrinsic evaluation of activities was 
noted in the students who saw lessons in terms of examination outcomes, 
e.g. student 76 who was not in class to talk but to work for the desired 
exams. The question about small classes (Q.3) also highlighted point 3. 
Thus, student 18 thinks relationships in class are important as they help 
in her own task of learning. It is a very practical matter. "You 
also tend to like to compare work when you are in so small a class and if 
you don't get on well you might be afraid to share your mark especially 
if it was bad." Point 2, knowledge, in terms of understanding or 
usefulness, emerged at one level in the same question, but was also 
implicit in some responses that considered the problem of the neutron 
bomb. 
C. The relationship of people to the world. Communicative morality works 
at the level of human interaction but it will involve an approach to the 
world. The world must be seen as capable of being changed through human 
action. This human action must not be of the instrumental type based on 
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a direct cause and effect relationship. The relationship between human 
action and the world will be seen as a complex network of dynamic 
inter-reactions where people co-operate to bring about change. 
In the context of the questionnaire, these aspects mainly emerged 
in responses to the last two questions (Q.7 and Q.8). Perhaps because 
the situations were all ones that were directly or indirectly connected 
with technological progress, the criteria were primarily seen in terms 
of strategic/instrumental logic to which, in this instance, we contrasted 
the communicative approach. Criteria emerged from the responses thus:- 
STRATEGIC/INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC 
1. People related to the world 
linearly, cause-effect relation-
ships. (People obey same laws 
as physical world). 
2. World events determine change. 
People are powerless. 
3. Progress means technological  
progress. Progress is inevit-
able (fatalistic attitude). 
4. Situation need not involve people 
- can be seen in terms of money 
or property. 
COMMUNICATIVE LOGIC 
1. People have complex patterns of 
inter-relationships with each 
other and the world. 
2. People can affect change via 
communicative action. 
3. Progress means human co-
operation. 
4. All situations involve people. 
The determinism of point 2 was demonstrated by responses to the 
question on the neutron bomb (Q.7). Student 9, for example, believes it 
to be "necessary if not for now, for the future. The neutron bomb is 
"essential" in regard to the arms race because "we are faced with very real 
confrontations." 
It was realised that there can be a passive instrumentality as well 
as an active instrumentality. This is referred to in point 3 as fatalism. 
Whilst active instrumentality achieves its end through the methods of 
technology, passive instrumentality is the victim of technology. It is 
fatalistic in that it doubts the power of human action and allows itself 
to become an object, a pawn in the game. Student 45 combines a belief in 
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technological progress with such a fatalism. The neutron bomb should 
not be banned because, "You can't stop scientific advancement in my opinion. 
It would carry on illegally if necessary. . . it's human nature to go 
against law." A stronger fatalism still is shown by student 1 who 
connects progress with disaster. "People will keep on inventing new 
ideas creating new wars this will always happen until man no longer has 
a world left." Student 76 has more hope for the human race which "is only 
just beginning to expand its ideas and so has a long way to go before it 
is completely good." In the meantime she considers it advisable to ban 
the Bomb. A more truly communicative approach comes from student 64 who 
thinks, "that we are civilised enough now to sort our differences by 
talking rather than by killing each other." 
Linear or cause/effect approaches (point 1) were used when discussing 
the arms race and commonly in discussing the problem of law and order. 
More police powers or longer sentences will automatically lead to fewer 
crimes. A few extended this reasoning to immigration. So, to student 70, 
as many of Britain's problems "stem from not enough houses/jobs/health 
service etc." immigration control will overcome these problems. There is 
a linear relationship; fewer immigrants leads to more jobs. 
Student 28 illustrates point 4, the "peopleless" approach, most 
succinctly. She believes production of the neutron bomb should be 
stopped, "Because a vast amount of money is being spent on the 
development, and it may never be used." 
The assessment of the polythetic judgements was made according to 
a continuous scale where -3 represented the maximum degree of strategic/ 
instrumentality, +3 maximum communicability and 0 was a neutral position. 
Responses to each of the six questions were assessed in terms of the above 
criteria, instances of any procedural step in terms of these approaches 
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being noted. The question was then given a score for the degree of 
communicability and/or strategic/instrumentality on the basis of instances 
of use of the relevant logic. For each of the two axes (+: communicative; 
-: strategic/instrumental) for each question, judgements were assessed on 
a 1 - 3 scale. On each scale, approximately 60-70% respondents using 
that logical form were graded 1, 20-30% were graded 2 and 0-10% were 
graded 3. The two scores were then added, the figure now indicating a 
resultant degree of communicability or strategic/instrumentality in the 
response. As the criteria had been determined on the basis of the two 
approaches being opposed, this procedure was considered justified. It 
was quite common for respondents to have one unit of communicability 
cancelled by one unit of strategic/instrumentality, such responses showing 
an ambivalent approach. It was unknown for girls to show a high degree 
of both opposing logics within the same question but a number had 2 units 
in one direction accompanied by 1 unit in the opposite direction, giving 
them a resultant score of + or -1. The question showing the highest 
occurrence of ambivalence was Q.8, the most open question on social 
problems. Here there was evidence, in many cases, of portions of school 
knowledge juxtaposed with parental opinions. Some respondents were honest 
here, student 40 for example, adding this codis to her answer to Q.Bc): 
"My parents have taught this to me and I am not sure whether or not I 
feel the same way, I think I am confused." 
The number of respondents gaining a resultant score in each category 
for each of the six questions is shown in Table III. It can be seen, 
immediately, that there is a considerable variation in response from 
question to question. This is particularly apparent with the large numbers 
of monothetic responses in Q.4 and Q.7 compared with the other questions. 
These questions posed very relevant problems which appeared to provoke an 
emotive response from many girls so that they attempted to escape the 
dilemma by applying a moral or practical recipe without thinking the 
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situation through. Question 5 elicited the lowest proportion of 
monothetic responses, probably because it gave the girls a series of 
alternatives which helped them think their judgements through. Some 
questions were more prone to elicit communicative responses than others. 
Q.5 for example had no truly instrumental factors associated with it - it 
was a question that opposed strategic to communicative logic. Responses 
cluster around the moderate communicative score of 1. Q.3, however, 
dealing with a school situation, introduced implicitly the truly 
instrumental factor of examination success. Responses cluster around the 
moderate strategic/instrumental score of 1. 
LOGICAL FORM OF JUCGEMENT 
RESULTANT SCORES FOR 84 SIXTH FORM RESPONDENTS 
Q.omit- 
ted 
Mono= 
thetic 
Strategic/ 
instrumental 
Neutral Communicative 
responses -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Q.2 
(friends) 2 3 10 29 25 15 
Q.3 
(small 
classes) 3 3 35 14 21 7 1 
Q.4 (the 
Bloggs) 6 30 5 11 7 22 3 
Q.5 (the 
cousin) 1 2 2 13 19 36 10 1 
Q.7 
(neutron 
bomb) 7 23 6 18 5 18 7 
Q.8 
(social 
problem) 12 6 8 5 8 9 20 10 6 
TABLE III  
We have made no attempt to put these raw scores in a more sophisticated 
form or to further scale them in any way. The questionnaire was no more 
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than a crude tool and if such an approach were to be standardised, the 
questions themselves, as well as the scoring, would need considerable 
refining. The task of the questionnaire was to enable us to distinguish 
between individuals who showed a consistently high use of communicative 
logic from those who showed a consistent use of strategic/instrumental 
logic. Consistency was to be assessed in terms of the maintenance of the 
same logical approach in both the inner zone of relevance and the outer 
relevance zone. The inner zone was represented on the questionnaire 
by Qs 2-5 and the outer zone by Qs 7-8, so by comparing each student's 
mean for the two sections we could get an indication of those showing 
some consistency. No comparative analysis was made across the two zones, 
first because the questionnaire itself, with its scoring system, was by 
no means a sensitive instrument and secondly because the first mean 
resulted from four questions and the second from only two questions. 
Respondents were classified as "consistently communicative" if 
their mean score for both sections was 0.5 or greater and consistently 
strategic/instrumental "if their mean scores for both were -0.5 or less. 
Respondents showing a resultant communicative score of at least 0.5 
in one section and a strategic instrumental score of -0.5 or less in 
the other (or 0 in one section and 1- or -1 in the other) were classified 
as "inconsistent" and the remainder as "neutral". Of the eighty four 
respondents, twenty two were thus classified as consistently communicative 
and eleven as consistently strategic/instrumental. Twenty four were 
classified as inconsistent and twenty seven as neutral. Of those 
respondents classified as consistently communicative, ten had totals for 
the two means in excess of 2 and of those consistently strategic/ 
instrumental, four had totals of less than -2. These girls, at least, 
would be sought for the follow-up study as their responses were good 
examples of the two logical extremes. 
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Table IV shows the number 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONDENTS 
JUDGEMENT 
Year of 	 Classification in 
6th Form 	 terms of logical 
form 
of respondents in each category. 
IN TERMS OF LOGICAL FORM OF 
AND SCHOOL RELATIONS 
Humanities- 
1 yr. 	 biased 
Science-
biased 
courses Class I Class II 	 Class I Class II 
Upper 6th Consistently 
2 1 communicative 
Consistently 
- 2 2 - - 
strategic/ 
instrumental 
Neutral 2 1 2 - - 
Inconsistent 4 2 3 
Lower 6th Consistently 
5 5 4 2 3 communicative 
Consistently 
2 3 2 
strategic/ 
instrumental 
Neutral 17 4 1 
Inconsistent 8 3 1 3 
TABLE IV  
Table IV shows that individuals who were classified as consistently 
communicative or consistently strategic/instrumental come from a wide 
range of subject and achievement backgrounds. There does not seem to 
be any immediate connection between the logical form of the moral 
judgement process, as we assessed it, and the school relations as we 
classified them. Appendix B shows the results of a preliminary 
examination of these relationships which concluded that it would not be 
fruitful to attempt to look further at school influence on moral 
judgement in these terms. The table points to the inability of the 
questionnaire to discriminate effectively between girls taking one-year 
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courses, who we have already described as being, in many cases, of very 
low ability. The high proportion classed as "neutral" was partly owing 
to the larger number of monothetic responses but also to the fact that 
these girls tended to write less and be much less committed in their views. 
In the last two questions (Q.7 and Q.8) many had trouble with their answers 
because they lacked background knowledge. 
The analysis of the judgements in terms of content, i.e. material 
referred to in substantiating the judgements, was done concurrently 
with the analysis of the logical form. The relationship between form and 
value content was discussed and schematised in Chapter 6. We are here 
continuing to analyse our empirical data in terms of the scheme devised 
from Habermasian theory. In the context of the responses it was 
impossible to make any fine philosophical distinctions. We noted 
concepts referred to by the respondents in the context of being "goods" 
(or desirables) as "bads" (undesirables). It was mentioned in the last 
chapter that we expected this reference matter to include beliefs, values, 
principles, paradigms and so on. Respondents, in fact, made their 
judgements with reference to what they found valuable or believed in 
rather than to beliefs about the world. Most values were referred to 
in positive terms but some negative values were referred to, especially 
in response to Q.7 (neutron bomb). 
These positive and negative values are listed, in order of popularity, 
in Table V. Negative values have not been translated into their 
positive forms as it is easy to change meanings. Loving peace is different 
from hating war. In most cases the actual phrase used by the respondents 
has been recorded but in a few cases when the meaning was quite clear it 
has been grouped under a more common phrase, e.g. "doing what you enjoy", 
was subsumed under the phrase "pursuing interests". Achievement was 
commonly mentioned by name but we included such phrases as "doing well at 
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it" and "reached the top" as clearly indicating achievement rather than 
pursuit of interests. Conceptual distinctions have been made so that, 
for example, trust is not confused with understanding. Both were 
commonly referred to in the context of Q.2 a) which asked for meaningful 
aspects of a friendship. Thus, as we have recorded the number of 
respondents referring (once or more than once) to each concept or value, 
"trust" and "understanding" may or may not have been referred to by the 
same girl. Table V records these values according to the prevailing logic 
used by the respondents. 
It will be noted first that the proportions of the highly and 
consistently polarised respondents are greater in referring to values in 
making judgements than are those of the remainder. This is largely on 
account of the large numbers of more academically limited girls whose 
final scores tended to place them in the neutral group. Many referred 
to values when the question was appropriately worded, as with Q.2a) 
about the meaningfulness of friendship but otherwise tended to be 
sparse with reference matter. This is a limitation of a written 
questionnaire. 
The two most generally referred to values were trust and 
independence which were highly regarded. Fairness was also widely 
accepted and was probably the underlying reason for many of the 
monothetic responses to the Bloggs problem, but when it was not 
specifically mentioned it was not recorded. Human life is highly 
regarded. It was more commonly referred to in its negative form of 
destruction of human life being an evil. Altogether half the 
respondents referred to the value of human life, whilst others referred 
indirectly and thus less strongly, in terms of the destruction of the 
world being a terrible thing. 
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CONCEPTS REFERRED TO IN MAKING JUDGEMENTS RELATED 
TO RESPONDENTS' PREVAILING LOGIC 
(each number represent's one respondent who referred to the value 
once or more than once). 
POSITIVE VALUES 	 CONSISTENTLY 
	
CONSISTENTLY 
	 OTHERS 
COMMUNICATIVE 	 STRAT./INSTRUM- 
RESPONDENTS 	 ENTAL RESPONDENTS 
N=22 (%) N=11 (%) N=51 (%) 
Trust 9 (41) 2 (18) 15 (29) 
Independence 5 (23) 4 (36) 13 (25) 
Achievement - - 7 (64) 12 (23) 
Understanding others 6 (27) 1 (9) 12 (23) 
Sincerity/honesty 7 (32) 3 (27) 8 (16) 
Discussion/commun- 
ication 9 (41) - - 8 (16) 
Fairness 5 (23) 1 (9) 9 (18) 
Human life 5 (23) - - 8 (16) 
Kindness/caring 1 (4) - - 12 (23) 
Harmony 6 (27) 1 (9) 4 (8) 
Humour 2 (9) 1 (9) 6 (12) 
Pursuing interests 6 (27) - - 3 (6) 
Grasping opportunities 1 (4) 5 (45) 2 (4) 
Personal relationship 
/sociability 4 (18) 1 (9) 3 (6) 
Respect 2 (9) - 5 (10) 
Reliability - - 1 ( 9) 5 (10) 
Equality 2 (9) 1 ( 9) 3 (6) 
Order - - 3 (27) 1 (2) 
Quality of life 3 (14) - 1 (2) 
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NEGATIVE VALUES CONSISTENTLY CONSISTENTLY 
N=51 
OTHERS 
COMMUNICATIVE STRATJINSTRUM- 
(%) 
RESPONDENTS ENTAL RESPONDENTS 
N-22 (%) N=11 (%) 
Destroying human life 10 (45) 3 (27) 16 (31) 
Violence 5 ( 9 ) 3 (27) 4 (8) 
War 3 (23) 1 (9) 7 (14) 
Dissension/tension - - 1 ( 9) 10 (20) 
Prejudice/racism 5 (23) - - 2 (4) 
Destroying world 2 (9) 1 (9) 3 (6) 
TABLE V  
Whilst it is realised that with only eleven respondents occupying 
the strategic/instrumental category we cannot talk of "statistical 
significance', it is interesting to look at the values referred to by 
members of the two polarised groups where they are proportionately higher 
than those of the control group. Thus, consistently communcative 
respondents emphasised trust, understanding others, sincerity or 
h nesty, discussion or communication, harmony, the pursuit of interests 
and the value of human life. Strategic/instrumental respondents 
consistently emphasised achievement and grasping opportunities, and 
also referred to independence, sincerity or honesty. Violence was 
considered as bad as the destruction of human life and no-one mentioned 
human life or quality of life as being desirable in positive terms. It 
is interesting that of the four respondents referring to order as a 
social "good", three of them were in the strategic/instrumental category. 
To some extent the ideas and values that we recorded as most commonly 
referred to by these groups were bound up with the scoring of the 
logical form. Hence a girl referring to the need to communicate in a 
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small group was quite likely to receive a point on the communicative 
axis whilst one who saw the small class in terms of examination success 
might refer to achievement in this context. And achievement being an 
extrinsic factor will tend to be approached as a goal and thus lead to 
a score on the strategic/instrumental axis. But first, it must be 
stressed that in scoring for the logical form, points were not given 
because a respondent referred to communication or achievement: the way the 
value was approached was all important. Hence it was quite possible to 
mention class discussion in terms of its efficacy for bringing about an 
atmosphere of harmony which would lead to better results, or as the 
highly instrumental student 18 put it, "It helps the teacher if you all 
get on well because its harder to teach a divided class than a united 
one." Here discussion was not seen as a desirable state of affairs in 
itself but as a means to an end. Although the concept of achievement 
and the nature of the questions may have meant that it was associated 
with a score on the strategic/instrumental axis there was no direct 
connection between the concept "grasping opportunities" and logical form. 
An opportunity can be grasped for improving community relationships 
just as well as for some extrinsic and linear end. Yet this was a popular 
value for strategic/instrumentalists. Secondly, it must be emphasised 
that to be classified as consistently polarised in the use of either 
logic, a respondent had to maintain the approach across a series of 
questions. Only two out of the six questions were suitable for reference 
to be made to achievement, for example. The value of "trust" was 
not directly associated with scoring of logical form although it tended 
to be elicited by the questions on friendship and family relationships. 
It was highly valued by those who favoured a communicative logical approach. 
It is interesting to note that the consistently polarised respondents 
thought highly of sincerity and that those who stressed the comfortable 
values of kindness and caring were not strongly polarised. It was the 
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control group, too, who alluded to dissension in negative terms whilst 
there was a wide scattering in this group of reference to such "bads" 
as"boredom", "loneliness", "unpleasantness", "insecurity" and "wasting 
money". These concepts are not related to commitment as are the 
stronger values and virtues emphasised by the polarised groups. 
We thus have the beginnings of an association between values and 
virtues and a tendency towards a particular logical approach of the making 
of moral judgements. Communicative logic tends to be used in association 
with an attitude of trust where understanding of others and of situations 
is sought through discussion. Harmony, rather than order is seen as 
important in the social sphere. Activities are seen in terms of their 
intrinsic worthwhileness. Personal traits of sincerity and independence 
are valued as is fairness but the greatest value of all is placed on 
human life. Strategic/instrumental logic is associated with extrinsic 
values such as achievement and to this end independence and sincerity 
are important. Understanding and discussion are not valued in themselves. 
Social order is important and such things as violence which interfere 
with order are considered as social evils. 
We do not claim that this is any more than a beginning. We have 
already noted the limitations of the questionnaire both as a general 
method and in this particular case. There is always a problem of 
interpretation in addition to the problem of written expression. We 
thus do not intend to extract any further significance from the reference 
material we gleaned from the questionnaire responses. They were useful, 
however, in relationship to the interview approach of the intensive study 
because we believe that when one is considering moral consciousness in 
general, rather than specific moral judgements, a person's values are 
only meaningful when related to his world view or system of beliefs. 
The relationship of context in terms of relevance level has already 
been briefly referred to. The two distinct relevance levels were built 
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into the questionnaire to help us isolate consistent users of the 
polarised logical forms. It was particularly important to include the 
outer zone of wider issues, first to discriminate a tendency towards 
communicative morality from the adolescent morality of interpersonal 
relationships and secondly to give a chance for school influences to 
be observed. 
In Chapter 6 we drew attention to Kitwood's17 conclusion that much 
adolescent morality is based, almost entirely, on the experience of personal 
relationships with friends. While this type of morality proves adequate 
for solving day to day practical problems it is essentially particularistic 
and not suitable for application to wider issues. If all questions 
were focussed on familiar everyday situations it would be possible to confuse 
this restricted form with the universalistic communicative morality. 
School knowledge is particularly associated with an understanding of the 
wider world. This knowledge would be largely elicited with respect to 
the outer zone of relevance. Consistency in use of logic throughout 
the two zones will show a consistency in approach to morality in terms of 
one's understanding which is largely centred on home and friends and of 
one's understanding which has been exposed to school influences. 
The wider issues did elicit a different set of values from those of 
the inner relevance zone. Responses to Q.7 and Q.8 were often given with 
reference to the value of human life which was not a suitable basis for 
judgements in the personal sphere. Some values were maintained throughout 
the two sections so that trust and communication were seen (almost 
entirely, now, by committed "communicators") with relation to 
international problems and issues such as euthanasia. There was, 
however, no way of relating the reference matter to the experience to which 
it related, unless the respondent volunteered the information. The 
"focussing" section of U.S was meant to stimulate awareness of the source 
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of the knowledge in the respondent herself and in some cases it gave 
a clue to the origin of the concepts expressed. 
Some respondents gave full details of the context of their knowledge. 
Student 23, for example knew that the neutron bomb was in the long run a 
"good idea" even though she realised it would cause "tension and pressure 
on people suffering as a cause from it being developed". She cannot 
really remember why she believes this but knows it is the right answer: 
"I've come to this conclusion, because I have done History and already 
discussed it with my teacher. And we all came to the conclusion that it is 
something good." "But not good in the sense that it kills the people and 
leaves their property behind." Student 23 had received a 5 for C.S.E. 
History the previous year and was not studying the subject currently. 
Serious students of History (i.e. A level candidates) did not refer to the 
source of their ideas. It is possible that one A level History student who 
discussed the neutron bomb in very deterministic terms was influenced by 
the cause and effect approach of exam-orientated History. Student 9, 
quoted above for her use of strategic/instrumental logic in Q.7, 
discussed a series of issues in Q.8 in highly communicative terms. "The 
5% Pay Policy problem has got to be discussed", she declared. Her 
arguments were many and varied. ” . . . I do not believe in the Tory 
free pay bargaining system whereby people can work for as much as they want 
- what about people with set wages, e.g. teachers ? Besides it is not 
more [wages] that we want but more of the necessary requirements for 
life which we have to work for - but need." On checking back to Q.8a) 
one learnt that Government Pay Policy had been discussed with the Young 
Socialists. It was this girl (classified as consistently communicative 
in spite of her lapse in Q.7) that tutors later told me was "going 
through a rather Bolshie stage." Another communicative respondent 
referred to the Young Socialists as the source of her knowledge on the 
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same topic and I later discovered she had gone with student 9 to two 
of their meetings. Student 9 also referred to a "school discussion group". 
Only two other girls (students 33 and 36) referred specifically to this 
group but many respondents whom I later discovered belonged to this group, 
referred to their discussions "with friends" which would include this 
group. The group was the product of this particular lower sixth form 
where the most able academically were also interested in social issues. 
There is an undoubted connection between this group and the fact that 7 
out of the 9 highly achieving ('Class I') respondents from the lower sixth 
were classified as consistently communicative. The seven either belonged 
to the group or had friends who did. But a questionnaire and reasonable 
background knowledge can say no more than that. These girls approved of 
all forms of social interchange, including talking with sociologists and 
co-operating in questionnaires. There were some high achievers who did 
not attempt the questionnaire. 
Sixteen respondents (showing all ranges of logical form) referred 
specifically to school lessons as sources of knowledge of the issues of 
Q.S. English lessons were mentioned by five girls and five 
referred to Sociology lessons e.g. student 72 states, "All these topics 
have come up in my sociology lessons." A large number of respondents 
referred with various degrees of specificity, to discussions with 
families. Student 56 answers question 8a) (which asks which issues have 
been discussed) as follows: "Imigration, which my dad is always on 
about because he is very colour predjuce which I am not." 
It was easy to hear "dad's" voice in some of the responses to Q.8. 
Student 1 considers that Government pay policy is the most important problem 
for British society to face and solve, "because I think trade unions 
should be abolished and they cause about 80% of the trouble if there is 
more pay rises there is going to be more and more inflation and that will 
continuously be a visious circle." Student 1 had responded with a 
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considerable degree of communicative logic to Q's 2 - 5, now in Q.7 
and Q.8 she shows a distinct reversal of form. Her answer to Q.8a) 
shows a certain tendency towards emotion: "1) sister, ii) family 
friends, iii) family close friends school friends sisters everyone I 
always get so annoyed iv and v with friends in mass media." No mention 
of father. In fact, the father does belong to a union but seldom 
expresses his views on such matters. Because student 1 was followed up 
in the intensive study I formed an opinion about the complex relationship 
that exists between her opinions and her father.18 But there is no way 
that a knowledge of a student's school background and a written 
questionnaire could make this connection. 
Student 5 has discussed violent crime and terrorism with "hum + Dad + 
friends". Her opinion is as follows: "It is about the crime and 
terrorism was kept to a minimum by bringing back the death penalty. 
Innocent people are being mugged, raped, killed etc. for the sake of 
kicks for people." This is a most atypical approach in a sixth form 
of a girls' Comprehensive such as Greenbank. She was the only lower 
sixth I met who believed in "bringing back the death penalty". Yet 
neither of her parents were in favour of capital punishment, although in 
two-thirds of the families visited, one parent at least wanted it re-
introduced. There is no way that family influences can be assessed 
without personal knowledge of the family. Similarly it is easy to over-
simplify school influences. The preliminary analysis of logical form 
related to school achievement and subject bias (Appendix B) gave no 
indication of any clear-cut relationships. But similar relationships have 
been shown to occur - the Kohlbergian relationship of moral development to 
intelligence, for example. If such relationships do appear to exist, then 
further statistics based on questionnaires or analyses of dilemmas will 
not help to understand their nature. For this we need different tools 
and in some cases more adequate theory. We turn then to the next phase 
268 
of the Greenbank study. 
The Study in Action: Phase III  
Phase III, the intensive study, which followed up sixteen girls in 
relation to home and school is discussed in Chapter 8. In this phase 
our method changes from analysis of written judgements to direct inter-
action with our subjects and their families and observation of their own 
interactional patterns. We here attempt to relate reflexively whilst 
we constantly apply Habermasl insights on the interrelatedness of theory 
and practice in the moral sphere. At this stage we had distinguished 
between pupils tending to use communicative logic in making moral 
judgements and isolated a contrasting group of strategic/instrumental 
judgement makers. It was now our task to choose a group of respondents 
who showed strong tendencies towards communicability and study them in 
relationship to those who showed strong strategic/instrumental tendencies. 
We were also interested to include a few girls like students '1 and 2, 
quoted above, who were inconsistent in their approach. The pupils would 
need to be willing to be interviewed, for their progress and attitude 
to be discussed with their tutors, records looked at, etc., for their 
parents to be approached and for their homes to be visited if their 
parents were willing. 
By the beginning of the school's second term we had isolated twenty 
one girls who looked promising. Some had already indicated that they 
were willing to "carry on" should they be chosen. Some, who showed 
strongly polarised logic use, had explained that either because of 
pressure of work or their family situation they did not wish to continue. 
A mixture of upper and lower sixth was desired and also it was considered 
desirable to include both humanities and science students. Nine strongly 
communicative and seven strongly strategic/instrumental logic users were 
selected, together with five who had been inconsistent. The girls were 
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approached informally and given a chance to discuss the matter with 
their parents. If the girls were happy to be part of the intensive study 
and if they were willing for their parents to be approached they were 
given two letters to take home. One was from the headmistress commending 
me and the study to the parents, each one personally addressed and signed. 
"As home influences are naturally strongest," she wrote, "she would 
welcome your participation and I would wish to underline the invitation if 
you feel that you are able to co-operate." After stressing confidentiality 
and anonymity she added, "I trust that you will feel able to participate. 
I hope each girl will increase her own self-awareness and that the 
research will further understanding of students of this age range".  
Enclosed was a letter from me saying that I had selected their daughter 
for follow-up interview and would like to talk with them, too. I 
would ring to see if they were agreeable and if so to arrange a 
convenient time to visit them. Letters were only sent when girls had 
already given their own consent and said they thought "it would be O.K." 
with their parents. Sixteen girls and their parents agreed to 
participate (although one father, whilst agreeing in principle refused to 
meet me when it came to the point). The full text of the letters is 
given in Appendix C. 
Of the nine "communicatives", one had left and one did not wish to 
participate. The seven others accepted. Three of the strategic/ 
instrumental group felt unable to accept and two of the inconsistent 
group were keen to take part but their parents were not. Two "reserve" 
inconsistent respondents were selected and accepted. We thus had a 
group of sixteen made up of seven classified as "communicative", four 
as "strategic/instrumental" and five as "inconsistent". Table VI shows 
the constitution of this group in terms of logical form and school 
classification. The girls have been given code names which will be used 
from now on. Further information, on their backgrounds is given in Appendix 
D. 
THE INTENSIVE STUDY GIRLS 
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Q'aire Code Name Logical Questionnaire 1 	 or Yr. Subject- Achieve- 
number for Inten- Category Score 2 yr in Bias ment 
sive Study Q2-5 - Q6 & 7 Course 6th level 
(U 	 or 
L) 
(2 yr 
only) 
1 Amy Inconsist. 1 -2.5 1 L Science - 
(0 	 level) 
5 Betty Inconsist. 0 -2 1 L Humanities - 
(0 level) 
7 Cathy Communic. 1.5 1.5 2 L Science II 
8 Diane Communic. 1.25 0.5 2 L Humanities II 
14 Eliza Inconsist. 1.5 0 2 L Science II 
17 Frances Communic. 1 2.5 2 L Humanities I 
18 Georgina Strat/Inst. -2 -2.5 2 U Humanities I 
25 Heather Inconsist. -1.25 0.5 2 L Humanities II 
30 Joy Strat/Inst. -0.5 -2.5 2 L Humanities II 
31 Kate Strat/Inst. -0.5 -1 2 L Humanities II 
34 Lucy Communic. 1.5 2.5 2 L Science II 
36 Mary Communic. 1 2.5 2 L Science I 
37 Naomi Communic. 1.5 2.5 2 L Humanities I 
39 Olive Inconsist. 1.25 -0.5 2 U Science I 
45 Patience Strat/Inst. -1.5 -2 2 U Humanities I 
82 Queenie Communic. 0.75 1.5 2 L Humanities I 
TABLE VI  
It will be noted that every combination of school classification is 
included. Only three upper sixth girls were in the study, several 
having refused owing to pressure of work. All but two are taking two-
year courses. Questionnaire scores vary, but all those classified as 
"consistent" had a strong score in the same direction in both relevance 
zones. Thus we have a group (5 girls) who showed inconsistent use of 
logic (which, as this and non-polarised approaches were common, can be 
considered as a "control" group), and two groups showing oppositely 
polarised use of logic, typifying communicative logic use and 
strategic/instrumental logic use. 
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Communicative logic (7 girls) is characterised by its active 
reflexivity, where situations and people in them are approached in 
interrelational terms and where solutions to problems are sought in 
terms of consensus through discourse or in terms of co-operative action. 
Associated with it are values of trust, understanding, sincerity and 
harmony, whilst valued activities are discussion and the pursuit of 
interests. Lucy, for example, had referred to trust, communication 
development, peace, human life and tolerance as positive values: 
Frances had referred to independence, discussion, trust, fairness and 
harmony. 
Strategic/instrumental logic (4 girls) is characterised as goal-
orientated, where outcomes to problems are sought by technical means or 
through the application of rules. Associated with it are the values of 
achievement, independence, grasping opportunities, sincerity and social 
order. Georgina, for example had referred to achievement, grasping 
opportunities and social order: Patience had referred to honesty, 
reliability, social respectability, achievement and (technological) 
progress. 
As well as informal discussion and informal follow-up to home 
visits, each girl had a taped interview lasting approximately one hour 
and each family was visited at least once, for from two to four hours. 
During this period a tape recorded interview was obtained. Girls who 
differed significantly from their parents on social and moral issues 
had additional taped interviews. Girls' school reports were read and 
their progress and general attitude was discussed with their tutors. 
Tutors who had been with the girls, in most cases, since first form, gave 
their personal observations of the girls' parents and of her relationship 
to them. Contact with the sixteen girls was maintained throughout the 
term and follow-up reports obtained on all the girls after the summer 
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holidays. The seven in the communicative group were again followed up 
approximately one year after their initial interview. 
The purpose of Phase III  
The first purpose of the intensive study was to gain insight into 
the general contexts of the girls' beliefs and values - their world 
views and overall aims of life. Only one girl of the sixteen (Naomi) 
had given sufficient information in her questionnaire-response for her 
values to be seen in relation to a coherent world view. Now communicative 
morality cannot be characterised in empirical reality only in terms of use 
of communicative logic with reference to "communicative" values. 
Habermas has made it clear that communicative morality has a political 
dimension. It will need to be associated with a world view which will 
include a belief in human progress through co-operative human interaction. 
For communicative morality to be practiced not only in judgemental 
procedures but in co-operative political action, there will also need to 
be motivational factors operating. This motivational aspect of morality 
was stressed by Habermas in his earlier discussions but has received 
little emphasis since cognitive psychology was incorporated into his 
formulations.20 As our analytical scheme was constructed in relation to 
moral consciousness rather than to communicative morality in action, 
motivation was not stressed. It will, however, be referred to in 
connection with the girls' world views at the end of Chapter 8. 
The second purpose of the intensive study is to investigate the 
part that home and school might play in the generation of communicative 
morality. It was shown above, that although the questionnaire gave rise 
to some background information connected with the girls' beliefs, it was 
not possible to interpret the relationship of a girl's home or school 
experience to her beliefs from the information given. School influence 
cannot be described solely in terms of a girl's progress and reputation. 
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Her own perceptions of how the school has influenced her must be 
sought. Home influences are even more complex and no conclusions can 
be made without the co-operation of the girl and her parents and their 
participation in reflexive interviews. 
The overriding aim of the empirical study at Greenbank also 
pertains to Phase III; that is to design and test an approach to the 
study of morality in the concrete situation, based on the insights and 
theories of Habermas. 
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Notes,: Chapter 7  
1 
King, R., Values and Involvement in a Grammar School, London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1969, ch. 2. 
2 Erikson sees later adolescents as developing a "sense of inner identity". 
Earlier adolescents are characterised by their search for identity where 
they "define, overdefine, and redefine themselves and each other in often 
ruthless comparison, while a search. . . can be recognised in the restless 
testing of the newest in possibilities and the oldest in values." 
Erikson, E.H., Identity: Youth and Crisis, London, Faber & Faber, 1968, p.87. 
3
Rutter, M., Maugham, B., Mortimore, P. and Ouston, J., in Fifteen  
Thousand Hours, London, Open Books, 1979, suggest that "some kind of 
overall school 'ethos'" may exert influence, but they do not explain what 
this 'ethos' may be. pp.182-184. 
4
"Head Mistress's Statement" - press release to launch a fund raising 
drive which opened 10.11.78. 
5
"Head Mistress's Report: Presentation and Reception Evening, Thursday, 
16th November, 1978." 
6
Ibid. 
7
Interview with headmistress, 2.2.79. 
8
These two extreme positions were expressed by the head of the Religious 
Studies department and the head of Sixth form, respectively. Both are 
influential staff members. 
9
Interview with headmistress, 2.2.79. 
10
"Head Mistress's Report", op.cit. 
11
Habermas, J., Communication and the Evolution of Society, London, 
Heinemann, 1979, p.78. 
12
Taped discussion with Religious Studies group, 24.5.78. 
13Chapter 6 discusses how the idea of relevance was built into the analytic 
scheme. While the introduction of Schutzian insights into the scheme was 
being considered, it was noted that Musgrave had recently referred to 
Schutz in his account of adolescent moral decision making. 
An illustration of such a questionnaire is found in Rutter, R., Maugham, B., 
Mortimore, P. and Ouston, J., op.cit., Appendix D. This is also a feature 
of Royston Lambert's research into English public schools, in particular 
his lack of interpretation of what the responses might really represent; 
see Lambert, R., Milham, S. and Bullock, R., Manual to the Sociology of  
the School, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970; and Lambert, R., 
Bullock, R. and Millham, S., The Chance of a Lifetime ? London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975. 
14 
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15
This was confirmed by the head of sixth form. A detailed analysis of 
all sixth formers' courses was not justified and a full subject analysis 
was not at hand. We were not attempting to get proportionate samples 
but merely checking for tendencies amongst those who had already 
volunteered. 
16
A1l quotes are given as written. Reference to errors in pupils' work 
will be omitted from now on. 
17
Kitwood, T., "The Morality of Inter-Personal Perspectives: An Aspect of 
Values in Adolescent Life", J. Moral Educ., Vol. 7, No. 3, 1978. 
18Student 1 became Amy of the intensive study. Her relationship with her 
father is discussed towards the end of chapter 8. 
19
This approach of the headmistress is a further indication of her beliefs 
and concerns. 
20In Legitimation Crisis the index lists "motivation" as pp.48, 75-92, 95. 
"Motivation" does not appear in the index of Communication and the  
Evolution of Society. 
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Chapter 8: The Intensive Study: Investigating  
Relationships  
The Practical Approach  
Phase III, the intensive study, continues the attempt to 
characterise communicative morality amongst Greenbank 's sixth formers 
and to investigate generative influences in home and school. In the 
previous chapter, we discussed the earlier phases of the study where 
the conceptual scheme and the questionnaire were devised and applied. 
Sixteen girls and their families comprised the intensive phase. The 
girls were classified according to their predominant logical approach to 
moral judgemental procedures; 7 in the "communicative" group, 4 in the 
"strategic/instrumental" group and 5 in the "control" group. The 
characteristics of communicative and strategic/instrumental logic use 
were summarised at the end of the previous chapter. 
I. Theoretical antecedents  
Most sociological studies of the influence of home and school on 
moral development are of little relevance to this study because of 
their different conceptualisation of morality. Such studies have 
largely been in the socialisation tradition and have concentrated on 
the transmission of norms and values following on from the pioneer work 
of Parsons.1 Such work had two hidden assumptions: that there was a 
direct relationship between methods of child training and acquisition of 
norms and values and that there was a linear relationship between moral 
beliefs and moral practice.2 Many studies were further complicated by 
the insertion of a third inadequately theorised concept, class. When 
such studies proved contradictory and inconclusive, 3 attention began 
to be directed towards the schools as moral agents. We have already 
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referred to Parsons' classic paper4 that considered the school as a 
major agent in the moral formation of the young and have pointed out that 
this approach is based on a faulty concept of morality. Subsequent 
research challenged Parsons' contention that the school's normative 
influence is related to its selective mechanism and its dominant value 
of achievement, and substituted peer group pressure5 or the "hidden 
curriculum"6 as the affective agents. Others argued for a complex 
interrelationship between home and school in the transmission of morality 
to the young.7 However, all of these socialisation theories have in 
common the concept that moral development is synonymous with the acceptance 
of norms or principles of conduct and with training in how to act 
according to them. Thus, whether such studies find the school or the 
home to be a greater influence, will bear little relationship to our 
typification of the development of communication morality, where both 
moral judgement and its practical outcomes are understood as complex 
reflexive processes. 
Whilst the functionalist approach to moral transmission bears little 
relation to our formulation of morality, we cannot dismiss the possibility 
that the value component of communicative morality may be transmitted 
by home or school. In King's conceptualisation,8 education is seen as a 
process of cultural transmission with various degrees of continuity existing 
between the culture of the pupils' families and the culture transmitted 
by schools. Accordingly, the higher the degree of cultural continuity 
the higher will be the degree of involvement of the pupil in the school. 
For King, the dominant values of the school's culture had middle class 
connotations and whilst his empirical study did not show a very 
significant relationship between the pupils' values and their school 
involvement, there was some evidence that there was a connection. 
Thus, although we are attempting to observe and understand an aspect 
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of empirical reality in Habermasian terms and are not stressing class, it 
would be foolish to be so intent upon one theoretical framework that we 
failed to notice an obvious connection. However, as we do not see values 
as existing in isolation but as part of loosely connected sets of beliefs, 
we shall take note of any ideological continuities that exist between home 
and school and see if there is any apparent relationship between them and 
the girls' belief systems or logical approach to moral judgement. 
II. The Tasks  
The task of this phase is to investigate relationships: first, the 
relationship that exists between a girl's interconnected system of 
beliefs or world view and her style of judgement; second between these 
aspects of her moral consciousness and her school experience and finally 
between her moral consciousness and her experience at home. The main 
research tool is now the semi-structured interview, the success of which 
will depend on the subjects' ability to reflect about themselves and 
their relationships and the interviewer's skill in helping them to make 
this process authentic. This will partly depend on the subjects' 
insights and partly on the degree of trust that exists between subject 
and interviewer. 
In the girls' interviews there was a possibility of establishing a 
relationship of trust, the basis of which was a shared aim of exploration 
and discovery. The girls were interested in understanding themselves and 
clarifying their ideas and believed that the researcher was interested in 
the way they thought and felt. If they had not been prepared to 
co-operate in the interviews, they would not have accepted the invitation 
to continue with the study. The biggest threat to inauthenticity was 
either that the girl lacked any real insight or self perception and 
tried to give answers she thought were wanted or that in attempting to 
protect a vulnerable self from exposure, she reacted by projecting an 
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untrue, yet consistent image of herself. Lack of insight would certainly 
have been a problem with many of the original respondents, particularly 
with some of the younger girls. The sixteen girls who had been selected, 
however, were all at least seventeen years of age by the time of their 
interviews and informal discussion had indicated that they were not 
without insight. The biggest potential problem was that they would seek 
to present a preferred self-image that would result in masking not only 
the way they really saw themselves and the world, but the way they really 
related to home and school. This problem is never entirely absent from 
any interview, based as it is on a face to face relationship that 
involves the presentation of self by verbal means.9 
III. The Techniques  
With the girls' interviews, several approaches were merged to help 
the girl reflect on her own behalf and attitudes and to minimise 
inauthenticity. The first stage of the interview was conducted without 
the use of the tape recorder. Questions concerned interests and 
activities, details of parental background. Answers were written down 
briefly on the pupil's card, in her sight. She was then given the 
"Beliefs and World Views" card (see Appendix E) to complete and only 
when she had nearly finished it was the tape-recorder switched on (with her 
knowledge but without her focussed attention). Discussion of the pupil's 
own views and of how she saw them differing from her parents' beliefs, 
developed in relation to her responses to the items on the card. This 
discussion led naturally to beliefs not included on the list. The first 
insight into how the pupil saw her personal relationship with her parents 
was gained at this stage. A similar focussing device was used in 
relation to the pupil's ideals and aims for their lives, where the 
television series "The Good Life" was discussed and her version of the 
good life was sought. The second insight into family relationships 
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usually emerged here, as pupils compared their aspirations with their 
home experience. The third window into family relations and parental 
practices was obtained through discussion of the concepts of duty and 
obligation. The idea of obligation or indebtedness to parents led to 
questions about family norms and sanctions. This topic also elicited some 
attitudes and beliefs about the school and its function. Further 
insights into the girls' school experience were gained through a general 
discussion of comprehensive education and whether or not it was 
desirable. 
This approach aided reflection by encouraging an interplay between 
the concrete and the abstract for each concept or set of concepts that 
was considered. Direct questions about relations with home and school 
were avoided because these can be emotionally charged topics, and one 
risks evasion or distortion through self-pity or self-dramatisation. In 
some cases, feelings of resentment emerged indirectly that gave 
indications of family relations for later follow-up. 01 	 The pictures 
of family relationships revealed by the girls' interviews were remarkably 
similar to those observed in family interviews and described by tutors. 
There was no possibility of developing the same type of relationship 
with the parents as with the girls. The approach to the parents was 
one of interest in their daughters' background and of general interest 
in the way parents and offspring viewed social and moral issues.11 They 
were thus asked details of their daughters' upbringing, schooling, 
relationship with brothers and sisters, where she had had problems etc. 
Their own schooling and family background was elicited in this context 
if it had not been described when they discussed their occupations, 
interests and hobbies. They were asked to respond to the "Beliefs 
and World Views" check list and to Q.4 (The Bloggs) and Q.8 (Social 
Problems) of the questionnaire in the context of a comparison with their 
daughters' ideas. Finally, knowledge was sought on their attitude to the 
281 
problems of youth and in this respect their own approach to private 
and public morality was elicited. The interview schedules for the girls 
and for their parents are found in Appendix E. 
No attempt was made to assess the moral consciousness of parents. 
In the first place, adults of this generation have had to adjust to a 
changing world through trial and error and tend to have recipes for making 
judgements and decisions that are far from reflexive.12 Secondly, each 
parent has his or her own moral beliefs and paradigms for action which 
relate in a large part to his or her experiences before marriage. One 
cannot speak in terms of a "family" approach to moral judgement, or of the 
moral consciousness of a family. But families do have patterns of 
interaction and they have certain shared beliefs and basic assumptions 
which impinge upon family life. 
We shall be looking at the family from two perspectives. The first 
will be on the level of beliefs and values. We shall begin by noting the 
similarities and dissimilarities existing between the pupil's and her 
parents' beliefs about the world and then look at the degree to which the 
parents ascribe to what Habermas sees as the fundamental legitimating 
values of capitalism. The second perspective will be to observe the 
family patterns of communication and to look for aspects of family 
relationships showing a distinct level of distortion. The derivation 
of this scheme from Habermas' theory, and details of how it was put into 
practice in assessing families are described below in the section 
dealing with the relationship of home to a daughter's consciousness. 
The approach to the school will be in terms of the pupil's 
understanding of her school experience related to her school history 
and her tutor's opinion of her. This is seen in the context of the 
dominant values expressed by the school through its organisation and 
the pronouncements of its head. These are taken as indicators of the 
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school's ethos. No attempt was made to elicit the views of the whole 
staff, as many who have taught the present sixth formers are no longer at 
Greenbank. Tutor's opinion was noted only incidentally as they were 
interested in discovering what their charges had been doing in the study, 
and most volunteered their own views of the world view list. 
Values in context - belief systems and world views  
The extent to which beliefs are part of a coherent world view 
will vary with each girl. Our aim is first to see whether any 
generalised world view is shared by girls who share a similar style of 
moral judgement and then to see in what ways girls sharing the communicative 
style differ from each other in their beliefs and in how they view the 
world. 
The sections of the girls' interviews (see Appendix E for schedule) 
which aimed at eliciting world views and morally significant beliefs 
were the check list ("Beliefs and World Views") and its related discussion, 
and the section on the "good life" which included personal aims and 
ideals with related questions on duty or obligation. 
The check list (see Appendix E) was designed partially to act as a 
basis for discussion and to encourage the girls to reflect on their 
beliefs, and partly to highlight tendencies to the acceptance of an 
ideology of science and technology. If all Habermast considerations 
are to be accepted, one would expect that the present generation, if no 
longer holding to traditional "bourgeois" ideology will have replaced it 
with a technological ideology .13 Gouldner contrasts the older ideologies 
of nationalism, "laissez faire" individualism and socialism with "the 
supposedly modern ideology which seeks to ground the legitimacy of 
modern neocapitalism and bureaucratic socialism in the idea of a 
technologically guided society."1 4  This contrast is the basis of the 
check-list. 
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In the order in which they are presented in Appendix C (subjects 
saw them in alphabetical order) the statements represent the following 
ideologies or positions of belief:- nationalism; laissez-faire 
individualism; the Judeo-Christian position; egalitarianism; the 
ideology of efficiency; technocracy; faith in technological progress 
and a positivistic approach to science as truth. It will be noted that 
the first five statements represent traditional value stances and the 
next five represent modern technologically-linked positions. The 
latter five range in commitment to science/technology from the awareness 
of its dangers shown by the conservationists, to espousal of it as an 
ideal. The statements cane from a number of representative sources, 
No. 1 (nationalism) coming from a National Front pamphlet, No. 5 
(egalitarianism) from a policy speech by Hugh Gaitskell, No. 6 (con- 
servationism) from a "Friends of the Earth" leaflet, and so on. The 
girls were told that they had been collected from various sources and that 
they represented "ideas common in Britain today". They were asked to 
mark any they agreed with and, if they wished, to alter any statement 
to bring it into line with their own ideas. 
An analysis of the girls' responses in relation to their parents' 
responses is shown in Table VIII. The statements that received almost 
total support were No. 6 on conservation and No. 5 - egalitarianism. 
All but one girl believed in conservation and all but two were 
egalitarians. The seven in the communicative group were unanimous on 
these beliefs and also strongly supported statement 4 (ethical humanism). 
Only one of this group argued with any right wing political statement 
(Nos. 1 and 2) and only two agreed with any of the statements with a strong 
technological emphasis (Nos. 7 	 10). Of the nine girls remaining, 
there were four agreements with the right wing statements (from two 
girls) and ten agreements with technologically oriented statements. There 
was no obvious relationship between girls classified as strategic/ 
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instrumental with the technological ideologies, only one of them, 
Patience, showing a commitment to this ideology. Numbers are small 
however and as all in the "inconsistent" group, except Eliza, had shown 
a marked degree of strategic/instrumental logic in one section of 
their questionnaire responses there may be a connection. The low 
commitment of the seven in the communicative group to technological 
ideologies is noteworthy. 
The discussion which followed the completion of the "Beliefs and 
World Views" check list encouraged the girl to expound on and give 
reasons for her choices and to talk about any other concerns she had 
for Britain or the world. If she could not think of anything she was 
prompted by referring to the books and recreational interests previously 
discussed. Did these indicate concerns or strong beliefs of any kind ? 
She was then led to a consideration of the claims of the science fiction 
cult in terms of the reality of the experiences described in recent films 
and reports in the media. This followed the preliminary findings of 
research into the beliefs of young people which considered that a "mild 
form of science fiction" had replaced religion in young people's beliefs.15 
It was felt that should acceptance of the ideology of science and 
technology not be revealed through agreements with the relevant statements 
on the "Beliefs and World Views" list, it might be elicited in this 
more popular fashion. 
Discussion of the girl's life aims and aspirations was introduced 
with reference to the television series, "The Good Life". The idea of 
duty or obligation was discussed in this context and terminology was 
adjusted until the concept was expressed in a form which the girl found 
acceptable. The discussion was usually in terms of how a girl felt she 
"ought" to act in relation to various areas of life, or of under what 
conditions the word "ought" had meaning for her. Some extended sections 
of interviews are included in Appendix E. They include two strongly 
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contrasted openings (Eliza and Cathy) where underlying concerns are sought 
and parental opinions considered, and the section on the good life with 
the accompanying discussion of obligation from Georgina's interview. 
Table VII shows a summary of the girls' beliefs about the world and 
how they see their beliefs relating to their own lives. Of those who 
expressed particular concern for Britain or the world, only five also 
believed that there was anything that people could do about it. All five 
belonged to the communicative group. Of those who despaired of man's 
potential for change, notable were Amy, Heather and Patience. Amy is deeply 
concerned about the problems of nuclear reactors but nothing can be done to 
channel money into alternative sources of energy. Tragic results are 
inevitable: ". . . it'll take an accident to make everybody realise 
what is going on." Heather pins all her hopes on science because 
governments "make a mess of it". When the comment was made that she did 
not seem to have much faith in man's ability to make improvements, she 
answered: "Yeah. I don't think you can achieve much through just 
discussing things. I mean it depends what you're talking about. If 
it's really major, I think you'd be better off to bung the question in 
the computer and see what they say." Patience, also strongly orientated 
towards an ideology of science had indicated a desire for a classless 
society (item 5 in the check list), but has little faith in politics. 
She comments: "I'll be able to get a vote in - I'll be eighteen in 
August - but I can't see the point of voting because I don't think any 
party appeals to me. I don't think any one party can satisfy the 
problems - I think we're just in a right mess." She adds, after further 
thought, "I'll probably vote Conservative". To the immediate challenge, 
"Even though Conservatives aren't pushing [No. 5] that you said you were 
quite keen on ?" she replies, "I don't think it's possible anyway." 
Of these three, only Patience belongs to the strategic/instrumental 
group, although the other two had shown a strong tendency to instrumentality 
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in some parts of their questionnaire responses. Amy and Heather had 
also shown a strong tendency to believe in UFO's and associated 
phenomena which connected with their not very knowledgeable faith in 
Science. 	 All other girls had been agnostic or open minded on this topic, 
which thus failed to elicit tendencies not already revealed by the check 
list.] 
All but two of the seven in the communicative group expressed a 
strong concern for some problem of humanity and believed that change could 
be effected through joint human action. Queenie, for example, who is 
concerned about political apathy and ignorance, believes that the man-
in-the-street could have a say if he wanted to. "They don't want to. 
They think, 'We'll leave it to someone else'." Naomi finds so much in the 
world that needs changing and so many ways in which to express concern 
that it is difficult to decide on priorities. Discussing her outside-
school activities she answers: "Outside school ? Well, there's this 
voluntary organization bit with the old biddies and there's the Friends 
of the Earth which I go to, and then there's the odd sort of things 
that I go to, lectures and things like that. . . I'd like to do a bit 
with Amnesty International as well. But there's so many other things 
that have to be sorted out first, well not first, but there's so much to 
be done, but you can't go out and change the world in a day." Frances, 
academically outstanding,16 a pacifist and ardent socialist, makes the 
following statement to summarise the opinions she has been forcefully 
expressing: "What I think is that it's people who are important 
rather than machines, rather than buildings, rather than anything. 
People are important and people have got to live, be able to live, with 
their world, rather than destroying it and I mean to live with that world. 
They've got to respect nature and they've got to respect other people 
around them and they've got to sort of love other people, care for other 
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BELIEFS ABOUT THE WORLD IN RELATION TO SELF 
Girl 	 Expressed political or Joint "Good 	 "Good 	 Obligation Obligation 
world concern (with 	 human Life" 	 Life has 	 extends 	 extends to 
agreed "check-list" 	 action seen in 	 wider 	 beyond 	 wider world 
items) 	 can 	 terms of (political) family & 
effect inter- 	 dimension 	 friends 
change relation- 
ships 
Amy 	 6, 9 
Nuclear power threat 
	 Strong 
Union power threat 	 Dis- 
belief 
Betty 	 5, 7 	 %,/ to vote 
Cathy* 	 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 
Need to share re-
sources with 3rd 
World 
3 I 3 3  
to translat 
into action 
ing concern 
3rd World 
e beliefs 
( in clu d-
for 
Diane* 5, 6 
Eliza 4, 5, 6, 	 7 
Frances* 4, 5, 6 
Social injustice & 
inequality, 
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world to fight for justice 
and equality and 
world peace 
Georg- 
ina + 
1, 2, 3, 6 God and 
her Church 
Heather 5, 6, 8,  9,  10 Strong 
Disbelief - 
Joy + 1, 2, 4,  5,  6,  7,  9 
Government should 
represent all 
people. 
Immigration should 
be limited. 
Kate + 	 1, 4, 5, 6, 9 
Lucy * 	 5, 6 
Racial integration 
  
N./ school, 
consider-
ation of 
others 
Mary * 	 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 
	
I Integrity 
in rela-
tionships 
live 	 4, 5,  6 
atience 5, 6,  8, 9, 
4- 
ueenie* 4, 5, 6 
Not to 
upset 
people 
Strong 	 - 
Disbelief 
3 3 3 3 	 3 
to be politically aware 
and shownconcern for the 
environment. 
10 
Education for pol-
itical under-
standing and social 
action. World 
conservation. 
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irl 	 Expressed political or Joint 
world concern (with 	 human 
agreed "check-list" 	 action 
items) 	 can 
effect 
change 
"G ood 
	
't ood 
Life 	 Life has 
seen in wider 
terms of (political) 
inter- dimension 
relation- 
ships 
Obligation 
extends 
beyond 
family & 
friends 
Obligation 
extends to 
wider 
world 
aomi* Harmonious relation-
ships amongst people 
and between people & 
the earth. 4, 5, 6 to be as authentic and 
helpful as is humanly 
possible. 
Communicative group. 
Strategic/Instrumental group. 
- Nationalism. 
- Laissez-faire. 
- Judeo-Christian. 
- Ethical humanism. 
- Egalitarianism. 
- Conservationist. 
- Efficiency. 
- Technocracy. 
- Technical progress. 
) - Positivism. 
TABLE VII  
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people and also they've got to realise themselves that they are 
individuals and that they are important as being an individual and that 
people are important." 	 Of the communicative group only Diane and 
Mary failed to express political or world concern, Both Diane, a 
student of Art and Mary, a science student are dedicated to their areas 
of study and are conscious of their lack of knowledge and understanding 
in the sphere of politics and world affairs. Both are concerned for the 
people they know and find human relationships to be personally important. 
Both can extend their logic of moral judgement from the familiar sphere 
of personal relationships into the sphere of wider social problems, but 
neither has any real political insights Or awareness. 
The discussion of the "good life" highlighted one aspect shared 
by all girls in the communicative group and by none of the others. This 
was in their conceptualisation of the "good life" in terms of 
interrelationships. Apart from their unanimous support of conservation 
and egalitarianism this was the only belief the whole group had in 
common and can thus be considered to be a characteristic belief that 
accompanies the use of communicative logic in moral judgement procedures. 
With the apolitical. Diane and Mary, and with Lucy, whose concern for 
racial integration did not extend far beyond her personal experience, 
this aspect of the good life was largely expressed through the intentions 
and aspirations they held for their future families. They wanted their 
children to experience the sorts of relationships they had experienced 
in their families - openness, being able to talk things through, mutual 
respect. Good human relationships, characterised by mutual understanding 
and genuineness were also desired with friends and work mates. For 
Diane and Mary, in particular, career satisfaction was a very important 
part of the good life but it was not the whole of life in any sense. 
Cathy, Frances, Naomi and Weenie, who had earlier expressed 
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concern about the wider world, saw the "good life", not only as involving 
interrelationships but as involving their own participation in helping to 
make the world a better place. Naomi found the phrase "the good life" was 
seductively idealistic, but thinking about it made her more aware of life's 
contradictions. She answers: "That's quite a difficult question, really, 
because there is the ideal which would merely be. . . to live in harmony with 
nature and everything, altogether as a whole, and sort of just produce what 
you need and live happily in the countryside somewhere and it sounds very 
idealistic and 'how wonderful', and then if you think about it now, living in 
the middle of London, then that's quite unrealistic in a way because when 
you walk through [depressed nearby region] you see all those people who are 
bitter, grey-faced and things like that and you cannot say, 'Well, wouldn't 
it be nice if you had a nice house', when you're taught all the time to get 
your qualifications, strive for this and strive for that and when you get so 
much money you'll be happy 	 It's a hard question, cause there are so many 
things interrelated, you can't just say, 'This would be a nice life'." 
Naomi prefers to think in terms of present realities where she tries to 
practice the things she believes in ("co-operating", "communicating together") 
and attempts to make a practical contribution. "I mean its important to 
discuss issues but you must also develop from there and be able to do something 
as well," she said, when discussing a Friends of the Earth petition for which 
she'd collected signatures. 
For Cathy discussion of "the good life" led to a consideration of her 
plans for her life. She was unclear about the details but was not fussed about 
it. "I'm at that stage where I'm trying to decide but I'm not trying to think, 
'Oh how on earth do I look on life ?' I'm just letting it come naturally," she 
explained. Her aim in life is to put into practice her beliefs about the need 
to share technological resources with people in the Third World - "I want to 
work in poor areas, if I can, if I'm brave enough." She sees herself as 
helping people but it will be "a sort of two-way relationship." She does not 
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pretend that she is not "selfish to a certain extent." Through "a lot of 
deep thinking. . . trying to interpretate [sic]" her actions and through 
help from "other people around" her, she is trying to sort out her priorities 
and plans. Queenie, who believes that ". . . everyone has to want a better 
place to live and have to make the effort to do it", is going to try to 
contribute to improving the environment by taking up the study of Environmental 
Science. She also will not be content unless she is trying "to see that 
people do get on with each other." Frances will not be satisfied with any 
form of life that does not involve furthering the cause of justice and peace, 
although she realises that "you can't save the world in a lifetime." Although 
a "first" at Oxford would be "nice", things like that are "not ultimately 
important". Instead, she sees "achievement" in terms of "living a worthwhile 
life, feeling that perhaps I've helped somebody at some point in my life, 
you know. . ." 
These four girls are not claiming to be altruistic, in a self- 
sacrificial way. It is rather that their understanding of life has a dimension 
which Stiarn S to be lacking in the non-communicative groups and which in the 
three others of the communicative group has not (yet ?) extended to the wider 
social world. 
Most of the other girls described their idea of the "good life" in 
terms of career interests, marriage plans or, perhaps, travel. Georgina, 
whose discussion of the "good life" is quoted fully in Appendix E, wants a 
career in nursing, marriage, a home in Norfolk and a loving husband and family 
who share her religious beliefs. There is kindness and consideration in her 
form of the good life but no real interaction, no mutuality. Her children's 
progress is seen in terms of achievement. Patience, another member of the 
strategic/instrumental group, had a similar approach. To the question, "Now, 
outline the sort of 'good life' that you see for yourself - in what terms do 
you see yourself as being happy ?" Patience replied, "I want to be successful 
in a career first of all. I want to get married and have children - rear 
292 
children." To the ensuing question: "Now tell me something about the sort 
of attitudes you'd like to see in your family ?" Patience responded: "I 
think respect for the parents is very important. Well I'd want them well 
behaved and I want to be boss of the house." She has plans for the children: 
"If they've got the brains to go to University I'd like them to go." Asked 
what if they had brains but decided to "throw it in" she replied that she 
would "be very upset". Both girls were strongly oriented towards achievement. 
Both the girls classified as "strategic/instrumental" and those classified 
as "inconsistent" saw themselves as pursuing lives which lacked any inter-
relational dimension. Some are clearly lacking confidence in their ability to 
relate to people. Thus Eliza who has said she does not want to get married, 
explains why. "Well I'd like to get married but I get fed up with people very 
quickly - specially boys - and it would be amazing if I found somebody I 
could settle down with. I don't think I could - I get bored with people. 
So, I'd like to say I'd be married but I'd probably live in sin. I wouldn't 
get married unless I was really sure." All these girls saw the "good life" 
as the fulfilment of their own private ambitions, other people only entered 
their world in a direct relationship to themselves as spouses or offspring. 
Their ambitions did not seem to be related to what they saw as being wrong 
with their country or the world. 
The discussion of duty and obligation found one belief (or non-belief) 
that was shared by all sixteen girls. Not one believed she had a duty to her 
country. Some, like Naomi, saw the word "duty" as having connotations of 
external compulsion - "like in war, 'It's our duty to defend Britain and the 
Fatherland' or whatever, which is really rubbish." She was happy to consider 
the concept in terms of ought and summarised her belief as: "I think I 'ought' 
to help as many people as I could - in whatever way I can." Others, like 
Joy had never thought about the subject: "I usually take [life] as it comes. 
I don't feel as though I 'ought' to do anything." 
For many girls, their only sense of obligation was to their parents. 
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Eliza sees this in reciprocal terms: "I think if they've got the decency 
to let me stay on at school - because I want to go to College afterwards 
if I possibly can and I think they'll let me. And if they do that for me 
. . then I should pay them back - in passing or whatever." Patience sees 
parental obligation as the product of respect: "I think a lot of its to do 
with respect - for parents. Because they've had a lot of experience in the 
world they know better than I do sort of thing. So if I want to do something 
and they say, 'Don't' I feel obliged to not do it." Some, like Amy and Betty 
extended duty to friends - Amy because they relied on her, and Betty because: 
"If they've been good to you I think you ought to repay them." 
Several girls saw duty extending beyond their families to certain specific 
fields. Betty believes she has a duty to vote, otherwise one has no right to 
complain if "something goes wrong with the government". Georgina sees an 
obligation towards God and her church but does not see God as being very 
concerned with the wider world. Olive believes one has "a duty to the people 
you work with and the people you live with, so that things run smoothly and 
you don't upset them too much." 
Of the communicative group, all but Diane saw obligation as not only 
extending beyond family and friends but as extending into various positive 
dimensions of interpersonal relationships. To Diane the concept of obligation 
is alien in every form. She accepts the idea of "responsibility" and feels a 
responsibility to herself and her family. She believes that people are 
important and "you've got to understand people", but she cannot accept 
"ought". The others accepted the concept in one of its forms. Lucy thinks 
that consideration of others is most important and to this end one should 
learn self control. One has an obligation at school, for example, to consider 
other students and teachers, even if you "don't like them". Mary believes she 
has a duty to act with integrity in all her relationships and "not put on 
a false front". 
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The four from the communicative group who had seen the good life as 
necessarily involving their own action in helping to further what they believed 
to be right, followed through this approach when discussing duty and obligation. 
Naomi's summary was quoted above but earlier she expressed how she works 
out what her "ought" is in practice: "We've got to start at the beginning 
really. 'Am I happy with the situation ?' 'No.' Therefore something is 
going wrong. Well, how can I change it ?" Queenie, like Naomi, tries to work 
out her aims in daily life. Apart from her sense of obligation to be 
politically aware and environmentally concerned, she feels a responsibility to 
encourage co-operation at school which "is like another little society, you're 
all part of it and you should try to keep it as one place. . ." Frances 
believes that essentially one's duty is "towards people and you've got a duty 
towards the world." She does not believe that she has "a duty towards the 
school as an entity" but she has "a duty towards those people in the school." 
But "it's a give and take thing in the whole society, you've got to give 
and you've got to take. . ." To Cathy, duty means following what she believes 
in, not acting because "you feel it's your duty to do something." She refers 
to her intention to work in the Third World. "Well obviously I've got strong 
ideas about not being centred in places there's already a lot of - help. I 
feel it ought to be spread out, so I feel it's my duty to work elsewhere." 
Whilst all seven in the communicative group saw the "good life" in 
interrelational terms and all but Diane considered that their duty extended 
to people beyond their family and friends, only Cathy, Frances, Naomi and 
Queenie considered that life could be satisfying only if it involved them 
in purposeful social action. Moreover, not only did these four conceive of a 
desirable life in these terms but they felt obliged to put their beliefs about 
themselves in relation to their world views, into practice. The seven girls 
had been selected for their tendency towards the use of communicative logic 
in moral judgement procedures. We would now say, that of these seven, four 
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show a world-view which is commensurate with that which characterises 
Habermas' proposed universal ethics of speech. This way of looking at the 
world is an interactive one. It involves not only the way the girls see 
the world but how they see themselves and their actions in relation to the 
world and its needs. Their specific world views differ in emphasis but 
all believe that they have a responsibility to other people which involves 
not only enjoying, but fostering, human relationships. They also believe 
that what they do in life can help bring about change and that they should 
co-operate with others to help correct what they see as wrong. Their sense 
of responsibility extends to the realm of nature. They consider they haute 
an obligation to help preserve the earth's resources and protect its life 
forms. 
There were no particular aspects of belief which distinguished the girls 
classified as strategic/instrumental in logic from the control group but they 
did share a characteristic cluster of beliefs and attitudes. They all doubted 
man's ability to bring about change in the world. They did not see themselves 
as having any necessary relationship with the world or with other people - 
the concept of co-operation or mutuality being foreign to their thinking. They 
all emphasised achievement not only with respect to their careers but as a 
desirable aspect of life. These beliefs were also held, in various degrees 
by members of the control group, with the exception of Eliza (who lacked any 
tendency towards strategic/instrumental logic use). It thus looks as if 
these attitudes and beliefs could be associated with the use of strategic/ 
instrumental logic. It is considered probable that a wider survey would find 
a connection between strategic/instrumental logic and the ideology of science 
and technology, but this has not yet been demonstrated. 
The Relationship of the School to Moral Judgement  
Although we have described the moral consciousness of four of the seven in 
the communicative group as possessing an aspect largely undeveloped in the 
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other three, we shall still look at the whole group as representative of 
communicative morality. The logical use of this group is quite distinctive 
and members share an approach to other people and an evaluation of life in 
interrelational terms which emphasises the similarity of their morally relevant 
beliefs. As a group they share a moral approach which is quite characteristic 
and which is markedly different from girls in the other groups. 
We decided earlier that there were no indications that choice of subjects 
or degrees of school achievement was an influential factor in the development 
of communicative morality (see Appendix B). We shall turn then, to the 
general ethos of the school. 
The headmistress was described in the previous chapter as committed to 
comprehensive education and as believing that it was a school's duty to 
develop the pupils' talents. Full participation in school life, and making 
use of opportunities (which, in practice at Greenbank refers especially to 
music, dance and sport) are encouraged but there is little emphasis on 
achievement of external goals. The head also believed relationships between 
staff and staff, and staff and girls to be vital and observation bore out her 
claims that these relationships were excellent. Staff were available to 
see girls at any time and class discussions were friendly affairs, which 
tended to lack rivalry and encoJrage tolerance. Of all the sixth form 
tutors who viewed the "Beliefs and World Views" check list, those who 
volunteered their own responses were in agreement with items 4, 5 and 6, 
those most supported by the pupils ("Greenbank Preferred" items of Appendix E). 
Was it possible that the school was generating the communicative style of 
moral judgement in some way that was not directly related to subject 
orientation or school success ? We saw from the general study that the values 
associated with use of communicative logic were trust, understanding others, 
sincerity, discussion, harmony, the pursuit of interests and human life. The 
intensive study showed how viewing life in terms of the importance of inter- 
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relationships was overwhelmingly linked with communicability. Greenbank's 
emphasis on development of talent rather than on achievement, and its practice 
of openness in relationship, and the value placed (in everyday administration) 
on discussion and harmony meant that there was a high degree of similarity 
between Greenbank's official ideals and those associated with communicative 
logic use. Was there a tendency towards the generation of an officially 
approved ideal type ? If so it must be transmitted through the teaching staff, 
as the girls saw little of the headmistress and had almost no contact with 
girls of other years - there was no house system or prefect system and 
assemblies were essentially year-based. If there was a connection between an 
approved ideal type and communicative logic formation what was its nature ? 
An obvious possibility was that staff approval was assisting the formation 
of communicative logic. There is a certain amount of evidence to this effect. 
The hear heads' reports indicated that they did not hold the girls tending 
towards strategic/instrumental logic use in high esteem. Of the four 
intensive study subjects Georgina was "isolated, anxious to please" and 
"insensitive", Joy was "weak", "well intentioned" but "elusive", Kate "could 
be idle" and Patience was "vague", "woolly" and "disorganized". On the whole, 
the communicative group was highly approved, all but Queenie and Lucy having 
outstanding commendations at the start of the intensive study. On the other 
hand, the assessments twelve months after the study had begun, showed that 
whilst Lucy was now being appreciated, Frances and Naomi were giving some 
cause for concern. Frances was getting too politically committed and tended 
to be "a bit rigid" and Naomi's career choice of work with sub-normal 
children in preference to a University future was considered a disappointment. 
In the wider study, many pleasant, intelligent girls in the upper sixth who 
were highly approved had not demonstrated communicative logic use. 
On the whole, it was apparent that Georgina, Joy, Kate and Patience did 
not exhibit the official ideals. Georgina and Patience were competitive and 
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anxious to achieve. Joy was mother-dominated and lacked "openness" and 
Kate did not participate in school affairs. Only Joy had been involved 
in extra-curricular activities to any extent and that had now ceased. 
Of the seven girls in the communicative group, all were involved in 
extra-curricular activities to a high degree. In addition to the 
discussion group to which three belonged, five of them were very active 
in the dance group or the school choir, in spite of the pressures of 
sixth form.17 
Form tutors, however, who were more intimately connected with their 
pupils were positive about them and did not make the same distinctions 
as the year heads. Georgina's tutor had known her since she was eleven, 
thought highly of her and admired her ambition, although she always was 
"a loner" who "does not mix". Only Patience did not receive a positive 
and understanding comment from her tutor which was largely because "she 
tends to be right on the periphery" and was "not very punctual" so her 
tutor had not got to know her, being herself, new to the form. It is 
quite possible that the year heads were assessing the girls, to some 
extent, on whether they conformed to Greenbank's "official ideal type", 
not knowing them well as individuals. In some cases they may have been 
influenced by appearances. Queenie, for example, who felt (quite 
correctly) that the year head did hot like her, was assessed as being 
"meek and mild" and as someone who "never shows enthusiasm". But 
throughout the study and whenever she was seen later and in follow-up 
correspondence she showed both commitment and an enthusiasm. 
The connection between the headmistress' ideals of participation, 
development of talents and good relationships, and the pupils' style of 
moral judgement is not, apparently, a direct one. Whilst communicative 
logic is closer to the ideal than is strategic/instrumental log, not all 
girls showing a communicative approach are approved. The school is part 
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of the educational system and as such, subscribes to external goals, of 
necessity, so there will always be some emphasis on achievement and some 
approval of a strategic/instrumental approach. Over-emphasis on a 
communicative approach will tend to be considered unrealistic or 
unbalanced. 
However, this is not to say that the school's general ethos has no 
effect on the girls' values or approach to others. The key to the 
problem is found in the way the girls view the effect the school has 
had on them. The three aspects of the school that had been felt to be 
possibly influential were, i) the overall ethos and egalitarian nature 
of the school, ii) the effect of interaction with staff (including 
their specific knowledge) in a discursive atmosphere and iii) inter-
relationships with other sixth formers through informal discussion and 
the semi-structured discussion groups. 
None of these aspects were believed by all the girls to have 
influenced their approach to life or changed them in any way. There 
was a marked difference in how girls perceived their relationship to the 
school. Their perception related directly to their moral judgement style. 
Those in the communicative group felt they had gained from the school in 
various ways. Of the others, all but Amy felt the school had done little 
for them. Amy felt the school had given her confidence and found it 
wonderful that she could talk to the teachers "about anything" when she 
found it so hard to communicate with her parents. Betty, Eliza and Joy 
felt the school had had little effect but they appreciated the friends 
they had made there. Kate was appreciative because: "Its given me the 
opportunities that I want - for Art. What I want to do anyway." Olive 
felt that by attending a "big" school she had seen "such a variety of 
different people from different backgrounds which has widened by 
experience." Georgina felt she had learnt tolerance and that her A level 
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Religious studies had strengthened her own belief, through opposition. 
Heather felt it had had little effect upon her whilst Patience thought 
she was more influenced by her parents than by the school. When asked 
if she thought she had a duty to her school she replied, "No. They've got 
a duty to me." Speaking of her last school she said: "I disagreed 
with my last head of House. He thought school was where you could 
develop personality and develop your interest and that in society. But 
I felt school is just to get qualifications. I saw it purely as a place 
to study. I ignored the other side of school life." She felt Greenbank 
was letting her down because ". . . it doesn't seem to be pushing 
enough academically." Her lack of co-operation in her tutor group was 
caused by her beliefs about and attitude to, Greenbank. She considered 
any discussions to be a waste of school time. 
Of the seven in the communicative group all felt they had benefited 
greatly from the school. All but Nary felt this had something to do with 
the particular nature of Greenbank as a large egalitarian comprehensive 
school. Nary felt she would have benefited equally well from any good 
school. Cathy felt that the school had been an "opener" to her. "I'm 
glad they sent me to this school," she said. "I think it's been a big 
opener for me - you know - to see how different people react to things 
and I'm glad I've been to a comprehensive school rather than a grammar 
school because many of my friends who've been to a grammar school, they're 
so self centred - they don't really pay any attention to What's going on 
outside." Diane has valued the relationship with teachers as well as 
the opportunities for self expression. Frances has found that the school 
has given her the ability to be herself and to "realise the importance 
of being yourself and the importance of other people, whether they're 
brilliant and they're going to get firsts at Oxford or whether they're 
going to work in the local biscuit factory or something, but they're 
important and they're worthwhile human beings for being what they are. . ." 
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At a grammar school she would have been sheltered and got in an academic 
rut. But at Greenbank, ". . . immigration is people I've got to know 
and prejudice is something that happens on the doorstep." Lucy, too, has 
learnt a lot from having Pakistani girls in her tutor group. She does 
not blame her father for being racist because when he was little "they 
didn't know what a black person was" but she is grateful that she has 
had the opportunity of getting to know some immigrants as people. Naomi 
has valued all the relationships, especially with teachers, where in 
some classes they show themselves to be "human beings" and teacher and 
pupils can "sit down and have a good chat." Queenie commented especially 
on two aspects of school life that she felt had had a strong effect on how 
she saw the world. The first were her Modern History lessons that had 
made her aware about how easily wars can start, and the second were her 
discussions with Naomi. Naomi had given her a new insight into how she 
could do something about the environment and taught her "to sort of think 
about the world in general and about what other people are doing to it." 
Naomi's superficial influence on the sixth form was enormous - the 
common room was full of posters she had put up and piles of "Save the 
Whale" and "Friends of the Earth" pamphlets lay around. Yet Queenie, who 
was not a special friend, seemed to have absorbed much of Naomi's vision. 
It was also apparent that Frances and Naomi, quite opposite in personality 
types and in the way they approached life (Frances essentially cerebral, 
Naomi intuitive), had widened each other's horizons through their 
membership of the discussion group. Yet when it was suggested to Eliza 
that perhaps her friendship with Frances may have been partly instrumental 
in shaping her opinions, which were different from her parents, she was 
quite convinced that this was not so. She could only change her views 
through direct experience, never through discussion. And she gave a 
credible account of what had helped her develop some more tolerant 
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opinions. The only girls who believed that they could gain understanding 
through discussion, amongst the sixteen, were the girls of the 
communicative group (with the exception of Diane) together with Amy 
who had been helped greatly by discussions with teachers in the Media 
Centre. 
The communicative group appeared to have been affected by the school 
in all three ways. All seven girls were developing their talents - of 
the two not involved in Music or Dance activities, Queenie was in the 
discussion group and Diane was deeply involved in the Art Department - 
and were appreciative of the school's egalitarian ethos; all were 
conscious of the quality of staff relationships and all (but Diane) felt 
that informal discussion with their peers had helped develop their views 
on life. 
A clear illustration of the ability of the communicative type to 
extend her understanding from school lessons in a way that does not seem 
possible to the strategic/instrumental type is shown in Lucy and 
Georgina's second interviews. Both girls were studying A level English. 
Lucy, one of the communicative group had just recalled how her 0 level 
History had given her "both sides of the story" which had countered her 
father's approach of "goody-Britons and baddy-Germans":- 
- 	 And your English ? Do you notice that it gives you insights into 
people or - 
L: Yeah. It shows how complex the human feelings are and things like 
how deep characters are. Before you did English you used to read 
a book and never look deeply into the characters. But when you go 
through it now you think, 'Oh I'd never have thought of that ! You 
know it teaches you a lot. 
So if you're thinking about a person you think you'd be less likely 
to put them into "good" categories or "bad" categories ? 
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L. Yeah. I think so. I don't think you should judge people on first 
appearances sort of thing. 
- So in your case you think you have got something out of your 
school humanities studies ? 
L. Yeah. Yeah. I think so. Yeah. 
Georgina has been talking about her English. She feels she is gaining 
in self expression and has gained some confidence. Lucy had made the 
above statement the day before. We try the same approach:- 
- And has it changed the way you look at outside situations or 
outside people at all ? Your study of English ? 
G. Urn - [looks puzzled] 
- Well. You have to analyse characters - 
G. I have to analyse characters but I don't think that's - they aren 2 t 
really related to reality. They are not alive. Not in people I 
see particularly. I don't go round saying, 'Ah, there's an Antony 
- just like Antony', [in Anthony and Cleopatra]. The characters 
are real within the books themselves - some of them jump out at you - 
as characters. But not as characters that you actually know as 
individuals. 
- So you find that your study of English helps you in your understanding 
of other books you read but it doesn't have a great deal of direct 
relationship to the ordinary people you meet ? 
G. Not really. Apart from the fact that it just gives me that edge 
to be able to discuss perhaps clearer. 
- You can express yourself better ? 
G. Yes. It's definitely helped my expression. 
The school, then, appears to be acting as an agent of reinforcement on 
those already disposed to respond to its influence. Those whom we 
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assessed as communicative had felt themselves to have been influenced by 
the school, its organization, its teachers and the discussions of pupils. 
But other pupils, especially those we had found to exhibit strategic/ 
instrumental logic, do not find themselves affected in the same way by 
what appear to be similar experiences. 
The school's general philosophy of comprehensiveness, carried 
through in its daily running to a considerable, if variable extent 
had features in common with communicative morality. But it cannot be 
said to be generating this form of morality even though it may be seen 
as fostering its development amongst certain of its pupils. 
The Relationship of Home to Moral Judgement  
Since the school does not appear to have a directly generative function 
in the formation of communicative morality it is important that the 
home is observed with this end in view. Two aspects of family life were 
considered to be important. The first was the dominant ideology 
embedded in family practices as well as openly expressed by the parents, 
and the second was the level of distortion of communication. These 
aspects were both basic to our Habermasian conceptual framework and so it 
appeared logical to apply them to the study as it relates to family life. 
We saw in Chapter 4 that Habermas considers that the major ideologies 
which serve to legitimate capitalism are the orientation towards 
achievement and possessive individualism.18 The ideology of achievement 
has been long associated with the educational system. As Habermas has 
expressed morality in terms of communication theoretically it appeared 
important to attempt to translate this aspect of his theory into 
practice to see whether the level of communicative competence within a 
family affected the form of the daughter's morality. 
The necessity of looking for more fundamental factors than the 
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transmission of beliefs or ideologies is emphasised by the results shown 
in Table VIII. This table shows the responses of parents and daughters to 
the "Beliefs and World Views" check list. No evidence is apparent that 
any relationship exists between a continuity of belief between parent 
and daughter and her logical style of moral judgement. All girls show a 
considerable degree of disagreement with their parents. Only Frances is 
in perfect agreement, a fact she predicted in her interviews. [Frances' 
parents had chosen Greenbank because its overall educational ideals matched 
their own.] Of the other girls, those belonging to the communicative 
group have a lower degree of disagreement than those belonging to the 
other groups. But Lucy shows a considerable variation, having rejected 
both parental right wing and scientistic views. It can be noted that 
Joy and Georgina, both tending towards strategic/instrumental logic use, 
have accepted their parents' right wing views, but so has the communicative 
Mary. Most other girls have rejected their parents' right wing beliefs. 
We commented above, that a wider study might show a relationship to exist 
between a young person's accept4nce of an ideology of science and 
technology. But there is no obvious transmission of technological 
ideology by the family. Some girls, such as Cathy, Heather, Joy and Kate 
show a certain degree of continuity. Others, such as Georgina and Lucy 
have rejected their parents espousal of science, whilst Patience has 
developed a trust in science that is absent in her family. 
It does not appear that parental beliefs are being transmitted to any 
obvious extent. This does not mean that very fundamental ideologies and 
values are not being transmitted, or are not in some way having direct 
bearing on the daughters' moral development, but actual beliefs about the 
world do not appear to have continuity. 
We shall turn, then, to the scheme we shall use to evaluate the 
families in terms of ideology and interaction. The ideologies expressed 
MF 
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by Habermas as both "achievement orientation" and "possessive 
individualism" will be subsumed under the heading "possessive individualism". 
For its conceptualisation we shall turn to the two authors to whom 
Habermas refers in its regard, C.B. Macpherson and Claus Offe. To analyse 
the level of distortion of communication we shall utilise Habermas' 
interpretation of the traditional principles of truth, freedom and 
justice in terms of communicative competence. 
Assessing possessive individualism in the family  
C.B. Macpherson has described how possessive individualism became 
the dominant ideology of capitalism.19 It is based on the Hobbesian 
idea that a man's humanity is characterised by his freedom from dependence 
on the will of others. Within this framework individuals are regarded 
as proprietors of themselves. They relate to each other in a series of 
market relationships. Political society is thus a contrivance for the 
protection of the individual's property, including his own person, and 
for the maintenance of orderly exchange relations. Lukes20 has shown 
how individualism has appeared in different forms and in various ways 
throughout Europe's history. It can be considered to be a more highly 
evolved moral state than forms of collectivism as it implies a sense 
of responsibility for one's own actions and stresses autonomy of 
conscience. It is individualism in this sense to which Habermas refers when 
he equates social regress with "the end of the individual".21 In the 
context of possessivism these morally liberating aspects of individualism 
are suppressed. Possessive individualism is the fundamental ideology of 
what Offe discusses as the "achieving society". 22 Elsewhere he describes 
the elements of possessive individualism in terms of two related norms 
with which the individual actors must comply, if they can be said to hold 
this ideology: 
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First, they must be willing to utilize the opportunities 
open to them, and they must constantly strive to improve their 
exchange position (possessiveness), and second, they must be 
willing to accept whatever material outcome emerges from their 
particular exchange relationship - particularly if this outcome 
is unfavorable to them. Such outcomes must, in other words, 
be attributed to either natural events or to the virtues and 
failures of the individual (individualism).23 
Basing our understanding on Offa's definition, it can be seen that 
we can observe the ideology of possessive individualism within families 
in four different dimensions: 
1. The parents' attitude to the utilisation of opportunities and 
achievement; 
2. Their attitude to acquisition; 
3. Their attitude to ability and progress of individuals. 
4. Their ideal for the relationship of the individual to society - 
competition or co-operation. 
We shall now indicate the assessment scheme that was devised to 
give an estimate of the degree of possessive individualism embodied in 
parental beliefs and practices. 
1. Attitude to the utilisation of opportunities and achievement  
This aspect can be assessed as follows:- 
a) The Parents' attitude to their own careers. This was, in the 
study, the parents' attitude to the father's career. Ambitious parents, 
with the desire (and opportunity) to improve their social position, or 
a wife who is active in encouraging her husband to improve his earning/ 
status level, demonstrate this aspect of possessivism. It will be lacking 
where there is no opportunity for advancement or where the parent finds a 
job both rewarding and fulfilling. Assessment was largely via parental 
interview when the parents' occupations were discussed. The daughter 
sometimes shed light on her father's approach to his own job or career. 
(Item 1 on possessive individualism scale). 
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b) Parents' attitudes to their children's educational career. 
This was evaluated in terms of whether the children are directed towards 
academic or sporting success. The attitude of parents to their sons is 
significant here as some parents lack ambition for their daughters. 
This aspect was assessed at the parental interview through discussion of 
the various children's activities. The daughter's assessment of the sort 
of pressure she received towards her goals was taken into consideration 
(Item 2). 
c) Parental evaluation of achievement versus equality. This was 
assessed by discussion of the Bloggs dilemma (Q.4 on the pupils' 
questionnaire). A decision to grasp the opportunity for further 
achievement rather than to consider the needs of the children equally 
was seen as demonstrating this aspect of possessive individualism (Item 3). 
2. Attitude to acquisition  
An acquisitive attitude in a family would be shown by the family 
possessions being related to its improved exchange position (status 
linked) rather than to family needs or family interests. 
This was assessed by the visit to the family home, where in most 
cases one's attention was actively directed to significant family 
possessions. A family who showed one the new organ (that no-one could 
play) was contrasted by families where treasured possessions were the 
creations of family members. The actual confort-level or expensiveness 
of items in use did not count in the assessment (Item 4). 
3. Attitude to ability and progress of individuals  
a) How Parents saw "ability" within the educational process. The 
ideology of individualism was apparent when parents saw ability as a 
fixed property of an individual which would determine his or her academic 
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or educational outcomes. This aspect was assessed via the discussion of 
comprehensive versus selective education and in particular of the 
desirability of streaming. This aspect was not necessarily linked with 
achievement, although it could be. Some parents were pro-streaming because 
the child was kept with others of his or her own ability and when the child 
was "weak" or a "plodder" it would be disadvantaged by contact with 
"bright" children. It was better to get the right sort of education for 
one's own level. (Item 5). 
b) Attitude to the school over daughter's  ".progress". 	 This aspect 
is seen in terms of individualism per se rather than in terms of achievement. 
It is shown by parents whose approach to the school is one of ensuring 
that their daughter gets her "rights" as an individual and that her merits 
are recognised. This item was assessed mainly via the related experience 
of tutors and year heads but was aided by the way the parents 
discussed their involvement in the school. 
All parents will tend to see a school largely in terms of their 
own children's progress, development or happiness so it may be that we 
are assessing the overt rather than covert approach to the school. 
Moreover, by assessing motives via action we are treading on unreliable 
ground.] (Item 6) 
4. Ideal relationship of individual to society - competition or  
co-operation. 
a) Whether open competition is seen as generally.  desirable. This 
was assessed by the parents' response to the statement on "laissez-faire" 
individualism from the "Belief and World Views" check list and their own 
comments on their response. Here we are assessing the ideal of 
competition in the economic sphere. (Item 7). 
b) Whether the function of the state is seen in individualistic or  
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relational terms. 	 Is the state seen in Hobbesian terms as protecting 
individuals from each other or in terms of ordering the well-being of 
everyone. This political aspect of competition versus co-operation was 
assessed largely via the discussion on law and order, backed, in most 
cases by discussion on the unions. When the parents gave their opinions 
on "what ought to be done" were they seeing the problems as belonging to 
the community or were they looking at them from a privatised and 
individualistic viewpoint ? Is the main problem of law and order seen in 
terms of keeping criminals from attacking one's own person or property 
e.g. "If someone raped DI daughter I'd kill 'im." (Georgina's father), 
or is law seen in terms of ordering the common life ? (Item 8). 
Assessing distorted communication in the family  
Habermas' concept of the ideal speech situation gives a framework 
in which can be described sets of dynamic family interrelationships and 
interactions that are potentially generative of moral logic. In chapter 
4 we referred to Habermas' theory of communicative competence in the 
context of which he shows how the traditional ideas of truth, freedom 
and justice can be apprehended in terms of linguistic communication and 
their negation in terms of the constraints which prevent the ideal speech 
situation from being achieved.
24 
Thus truth is seen as the outcome 
of unrestricted discussion through the development of an unconstrained 
consensus; freedom is seen in terms of "the mutuality of unimpaired 
self-representation"; and justice is seen in the generation of universal 
understanding and universalised norms. 
We shall use these broad principles of the ideal speech situation 
to assess constraints to interaction which exist in the family. The 
aspects of such communication distortion which are observable in the 
families being studied will be assessed with relation to Habermas' 
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conceptualisation of truth, freedom and justice. 
1. Truth. If truth is understood in terms of unconstrained consensus 
we can locate three aspects of family interaction where distortion 
of communication may be present. 
a) Open Discussion. 	 Where truth has become established or 
sedimented within the family, discussion of new ideas or understandings 
will be meaningless. The parents will resist the daughter's attempts 
to share her insights with them either by refusing to listen or to 
enter into discussion or by non-dialectical pronouncements which attempt 
to "put her straight". This aspect was assessed by the way the daughter 
perceived the degree of open discussion in the family especially with 
regard to social issues and controversial points of view. 
	
The validity 
of the girl's judgement was tested at the interview if it was suspected 
that she could be exaggerating or showing neurotic tendencies, i.e. 
their attitudes to topics in which the daughter had described them as 
being thoroughly recalcitrant, were checked.] (Item 1 on Distortion 
of Communication scale). 
b) The husband and wife's relationship to truth may be assymetrical. 
One parent may be the authority on family matters defining the situation 
regarding family history, family norms and habits and family relationships. 
Again, one parent may define family beliefs and attitudes on social and 
political issues. While it is likely that the parent who spends more 
time at home will be more knowledgeable about family affairs and the 
parent who spends more time in the outside world may be more politically 
aware, distortion will occur if the more knowledgeable parent acts as 
if he or she possesses the monopoly on truth in that area and refuses 
to be challenged. 
This aspect was assessed from the parental interview. When both 
family matters and social and political affairs were under discussion a 
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point was made of directing questions to the husband and wife alternately 
if they did not interact spontaneously when the questions were first put. 
The "Beliefs and World Views" check list was of assistance in some cases, 
as it was possible for there to be an apparent family consensus during 
interview, whilst one parent showed a very different pattern of beliefs 
in his or her check-list responses. [Evidence from tutors of their 
experience of parents was used as additional information]. (Item 2). 
c) Parental monopoly of truth.  This aspect stresses the situation 
where parents cannot see the possibility of a reciprocal relationship 
existing between them and their daughter with regard to truth. Truth 
is not necessarily sedimented - the parents may have an open attitude 
to truth in relation to each other, to their jobs or other adults. However, 
they cannot conceive of a change in their ideas or understanding through 
interaction with their children. (In this case with the 6th Form daughter). 
At the parental interview the question, "Do you think you have 
learnt anything from your children", led to a discussion on this topic. 
If the question was not responded to in its open-ended form it was 
extended in the form of questions on the possible impact of the children's 
school knowledge on the parents' ideas. (Item 3). 
2. Freedom . The focus is now on unimpaired self-representation. 
This aspect is observed in terms of the extent to which family members 
are free to become themselves (develop their own identities) or whether 
family interaction inhibits this freedom. As Habermas writes: "In 
normal communications an intersubjectivity, guaranteeing ego-identity 
develops and is maintained in the relation between individuals who 
acknowledge one another."25 Only the subject-daughters were available 
for assessment here as multi-faceted observation together with the 
subjects' self reflection is required. Two aspects were observable:- 
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a) The daughter's ego-identity will tend to lack continuity between 
home and school where freedom is distorted. Whilst different aspects of 
an adolescent will tend to predominate in situations as different as 
home, class-room or amongst peers, a severe disjunction between the self 
as expressed at home and the self as expressed at school will indicate 
constraints operating in either home or school. Thorough knowledge of 
the school situation and of the student's relations with staff and pupils 
should help distinguish in which locus the constraints are acting. 
The assessment of this aspect was, in the first place, based on 
subjective impression. Was the general personality of the girl who was 
known at school continuous with that displayed by the girl in her home. 
The girl's home personality was revealed largely from the manner in which 
the parents' discussed their children. Did they seem to think, for example, 
that their daughter was quiet and shy when at school she was quite 
relaxed. Although the girls were seen in the context of their families, 
this behaviour was not assessed, as the presence of a visitor would tend 
to influence them. Follow-up talks with the girls, showed whether they 
accepted their parents' assessment of themselves and whether or not they 
felt they were the "same person" at home and school. Tutors were 
another source of input here, especially when they had noted that 
parents failed to understand that a girl was a person in her own right and 
tended to project their own desires onto their daughter. (Item 4). 
b) Whether the girl felt she was accented as a person by her 
parents was the second aspect of freedom distortion. A girl who does not 
believe she is accepted by her parents as a person or who feels that her 
individuality is not acknowledged, will not be free to take them into 
her confidence or consult them on matters to do with her private life 
on which she requires advice. 
This aspect of freedom was assessed by the girl's response to the 
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questionnaire item which asked whether family members would be consulted 
in a moral dilemma (Q.6), followed up in the girl's interview (Item 5). 
3. Justice. In terms of the ideal speech situation, justice is that 
process whereby, through discourse, the suitability of norms is tested and 
universalised norms are sought. The concept of equality is inherent in 
this concept of justice, as it is essential to the intersubjective 
recognition of norms. For in "undistorted communication" not only is there 
an absence of constraint to self-representation but "the communicated 
meanings are identical for all members of the language community."26 It 
is thus possible to observe injustice operating as a distortion within a 
family's patterns of communication by focussing on the way norms are 
generated and sanctioned and on whether the needs and interests of the 
children are equally considered. We can discern: 
a) Whether family norms which concern older adolescent members, 
including the sixth form daughter, are discussed and agreed upon or 
whether they are arbitrary or traditional rules formulated or retained by 
the parents without consulting their children. Rules of conduct accepted 
by parents as right because they were brought up to obey them, have, 
in the context of their own families the nature of what Habermas refers 
27 to as "pre-linguistically fixed motivations". As such these may be 
barriers to the exercise of justice in the family. 
The norm found to be relevant to all families which was discussed 
with all parents and daughters was that which concerned the daughters' 
evening leisure activities. All families had formal or informal rules 
covering the frequency, duration and nature of evening outings. The 
situation was considered to involve distortion, if such rules were applied 
to the daughter without adequate discussion. What was "adequate" tended 
to be relative to the group of sixteen, but both discussions with parents 
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and daughters were involved in the assessment. (Item 6). 
b) Whether these norms are sanctioned by agreed-upon procedures 
which are considered by the daughter to be "fair" or whether they are 
enforced by arbitrary punishment or psychological pressure. Arbitrary 
sanctioning of norms is as much a feature of distorted communication as 
arbitrary norm formation. Both are aspects of the repressive norm which, 
in Habermasian terms, is basic to the unjust society. As with a) (norm 
formation) the sanctioning of norms to do with evening outings was 
discussed with parents and daughters but it was the daughter's perception 
which was considered to be especially significant. 
[It is realised that whilst this approach to norms may now be 
suitable, it would not be for very young children and that in the case of 
sixth formers, morally generative forces in the family were at work 
many years ago. It is felt however, that if the distortion due to this 
particular injustice is now present, it is probable that some similar 
form of injustice was active in the family when the subjects were 
younger.] (Item 7). 
c) Whether the Parents are discriminatory in the treatment of their 
children or whether a reasonable degree of fairness is operating. 
Whilst children's needs are different, one or more members of the family 
can be favourites or there may be differential expectations in school-
work or sport for sons and daughters. 
Inequality within the family was observed informally during the 
interviews with the girls when family norms were under discussion. It 
was most readily observed, though, in the situation of parental interviews 
when, as all the children were being discussed, favouritism and unequal 
consideration of the interests of one or more members of the family were 
noted. The problem of the Bloggs family, which emphasised the tension 
between equality of opportunity and the fostering of talent, frequently led 
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parents to discuss their actual differential treatment of their children. 
(Item 8). 
The Ideology/Interaction Grid  
The families were assessed, comparatively, on each of the eight 
items taken as indicating the ideology of possessive individualism and 
on the eight items which indicated distortion of communication. By 
making the presence of each factor equivalent to one unit on the 
Ideology Scale or on the Interaction Scale and presenting the scales as 
intersecting axes, the position of each family can be plotted on the 
resultant grid. 
Each factor was evaluated in terms of 0 = absent,1 = present. Where 
the factor was clearly present or absent, as in the case of agreement 
with an item of the "Belief and World Views" check list there was no need 
for a subjective assessment. Mostly, however, assessment was made relative 
to the group of sixteen girls, with a subjective judgement being made 
of the position of the point between a high and a low manifestation of 
the observed factor. In some cases half units were used. An example of 
the use of half units is item 5 on the Interaction Scale. If a girl 
believed it was impossible to discuss personal problems with all family 
members, one unit was added to the scale, but if she felt she could 
discuss a problem with one parent or an older sibling, a half unit would 
be added. Similarly with item 3 on the Ideology Scale, where the Bloggs 
family was discussed. Parental difference as to whether equality or 
achievement should be stressed, or agreement at a point of compromise 
was awarded a half point. 
In some cases it was impossible to assess an item, either because 
the situation did not exist e.g. an only child could not be treated 
unequally, or because the parents had not given sufficient information 
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for an assessment to be made. This latter problem only occurred in 
relation to the Ideology Scale. In this case an average for the 7 items 
scored was made. One girl, Naomi, had lived with one parent for the 
last three years and had little contact with the other. Assessment was 
made with regard to the present family of mother and children (even 
though in Appendix D, her family's social class still relates to her 
absent father). 
The relative position of the families with respect to these scales 
is shown in Figure II. Appendix F shows how each family scored on each 
item and gives a detailed account of how the assessment of one of the 
families was carried out. 	 No attempt was made to isolate specific sets 
of criteria for the assessments of either possessive individualism or 
distortion of communication. With only sixteen families, all coming 
from one area of London, such criteria would lack any meaning. As all 
the items were assessed in relation to the sixteen families, the positions 
of the families as they relate to each other on the interacting scales 
should reflect the theoretical elements on which the scales were based. 
It will be noted from figure II that the families of the girls who 
belonged to the communicative group are clustered together in the lower 
left quadrant. This quadrant represents a low degree of distortion of 
communication and a low degree of possessive individualism. All girls 
who showed consistent use of strategic/instrumental logic belong to 
families positioned in the upper right quadrant. These families show both 
a high degree of distortion of communication and a high level of 
possessive individualism. The other families all show a high level of 
distortion, but only a low level of possessive individualism - Betty's 
family to a lesser extent. 
This very rough measure, gives a distinct indication that the family 
beliefs and practices bear a direct relation to the phenomenon which we 
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have classified as the logical form used in the making of moral 
judgements. The relationship, it will be noted, is to the type of 
logic, not to the world view or system of belief. Whilst it was shown 
that Cathy, Frances, Naomi and Queenie shared a political concern and 
an obligation to put their political beliefs into practice that was much 
less developed in Diane, Mary and Lucy, this distinction is not 
reflected here. 
It can be seen that the Interaction Scale discriminated more 
effectively between families than the Ideology Scale. There is a 
marked difference on the Interaction Scale between the families of the 
communicative group and those of both other groups. Families assessed 
as "low" on one factor indicating distortion of communication, tended to 
be "low" on most factors. As all daughters of families showing a high 
degree of communicative competence (low distortion ) have shown a 
consistently high degree of communicative logic in making moral judgements 
it can be assumed that the phenomena are connected. The practical 
patterns gained at home appear to have extended into the daughters' 
practical morality. These families also showed a low level of 
possessive individualism as did their daughters. Yet, in general, a 
comparison of parents' and daughters' patterns of beliefs had led to the 
conclusion that ideologies are not directly transmitted. As more of our 
parents showed a high degree of possessive individualism together with 
low distortion of communication it is impossible to comment further. One 
would not expect Greenbank parents to combine these categories. Parents 
whose patterns of communication were open and who were highly oriented 
towards possessive individualism would be likely to be consciously 
ambitious and thus unlikely to choose a school with such a different 
ethos from their own. Parents valuing achievement would most likely 
choose an achievement-orientated school for their children, unless 
they believed them to be potential failures. 
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Of the girls coming from families showing a high degree of 
distortion it is the ideology of possessive individualism that appears 
to be associated with the distinction between those showing consistent 
use of strategic/instrumental logic and those with inconsistent use. 
Thus Heather and Amy come from families showing a high degree of 
distorted communication and while both girls showed a marked tendency 
towards strategic/instrumentality in one section of their questionnaire 
they were predominantly communicative in the other section. The 
families of Joy and Patience (both girls classified as strategic/ 
instrumental) also showed high distortion of communication but exhibited 
a much higher level of possessive individualism than Heather's or Amy's 
families. It is interesting to speculate upon a mechanism whereby such 
an ideology may be accepted by a daughter when other beliefs are questioned. 
If a child's natural desire to communicate with parents is thwarted will 
the child be more open to indoctrination via a desire to please the 
parents ? Amy discussed her agony of separation from her father. She 
had discovered that she could please him by making him cakes. She now 
cooks the supper every night and although the parents do not communicate 
with her in the way she would like, she does receive their praise. Her 
father, a manual worker, is not ambitious and is not particularly 
interested in her academic progress. .Amy has intelligence but has 
never really extended herself, until recently when she discovered in 
photography and television technology. She has lacked external goals. 
Georgina, classified as consistently strategic/instrumental, had been 
a poor achiever in primary school and was seen by her parents as a 
"plodder". Her mother is intensely ambitious and shows great disappointment 
that her husband has not "got on". Georgina finds communication with 
either parent very difficult, but appears to have set out to achieve 
academically, as a way of pleasing them. She basks in their approval of 
322 
her academic attainments (she now has two A levels), yet away from them 
she lacks confidence and feels that they do not really understand her as 
a person. She never discusses personal problems with them. 
As well as this indirect connection bwtween the parents' ideology 
and the daughters' desire to please them via achievement, there is the 
relationship between the ideology of individualism and the practice of 
competitivism. It is quite likely that competitive attitudes are 
caught by the child in a family where communication is low and individualistic 
competitive behaviour is constantly approved. 
We do not believe that our rough scales and very general criteria 
should be subject to a high degree of analysis or speculation. What does 
appear to have been shown is that communicative logic is directly related 
to the home environment and appears to be associated, above all, with a 
low level of distortion of communication in the family. 
We have thus shown that it makes sense to translate Habermas' 
typification of morality in terms of communicative competence into 
empirical reality. There is a connection between the active, practical 
patterns of communication in a family and the way the daughter makes her 
judgements about everyday practical concerns or about social problems 
in the wider world. 
The Home/School Relationship and Moral Judgement  
At Greenbank School, co-operative relationships and open 
communication are officially valued and their practice is encouraged. 
Yet, of the sixteen in the intensive study, only those girls classified 
as consistently communicative seemed fully aware of this aspect of the 
school.28 We have now seen that the essential style that characterises 
the making of moral judgements is most probably generated at home. It 
is suggested, then, that Greenbank's comprehensive ethos serves to further 
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the developments of the communicative ethic in those already disposed 
to it and helps them move from particularism to universalism. 
Communicative Lucy, for example, disagrees with many beliefs held by 
her parents. Her parents are racist and would like to reintroduce capital 
punishment. Yet relationships are open and communication is a reality. 
Lucy argues with her father and hopes her children will be able to 
discuss these problems with her, as openly as she can with her mother. 
Through the school, Lucy has discovered that Pakistanis are "real 
people" and has made friends with several. She is now strongly anti- 
racist. She las learnt not to "judge a sausage by its skin" and now refuses 
to categorise people. She will not ostracise neighbouring youths when they 
return from Borstal, although her father tells her they are worthless. 
Yet she also refuses to blame her father for his "narrow-minded" 
attitude. He has lacked the opportunities and experience she has enjoyed. 
It is Lucy, essentially practiced in communication and secure in her 
human relationships who can deepen her understanding of people from a 
study of A level English. Lucy had referred to this aspect of English 
in her second interview, quoted above. Georgina, on the other hand, 
strongly orientated towards external goals, saw the practical outcomes 
of the study of English (excluding examination success) as limited 
to improving her self-expression. Yet although Georgina is unable to 
develop relationally through her school life, she believes that being 
there has made her more "tolerant". 
A similar broadening of frames of reference as seen with Lucy can be 
found in Cathy. Cathy comes from a family which not only shows a high 
degree of communicative competence but is involved in local activities 
to a greater extent than any of the other sixteen families. Father 
helps with the church, mother with the Girl Guides and the whole family 
belongs to several clubs concerned with nature conservation. Yet Cathy 
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has decided that she wants to work for the benefit of the Third World. 
Her enthusiasm has led to increasingly good academic results and she is 
expected to qualify for her chosen University, where the Geography 
courses feature the Third World. Cathy, like Georgina, was not a 
potential Grammar School pupil and has only recently decided that 
knowledge, as well as willingness, is needed if she is to be effective. 
Her father said at the interview that he believed Cathy's concern had 
emerged from her studies of Biology and Geography. Neither parents 
had a University education. Both are concerned for their immediate world. 
Through her experience as a pupil of Greenbank (she had found it an 
"opener", preventing self-centredness), Cathy has widened her horizons 
whilst maintaining her general approach to life. Her studies have given 
a truly universal aspect to her world view. 
It is likely that any subject studied at an advanced level, in 
a spirit of enquiry will have the potential to extend a pupil's view 
of the world from the particularistic concerns of family life to a more 
universalistic approach. Because of their stress on understanding human 
action, we would expect subjects such as History and Sociology to have 
a universalising effect on a student's understanding and one is not 
surprised when Queenie attributes much of her political concern to her 
study of History and Naomi feels she has developed her understanding of 
human relationships through her study of Sociology. But other subjects 
can be similarly effective. Frances' French teacher reported that Frances 
was showing an ability and a willingness to extend her understanding of 
motive and purpose through French literature discussions. Mary's studies 
are restricted to Science subjects. She comes from a home where horizons 
are not wide and where her parents, both originally "East enders", hold 
strong and non-liberal opinions e.g. anti-Common Market, anti-immigration. 
Although Mary shares many of these opinions she shows a breadth of vision 
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and an ability to make judgements on wider social issues that is lacking 
in her parents. Her family shows a high degree of communicative competence 
at the everyday interactive level but Mary's greater intellectual 
development has enabled her to extend the communicative form into the 
universalistic dimension. 
The informal discussions amongst sixth formers or the more formal 
discussions held in Liberal Studies groups or in the lower sixth discussion 
group on current affairs can have a similar universalising effect for 
those already practicing a communicative mode in relation to knowledge. 
Work with the groups in Phase I had revealed the unexpected fact that many 
girls felt that discussion led to a consolidation of their own opinions 
rather than acting as a challenge to belief. The effect of discussion on 
their ideas and opinions was followed up in the girls' first interview 
in the intensive study phase. It was the girls who had already been 
classified as communicative in making moral judgements who expressed a 
belief that discussion with others was important in developing their 
ideas and understanding of life. Outstanding examples here were Queenie 
and Naomi. Queenie was reported above, as having caught her awareness 
of environmental needs from Naomi, particularly through the discussion 
group. Frances, too, had provided political stimulation but her 
interest rather than the ideas themselves had provided the stimulus as 
"hers' are so definite ideas, there's no room for anyone else to put 
in an idea", Queenie had commented. Naomi, herself, had always had an 
open and communicative relationship with her mother but as a child had 
accepted the family evaluation that money meant happiness and achievement 
was needed for both. It was through informal discussion with her friends 
and their parents that she became aware of the lack of reciprocity between 
her own parents and after they split she gradually re-built her system 
of values, based on the intrinsic worth of co-operative human interaction. 
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To Naomi, it was the discussions in class and common-room and with friends 
away from the school that helped develop her present world view. Yet 
interviews with her mother show that Naomi already possessed a high 
degree of interactive competence before she began to re-build her 
belief system. 
We are stressing here that there is a continuity between the degree 
of communicative competence of a family and the daughter's ability to 
extend her world view and system of beliefs into the universalistic 
dimension through communicative action at school. Children of families 
where there is a high level of communicative competence will, as 
individuals, show a high level of interactive competence and will make 
judgements on matters of morality affecting themselves and the wider 
world, according to communicative logic. It is the judgements on 
wider issues, in particular, where the school can be seen to play a part. 29 
We are not claiming that the school has no effect on the beliefs 
and world views of pupils showing lower levels of communicative competence 
but insofar as they are less open to extending their knowledge through 
discursive means, they are less likely to be affected by the particular 
"comprehensive ethos" of a school such as Greenbank. It must also be 
recognised that because Greenbank is part of a wider school system and 
has an accepted function of selection and certification for future 
training and employment, it is inevitably linked with individualism 
and instrumentality. It is not surprising that more sixth formers who 
attempted the questionnaire were classified as "neutral" or "inconsistent" 
than showed strongly polarised logic use. Most families, sufficiently 
successful in a capitalistic system to have a daughter in the sixth form 
would be likely to show a certain degree of possessive individualism, 
and distortion of communication, being itself the inevitable result of 
an imperfectly just society, is likely to be the norm.30 
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Beliefs, World Views and Motivation  
In Chapter 7 we noted that in their questionnaire responses, girls' 
consistent in use of communicative logic emphasised the values of trust, 
understanding others, sincerity, discussion, harmony, the pursuit of 
interests and the value of human life. Those tending to use strategic/ 
instrumental logic emphasised achievement, grasping opportunities and 
independence and also valued order and sincerity. 
Through the interviews of the intensive study we discovered that the 
values isolated as reference matter of moral judgements did indeed fit 
into the girls' general view of themselves in relation to their world. 
All the communicative girls saw human relationships and co-operation as 
ultimately desirable and most expressed the belief that joint human action 
could effect change in the world. Most of them also felt a sense of 
obligation to act in a considerate and co-operative way and to relate 
honestly and openly with other people, irrespective of who they were. Only 
four of them, however, saw themselves as necessarily concerned with joint 
human endeavour (political dimension) and felt a sense of personal 
obligation to work to help right what they saw was wrong with the world. 
The strategic/instrumental girls, and indeed most of the non-aligned 
(control) group, wanted a happy and fulfilling existence in a stable 
world but did not see themselves as being necessarily concerned with 
improving the world. Their sense of obligation was largely in return for 
what they had received - feeling in debt to their families, they saw 
themselves as reciprocally obliged to their families in various ways. 
The strategic/instrumental group were noticeably more concerned with 
their careers and less concerned with the people with whom they would 
be sharing their lives. 
To a large extent, the girls' view of the good life, what they see 
as ultimately desirable in life, will carry its own motivational force. 
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As the philosophers of education have shown, 31 motivation has a strong 
cognitive element and what one believes to be desirable will influence 
one's choices for action. It is this cognitive aspect of motivation 
that Habermas stresses when he writes, "I shall proceed on the assumption 
that 'moral consciousness' signifies the ability to make use of 
interactive competence for consciously processing morally relevant conflicts 
of action."32 It is understandable then, that the communicative girls, 
seeing human discursive relationships as desirable, are more likely to 
make judgements with reference to co-operation and people's needs than 
those whose aims focus on achievement seen as career success. Yet when 
we talk in terms of a sense of obligation we are moving into a motivational 
level that cannot be fully described in cognitive terms. Because our 
scheme was designed to analyse moral consciousness in cognitive terms we 
have concentrated on the girls' conscious sense of obligation. We thus 
reported that Diane, outstanding amongst the sixteen for her consideration 
and sensitivity to others, was not aware of any sense of obligation. 
Again, if we seek to characterise the four girls whom we believe to 
exhibit the Habermasian ideal of communicative morality (Cathy, Frances, 
Naomi and Queenie) we describe them as having a political dimension to 
their world views and believing they have a duty to put their concerns into 
practice. Yet, for communicative morality to be an evolutionary force 
it must transcend the cognitive dimension. floral action, as well as moral 
judgement, will be required. 
Habermas is aware of "the frequent discrepancies between moral 
judgement and moral action" but does not offer any explanation for the 
discrepancy beyond an inadequacy in the individual's "motivational 
structure". The motivation structure is not described although he refers 
to "superego formation" and the "authority of conscience". 33 The 
authority of conscience that gives rise to what Peters refers to as 
34  
"authority guilt" 	 is connected with rules internalised in childhood and 
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is not likely to motivate any to act out their obligations, unless the 
obligations are grounded at a very basic level. Duty to family based on 
reciprocity could be a case in point. Peters also refers to the 
"humanistic conscience", postulated by Money-Kyrle as originating in 
the 'guilt' experienced by the child when he hates or hurts the mother 
he loves.35 Such a conscience may explain why one feels an obligation 
to be considerate of others. There is also shame which in Peters' terms 
is connected with "our own loss of self-esteem and our disappointment in 
being unable to live up to our ideals."36 Such negative motivations are 
indeed part of the personality structure and to some extent help bridge 
the gap between one's judgement and one's action, but they are hardly a 
powerful force sufficient to cause an individual to act co-operatively 
for the general good rather than in accordance with his own interests. 
By returning to "the four" and examining what they have said and 
written, one is struck by the fact that they are strongly motivated to 
act out their world concerns and so far have been putting them into 
practice. What distinguishes Mary from Frances can only partly be 
described in cognitive terms, by referring, for example, to Mary's 
narrower horizons and Frances' broad political concerns. Mary is quite 
as aware as Frances that the world has problems and she would like to 
help make the world a better place. She is just as considerate of others 
in everyday practice or communicative in her judgements on paper. The 
difference lies in the level at which the two girls are satisfied. Mary 
feels she will be satisfied if she fulfils her career aims and settles 
down with a happy family around her. Frances on the other hand is for ever 
seeking further involvement with the world and deeper levels of 
satisfaction. Her letters about last summer's vacation indicates this. 
She had received an ILEA award to go to Germany and decided to join a 
work camp because she "wanted to do something more interesting and 
profitable than staying with a penfriend." She learnt a lot and found 
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the experience worthwhile but was disappointed that the work itself, 
in a forest, lacked social purpose. "I did not feel the work was 
particularly useful," she wrote, "and this meant that the experience 
was slightly less satisfying." When she does voluntary work in the 
future she will "make sure it is concerned with a social project." 
When Frances makes such decisions in terms of what is most 
satisfying, she is clearly being motivated by powerful positive forces. 
These can most generally be described as the fulfilment of deep needs. 
Mary and Frances are both motivated by their needs but whilst Mary is 
concentrating on needs of achievement, security and love, Frances 
may be experiencing what Maslow describes as self-actualising needs.37 
It may also be that Frances understands achievement in different terms 
(we quoted her above as believing that a helpful life was a greater 
achievement than a "first" at Oxford), and that her self-esteem needs 
can only be satisfied when she feels she has helped the world. It is not 
our place to discuss the mechanisms of positive motivation. We are 
stressing, however, that to characterise Habermas' communicative ethic in 
empirical reality we would need to go beyond cognitive understanding and 
negative motivations such as guilt and shame. Communicative morality is 
positively motivated by needs that are only satisfied through co-
operative human action, by a desire for truth and justice only to be 
met through discursive, consensus orientated activity. 
Summary - Habermas in Practice  
The purpose of the empirical study, as a whole, was to extend 
the relationship of Habermas' theory into the realm of empirical reality 
- to "operationalise" Habermas. We had already shown how Habermas 
theorised morality in practical terms, as undistorted human communication 
and posited moral consciousness as a limiting condition of social evolution. 
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We had devised a scheme to investigate moral consciousness from a 
Habermasian perspective through the analysis of the procedures used 
in the making of mor&31 judgements. We thus set out to use this scheme 
to investigate the moral consciousness of sixth formers in Greenbank 
Comprehensive School. Keeping in mind Habermas' formulation of social 
evolution, we gave ourselves the specific task of discovering tendencies 
towards the practice of communicative morality and of looking for factors 
assisting the development of this moral form in home and school. 
During Phase I we devised the scheme for conceptualising and 
analysing the making of moral judgements. Moral judgements were seen as 
procedural and as being distinguished by their style or logic which was 
related to the moral agents' value system and the way the situation being 
judged was contextualised in her experience. This scheme was discussed in 
Chapter 6. The phase ended with the construction of a questionnaire which 
contained morally relevant conflict situations designed to draw upon two 
separate dimensions of experience (relevance zones) the direct personal 
experience of family and friends and the less personal experience of the 
wider world gained particularly from school, books and the media. 
During this phase we were selecting sections of Habermasian theory 
together with insights from his semi-theoretical formulations and 
constructing from them a particular purpose for the empirical endeavour 
together with a general method of conducting the enquiry. The purpose 
was derived from his formulation of social evolution, the methodology 
from the fundamental distinction between work and interaction used in 
his critiques of Marx and his reformulation of rationalisation. This 
then was a period of engaging in practical interaction whilst selecting 
theory considered applicable to our task. 
Phase II was the period where data was collected and analysed 
according to the theoretical scheme. The data consisted of the 
judgements made by the eighty four sixth formers in response to the 
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morally relevant situations of the questionnaire. The major analysis 
was of the style or logical form of the girls' judgements. During the 
analysis we isolated three sets of criteria for distinguishing between 
communicative and strategic/instrumental logic. These referred to 
interpersonal relationships, human activities and relationships of people 
to the world. In this way Habermas' general typification was particularised 
and applied to judgements of practical situations. The values referred to 
during judgemental procedures for substantiating judgements were analysed 
and were seen to relate systematically to the logical type in terms of 
the concept of communicative morality. 
In Phase III, the phase of the intensive study, a reflexive 
relationship was established with sixteen pupils and their families with 
attention focussing on the distinctions between the seven showing 
consistent use of communicative logic and the remainder. This included a 
group strongly polarised towards use of strategic/instrumental logic and a 
group showing mixed logical form. The most fundamental influence in 
generating the logical form of communicative morality was shown to be the 
family, but the school played an important part in helping develop the 
systems of beliefs and world views of girls already possessing the 
communicative form. The school assisted the transformation of the 
girls' values from particularistic to universal concerns and encouraged 
the development of the political dimension necessary for the universal 
ethics of speech (communicative morality). 
In this phase we utilised and applied Habermas' definition of 
moral principles in terms of the ideal speech situation. Truth, freedom 
and justice were translated into necessary conditions for undistorted 
communication. Observations of distortions to communication in the 
family were thus observations of their tendency to negate or suppress 
fundamental moral principles in family interaction. The families which 
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showed low distortion (i.e. a high degree of communicative competence), 
were the families of the girls showing consistent use of communicative 
logic. As Habermas has described moral development in terms of 
development of interactive competence it can be supposed that these girls 
also possessed a high level of (potential, at least) interactive 
competence. It would be just as wrong, however, to conclude that a 
family's communicative competence is directly transmitted to the 
daughter as interactive competence and that this shapes her cognitive 
style of making judgements as to conclude that a family's moral beliefs and 
values are transmitted at the cognitive level and directly lead to moral 
action. There is a reflexive relationship between cognitive understanding 
and practical interaction that exists at both the family level and at 
the individual's judgement making level. There is likewise a reflexive 
relationship between the individual's conscious awareness of her moral 
approach and the actual way she relates to others and comes to make her 
judgements. Hence Frances showed a high level of awareness of her moral 
motivations, whilst Diane, a highly intuitive and expressive girl, and 
much less analytical than Frances, showed little conscious understanding 
of her moral beliefs and motivations. The interrelationship between 
moral theory and moral practice at the level of interaction was also 
used to explain a possible mechanism for the transmission of goal 
directedness or achievement orientation from parents to child without 
necessarily being accepted by the child at the cognitive level. 
This phase then, investigated the relationships existing between 
home, school and communicative morality at one level. At the other, 
however, it investigated the use of Habermas' theoretical relationship 
between moral theory and human practice in empirical reality. By using 
his relationship between theory and practice within morality, the real and 
actual relationships existing between family, daughter and school were 
capable of being observed and discussed. 
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A summary of the characteristics of communicative and strategic/ 
instrumental morality with their relationships to home and school in 
terms of ideal types is given in Appendix G. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion  
This essay has been concerned with the sociological study of 
morality in the field of education. Its underlying theme has been 
the relationship of theory to practice. This theme sprang from the 
nature of the topic; morality, but has found expression in observations 
of the sociological enterprise. Morality concerns beliefs and theories 
about practical human activity. It is a theoretical consideration of 
the practical in terms of worthwhileness or value. Sociology 
theoretically considers human social activity. It must thus include the 
consideration of man's efforts to evaluate his action: it must be able 
to theorise the moral. It must not only theorise about morality but be 
able to investigate it empirically. Its theoretical understanding of 
the nature of morality within society will influence its empirical 
research - its theory of the moral will shape its sociological practice. 
In the Introduction we pointed out that Sociology had made little 
progress in the study of morality in education since the time of 
Dewey and Durkheim. Within the general field of education, sociological 
studies had investigated both positive and negative aspects of morality, 
focussing on both moral education and juvenile deviance. It was 
considered that both aspects lacked an adequate theory of morality and 
were thus unable to deal with moral reality in social terms. The 
approach to moral education was largely functionalist and morality was 
confused with societal goals. Deviance studies saw deviance as a social 
rather than a moral problem but traditional approaches to deviance tended 
to conflate the problems as they tended to accept functionalist 
assumptions. A basic assumption of functionalism and particularly 
pertinent to the sociology of morality was that a direct linear 
relationship existed between moral beliefs and values and morally 
relevant action. 
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In Chapter 2, we discussed the relationship between belief and 
action and showed how assumptions which prevailed in America's socio-
logical tradition had their roots in its pragmatic heritage. The 
assumption that belief and action were directly and unreflexively related 
was illustrated by deviance studies and we showed its connection with an 
oversimplified view of motivation. Such assumptions affect sociological 
practice and lead not only to a false understanding of the phenomena 
but draw attention away from the belief/action relationship, study of 
which would demand an adequate social theory of morality. 
In Chapter 3 we examined the contribution of Marx, Durkheim and 
Weber to Sociology's understanding of the moral. We considered that it 
was the founding fathers' inability adequately to conceptualise and 
theorise the moral within society that was largely responsible for the 
lack of progress in the sociology of morality today. They were aware that 
modern industrial developments had brought with them rapid social change 
and they all attempted to interpret the fundamental relationships that 
existed under capitalism. This meant an examination of the place and 
nature of morality in modern society, and, as Kant still dominated 
academic thought in Europe, it meant grappling with Kantian ideas, either 
through critique or re-interpretation. 
Marx saw conventional ethics as serving the interests of those in 
power and sought to replace moral theorising with a critique of 
practical human activity. His contribution to the sociology of 
morality is his insistence that man's humanity be discussed not in 
terms of intentionality or ideal action but as co-operative activity, 
praxis. But in his endeavour to eradicate all non-philosophical 
elements from his critique, Marx disconnected his concept of praxis from 
moral universals and left his followers with the reality of a revolutionary 
proletariat but with no guiding lines for its emancipatory activity. 
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Durkheim moved morality from the Kantian realm of the individual 
conscience to function as the principal cohesive mechanism of society. 
But Durkheim's morality was contained by the society it served and could 
not transcend relativism. Moreover man's only degree of freedom is as an 
individual acting in spite of the society of which he is an integral 
part. Modern man's relationships are essentially contractual, his only 
practical co-operative activity being associated with his position in 
the division of labour, as a member of a trade guild. Just as we saw how 
Marxist sociologists were unable to give a critique of the justice of 
political practices, so we noted that functionalist sociology, following 
Durkheim's approach to morality, was incapable of evaluating social 
practices except in terms of their contribution to social cohesion. 
Weber's neo-Kantian approach, which emphasised the separation of fact 
and value, led him to see social change in terms of technological and 
bureaucratic progress, the outward expression of Zweckrationalitat. 
Industrial man was decreasingly influenced by morality which now was 
limited to the arena of his private conscience. Morality was neither 
social nor rational. Its importance lay in its connection with individual 
motivation and individual action. It could only be investigated at the 
individual level through the quasi-scientific operation of Verstehen. 
The Weberian approach to the moral has been of tremendous influence in 
all aspects of Sociology. Incorporated into Parsonian functionalism, it 
reinforced the non-humanistic aspects of the Durkheimian strands to 
such an extent that society became not only the measure of morality but the 
determinant of individual consciousness. When the Weberian tradition 
reappeared in its symbolic interactive and phenomenological forms and 
challenged the determinism of functionalism, it could not attack the 
injustices that functionalism masked and indeed condoned. In Weberian 
thought there could be no connection between what people believed to be 
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right and what was indeed legitimate. Legitimacy depended on the 
rational action of the law and was unrelated to people's norms and values, 
for there could be no co-operative or representative "moral" action. 
Morality was individual and irrational. 
It was the realisation of the falseness of the above concept which 
led Jurgen Habermas to extend his discourse theory from the validity of 
truth claims to the rationality of norms. Social norms can be considered 
rational if, through practical discourse focussing on the generalisability 
of interests, a consensus is reached that a norm is appropriate to all whom 
the situation concerns. Through the rules of normal communication, 
Habermas had already concluded that norms had a direct relationship to 
truth. Now, by defining their rationality in terms of discourse theory, 
Habermas has taken norms from the Parsonian realm of societal "givenness" 
where they are unconsciously internalised by oversocialised individuals 
to the realm of conscious interaction where norms are examined for their 
repressive possibilities or their suitability. Thus, human practice 
takes precedence over societal pressure. 
In Chapter 4 we discussed the remarkable contribution Habermas is 
making to the sociology of morality. We noted that Habermas' communicative 
theory of morality meets the requirements of a theory through which 
morality can be investigated in social terms. The traditional ethical 
concepts of truth, freedom and justice are theoretically related in terms 
of human interaction through the device of the ideal speech situation. 
Practical morality is thus considered as communicative human action. 
Moral deviance, for example, is described in terms of imperfect 
communication. It is deviance not from the norm but from the ideal. 
Moral deviance is not, then, a property to be ascribed to an individual 
in status terms although it may describe an individual's behaviour (in 
terms of his role in communicative action). As distortion to communication 
is seen as essentially a societal phenomenon, the expressed outcome of 
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oppression and social injustice, we see that communicative moral theory 
gives us a connection between social morality and individual morality 
without positing a simple cause and effect relationship. If an 
individual shows systematic distortion in his communicative ability or a 
low level of interactive or communicative competence we are observing a 
moral fact about the individual - he shows evidence of moral damage or 
moral immaturity. Because communicative theory considers individuals as 
responsible and autonomous we would expect him to be capable of change or 
growth. But because distortion of communication is essentially social, 
we would look to family and societal relationships in order to bring the 
individual's problem into perspective. 
Habermas has provided an effective critique of Kantian ethics 
following the tradition of Hegel and Marx. Where Hegel tried to show 
that value and fact merged in history, Habermas has shown their perfect 
theoretical fusion in the ideal speech situation. Habermas does not make 
the mistake of Marx, losing all purchase on value through a translation  
of morality into practical human activity (the dimension of fact). He 
maintains the essentially Hegelian dialectical approach of a dynamic 
exchange between the realm of the ideal and the realm of the real, between 
value and fact, between theory and practice. We stressed in Chapter 4, 
that the Habermasian critique of Kant was essentially a replacement of 
Kantian individual (though universalistic) will-directed action by co-
operative, communicative interaction. To Habermas, Kantian moral action 
is not wrong because it is individual action, for individual autonomy 
is essential to morality. Kantian action is less than perfectly moral 
because it is performed by the individual with reference to himself and his 
private understanding alone. When one acts in accordance with Kantian 
ethics one follows a rule or maxim based on what one believes is right 
for all men. This, in Habermasian terms is strategic action. The 
relationship between the understanding and the action is linear, the 
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connecting link or the motivating force being the "good" will.1  
For Habermas, the entire enterprise must be reflexive. Moral thought 
is reflexive thought: it involves what is true as well as what is right 
and relates the two. It considers the situation in ideal terms, i.e. in 
terms of what would be a desirable state of affairs but also considers 
the actual practical situation as it concerns everyone involved or 
affected. And this type of reflexivity, where there is a constant 
dialectical relationship between fact and value, the ideal and the real, 
theory and practice, must occur at the practical level, through dialectical 
human symbolic exchange - discourse.2 The paradigm of discourse is 
basic to all Habermasian theory. If Hegel attempted to pursue his 
dialectical course by giving precedence to the ideal and finally came to 
rest in the concrete (the Prussian state), then Marx can be seen to have 
pursued a materialist dialectic which resulted in an idealised 
proletariat which lacked reflexivity and thus practical direction. 
Habermas has attempted to ensure a viable reflexivity by basing his 
theory on the very source of all dialectical action, practical human 
communication. So while actual human communication is both the topic of 
his research (as in universal pragmatics) or an essential ingredient 
to his theories and formulations (ideal speech situation, social evolution) 
it is also the basic model for the way he approaches all relationships. 
Thus moral action, whilst it can be described in terms of human 
communication must also bear a reflexive (communicative-type) 
relationship to belief. And beliefs are not to be considered as "moral 
beliefs" in the Parsonian sense of being defined in terms of leading to 
"moral" action. All action can be evaluated from a communicative 
approach and all beliefs to which an actor refers when considering 
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how to act, can be defined as morally relevant. The beliefs themselves 
will be complexly interrelated, often inconsistent, and will to some 
extent be associated with the practical experiences which led to their 
acceptance. The belief and the action will relate in a reflexive 
fashion, as if the actor and the situation were carrying out a dialogue. 
So an individual may come to a solitary evaluation of a morally relevant 
situation, but if fully moral in the communicative sense, his model for 
his evaluation must be that of practical discourse. These ideas are 
basic to the conceptual scheme discussed in Chapter 6. 
If Habermas' theory is to be of use to the sociology of morality it 
must be put to the test in empirical reality. Our attempt to 
"operationalise" Habermasian theory and apply it to a study of moral 
judgement making in a girls' comprehensive school has been the task of 
Part II of this thesis. In Chapter 5 we discussed the theoretical problems 
of the enterprise - Habermas was frequently indecisive and even 
contradictory in his formulations. We believed that his greatest 
contradiction was the acceptance of cognitive psychology into his 
reformulation of historical materialism and we decided to carry out the 
empirical section of the study without the inclusion of Piagetian or 
Kohlbergian concepts. The steps whereby we increasingly concretised 
Habermas's ideas and the relationship we observed are described in 
Chapters 7 and 8 and summarised at the end of Chapter 8. 
Now, at the close of the study, we return to our underlying 
relationship between theory and practice. Our reflections above, have 
been a continuation of Habermasian discursive theory. But, if Habermas' 
relationship between theory and practice is true, it should be borne out 
in the practical empirical situation. The theoretical approach should be 
found to influence the sociological research practices. The practical 
experience of the research should throw light on the theoretical 
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formulations. Finallys the experience of interrelating theory and 
practice in an empirical situation should lead to some understanding of 
the situation itself, in our case the relation of comprehensive education 
to morality. 
We shall turn our attention, then, to three questions:- 
1. How have the practices of the empirical study been influenced by 
Habermas' theory ? 
2. How have the empirical observations shed light on Habermas' 
theoretical formulations ? 
3. Has the study indicated any role for comprehensive education 
in moral development or moral evolution ? 
1. The influence of the theory on research practice  
Habermas' theory lays emphasis on reflexive procedural activity. 
At the same time it tends to function at a high level of generalisation. 
Thus, in order to carry out an investigation of actual particular 
phenomena the researcher was forced to engage in an ongoing reflexive 
relationship between theoretical considerations and research practices. 
At no stage was one able to make a simple application of Habermasian 
theory to the empirical situation. 
During the first phase of the study we engaged in interaction and 
dialogue with two groups of students whilst we searched for situations 
which would be morally relevant to them. It was during this period of 
being tuned in to the girls' moral wavelengths that we sought to 
interrelate elements of Habermas' theory in a way that would allow us to 
describe moral judgement making in reflexive and procedural terms. The 
practical problem of an inconsistency which appeared related to the 
context of the girls' experience here induced us to be deflected from 
Habermas and to build Schutzean insights into our analytical scheme. 
In this case theoretical consideration was dictated by explanatory need. 
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At the beginning of the second phase we had a model with which to 
analyse judgemental procedures and a series of questions intended to 
stimulate moral evaluatory activity. The second phase, though accompanied 
by interaction at the informal level was less reflexive at the formal 
level - the situations were presented and the pupils responded. Analysis 
of the responses, however, forced interaction between the girls' ways 
of evaluating the practical situations, which reflected their moral 
consciousness), and Habermas' theoretical constructions. From this 
activity we devised the set of criteria used to distinguish the 
communicative form of judgement making from the strategic/instrumental 
form. 
During the third, intensive phase we set out to investigate 
relationships between the subjects' beliefs and world views and their 
ways of making judgements and between their moral approach and their 
experience of home and school. Our role with the pupils was to assist 
them to reflect upon their ideas and their experience: with the families 
it was to facilitate idea sharing and interaction. The Habermasian 
interrelationship of value and fact (derived from the ideal speech 
situation) allowed us to concentrate less on the value "content" of 
parental world views and more on the communicative competence exhibited 
through family interaction and family practices. During the final 
research procedures of the analysis of the parental tapes we were 
continuing to typify the value/fact relationship in terms of practical 
fanny activities. 
In Chapter 7, when we outlined our methodology, we referred not to 
"aims" of investigation but to "procedures". The procedural nature of the 
study was influenced by its exploratory approach and the highly 
generalised form of the theory to which we referred, as to some extent 
was the constant interchange between theoretical considerations and the 
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practical research activities. We consider, however, that it was the 
theoretical emphasis on the interrelationship between theory and practice 
that was largely responsible for the reflexivity of the research. 
2. The empirical observations as critique to Habermas' theory  
The intensive phase of the empirical study highlighted two 
weaknesses in Habermasian theory. First it showed the power of the family 
and school in affecting moral consciousness, thus underlining Habermas' 
neglect of institutions in his formulation of social evolution. Secondly 
it drew attention to the importance of motivation in moral action and 
pointed to Habermas' failure to provide a generative force for moral 
evolution and to his acceptance of cognitive psychology as a substitute. 
In Chapter 4, we referred to Habermas' theoretical weakness with 
respect to the role of institutions in the evolution of moral consciousness. 
He saw neither the educational system nor the family as transmitters of 
worthwhile values or world views: the family was associated with 
declining bourgeois values and the main ideological task of the schools 
was to maintain achievement orientatica, and their role here was dsclininq. 
Moreover, he saw the development of a universal ethics of speech as 
unconnected with cognitive interpretations. We agreed with Jean Cohen's 
assertion: "Habermas has failed to assess the holding power of 
democratic traditions, and to analyse the possible institutional bases 
within late capitalism that could secure individuation, or autonomy, as 
norms to be radicalized."3 
The study gave substance to our theoretical critique. Some homes 
were indeed generating the moral approach which Habermas claims is 
fundamental to capitalism. Parents were highly possessive and 
individualistic and the daughters were goal orientated in their moral 
judgements. Other homes perhaps typified what Habermas sees as the 
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current situation, distorted in communication yet lacking a powerful 
orientation towards achievement. Yet the families of the seven girls 
we had selected as tending towards a consistent use of communicative logic 
combined a low adherence to the values of capitalism with a high degree 
of competence in interactive practice which could be considered as 
typifying a social democratic tradition. These families were 
contributing to the generation of communicative morality by the 
interactive patterns they engendered in their children. 
The school, moreover, did have a function in the development of 
world views consistent with the universal ethics of speech. The school's 
role was not only associated with its general ethos or extracurricular 
activities: evidence was found of its influence on girls' world views 
through participation in its academic curriculum. In Chapter 8, we 
dismissed the limitations of this influence and we are, of course, 
concerned with only one school, of a particular type. Yet we consider 
that our observations indicate a distinct potential for development of 
communicative morality that Habermas has overlooked. W13 shall return to 
this potential in the next section when we discuss comprehensive education. 
In Chapter 5 we discussed Habermas' incorporation of the theories 
of the cognitive psychologists, Piaget and Kohlberg into his formulation 
of social evolution. We considered that such theory was essentially 
contradictory to Habermas' Hegelian approach. Piaget and Kohlberg are 
essentially Kantian. Although Habermas showed that Kohlberg's sixth 
stage was morally inadequate, being rule-bound and individualistic, he 
could not correct the essentially linear relationship which exists between 
Kantian moral judgement and Kantian action. Moreover for the cognitive 
psychologists progress happens in spite of human co-operation rather than 
because of it. Whilst adaptation and assimilation, the mechanisms for 
cognitive development are complex interrelationships which exist between 
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an individual and his environment there is little room for individual 
freedom. Development is something that happens to one. 
Our study of the seven girls who systematically used communicative 
logic in making moral judgements had led us to consider their differences 
as well as their similarities. Four had possessed world views with a 
universal dimension but their difference was also pronounced in their 
feelings of obligation to pursue their ideals and their need to engage 
in what they considered to be worthwhile social action. We considered 
that these four girls showed characteristics typical of communicative 
morality. Their difference from the other three, with whom they shared 
their communicative approach to judgement, was not only at the cognitive 
level but at the level of motivation. It was in seeking to understand 
motivation in Habermasian terms, in the light of our empirical findings, 
that we discovered his conceptual weakness on this topic. We concluded 
that his introduction of cognitive psychology into his formulation of 
social evolution was connected with his inadequate theoretical grasp of 
a concept of motivation. 
In Legitimation Crisis Habermas frequently referred to the term 
"motivation" to express active tendencies of the socio-cultural system 
which depended on its incorporated beliefs, norms and values. However 
in spite of the importance given the general area of "motivation" 
within his crisis theory, his concept of motivation is very imprecise. 
He accepts, with Freud, Durkheim and dead that "motivations are shaped 
through the internalization of symbolically represented structures of 
4 
expectation". 
	
He is aware that "the sociological concept of 
internalization (Parsons) raises a series of problems at the psychological 
level"5 and decides to leave the matter where it is. He concentrates 
instead on "the values and norms in accordance with which the motives 
are formed"6 and shows how they can be seen to be related to truth. 
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Habermas thus decides to lay aside the concept of motivation in its 
full sense and concentrate only on the cognitive elements connected 
with it. However, his theory of social evolution needs a propelling 
force, so in the absence of a dynamic model of motivation Habermas 
must turn to the only developmental view of morality that stresses only 
cognitive elements, namely cognitive psychology. He thus is forced to 
accept a theory which is not only questionable at its empirical source 
but is fundamentally in conflict with his own. Moreover, cognitive 
psychology only explains moral development at the individual level, and 
Habermas is still left with no connection between the individual and the 
social levels of moral development. 
Whilst it is understandable that Habermas saw problems in Parsons' 
concept of internalisation it is more difficult to understand why, 
after considering the Parsonian inadequacies, he failed to search for an 
adequate concept of motivation. In the previous chapter we observed that 
the four girls who characterised communicative morality could be 
described as being motivated in terms of their needs. We referred to 
the concepts of Maslow and his needs theory of motivation. Maslow's 
concept of motivation by self-actualising needs is, in practice, as 
individualistic as is Kohlberg 's theory of moral development. Yet 
self-actualisation refers, in Maslow's terms to "man's desire for 
self-fulfillment. . . to the tendency for him to become actualized 
7 in what he is potentially." 
	 Now, although Maslow may interpret self- 
actualisation as an idiosyncratic phenomenon, we would suggest that 
with a Marxist twist (or a linguistic turn) self-actualisation can 
become a communicative phenomenon. If man has a basic need to fulfil 
his potential then he has a basic need to be fulfilled in purposeful social 
interaction. Marx, who knew very little psychology, considered that 
man's radical needs could be a revolutionary force.8 A Habermasian 
approach to needs could answer the problem of evolutionary force. 
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We consider that it would be better for Habermas to erase all 
reference to cognitive psychology from his developing formulation of 
social evolution and replace it with a reformulation of Marx's theory 
of needs built into a theory of motivation. Such an approach would be 
essentially in harmony with his own theoretical foundations and would 
extend the developmental force from the cognitive level to the level of 
the deep personality structure. Above all it would remove the problem 
of transition from development at the individual level to development at 
the social level. If self-actualising needs are given a communicative 
dimension then motivation is motivation towards communicative action. 
3. Comprehensive education and moral evolution  
The intensive study indicated that although the girls' families 
appeared to be the major influential factors in the development of their 
general moral approach (shown as the logical form of judgement making), 
the school had a function in the development of the girls' belief systems 
and world views. 
In our discussion of the empirical study (Chs. 7 and 8) we pointed 
out that although the study was limited to one school, it was a school 
that by public reputation, in its organisation structures and in the 
personal opinions and pronouncements of its head could be considered to 
typify the comprehensive ideal. We shall take our experience of this 
school, then, and from it suggest ways in which a comprehensive school 
with a similar approach can function in fostering communicative morality. 
First, a comprehensive school will challenge its pupils° 
preconceptions about the rightness of family norms and values. Keniston 
suggests that an individual is more likely to question conventional 
moral systems when personally confronted with alternative moral values 
"especially when these are concretely epitomized in the people, the 
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institutions, and the cultures among which he lives."9 We found that 
many of the girls of the intensive study had been influenced by the 
school in questioning parental values. Lucy and Naomi cited aspects of 
their school experience as having led them to reject family values. 
Georgina believed she had become more tolerant. The varied composition 
of the school gives a wide experience of attitudes and values which is 
lacking in a school which emphasises a narrower curriculum and a narrower 
range of abilities and interests. 
Secondly, a comprehensive school can help to develop in pupils 
already predisposed by family experience to its influence a self awareness 
and world view consistent with the communicative approach. The 
comprehensive ethos is an ideal environment for developing a 
universal world view and a broad awareness of societal problems. 
Cathy felt that a grammar school would not have made her be open to the 
world in the way Greenbank had. The mixed social, economic, and academic 
backgrounds of the fellow pupils, the broad approach to the curriculum 
and the general ethos of communication all help pupils to broaden their 
understanding of the world and of their relationships with others. 
Finally, a comprehensive school may help stimulate its pupils' 
radical (communicative) needs. Where potential is seen in broad terms 
as in the vision of Greenbank's head, and where individuals are 
encouraged to develop a variety of talents and skills, physical and 
social as well as academic, pupils can become aware of undeveloped 
potential. A school strongly orientated towards success along a narrow 
academic course can satisfy its pupils' needs to achieve and stultify 
their more varied social needs. Awareness of a wide spectrum of needs can 
challenge individuals to develop their communicative potential as well 
as their particular interests. 
If Habermas is correct, evolution of new forms of social integration 
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must precede the institution of new economic forms, new modes of 
production. Change at the socio-moral level must precede full development 
of technological potential. 
We are currently facing a period of technological upheaval through 
the introduction of the microcomputer, the "silicon chip". If Western 
society is to survive this revolution without breakdown and subsequent 
totalitarian takeover it must develop new and viable forms of social 
integration. These will need to be based on co-operative interaction and 
discursive will formation. The underlying morality of the new society can 
no longer be the individualistic morality of utility but must move 
towards the morality of communication, the universal ethics of speech. 
We believe that a comprehensive education which is structured to 
conduct teaching and learning in a discursive and co-operative way and 
which seeks to foster the potential abilities of all pupils, whatever 
their type, can play a positive part in the development of communicative 
morality and thus contribute to social evolution and societal progress. 
If in the interests of improved productivity, Britain were to return to an 
academically segregated form of education with a renewed emphasis on 
achievement and individual competition, we believe that she could be 
heading for social regress. 
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Chapter 9: Notes 
1 It can be assumed from this description that Habermas would also 
consider William James to be an advocate of strategic action (see 
Chapter 2). For Habermas, discourse gives rise to a rational will, 
namely a consensual and co-operative will. The relation of this "will" 
to action will continue to be dialectical, through practical co-
operative interaction, interrelated with discursive evaluation. 
2In the formulation of the ideal speech situation we find that the 
following relationship holds:- 
Realm of Practice (Fact) 
IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION 
Undistorted (perfectly 
competent) communication 
It will be noted that morality is defined in socially interactive (or 
political) terms and that the political sphere is given a moral 
dimension. 
3Cohen, J., "Why More Political Theory", Telos, No. 40, 1979, p.94. 
4Habermas, J., Legitimation Crisis,  London, Heinemann, 1976, p.95. 
sIbid. 
6Ibid. 
71Maslow, A., Motivation and Personality,  New York, Harper & Row, 1970, p.46. 
8Heller, A., The Theory of Need in Marx, London, Allison & Busby, 1976. 
9 Keniston, K., "Moral Development, Youthful Activities", Youth and Society, 
Vol. 1, No. 1, 1969, p.121. 
Realm of Theory (Value) 
TRUTH, FREEDOM, JUSTICE 
Moral Principles 
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APPENDIX A 
[G REENB ANK ] SCHOOL 
SIXTH FORM QUESTIONNAIRE, Nov. 1978 
This questionnaire is designed to help me discover how sixth-formers 
are thinking about moral and social issues. You are asked to answer 
the questions as thoughtfully and honestly as you can - there are 
no right or wrong answers. Your opinions are quite confidential. 
Your papers will not be shown to anyone connected with the school. 
Some details of your school "history", your career plans and your 
connections with science or technology are asked for as they may 
have some relevance in analysing your ideas. I am most grateful for 
your help in sharing your ideas and opinions with me. 
SECTION A - BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1. How old are you ? 
	 yrs. 	 mths. 
2. Are you in the upper or lower 6th ? 
	
upper/lower 
3. If lower, do you intend to spend one year or 
two years in the 6th form ? 
	
one/two 
4. Have you been at [Gree bank] since first year ? 
If not, when did you start at [Greenbank] ? 
5. What were your fifth year results ? 
YES/NO 
19 
CSE 	 0 LEVEL 
Subject 	 Grade 	 Subject 	 G rade 
6. What subjects are you taking this year ? 
A LEVEL 	 0 LEVEL 	 CSE 	 Any others 
(apart from 
Lib. Studies) 
7. What are your present career/job hopes or plans ? 
8. Are any members of your family scientists or technicians of any 
kind ? (This includes jobs like being an engineer, a motor mechanic, 
a television or laboratory technician, working with computers, 
industrial chemistry, &c.) 
	 YES/NO 
If so, please mention their relationship (father, mother, brother &c.) 
and state what job they do. 
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SECTION B - IDEAS AND OPINIONS 
Some of the following questions deal with matters of fact and some refer 
to imaginary situations. These latter are to stimulate your thinking. 
In either case, it is your ideas themselves and the way you are thinking 
about social issues that are of interest. 
	
1. 	 A younger sister or girl-next-door is just starting at [Greenbank]. 
Are there any 'helpful hints' you would have for her2 	  
	
2. 	 a) Think of a friendship you have. What do you think are the 
aspects of this friendship most meaningful to you? 	  
b) Some people think it's better to have a wide circle of friends 
than a few close friends. What do you think and why? 
	  
	
3. 	 Some of your sixth form classes may be very small. If you were 
in a class of, say, four or five, do you think it would be 
important to all get on well with each other? If so, why? 
Or, if you don't think it matters, why not? 
	  
4. 	 Your neighbour, Mrs Bloggs, is a widow with two children. The 
elder one, who is fourteen, belongs to a gymnastics club and has 
been selected for the county team. The younger child, aged twelve, 
belongs to a swimming club and is keen to improve. Mrs Bloggs can 
only cope with the additional expense of supporting a county team 
member if the younger child gives up swimming training. She asks 
your advice. 
a) What would you advise Mrs Bloggs to do? 	  
b) What sorts of things did you take into account when deciding 
how to advise her? 
5. 	 Your cousin, aged sixteen, has been going around with a group which 
has recently taken to 'nicking' cars for fun. He tells you about it. 
His parents have no idea of what's going on. Would you: 
a) keep out of it, not wanting to interfere ? 
	 YES/NO 
b) tell his parents ? 
	 YES/NO 
c) try to "talk some sense" into him ? 
	
YES/NO 
d) take any other action ? 
	
YES/NO 
What are your reasons for your choice(s)? 
	  
6. 	 If you really were in a situation similar to (5), or had some other 
personal decision that you found difficult, would you tend to 
discuss it with someone else or would you keep it to yourself and 
try to work it out alone? 
If you do discuss problems with others, is it mainly with parents, 
other family members, school friends, or friends outside school? 
Can you give any examples of the sorts of problems you discuss with 
your parents and those you discuss with your friends or your 
brothers and sisters? 
7. 	 The neutron bomb has been designed to destroy the maximum number of 
human lives while causing only minimal damage to property. It is 
believed that its use could revolutionise modern warfare. Some 
people think it is quite immoral and its development should be 
banned. What is your opinion about the production of the neutron 
bomb by Western powers? 	  
Try to work out why you have come to this decision. 
8. 	 There are other controversial social and political issues that have 
appeared recently in the news. Such issues include:- 
i) euthanasia (mercy killing) - whether, and under what 
circumstances it should be legal for a doctor to end someone's 
life; 
ii) violent crime and terrorism - whether "police" powers should be 
extended to -make the prevention and punishment of such crimes 
more effective, even if it means depriving ordinary people of 
some of their civil liberties; 
iii) immigration - whether further restrictions are necessary in 
the interests of harmonious race relations; 
iv) the effect of media on public opinion - is the public being 
manipulated by "slanted" reporting, in the papers and on TV ? 
v) Government pay policy - whether unions should accept the 5% 
limit or fight for the right to negotiate wage increases 
freely. 
a) Have you discussed any of these issues in the last six months or so 
with your family or friends ? 	 YES/NO 
If so, which ones ( just write down their numbers), and with what 
sorts of people ? 
b) Which problems do you think are most important for British society  
TO FACE AND SOLVE ? If you can, place the above list in order of 
importance, quoting the relevant numbers. If you think that only 
a few of these issues are really important to Britain, then write 
only those numbers down. 
2. 	 3. 	 4. 	 5. 
Now give your reasons for selecting the first two on your list. 
c) Give your personal opinion about any one of the above issues, from as 
many angles as possible, giving reasons wherever you can, to back up 
your ideas. 
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APPENDIX B  
POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF SUBJECT BIAS AND SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT ON LOGICAL 
FORM OF JUDGEMENT MAKING PROCEDURES 
SUBJECT BIAS: LOGICAL FORM  
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% RESPONDENTS IN EACH CATEGORY 
All science- 	 All humanities- 	 Lower 6th 
biased 	 biased 	 Science- 
biased 
(N=15) 	 (N=35) 	 (N=12) 
Lower 6th 
Humanities-
biased 
(N=19) 
33 34 42 47 
13 20 17 16 
54 46 42 37 
Classification of 
logical form (from 
questionnaire 
responses) 
Consistently commun-
icative 
Consistently strategic/ 
instrumental 
Inconsistent or neutral 
TABLE (i)  
Table (i) shows that there is no evidence that pupils with science-
biased courses of study have any greater tendency to use a strategic/ 
instrumental style in making moral judgements than those studying 
humanities subjects. With both groups, pupils making consistent use of 
strategic/instrumental logic are in the minority. 
SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: LOGICAL FORM  
% RESPONDENTS IN EACH CATEGORY 
Classification of 	 LOW ACHIEVERS 
	 MODERATE ACHIEVERS 	 HIGH ACHIEVERS 
logical form (from 
questionnaire 
responses) 
1 yr.course 	 Upper & Lower 6th Class 
pupils (N=34) 	 II pupils (Science and 
Humanities) (N=29) 
Upper & Lower 
6th Class I 
pupils (Science 
and Humanities) 
(N=21) 
Consistently 
communicative 	 15 	 28 	 43 
Consistently 
st rat ./in st rum . 	 6 	 24 	 9 
Inconsistent or 
neutral 	 79 	 48 	 48 
TABLE (ii)  
Table (ii) compares the proportion of respondents in each major 
category of logical form according to their level of achievement in their 
fifth year. No distinction is made between upper and lower sixth pupils. 
The low achievers are not strongly aligned. Few show consistent use 
of strategic/instrumental logic (6%). The proportion of consistent users 
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of communicative logic was higher (15%) but by far the largest number 
of responses were neutral or inconsistent. The higher tendency of this 
group to give monothetic responses was partly responsible for this 
result. 
The moderate achievers are more strongly polarised, 52% showing 
consistent logic use. In the case of this group, nearly equal 
proportions use communicative logic as use strategic/instrumental logic. 
So here, increased achievement has resulted in increased polarisation and 
an increased proportion of strategic/instrumental logic use. 
The high achievers, however, whilst showing the same degree of 
consistent logic use as the moderate achievers are highly polarised 
towards communicative logic use, 43% using communicative logic and only 
9% using strategic/instrumental logic. 
Whatever factors are associated with this phenomenon, it can be seen 
from Table (iii) that it is not purely a matter of achievement. The 
bias towards strategic/instrumentality is to be found in the upper sixth 
pupils. The upper sixth pupils, as a group, are higher achievers than 
the lower sixth, twelve of the nineteen girls in the upper sixth being 
categorised as "Class I" whilst only nine of the thirty one lower sixth 
girls were so classified. Yet Table (iii) shows that whilst 45% of the 
lower sixth girls showed consistently communicative logic, only 16% of 
the upper sixth girls were communicative in logic use. 
YEAR GROUP: LOGICAL FORVI  
Classification of 	 % RESPONDENTS IN EACH CATEGORY 
logical form (from 
	
UPPER SIXTH 	 LOWER SIXTH  
questionnaire 	 Humanities and Science) 	 (Humanities and Science) 
responses) 	 N=19 	 N=31 
Consistently commun-
icative 
Consistently strat./ 
instrumental 
Inconsistent or neutral 
16 	 45 
21 	 16 
63 	 39 
TABLE (iii)  
There is thus no clear-cut connection between school achievement 
and logic use but there is a marked difference in response between the two 
years of sixth formers. This could be seen as a bias towards strategic/ 
instrumentally in the upper sixth group or a bias towards communicability 
amongst the lower sixths. 
NOTE 	 While we consider that these figures do not indicate any 
connection between science subject bias or school achievement level 
and the logical form of judgement it must be stressed that this applies 
only to the Greenbank School situation. 
Greenbank School is best known for its music, dance and 
comprehensive ethos. It does not have a good name for science nor are 
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its science results at 0 or A level of the sane standard as its humanities 
results. It is quite likely that girls who show an inclination towards 
science or mathematics in primary school, or whose parents are strongly 
biased towards science, would not be sent to Greenbank. 
Moreover, Greenbank does not equate academic achievement with 
success in life and it rewards (formally and informally) many forms of 
progress and achievement in addition to academic results. For example, 
a prize was awarded to Naomi in the sixth form for her contribution to 
dance. It is quite likely that a school which strongly emphasised 
academic achievement as its major educational aim would foster instrumental 
judgement making amongst its pupils in the sane way that Greenbank 
encouraged the development of communicability. 
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APPENDIX C 
LETTERS TO PARENTS OF SELECTED SIXTH FORMERS FROM GREENBANK'S HEAD-
MISTRESS AND RESEARCH STUDENT 
1) Letter from Headmistress 
Greenbank School &c. 
February 1980 
Dear Mr and Mrs --- 
I an enclosing a letter from Miss Gronowski, who is a Ph.D. student at 
the Institute of Education, University of London, and working on moral 
decision making among 16-18 year old students. As you may know, she 
has already interviewed 80 Sixth Formers from [Greenbank] and would like 
to follow this with a further questionnaire on 20 of these. As home 
influences are naturally strongest, she would welcome your participation 
and I would wish to underline the invitation if you feel that you 
are able to co-operate. 
The project has the approval of the I.L.E.A. Research and Statistics 
Department, as well as the Religious Education Inspectorate, and I can 
assure you that the replies are completely confidential between you and 
Miss Gronowski. In the final thesis all contributions are, of course, 
anonymous. 
I trust that you will feel able to participate. I hope each girl will 
increase her own self-awareness and that the research will further 
understanding of students of this age range. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Headmistress) 
2) Letter from  Research Student  
University of London 
Institute of Education, 
Department of the Sociology 
of Education, 
57 Gordon Square, 
London WC1H OBT 
Dear Mr and Mrs --- 
I an currently doing a research project at London University's Institute 
of Education on social and moral values in young people and have just 
conducted a questionnaire amongst [Greenbank] School's sixth formers 
(with the full support of the school and the I.L.E.A.). 
Your daughter ---, was one of my volunteers and I have selected 
her for a follow-up interview. 
364 
It would be a great help if I could have a talk with you too, partly 
because I should like to include the opinions of a small group of parents 
in my study and partly to compare your views on social and moral issues 
with those of ---. I an particularly interested in what you see as 
the major problems of today's younger generation. I would also like 
your opinion on several items of the questionnaire, answered by the 
girls, and your general attitude to current social problems. 
I shall give you a ring within the next few days to see if you are 
agreeable to this and if so, to arrange a convenient time when I can 
come to see you. 
With best wishes, 
Yours sincerely, 
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APPENDIX D 
ACADEMIC AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF INTENSIVE STUDY SUBJECTS 
Subject 	 Parents' 	 Social Posi- 	 Classif- 0 level 
place of 	 Class tion 	 ication 	 passes 
birth 	 of 	 in 	 by 	 (Grade 
Family family 	 primary 	 C+ or 
** 	 school 	 CSE 
(7 pt. 	 for 	 Grade I) 
scale) 	 sec.sch. 
entry 
band 
A Levels being 
taken 
1, 	 2, 	 3 
Amy Eng. 6 SIS 2 - -- 	 0 levels( Science) 
Betty Eng. 3 I 1 1 -- 	 0 levels(Human.) 
Cathy Eng. 3 ISSB* 2 9 Biology,Geog., 	 Food 
and Nutrition 
Diane Eng. 5 ISB 1 5 Art,History of Art. 
Eliza Eng. 5 IS 1 2 Food and Nutrition, 
(Science 0 levels) 
Frances Eng. 1 SI 1 8 English, History, 
French, German 
Georgina Eng. 4 IB 2 6 English, Religious 
Studies 
Heather Eire 7 IB 1 1 English 
Joy Eng. 5 IB 1 3 English, 	 Art 
Kate Eng. 3 IBSS 1 4 Art, Geog., Economics 
Lucy Eng. 4 ISB 1 4 English, Biology 
(Science 0 levels) 
Mary Eng. 7 ISS 1 7 Chemistry, Physics, 
Pure/Applied Maths. 
Naomi Germany 1 IB 1 6 English, History of 
Art, 	 Sociology 
Olive Eng. 4 IB 2 6 Biology (taken), 
Geog.(taken) 
Chemistry (Science 
0 levels)+ 
Patience Eng. 3 IBB Not avail- 
able 	 ++ 
10 English, History, 
German 
Queenie Eng. 4 BI 1 7 Biology, History, 
Geog. 
++All girls except Patience entered [Greenbank] in the first year. Patience 
transferred after completing 0 levels at a country comprehensive school. 
**Social class is described in accordance with Glass' 7 point scale. 
Glass D.V. (ed.) Social Mobility in Britain, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1954. 
* This indicates that Cathy (the individual being studied) has two younger 
sisters followed by a brother. 
+ Olive is doing a 3rd yr in 6th Form preparing to read biology at University. 
366 
APPENDIX E  
PUPIL AND PARENT INTERVIEWS 
i) Girls' Interview Schedule  
B ackground  
[Take notes] 
Check school information from questionnaire. 
Brothers and sisters - schools and ages ? 
Parents' jobs and educational background ? 
Interests and activities 
School clubs, groups or special activities ? 
Outside school activities - clubs, societies, organizations ? 
Hobbies and interests ? 
General reading ? 
Beliefs and World Views  
"The Beliefs and World Views" check-list is completed by girl. 
[Start tapes] 
(The girl is given a card with the statet9ents, bearing her code 
number. She is asked to tick any she agrees with. Section of 
any statement may be crossed out if the rest is agreed with and 
a tick given the remainder). 
The girl is asked to comment on her choice. Any other strong views or 
beliefs not on card ? Opinion of science fiction is sought - fact or 
fiction ? 
(Introduced with reference to the film Close Encounter of  
The Third Kind and/or television documentary on Van Mniken's 
Chariots of the Gods). 
Perceived difference from parents 
The girl is asked to predict her parents' response to the check list. 
If differences are perceived, to what does the girl attribute her 
different beliefs ? 
If the girl sees herself as essentially similar to parents in belief, 
then does she have a personal perspective and how is she developing it ? 
What part has discussion or working things out with others played ? 
(Refer to responses to Q.6 and Q.8(a) from questionnaire). 
What part has the school played ? 
How does she feel about comprehensive schools generally ? OR 
Is she glad she was sent to a comprehensive school ? 
The Good Life  
(Introduced with reference to the television series The Good Life) 
Personal aims and ideals for life - if the girl only talks about career 
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and marriage, then the question of her relationships with other people 
in the "good life" is introduced. 
The concepts of duty and obligation are introduced, again with 
reference to "The Good Life". Do the terms mean anything ? If not, what 
about "ought" ? Is there anything you feel you ought to do or ways 
you feel you ought to act with respect to country ? school ? family ? etc. 
ii) Parents' Interview Schedule 
Background  
[Take notes] 
Check jobs, referring to daughters' description. Training and 
schooling should come in here. If not refer later to parents' schooling 
in section on comprehensive education. 
Recreational activities - interests ? hobbies ? reading ? clubs ? 
Community involvement - organizations 7 e.g. tenants' association ? 
School involvement ? 
Family Life 
[Start tape] 
General approach to upbringing 	 Grandparents ? Attitude to 
behaviour, manners, obedience ? Attitude to "right" and "wrong" ? 
Any problems with daughter ? How did she compare with others ? What 
about now daughter is older 7 Rules ? What about going out at night 
et c. ? 
Questionnaire 
Parents are each given a card with Q.4 (The Bloggs) and Q.8 
(Social Problems). They are asked for their opinions, each question 
being dealt with and discussed separately. If immigration and law 
and order are not referred to among the most important problems, 
parents are asked to comment on these, specifically. 
"Beliefs and World Views" Check List  
Parents are asked to indicate their agreement separately. 
Clarification given if necessary but no discussion. Parents' cards 
bear their daughter's code number (in different colours.) 
Young People Today  
Taking the check lists back, without comment, parents are asked for 
their opinions of today's young people. Their views and ideas ? Do they 
clash with their daughter's ideas ? Does she express them ? Does 
their daughter influence their 
 ideas ? (Or do the other children 7) 
Where do they see young people's strengths and weaknesses today ? 
Do they lack standards 	 Sense of duty ? Have they any suggestions to 
improve the situation ? 
Comprehensive Education  
How do they feel about it ? Experience of streaming ? How have 
they found [Greenbank] 7 And how does it compare with their other 
children's schools ? 
368 
iii) "Beliefs and World Views" Check List  
[Nationalism] 
1. If Britain becomes just a part of Europe she will be selling her 
birthright. We need to restore a sense of pride and respect in being 
British and seek to maintain our traditional values. 
["Laissez-Faire"] 
2. The government should stop interfering with the economy. If they 
allowed more open competition everyone would be much better off. 
[Judeo-Christian] 
3. One's life is not complete unless one acknowledges one's Creator. 
[Ethical Humanism] 
4. Man needs to develop his intellectual resources, not only to 
increase his knowledge and understanding of the world, but also to 
solve the moral problems of how to use that knowledge. 
[Egalitarianism] 
5. We must strive for a classless society - one in which though people 
develop differently there is equal opportunity for all to develop. 
[Conservationist] 
6. The public must be made aware of the extent to which we waste our 
natural resources and squander our energy reserves. We must learn to 
live with, rather than at the expense of, our natural environment. 
[Efficiency] 
7. The only valid justification for Comprehensive Education is that 
it is a more efficient method of preparing young people for jobs which 
meet the needs of society. 
[Technocracy] 
8. As politics is a science, the government should stop trying to please 
everybody and leave the decision-making to those with the technical 
expertise. 
[Technological progress] 
9. Our future hope lies not in politics nor in forms of government but 
in scientific and technological development through which we can 
increasingly control the world in which we live. 
[Positivism] 
10. Scientific knowledge is the only certain and unbiased knowledge. 
Science alone transcends all barriers. It is the truly international language. 
[These statements were presented to the subjects in alphabetical order of 
statement's first word, namely 8, 1, 4, 3, 9, 10, 2, 7, 6, 5]. 
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iv) Sections of Pupils' Interviews 
Two opening sections and one section on the "good life" are 
appended. Cathy and Eliza have experienced different relationships with 
their parents. Cathy predicts that her parents will hold similar views 
to hers. Eliza predicts that her parents will hold different views. 
Cathy is thus encouraged to reflect how (and if) she is coming to her 
own opinions. Eliza is encouraged to work out where and when the 
differences are manifested. (After the parental interviews showed 
that the daughters' assessment have been correct, Eliza had another 
interview to try to work out how she had come to her different view 
of the world. Cathy's growing sense of vocation was followed up 
informally). 
Cathy had shown herself to be consistently communicative, whilst 
Eliza is inconsistent. 
The section on the "good life" from Georgina's first interview 
follows. This shows the way duty and/or obligation are introduced, 
in Georgina's case the terms being accepted without any problems. 
This had been anticipated as Georgina has fairly traditional values. 
Whilst Georgina is intensely loyal to her parents in direct discussion 
of home life, a certain degree of resentment shows through when she 
is offguard. Consistently strategic/instrumental in making judgements, 
Georgina shows the same goal directedness and lack of awareness of 
mutuality of relationships when discussing the "good life". 
Cathy  
[Cathy has given information about her interests, hobbies, leisure 
activities etc. and has completed the "Belief and World Views" check 
list agreeing with Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 (omitting middle sentence). 
We began to discuss her responses informally. The tape recorder is 
turned on.] 
- Now would you say that these covered your attitudes to life ? 
Are there any other strong views you've got ? 
C 	 Um. I think technology shouldn't be centred in certain parts 
where it isn't needed. It should be spread. 
- Industry, do you mean, should be decentralised ? What do you mean 
by this exactly ? 
C 	 Well - like - take nurses, for example. Most of them are working 
in areas where things are easy and it's not a poor area. There ought 
to be more spread over poor areas where its needed. 
- So you're really bringing in the concept of concentration of the 
benefits of technology in certain parts of the world but not in 
other parts of the world - 
C 	 Yes. 
- Or even in certain parts of this country, because London is relatively 
well off for hospitals, for example, whereas some of the other 
areas aren't. 
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C 	 Yeah. 
- And you would have a concern, then, for the Third World ? 
[C had referred to the Third World in her questionnaire response]. 
C Flmm. Yes 
- I wonder if you could express it more - do you think that people 
who have skills have a responsibility to share them ? Or resources ? 
C 	 Yes. But it depends a lot on the people, I suppose. They want to have 
a very normal life - I mean - there's got to be people like that. 
- What ? People who will just accept things as they are and then 
people who will level things up a bit ? 
C 	 If you don't have that balance it'll be all topsy turvy. 
- You mean, you can't have everybody racing off trying to fix the 
other half of the world - 
C 	 Yes 
- Have you seen the movie, Close Encounters of the Third Kind ? 
C 	 No. 
- I haven't either - but there's a lot of stuff floating around about 
UFOs and people from outer space and, "Is the world being influenced 
from outside ?" Now what's your opinion of these sorts of ideas ? 
C 	 Urn. I believe that there's life on other planets of course. 
- Why do you say, "of course" ? 
C 	 Oh just, you know, I don't think life is just on earth. I think 
there must be life elsewhere. 
- But not necessarily on other planets in our solar system ? It 
could be other planets of other suns ? 
C 	 Oh yes. So there's a possibility, yes. I'm not going to say: 
"Oh yes I believe in UFO's", 'cos I've never seen one. 
- So you remain agnostic on it - neither coming down one way or the 
other ? 
C 	 Ilmm. 
- And what about things like astrology ? Do you follow your stars ? 
C 	 No. fly father is very keen on astronomy - star gazing. 
- Astronomy rather than astrology ? Serious knowledge and understanding 
of the stars ? 
C 	 Yes. 
- Rather than trying to have some - er - pseudo science. 
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C 	 Yes 
- And what sort of science have you done yourself ? 
C 	 Biology. 
- And you're doing it at A level. 
C 	 Yes I'm doing three A levels at the moment, Biology, Geography and 
Home Economics. 
- Now you've said that your mother has had international experience, 
your father's had a lot of science experience and is also a 
practicing churchman and there's an interest in both science and 
other people in your family. Now if you look at this [check list] 
again, how would you predict how your parents would answer ? 
C 	 I'm not sure about my Mum - she might miss the first one [No. B] 
- she's a bit stubborn with her beliefs. My Dad probably would 
go along with it. The second one [No. 1] - no I don't think they 
would. My Mum is very stubbornly labour. My Dad - he swops around 
a lot - on the state of the country.. . she goes through the list 
slowly, predicting their assent on [No. 3 , rejection of [No. 9], 
she's unsure of No. 10] as it is a bit "too strong", and rejects 
[No. 2 and No. 7 although [No. 7] is an efficient method of 
education but only one. Like her, they would believe [No. 6 and 
No. 5].] 
- That's interesting. So you would feel that you are fairly close 
to your parents in these opinions, generally ? 
C 	 Yes. 
- Would you say there are any ways in which you are feeling your 
way towards a different approach to life or the world than you've 
had when you were brought up ? 
C 	 No. No. I think my parents have always had me this way - they've 
intended - you know, they've always - like I was talking to my Mum 
saying what I'd like to do and she was saying, "Oh I wish I'd had 
that opportunity, when I was your age." Or at least she didn't 
recognise it. So I mean - we're very close that way. 
- I noticed from your questionnaire that you discuss social and 
political things with your parents quite frequently - 
C Mmm. Yes. 
- And most of your ordinary everyday life you also discuss quite 
happily with them ? 
C 	 Yes. 
- Quite a lot of people mention that they only discuss school and 
career with their parents - that they don't discuss their own 
ideas about things or how they see problems of their everyday life 
at all - 
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C 	 No. I discuss that with my parents as well. 
- You would ? 
C 	 Mmm. 
- Now has school, then, given you any different dimension ? Say, 
being at this school ? 
C 	 I'm glad they sent me to this school. I think its been a big 
opener for me - you know - to see how different people react to 
things and I'm glad I°ve been to a comprehensive school rather 
than a grammar school because many of my friends who've been to a 
grammar school they're so self centred - they don't really pay any 
attention to what's going on outside. 
- So this really is a different dimension because your parents were 
both grammar school educated - In what ways do you think that it's 
been good ? You said it may have made you less self centred - 
C 	 Yes. 
- Anything else that its given you 7 
C 	 I mean I've seen more of people - [inaudible] - smoking, taking 
drugs and things - at this school - and it makes you think - you 
know - 
- It makes you aware of the sorts of complexities of the life you 
are going to be living in ? 
C 	 Yes. 
- Would you say that you now know where you're going completely ? 
Or are you still in a state of flux, working out what you believe 
in and what you want out of life ? 
C 	 Oh. I'm at that stage where I'm trying to decide. But I'm not 
trying to think, "Oh, how on earth do I look at life ?" I'm just 
letting it come naturally. 
- Mmm - Do you watch The Good Life at all ? 
C 	 Yes, I watch it sometimes. 
- What's rather good about that is that it puts into very strong 
contrast two different approaches to what life's all about. . . 
If I said: "Paint me a picture of 'the good life as I see it", 
perhaps in terms of your own future - how would you describe it ? 
C 	 How I'd like to lead my life ? 
- Yes. How you'd like things to happen - what sorts of experiences -
what sorts of attitudes - 
C 	 Well I don't want to live in this country. I want to work in poor 
areas, if I can - if I'm brave enough. I don't think I could 
stand a sort of nine to five job - you know - getting married when 
you're young - I don't particularly want to get married. I'd like to 
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have an active life. I wouldn't want to stay in one place for a 
great long time - 
- What's the sort of approach to other people you see ? 
C 	 Helping people. But obviously you're quite [inaudible] - if you 
help people to such an extent they respond - then its very rewarding. 
- So its a sort of two-way relationship ? 
C 	 Yes. Yes. Well I an selfish to a certain extent. 
- Well you are interested in yourself because you are the only person 
you have a certain amount of control over - Do you see you getting to 
know yourself as an individual or as part of a group or what ? 
C 	 I always see myself as an individual but I do a lot of deep thinking 
- if that's what you could call it - trying to interpretate [sic] 
my actions. 
- And the resources you'd have to help you interpret would be what 
What you've observed your parents doing 
C 	 Friends, really, I think. Not my parents, I'd say - but friends. 
- So although you see yourself as an individual in your thinking 
somehow your judgements are being made because of - 
C 	 Other people - around me. 
- So you don't see yourself as an individual in isolation ? 
C No. No. 
- You're an individual but - 
C 	 In a group. I mean I'm not reserved or anything. I an generally 
quiet but I'm not really reserved. I'm quite friendly. 
[The discussion was then steered back to The Good Life and Cathy's 
concept of duty]. 
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Eliza 
[Eliza has completed the preliminaries and done the check-lists, 
agreeing with statements Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and we have gone through them. 
The tape recorder is turned on.] 
- Now would you say you had any strong views or beliefs that aren't 
covered here ? This doesn't cover an awful lot of things that 
one might have views about. [Pause] Is there anything else ? 
[Pause] For example you like reading the "Vet" books. Do you 
have strong views about animals of any sort ? 
E 	 No, not really. I don't know. No. I think it's not very fair 
about all the government and everything. In fact I don't 
understand politics at all. I think it's a load of rubbish actually. 
- What do you mean by "It's not very fair about the government"? 
Do you think people are being hard on the government ? 
E 	 Well. Not only that. They don't give everybody a fair chance. 
Well I don't think so, anyway. 
- The government isn't giving everyone a fair chance ? 
E 	 No ! 
- In what way ? 
E 	 Well, they say about all this election. Up in Scotland. I don't 
know if you saw it on the tele, but I watched some things. About 
if people don't vote, then they vote for "No". I think its just 
unfair. I don't believe in it anyway. 
- So you think that people aren't really given a chance to get what 
they want done in the country. Somehow the government are 
organising things without giving people a fair say ? 
E 	 Yeah. Thatgs it. That's what I think anyway. 
- So you do feel there's a basic unfairness in the situation of 
government ? 
E 	 Yeah. 
- Have you got any answers to the problem or not ? 
E 	 No I haven't. 
- You haven't got any particular other hobby horses that you 
feel strongly about at all ? 
E 	 No. 
- 0.K1  now you said you liked Science Fiction. Have you seen 
Close Encounters of the Third Kind ? 
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E 	 No - more Star Wars. 
- Now what about - did you see that van Nniken thing about 
Chariots of the Gods on tele ? 
E 	 No, I didn't. 
- O.K. Now you like reading Science Fiction. Now when you come to 
something on tele or something in the papers about UFO's do you look 
on them as fiction or do you think: "Ooh, probably something in that"? 
E 	 Yes - well if its really sort of outstanding like lately there's 
supposed to be a lot of them. But I still don't believe in flying 
saucers and things like that. 
- You wouldn't say this would really be part of your way of believing 
things ? 
E 	 No. 
- So you like reading it for fun ? 
E 	 Yeah. That's it. 
- Goody. Now you said before you would disagree with your father on 
these [indicating check list]. Now would you like to predict how 
you think your father would answer this. I hope I will get a 
chance of him actually doing it because this would be very interesting 
- to what extent a daughter can know how her father responds. 
E 	 Well I don't think he understands politics deeply and I don't think 
he's that interested in it actually. 
- But he does have opinions ? 
E 	 He does. But he doesn't vote. Nor does my Mum. Mum doesn't vote 
neither. 
- Are you going to vote ? 
E 	 I don't know. If I find out a bit more what I'm going to vote for 
- then, maybe. 
- But you wouldn't see any point in voting if you didn't know what you 
were voting for ? 
E 	 No - I wouldn't. It'd be silly. 
- Do you think your parents don't vote because they don't understand 
the situation or do you think they think it's not worth it because 
it won't get them anywhere ? 
E 	 Um. Both really. A bit of both. I don't think they understand it, 
'specially my Mum. She doesn't understand it fully but I don't 
really know actually. I know that they used to vote and I know what 
she used to vote for - but they've just stopped. 
- What did they vote before ? 
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E 	 Labour. 
- Have they got disillusioned do you think ? With the Labour Party ? 
E 	 I think so. Yes. 
- But they don't want to swing and p'raps vote for Margaret Thatcher 
instead. 
E 	 No 
- O.K. Well - any of these some of the opinions you've heard your 
father holding forth on ? 
E 	 I think he would agree with that one. 
- No. [2] ? That's really a "father's favourite", no. [2]. 
E 	 Yeah. I think he'd agree with that one. 
- Now he's a technician - does he believe the government should be 
leaving things more - [indicating No. 8]. 
E 	 No. I don't think so. 
- Anythin else that he'd go along with ? [She points to no. 2]. 
Number L2] ? 
E 	 Yeah. A bit. I think he would. Yeah. 
- You think he'd feel the government is interfering and if they left 
people to get on with it, they'd be able to work things out in 
open competition ? 
Yeah. 
- What about those that you're definitely on about ? No. [7] ? 
E 	 Yeah, they would. 
- It means Comprehensives need to prove themselves by efficiency in 
preparing people for the job market rather than proving themselves 
because of giving equal chances. That's really what that's 
getting at. Um - would they come down on No. [6] or would they 
be neutral ? 
E 	 I don't really think they'd bother with it actually. They wouldn't 
kind of take that much interest. They don't seem to anyway. 
- No. Well that's what you tend to expect - 
E 	 Well my Dad doesn't like - he thinks he knows everything, but 
he doesn't. And that's what we disagree on. I try to tell him 
something and he doesn't want to know - he thinks he's right all 
the time. 
- What sort of things do you try to tell him ? Where he's wrong with 
some fact ? If he comes out with something - 
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E 	 Yeah. Say if I've learnt it at school and he goes against it and 
I know that I'm right but he won't have it. He's got to be right 
all the time and he's not. He doesn't like that. 
- What things would you disagree with particularly - with your parents ? 
E 	 I think - what I want to do he disagrees with quite a bit. I wanted 
to go into the Forces, first of all. But because he's been in the 
army he thinks that it's still the same as what it was when he was 
in it. He said he wouldn't like me to do that. And then I said 
that I wouldn't mind going into catering - 'cos I like cooking -
and he said that's no good. He thinks he knows everything. He 
said that's not good - the money isn't all that and it's slave labour. 
We disagree on things like that. Little things but we niggle each 
other. 
- And do you watch television together ? 
Yeah.E 	 But we don't like the same programmes. I want one side and 
he wants the other. 
- Do you ever watch the News together or Panorama together ? 
E 	 The News we would - but nothing like Panorama. 
- Then is there anything that you've come across at school, been 
studying at school where you'd actually feel that you're right and 
he's wrong ? 
E 	 Lots of things. 
- Such as ? 
E 	 In English, for instance. . 
[A long discussion about her relationships with both parents 
continued with details of norms and sanctions emerging naturally. 
The section on The Good Life then followed]. 
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Georgina 
[Georgina has indicated her own opinions, which she considers are 
"fairly close" to her parents. The whole family belongs to an 
evangelical church but she believes she is more "broad-minded" than 
her parents, whilst holding the same values. "I know where I stand 
on most things - in all things probably. You know, I've got my own 
standards - how far I go myself - and I don't go beyond it." We have 
been discussing what extra-familial influences she has been conscious 
of. . .1 
- Would you think that reading has influenced you much or do you 
think school - 
To a certain extent I think what you read and what you see in the 
media does affect what you think sometimes - you know - what I 
read sometimes does affect what I think. I think sometimes you 
realise after you've read it, or when you hear something else on 
the television. But the press or the television to some extent 
tend to blow up the situation. 
- Ah - now talking about television - do you watch The Good Life at all ? 
Yes. 
- Now, that throws very much into focus two different attitudes to 
life generally. Now if I asked you what was your idea of the 
"good life" - I know that in your career you're wanting to do 
nursing as a first step - now if I said "Map out for yourself the 
sort of future life that you'd like to have - what's your idea 
of the good life ?" what would you describe ? 
Urn. Finishing my training, doing a couple of years general 
nursing, specialising in orthopaedics - bones - or some other 
things if I didn't do bones - getting out of London as quickly as 
I could afterwards and going to live in Norfolk - Norwich, somewhere 
up there 'cos I love it up there - er - getting married - having 
four kids, all boys if possible - urn - 
- What would be your aim for your kids ? 
G 	 Make sure that they were all brought up well so that they - 
- What do you mean by that ? 
So that they had the chance to sort of - that they knew the moral 
standards and everything like that, they knew what was right and 
what was wrong - urn, also that they had the chance to hear about 
Christianity and religion and also had the chance to hear other 
things - but mostly that they should become Christians. 
- Would you want them to be successful in their jobs ? 
G 	 Yes. 
- What sorts of things would you think that you'd like them to be doing ? 
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G 	 What they wanted to do. Not what I wanted them to do, what they  
wanted to do. 
- And to be good at what they - 
G 	 Yes. To be good at what they did. To get a good education so they 
could get the jobs they wanted. 
- And then - 
G 	 To achieve the ultimate - all that they can do. 
- All that they want - 
G 	 Also I do want to marry a Christian. 
And what are some of the values in your own home that you would 
like to see 
Urn - 
- You know - with your family as they were being brought up - 
G 	 That they should help in the home, be polite, you know - not sort of - 
be sort of courteous. And keep people comp - you know, if a person 
is going to be on their own during some time to sort of keep the 
people company. But to be able to have some flexibility - when they 
get to fifteen or something like that, to be allowed certain 
flexibility - you know, in the hours that they go out and the people 
they mix with and when they get to adult - you know - eighteen -
to be respected for the views that they hold - even though I might 
not agree with them. 
- And how would you like to see your family 7 Mainly as a family 
unit, close together, with hobbies and interests or would you like 
to see lots of people from outside coming in, having a sort of, 
convivial, "hail-fellow-well-met" - 
I think a mixture - urn - I'd like us to be close as a family, you 
know, 'cos that's one of the things that's important to people, 
you know, the social thing is the family - as a unit - but also 
it's important that you're close and have each other - but also that 
they could bring their friends in at any time - so that you have a 
sort of "open house" kind of thing, you know - any time anybody 
wanted to come in they could do. 
- Now the words "duty" and "obligation" - In The Good Life they come 
over strongly for Margot and Gerry. He feels strongly about duty to 
his work and she feels she has a civic duty to uphold culture and 
so on. The other two don't think in those terms so much, although 
obviously they have obligations to each other. Now what would you 
say you see as your duty in life or your obligation 
	 Do you think 
that there are any duties or obligations that you have as 
[Georgina], as a person ? 
There are obviously duties and obligations for anybody. 
- Well, what would you say yours were ? 
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For me ? I've got an obligation to live my life for God. 
I've got an obligation to my parents too, in a way, in a 
sense, because they've brought me up and they've supported me 
at school. Also I've got an obligation for their sakes to do 
well in everything I do. I've got an obligation to people at 
Church, in the things I do, which is Sunday School teaching. But 
I mean you've got an obligation to anyone - if you're being 
respectful - to let people know if you're not going to be in 
or you're going anywhere. But I don't think - there are certain 
things that aren't duties or obligations. You shouldn't be 
obliged to do certain things at all. 
- In what way ? You mean for your family or society ? 
In some sense your family - outside obligations, you know, 
pressures put on you: "You must do so and so". 
- What would be an example of that ? 
"You must be - " I can't really explain it. "You must do so and so -" 
or "so much work by such and such a time", you know - or your 
parents, "You must be in by such and such a time". Especially when 
you get to my age. 
- You resent that a bit ? 
G 	 In a way - it's putting training longer. But in another sense I 
realise that my parents do get worried so therefore though p'raps 
I resent it, I do realise, you know, being an adult now, although 
I resent it I come in at that time because I realise that they 
get worried. 
- Now is there anything else that you'd like to put on tape about life 
or living or the things you feel you hold to. Do you think you've 
covered most of your aims and ideals and what you feel strongly 
about ? 
G 	 Um. I think so. I think in some ways if I hadn't been a nurse 
I would have liked to have been cleverer in a way. I sometimes 
feel as though I'm a bit stupid. I would have liked to have been 
more practical. I feel strongly that I should be more practical. 
- And why would you want to be more practical ? 
I don't know. Well my parents - my Mum says, "You're not very 
practical." I mean I'm not very good at doing practical things 
- like cooking. 
[The discussion moved on to Georgina's problems with her 
mother and her desire for independence.] 
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APPENDIX F  
(i) SCORES FOR FAMILIES ON IDEOLOGY AND INTERACTION SCALES 
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ii) A Detailed Account of the Assessment of Ideology of Possessive  
Individualism and Distortion of Communication in Diane's family  
(Family D)  
Both parents attended secondary modern schools. fir. D is a skilled 
technician, Mrs. D did some hairdressing training after leaving school. At 
present she does not go out to work. When the children were younger the 
parents had a small shop and both worked in it. fir. D plays table tennis 
and goes to "keep fit" classes during the week. On Saturdays he runs a 
"junk" stall at the local market. Mrs. D is interested in handicrafts 
and pottery and attends local classes. Both are only involved with the 
community through their hobbies. There are two younger children, a 
daughter (15) who attends [Greenbank] and a son (12) who attends a 
mixed comprehensive. The parents attend school concerts when the children 
are in them and go to all parent/teacher meetings to which they are invited. 
They do not go to parents' social functions. 
The family go their own ways during the week and on Saturdays and 
tend to do things together on Sundays - going fossil hunting, going to 
the beach etc. The children ask for family outings and the eldest 
daughter (Diane) still likes to go. The parents feel they are lucky 
with their children. 
Ideology scale  
Achievement  
1. Mr. D. enjoys his job as a telephone technician. He likes the 
companionship as well as the work itself. He does not think in terms 
of advancement. He runs his stall at the market "for the fun of it". 
But it brings in extra income which is useful. So although it's not 
"necessary" it means that "if they want to stay on at school they can". 
Mrs. D. is happy with the chance she has been having to do crafts now 
that they no longer have the shop and the children are older. She does 
not appear ambitious for her husband. Score = 0 
2. Diane sees her parents as giving her "encouragement" but as never 
having "pushed". "Mum and Dad have always said to me, 'Try your best 
and you can't do any more than that.'" Mr D's attitude to Diane's work 
has been: "If you want to do it, that's it." Mrs D has said to Diane, 
if she got worried about exams, "You can only do your best, if you don't 
pass you don't pass. It won't worry us." Diane qualified for a grammar 
school, but Diane wanted [Greenbank] so she and her mother had a look 
over [Greenbank] and both liked it. Mr and Mrs D agreed that it would 
give Diane the opportunity "of doing the things she was interested in 
- art and craft." Their son did not like the sound of a large mixed 
comprehensive school so they took him to see an "academic school". But 
there was no woodwork or craft and he decided on the comprehensive school 
after all, and has been very happy there. 
Score = 0 
3. The Bloggs' problem - firs D. "What would you say, Ed ? It doesn't 
seem fair to stop the younger one doing something. On the other hand if 
the other one has been picked for the county team it's an awful shame to 
stop the opportunity of being able to get on. . ." 
Mr D refused to pick up the "opportunity" angle - the important 
thing is the activity itself: "It's not a very good question because they 
could still go swimming couldn't they. . ." They discuss the problem 
together. Mrs D has expressed concern for achievement. Mr D has not. 
Score = 
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4. Acquisition  
The interview took place in the kitchen because there was something 
good on television and the children wanted to watch it in the sitting 
room. (Other families had moved the children and television out so the 
interview could be in the best room). The kitchen was very pleasant 
because Mr D had decorated it and firs D had a well tended collection of 
indoor plants. Everything that was referred to in the house was made by 
a family member. Mr D proudly showed Mrs D's pottery class work and 
Mrs D showed Diane's art work, especially the surprise painting done and 
framed for them as a Christmas present. The house is part of a council 
estate. The type of position-linked possessiveness, associated with 
capitalism, appeared absent to a marked degree. 
Score = 0 
5. Individual ability and progress 
They like the comprehensive schools their children attend because 
the children are happy, busy and "come on well". firs D thinks streaming 
is a good idea, "Because then if they're streamed you get all the ones 
which are really quite good, which means that they're eager to work, all 
together and the one's who aren't so keen in together as well. . . from 
what I've heard from the children anyway." Although not very strong, 
it was considered that the attitude of seeing ability as a fixed property 
was present in Mrs D. 
Mr D did not think that streaming mattered. What makes a good 
school is the whole approach of the teachers - to parents and children. 
The atmosphere of a school makes a big difference to how the children do. 
Mr D did not receive a score for this factor. 
Score = 
6. The parents have an excellent name at [Greenbank] - both girls were 
known to the year head. Diane's tutor has found the parents most co-
operative. She finds Diane herself "a sociable and respected member of 
the tutor group" and is "grateful for the part she has played in extra-
curricular school activities." The parents consider themselves very 
"lucky" to have children who are so little trouble and who are so happy 
at school. They seem pleased and a little surprised that the school 
appreciates their children, Mr D considered his son's school to be 
"good" because - "everyone's helpful up there, you know, the teachers. 
If ever you want to go in there they talk to you." 
Of all the [Greenbank] parents the D family, together with the 
M family were considered the most openly co-operative by the year heads. 
Score = 0 
Competition v. Co-operation  
7. Economic aspects. Neither parent agreed with laissez-faire economic 
policies. 	 Score = 0 
8. Political aspects 
Crime was discussed in terms of justice and the well-being of all. 
Mr D feels that juvenile delinquency results from parents not controlling 
384 
their children. Mrs D feels that law enforcement lacks fairness. They 
discussed together whether the death penalty should be reintroduced but 
decided against it. A big problem was, "there's always someone who's not 
guilty - you can't have one person hanged even if it's going to stop 
further crime." 
Mr D goes to his union's meetings but feels he doesn't really pull his 
weight: "It's not the union's fault because we are the union, aren't we ? 
We don't care. And if we don't go to the meetings it's our own fault. . ." 
The family looks on society as essentially based on co-operation, 
everyone needs to pull his weight. Mr D votes but Mrs D does not because 
she does not understand it. 
Score = 0 
Total for Ideology scale = 1 
Distortion of Communication Scale  
Truth  
1. Diane perceived a high degree of openness as existing at home. 
Political issues, however, are not discussed. Her father is "more into 
kind of politics" than her mother. Family matters are discussed freely. 
Disagreements are open. She has some disagreements with her parents and 
"they argue now and again but not like some people." Arguments tend to 
centre on family discipline where father sometimes is a bit "easy going" 
and mother feels she wants backing. 
These observations of Diane were borne out in the interview. 
Score = 0 
2. Parents appear to work things out together. They see the job of 
disciplining the children as being largely Mrs D's, because she is with 
them more. She admits to wanting backing, sometimes. This agrees with 
Diane's comment: "My mother's not the dominant one in the family or 
anything. I mean she doesn't put my Dad down or anything." With family F, 
the parents showed an outstanding degree of interaction at the interview. 
They used the term "we" frequently and they discussed items together, such 
as the desirability of single sex schooling versus mixed schooling. Both 
modified their expressed views at the interview during discussion. 
Neither appeared to have a monopoly on truth. 
Score = 0 
3. The possibility of their own children actually causing a change in 
their opinions, however, had escaped them. They "would have missed a lot 
without" their children's company but have not thought of any difference 
that living with growing-up children may have made to their ideas. The 
parents have shared interests and have set the pace. As Mrs D put it: 
"They've done things because they interested us and they've joined in 
and en joy ed them." 
Score = 1 
Freedom  
Diane's personality is continuous at home and at school. She is 
modest and fairly quiet but is self-assured and appears to possess an 
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inner calm. She is devoted to Art but relates to other people and 
has worked on joint artistic endeavours at school. People mean a lot 
to her. She had got to know the B's (Betty's parents) during a holiday 
away with them. The B's referred to her at their interview in similar 
terms to the year heads and her tutor. Her parents relate to her as 
if she is a person who matters and seem realistic about her. She was 
seen to be perfectly at ease in their company during the evening the 
interviewer spent in their home. 
Score = 0 
5. Diane is very close to her mother and discusses anything with her. 
But she feels that both parents have encouraged her to pursue her 
interest in art and she feels she has a definite relationship with her 
father. She has never had a problem that she is unable to discuss with 
her parents. 
Score = 0 
:us-Lice 
6. The parents tend to have brought children up by "instinct". Mrs D 
was firm with them when they were young because they were with her in 
the shop. She always acted on the spot. "We've never had rules, 
really, have we, its just. . ." said Mrs D, and Mr D finished the 
sentence, ". . . sort of been alright, they've been alright." 
Diane feels that she and her parents have an understanding about her 
nights' out: "I always tell my Mum what time I'll be home, more or less 
or if not she knows that I'll be staying at my friends or how I'll be 
getting home." Mrs D hasn't insisted but, "She'd like to know. She'd 
worry if she didn't know what time I was going to come home." Although 
Diane feels she can discuss anything with her mother, in this case, the 
norm is not really being openly negotiated and Diane's fear of her 
mother's worrying does indicate a certain degree of coercion associated 
with family norms. 
Score = 
7. The family believes in trust, however, and no undue coercion is 
noted. Mr D says "If you don't trust them there's just no point. You've 
got to be trusted haven't you ?" D feels she is trusted and has no tension 
about family sanctions. She does not see her parents as ever being unfair. 
Score = 0 
8. There is no sign of favouritism amongst the children. They are all 
seen as individuals and as equally members of the family. The son used 
to be very "antisocial", have tantrums and tend to go off alone, but he 
"grew out of it". His mother felt it was a combination of temperament and 
being the youngest. There is no feeling from his sisters that he is 
being unduly spoilt. 
Score = 0 
Total for Interaction Scale = 132= 
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APPENDIX G  
The Ideal Types of Morality - "Strategic/Instrumental Stephanie and  
"Communicative Connie"  
Stephanie and Connie are two hypothetical Greenbank sixth formers. 
Stephanie is highly polarised to strategic instrumental use of logic in 
making judgements of morally relevant situations. Connie is highly 
communicative in her judgemental logic. 
STEPHANIE 
Moral Judgement. Stephanie judges a situation in terms of its outcomes. 
This is usually in terms of her aims and goals. Her career plans guide 
many of her judgements. She co-operates at school so that the teachers 
have a better chance of getting their message across and she and the other 
pupils can get through their exams. When in doubt she falls back on 
what she knows is "right". Her parents got this through to her. She 
knows that one ought to tell the truth and tries to follow this principle 
in practice. She has chosen her school subjects because she is good at 
them. She plays tennis to keep fit and because she makes worthwhile 
social contacts. She disapproves of Russia entering Afghanistan because 
it may cause a third world war. 
She tends to justify her personal choices with reference to the 
importance of achievement and success. "One must grasp one's 
opportunities". She believes that politics is a waste of time. It 
doesn't matter what party is in as long as the country is well governed 
and everyone can go about his or her business without hindrance. 
Home and School. 
	
Stephanie appreciates all her parents have done for her 
and hopes to repay them some day. They have encouraged her to do well 
and have taught her to know right from wrong. 
She sees that there is not too much friction at home by keeping within 
the limits her father sets. It isn't so much that he gets mad if she comes 
in late but she knows her Mum is a terrible worrier. 
They don't discuss things much at home - her father has his own 
political views and her mother doesn't understand politics. She doesn't 
tell them about her school work because it doesn't interest them. Her 
mother goes to the school on parent's nights to see that she's getting 
on with her teachers. Her father has always taken notice of her school 
reports. When she was younger her mother made the rules and her 
father saw that the children obeyed their mother. 
Stephanie sees school as a place to work and get qualifications 
to help one get a good job. The teachers are there to get you through 
your exams. School work does not have anything to do with everyday life. 
Why should it ? 
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CONNIE 
Moral Judgement. Connie judges a situation by discussing it and working 
out a solution with others. In judging a problem on her own she tries 
to consider all facets of the situation and imagines she is consulting the 
other people concerned. Her personal choices are made in terms of what 
she considers worthwhile doing. She will not be satisfied with a job 
that does not allow her to co-operate with others or do something she knows 
really interests her. She has chosen her school subjects because she is 
interested in them and wants to pursue them further. She belongs to the 
dance group because she enjoys dancing itself and especially likes co-
operating creatively with others. 
She believes that people should be active in politics. She is on the 
sixth form council and belongs to a local environmental action group. She 
hates all forms of oppression so disapproves of Russia entering 
Afghanistan. On the other hand, other powers may be showing domination 
in less dramatic ways. If people are unable to express their needs and 
do something about them for any reason, then they are not free. 
She justifies her moral choices in terms of the worthwhileness of human 
life and human relationships. Mutual trust and understanding are highly 
valued. 
Home and School. Connie appreciates the open relationships that exist 
at home. Her parents have always worked things out together. They 
argue sometimes but usually resolve things. They have come to an agreement 
with her about the hours she keeps. When she was younger they decided on 
family rules together but increasingly have brought her in on family 
matters. Sometimes there are tensions but they discuss the situation. She 
argues with her father about his old fashioned political views and with her 
mother about her lack of awareness of feminist issues. 
She tells her parents about her school work quite often and listens 
to them as well when they have something to tell. Her parents both go to 
school evenings and enjoy finding out how the school works and how their 
daughter is going in it. 
She finds a large comprehensive school is a challenging experience 
and is pleased she came to Greenbank. She has had to widen her horizons 
and feels she has had opportunities to discover interests and get to know 
more sorts of people than she would have at a grammar school. She has enjoyed 
the discussions in class with other pupils and teachers. It helps one 
understand both the work and other people better. 
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